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JOURNAL OF RELIGIOUS PSYCHOLOGY

Including its
Anthropological and Sociological
Aspects

EDITED BY
G. STANLEY HALL
AND
ALEXANDER F. CHAMBERLAIN

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JOURNAL OF RELIGIOUS PSYCHOLOGY

VOL. 5

JANUARY, 1912

No. 1

EDITORIAL.

With new editors and a new plan, the JOURNAL OF RELIGIOUS PSYCHOLOGY begins its fifth volume. A glance into the volumes already issued shows that topics such as the following have been considered: Stages of religious development, history and psychology of prayer, sex-phenomena in religious thought, types of religious attitude, types of denominational belief, psychology of prophecy, faith, fear and the sublime, religion as a factor in the struggle for life, pedagogy of missions, psychology of Jesus, ethical culture movement, primitive magic and morals, conception of God, conversion, religion and sensualism, philosophy of Nietzsche, place of the feelings in religion, psychology of Christian hymns, the sign of the mother-goddess, original sin, human sacrifice, religious folk-songs of Southern Negroes, etc. The outlook upon the field of religious psychology has been broad and catholic both as to subject-matter and as to treatment of current literature and the more detailed and substantial arguments that find place in the ever-increasing number of monographs and books representing now the results of careful research as well as of naïve speculation. The JOURNAL will continue, as far as possible, to cover the field indicated by its title; there will be no narrowing here, either of service or of view-point.

More attention than has been the case hitherto will be given the anthropological and the sociological aspects of the subject, something justified by the rich material now being accumulated by competent investigators and ethnological experts, which is leading more and more to the revision of our opinions concerning the mythological, philosophical and religious ideas of so-called "lower races" of man and their relationship to the cognate phenomena now existing, or having once existed, among the "higher races." From the "new school" of American anthropologists, who have had at their very doors for years the great human laboratory of the Indians, a people among whom

are to be found still almost every variety of religious ideas known among men, from the Californian agnostic met by Powers to the Peruvian Inca, who had reached the level of monotheism, we may expect many interesting and important contributions to the science of religious psychology. Dr. Franz Boas' recent volume on *The Mind of Primitive Man* and Goldenweiser's excellent monograph embodying the ideas of the "American school" on the much-debated and much misunderstood question of *Totemism* are some of the first-fruits now garnered. These may well be set off against some of the more ponderous discussions of similar topics, which do not possess the advantage of having been continually controlled by the unequaled data extant in America alone. Here the student of religious psychology will find now, not merely the white man's own meager record, in his mother-tongue, of the religious life and activities of many more or less primitive peoples, but, in increasing bulk, the native texts, which record and explain, from the minds of the aborigines themselves, their mythic lore, religious beliefs, etc. From these sources may be expected not a little light upon the question of the linguistic aspects of religion as well as valuable data concerning the relationship of religious ideals and social institutions. New and fertile activities in the study of the mythologies and the religions of primitive peoples are to be seen in the recent investigations of Ehrenreich, Schmidt, etc. The problem of so-called "primitive monotheism," in the rather polemic discussion of which Father Schmidt, the editor of the excellent anthropological journal *Anthropos*, and Andrew Lang, the British man of letters (and ethnologist withal), have taken part, needs further study and elucidation. In his *L' Idée de Dieu* Father Schmidt has treated the whole matter from the point of view of a "Catholic man of science," with a wide range of bibliographical knowledge. An equally comprehensive statement of the question from the point of view of the thorough-going evolutional psychologist or anthropologist has not yet appeared. Dr. Paul Ehrenreich, an anthropologist *vom Fach*, has, in his *Allgemeine Mythologie*, sought to give new life to the science of comparative mythology, which had almost received death at the hands of its friends of the school of Max Müller,—a quasi-resurrection of the "sun-myth" theory is now being attempted by Frobenius and others. Ehrenreich escapes panbabylonianism, but runs some danger of being swamped by

panlunarism or selenomania. The new life in the sociological consideration of religion is represented not only in the increasing attention that is given to the institutional religious activities of savage and barbarous peoples, but in the discussion by psychologists of the social and economical aspects of religion everywhere. The monograph on *Rest Days* by Professor Hutton Webster, reviewed in this number of the JOURNAL, deserves special mention here. It will be one of the objects of the editors to see that new investigations and significant contributions to knowledge receive prompt and adequate recognition in these pages. Special effort will be made to secure ample and authoritative book-reviews, and publishers are invited to send in volumes and monographs belonging more or less in the field of religious psychology, notices of which will appear as promptly as possible. To the department of "Periodical Literature" in each number Professor Alexander F. Chamberlain will contribute brief analyses, résumés and critiques of the periodical literature of religious psychology, particularly that which appears in other languages than English.

It is intended that the JOURNAL OF RELIGIOUS PSYCHOLOGY shall appear quarterly, the four numbers making an annual volume of about five hundred pages. Contributors are requested to note that the editors feel more or less obliged to discourage papers of inordinate length, and believe that even the best articles should not exceed the limit of fifty pages; indeed a larger number of briefer contributions, where the content is of equal merit, must be preferred to a few long articles. This does not, however, mean that longer articles by expert authorities will not be accepted for publication in the JOURNAL, only that the average article must be of reasonable dimensions. The editors will welcome contributions from all regions of the field of religious psychology. For views expressed, theories advanced, etc., contributors are solely responsible.

A. F. C.

THE BELIEF IN IMMORTALITY.

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INTRODUCTORY.

The present writer makes no claim to having any special light to shed upon the age-long question of immortality. He is rather an inquirer than an illuminator. Having been for a number of years interested in this subject, there has grown up in his mind a desire to make somewhat of a first-hand study of it. Others have worked in this same field and have given us, from time to time, the results of their investigations. All this is necessary in order to know how the current of thought concerning the belief in an after life is tending. No one cross-section of the belief can tell us this. We need several such cross-sections in order to indicate the direction of its flow. If the study made in this paper shall in any small degree contribute to this end, the writer's purpose will be abundantly fulfilled.

The subject will be treated under four general heads. First of all we shall attempt an analysis of the concept of immortality with a view to determining the different senses in which that concept is used. Next we shall outline the different theories which have been advanced to account for the origin of the belief. Then we shall make a brief survey of the grounds upon which the belief rests. And, finally, we shall give the results of our own empirical study regarding the present status of the belief.

The numbers included in brackets refer to the corresponding numbers in the bibliography at the end. Where the letter p is prefixed to the number, the reference is to the page of the book quoted.

I. TYPES OF IMMORTALITY CONCEPTS.

1. *Plasmic Immortality:*

No part of the furnishings of the human mind is endowed with greater plasticity than the concept of immortality. It is capable of being moulded into a great variety of forms. Not infrequently do we hear the word used with reference to the rejuvenating power of protoplasm. Not long since, while in

conversation with a prominent biologist, I made some inquiry regarding the work being done in his class room. The reply that I received was that he was just then engaged in carrying his class through a course on the "immortality of protoplasm." This may seem like a strange application of the term to one who is unacquainted with the facts of biology, but to one who is cognizant of those facts the application seems entirely justifiable. As every one knows, it is a truism of biology that "no protozoa have any dead ancestors." These creatures, lowest in the scale of animal life, and composed of one tiny cell of protoplasm, never die under normal conditions. The whole mass of the cell is, in a sense, reproductive in its function, the mode of reproduction being that of cell-division. Taking the case of the amoeba, which is the lowest form of all, each parent cell divides, without loss or death of any of its material, into two equal parts. We have then two creatures instead of one, each having half of the protoplasm of the original cell from which they were produced. Here no part of the original cell can be said to be the corpse of a being that has perished. No being has perished. It has simply transformed itself into two beings. The only possible way of looking at such a process as this is to say that the substance and life of the original cell are continued on under changed conditions without loss or death.

And this fact of plasmic immortality is not confined solely to the protozoan level of life. Modern embryology has revealed to us that, in a limited sense, this same principle obtains also on the higher levels of life, including man himself. Physical death, or "the birth of the corpse," took place in the animal series, as a normal experience, only when in the metazoans the cells began to divide themselves into two specialized groups, the somatic, or vegetative cells, and the reproductive cells. The vegetative cells then assumed the function of forming for the animal a body. In doing so, they lost their original power of perpetual rejuvenation and thus became subject to dissolution and death. Why they should have done so is still one of the unsolved problems of biology. Far different, however, was it with the reproductive cells. They still retained their rejuvenating power. Both in the case of viviparous and oviparous reproduction, the offspring is simply a fusion of two parent cells which have detached themselves from the reproductive cells of the parent bodies. The whole chain of animal life, therefore, from the amoeba up

to man, is simply the product of one continuous chain of deathless protoplasm which is "eternally young, eternally reproductive, eternally forming new individuals to grow up and perish, while it remains in its progeny always youthful, always increasing, and always the same. Thousands upon thousands of generations which have risen in the course of the ages were its products, but it lives on in the youngest generations with the power of giving origin to coming millions. The individual organism itself is transient, but the embryonic substance which produces this transient organism preserves itself to all ages imperishable, everlasting, and constant."

2. *Influential Immortality.*

But, rising to a somewhat higher level, we meet with an entirely different use of the term immortality. This time it is applied to the permanent character of human influence. If we designate the former use of the word as denoting a strictly biological conception, we may designate this latter use as denoting a strictly positivistic conception.

Perhaps no better statement of this use of the term could be formulated than that given by Büchner, the famous exponent of German materialism during the last century. In speaking of death and immortality in his *Man in the Past, Present and Future* (p.225), he says:

"Great philosophers have called death the fundamental cause of all philosophy. If this be correct, the empirical or experimental philosophy of the present day has solved the greatest philosophical enigmas, and has shown (both logically and empirically) that there is no death, and the great mystery of existence consists in perpetual, uninterrupted change. Everything is immortal and indestructible—the smallest worm as well as the most enormous of celestial bodies; the sand-grain and the water-drop, as well as the highest being in creation, man and his thoughts. Only the forms in which being manifests itself are changing. Being itself remains eternally the same and imperishable. When we die, we do not lose ourselves, but only our personal consciousness or the causal form which our being, in itself eternal and imperishable, had assumed for a short time. We live on in nature, in our race, in our children, in our descendants, in our deeds, in our thoughts, in short, in the entire material and psychical contribution which, during our short personal existence, we have furnished to the subsistence of mankind and of nature in general."

Comte taught the same doctrine. He held that the only immortality which any individual can reasonably expect to attain is the perpetuation of his memory and influence in the race.

This abiding influence he called "subjective immortality," and held it up in true Thanatopsis fashion as the great incentive to noble living, the mighty motive to admission into the Company of the Saints made perfect by Positivism. A similar view is that of George Eliot, George Meredith, and numerous other writers of note. In his poems entitled *Earth and Man*, and *A Faith on Trial*, Meredith constantly exhorts men to live in their offspring and to dismiss forever from their minds the fictitious desire for a personal existence beyond this life. There is no such existence. The only immortality to which any man shall ever attain is the immortal mark which his influence makes upon the race in which he has, for a time, lived and moved and had his being.

3. *Cosmic Immortality.*

Leaving now these rather arbitrary uses of the word, we come next to a somewhat more consistent and more metaphysical application of the term. This time it is applied to the permanent character of the universe itself. This is the pantheistic notion of immortality, and as such may be designated as cosmic immortality. The whole universe, it is said, is one great being which is eternal and immortal. Out of this one unconscious cosmic being has come the whole train of individual things, including man himself. Each individual plays his part in his own day and generation and then sinks back again into this great unconscious world-soul out of which he originally sprang. In doing so, he loses his distinctive personal identity but not his essential existence. Just as the drop of rain which falls into the sea loses its own particular individual form in the great indistinguishable mass of water, yet not its essential existence, so does man fall back at death, soul and body, into the one impersonal essence of the universe, which is the great eternal God from whom all came and to whom all return.

The great philosophic exponent of this view in modern times was Spinoza, although the view is as old as philosophy itself. Its first distinctive advocate was Xenophanes, the founder of the Eleatic School of pre-Soeratic philosophy. Religiously, it may be said that the great exponent of this view is Buddha. The heaven, or Nirvana, of Buddhism has long since been a bone of contention, but for all practical purposes of thought it can be regarded as identical with the heaven of the pantheist. It is sometimes erroneously affirmed that Nirvana means annihilation.

But this is true only with reference to finite personality. Nirvana, in the true Buddhistic sense, does not mean the annihilation of existence itself. It means rather the annihilation of finite individuality through the infinite unfolding of individuality until it shall lose its finite limitations in becoming coexistent with the universe itself. It is the annihilation of personality through growth, just as the seed loses itself in the higher existence of the plant, or the ovum in the higher existence of the full grown man. Of course, the line of development toward this goal is by no means straight-forward. It is a singularly sinuous one, with numerous backward curvings of repeated reincarnations by means of which the soul is purged of its egoistic impulses and desires and thus made to take on the larger life of an impersonal, cosmic existence. A very clear and sympathetic exposition of this view is given by W. S. Bigelow (7).

For the ethical import of this conception of a future existence the reader is referred to C. L. Slattery's *Life Beyond Life* (61). While not accepting this view of the future as his own, Mr. Slattery is nevertheless forced to recognize in it a very lofty ethical principle, the principle of moral solidarity. According to this view the highest ethical effort of man consists in the elimination of all his purely personal and egoistic impulses and desires by merging them into the wider altruistic interests of the race. To quote his own words, Mr. Slattery says:

"The selfishness of some forms of the Christian doctrine of immortality is little short of ghastly. The smug satisfaction of the mediaeval saint, leaving the world to its misery and sin that he might fit his own miserable and puny soul for heaven, is not edifying, is not Christian. We have grown to think the saint a truer saint if, with some little flecks from the naughty world, he has stayed in the world and helped to raise others with himself toward the heavenly vision. It is the great and growing sense of brotherhood, of mutual responsibility, that is making us feel that we must reach that other country with the rest of mankind, or it will after all be a sad and mournful abode for our loving, unselfish hearts. That is the ideal toward which we strive. It is the kernel of vital truth hid within the Buddhist's doctrine of Nirvana."

In passing, it may be said that we are here dealing with a view of immortality which is widely held today by minds of great refinement and culture. The reason for this we are told is not far to seek. Besides the ethical charm of an ever-expanding altruism, already referred to, there is inherent in this view the philosophic charm of a monistic conception of the universe

which tends to satisfy the irresistible propensity of the human mind to mentally construct its material into a universe rather than a multiverse. There is, furthermore, inherent in this view, it is said, the religious charm of a monotheistic conception of the soul's relation to its God, and also the psychological charm of a unifying conception of life which tends mightily to the solidifying of personality, to the knitting together of psychic experiences against the inroads of abnormal dissociations. With all these features to commend it, we are not at all surprised to find this the cherished view of many highly cultivated minds.

4. Personal Immortality.

There still remains another use of the term immortality to be considered. This time it is applied to the survival of personality itself. It is the theistic conception of the after life, and, as such, is known as "personal immortality." According to theism, God is not the impersonal soul of the universe, as pantheism affirms, but is a transcendent personal Being, existing independently of the universe and yet imminent in it as its upholder and providential Ruler. Neither is the human soul a part of the essence of deity, as pantheism affirms. It is rather a secondary essence, a thing derived from the creative activity of deity, which will ever retain its own essential, personal existence apart from, yet in ethical relations with, deity. As to the exact nature of this personal identity there is a wide divergence of opinion among theists. Some hold that the after life will be a continuation of the present but under more favorable conditions. Others hold to a sort of cataclysmic conception of death by means of which the soul is to undergo at the moment of its departure from the body a sudden and radical transformation such as will purge out of it all traces of moral imperfection and thus enlarge and intensify its capacities and powers beyond the limit of anything which the most vivid imagination can now envisage.

In general, it may be said that there are now held by theists two radically different conceptions of personal immortality. According to the one, the human soul is essentially immortal, immortality being an inherent quality of soul-essence. According to the other, the human soul is not inherently immortal but immortable, that is, capable of being made immortal. Those who

hold to the former view are driven by the logic of the situation to postulate the personal survival of all human beings, good and bad alike, while those who hold to the latter view escape the perplexing problem of caring for moral degenerates in the after life by affirming that through lack of moral and spiritual cultivation these souls never arrived at the state of actual immortality, the result being that at death they simply go out of existence. Inherent immortality, it may be said, is the orthodox view of present-day Christian theology. It is held universally in the Greek and Roman Catholic Churches and also by the great majority of Protestant denominations. Whether or not the New Testament teaches inherent immortality is a mooted question. Naturally enough, the advocates of this view say that it does, and adduce not a few passages in its support. On the other hand, the advocates of immortality, or "conditional immortality" as it is commonly called, say that it does not, and in like manner adduce a respectable array of passages in support of their view. They tell us that the New Testament holds out the hope of immortality only to those who receive eternal life through faith in Christ and devotion to that ideal of life by which he lived and for which he died. The idea of inherent immortality, it is said, crept into Christian theology during the Middle Ages at the time when the teachings of Plato played so large a rôle in the formation of Christian doctrine. The first outstanding voice in modern times to be raised against this so-called relic of mediaeval theology was Rev. Edward White of England. In 1846 he published a book entitled *Life in Christ*, in which the conception of attainable, as over against inherent, immortality was strongly advocated. The logic of White's arguments is not generally accepted today. But his book served to call attention to the subject and to crystallize certain vague stirrings which were then at work in the minds of men and which have since then, especially within the last few years, taken shape in the well-formed eschatological doctrine of conditional immortality.

Scientifically considered, this view has much in its favor. It is the exact counterpart in the theological world of the doctrine of the "survival of the fittest" in the scientific world. As applied to the question of immortality, the doctrine of the "survival of the fittest" affirms that only those survive death who are morally fit. The rest drop out of the race and become ex-

tinct. Seizing upon this scientific postulate in support of his view, the advocate of conditional immortality has only to tell us who the morally fit are, who shall survive. They are the spiritually renewed, he tells us, the recipients of the immortal life through filial relations with God. It will be observed, of course, that throughout this discussion the standpoint is religious and philosophical. The existence of a spiritual entity called the soul is taken for granted. The only question at stake is this, is this spiritual entity inherently immortal or is it not. One camp of theists says it is, while the other camp says it is not but that it may become immortal. To this latter view one serious objection is raised. It is assumed by the advocates of imminortality that the soul is essentially mortal or subject to dissolution and death, but that, by an ethical and spiritual readjustment of its relations to God, it may be made essentially immortal. How, it is asked, can any ethical and spiritual readjustment of relationship between God and man effect a change in the essential constitution of the human soul? Can love and obedience to God reorganize, so to speak, the constituent elements of the soul so as to ensure it against dissolution and death? What is this essential change which takes place in the soul when it passes from a state of mortality over into a state of immortality? Is it not a pure fiction of the imagination born of a superficial cast of metaphysical thinking? Such is the objection offered by the advocates of inherent immortality to the doctrine of immortality. And so the battle rages, each side holding its ground with dogmatic tenacity, yet both agreed that whatever of future survival there is, it must be of a personal character.

Such then are the four chief uses of the word immortality, the *biological*, the *positivistic*, the *pantheistic*, and the *theistic*. The first two can hardly be classed under the head of beliefs. A belief is a conviction based upon considerations of greater or less probability but falling short of actual knowledge based upon experience. Plasmic and influential immortality are matters of every-day knowledge. We know from experience that these things are so. Cosmic and personal immortality, on the other hand, are matters of belief. They rest not upon experience, but upon presumptive evidence only. It is in these latter two senses, therefore, and especially in the sense of personal immortality, that we shall use the term in the remaining part of this paper.

II. THEORIES CONCERNING THE ORIGIN OF THE BELIEF.

It is needless to say that in dealing with the matter of origin we lose ourselves in an exceedingly dense maze of prehistoric uncertainty. The precise point at which, in the unfolding of the human mind, the idea of an after life first dawned upon the threshold of human consciousness cannot be definitely determined. There may be little evidence of its presence during the Palaeolithic age, but there is clear evidence of its presence during the Neolithic period. The ornaments, weapons, tools and food placed by the side of the dead, as well as the sacred drawings upon tombs, etc., all seem to indicate some conception of survival. Especially true is this of the position of the body in the tomb. One of the peculiar features of Neolithic burial was the bent-up posture of the body to represent, apparently, the position of the foetus in the womb. This fact is now regarded by some ethnologists as a rather strong evidence of a Neolithic belief in human survival. The grave may have been looked upon as the womb of mother-earth from which the soul of the dead was to be born anew into an after life. Some such motive, it is thought, must have induced these early peoples to have placed their dead in such an unnatural position.

The question now arises, whence came this belief? How did man ever come to have awakened within him this conviction of an after life? As already stated, we are here dealing with a question that lies entirely outside the sphere of demonstrable certainty. Our best knowledge is wholly a matter of conjecture, based, of course, upon considerations of greater or less probability. Three such conjectures have been advanced.

1. *Nativistic Hypothesis.*

The first theory purporting to explain the origin of the belief in immortality is that known as the "nativistic" hypothesis. According to this view, man came upon the stage of his earthly existence with the idea of immortality ingrained into the very structure of his mental constitution. Plato, of course, is the classical exponent of this view. His theory is rather unique. He held to the pre-existence of the human soul. Man's earthly life is a brief span, during which an eternal and immortal soul links itself up for a time with a temporal and perishable body. This spiritual voyager from the other world, in coming over into this tenement of clay, brought with it a full stock of knowledge

acquired during its earlier existence. This epistemological outfit then furnished the basis of all earthly advancement. The acquisition of knowledge for Plato was simply and wholly a process of reminiscence, a lifting up into the focus of clear consciousness that which was previously known but which the process of reincarnation had for a time obscured. How has man come to the idea of an after life? Plato answers, by calling to mind the fact of his former life. The fact that he has lived carries with it the necessary implication that he will live. And so, out of the depths of his own soul, man fishes up his belief in immortality. This, to be sure, is innateness with a vengeance, and, in the crass form in which Plato held it, is not popular today except among those who still believe in the doctrine of reincarnation, notably the theosophists.

But there is a less drastic form of this hypothesis which has been and is held very widely by those who do not believe in reincarnation. Emerson may be cited as a good exponent of this type. In speaking of the origin of the belief in immortality he says:

"I know not where we draw the assurance of prolonged life, of a life which shoots the gulf we call death and takes hold of what is real and abiding. Here is the wonderful thought. But whence came it? Who put it into the mind. It was not I, it was not you. It is elemental. It belongs to thought and virtue, and whenever we have either we see the bearers of this light. Whenever the Master of the universe has points to carry in his government, he impresses his will in the structure of minds."

That expresses very clearly the essence of the nativistic hypothesis. Man believes in his own future existence because the idea of such an existence is imprinted upon each human soul by the hand of its Creator.

The advocates of this hypothesis are very fond of quoting the experience of Huxley in support of their view. As is well known, Huxley was an avowed agnostic on the subject of immortality. He neither affirmed nor denied it. He simply lived a good life and wrought a good work in utter disregard of the future. But strange to say, while he disregarded the future, the future did not disregard him. In spite of all his agnosticism, the thought of an after-life forced itself in upon him with singular persistency. In a letter written to Morley near the close of his life Huxley makes this frank confession. He says:

"It is a curious thing that I find my dislike to the thought of extinction increasing as I get older and nearer the goal. It flashes across me at all

sorts of times and with a sort of horror that in 1900 I shall probably know no more of what is going on than I did in 1800. I had sooner be in hell a good deal—at any rate in one of the upper circles where the climate and company are not too trying. I wonder if you are plagued in this way.”—(*Life and Letters*, Vol. II, p. 67.)

Here, it is said triumphantly by the advocates of nativism, is a striking confirmation of our position. Why was Huxley unable to shake off this haunting idea of an after life? Simply because it was a part and parcel of the native stock of his soul-furniture. So far, all is plain sailing. Nothing could be more simple and self-evident. We believe we are immortal because the Creator has implanted the idea of immortality into the very texture of our natures. Such is the theory, and so it might stand were it not for the destructive weapons of the restless critic. As all must see, the whole theory rests upon the philosophic assumption of the validity of innate ideas, a philosophic bark that has had a stormy sea on which to sail ever since the days of Locke. As it is not within the scope of our present purpose to discuss this basal principle on which the theory rests, it must suffice to say that at best it is only an assumption, and, as such, any theory resting upon it can carry weight only in so far as the assumption itself is well grounded.

2. *Revelatory theory.*

A second conjecture which attempts to explain the origin of the belief in an after life is that known as the “revelatory hypothesis.” According to this theory, the human race did not come into existence with the idea of a future life imbedded within the texture of its psychical operations, but received this idea at a later date through the mediation of a divine revelation. This revelation, it is said, was not an isolated experience of the race, but was a part and parcel of a larger revelation which marks the origin of religion itself. Referring to this view, Dr. Brinton says, in his *Religions of Primitive Peoples* (p. 43):

“A strong school of Christian writers, led early in this century by Joseph de Maistre and Chateaubriand, and represented in our own tongue by Archbishop Trench, have asserted that all faiths, even the most savage, are fragments and reminiscences, distorted and broken indeed, of a primitive revelation vouchsafed by the Almighty to the human race everywhere at the beginning. These have occupied themselves in pointing out the analogies of savage and pagan creeds and rites with those of Christianity in proof of their theory.”

Here, then, we have a view which postulates the origin of the belief in immortality as an integral part of a larger revelation "vouchsafed by the Almighty to the human race everywhere at the beginning." But what about this original revelation, asks the critic, both as to its historic validity as well as its psychological possibility? Here again, it is said, we are standing on the slippery ground of a great philosophic assumption, the assumption of the possibility and validity of a supernatural revelation, and with the credibility of this basal assumption, stands or falls the credibility of any theory that is built upon it.

3. Genetic hypothesis.

A third conjecture purporting to explain the origin of the belief in a future life is that known as the "genetic hypothesis." According to this view, the belief originated not as the result of an innate idea nor yet as the result of a divine revelation, but rather as the product of man's whole mental reaction to his environment during the early, plastic stages of his psychic development.

The factors involved in this early experience of the race which conspired to produce this belief are variously estimated by the different supporters of this hypothesis. It is generally conceded, however, that the tap root of the belief is to be found in the fact of death itself. The human race has never taken kindly to the idea of death. There seems to be a deep-seated desire in every normal human being to live. In fact, so irrepressible and universal is this desire in the whole gamut of life, that Darwin was led to postulate the "struggle for existence" as one of the bed-rocks on which to build his whole theory of evolution by natural selection. "The-will-to-live," as it has been called, and its counterpart, the dread of death, is regarded, according to the genetic hypothesis, as the basal motivation out of which the belief in immortality originated.

In this process of belief-making, dreams are thought to have played an important rôle. The supposition is that at first primitive man looked upon death merely as a deep, prolonged sleep from which the slumberer would sooner or later awaken. Not finding this expectation fulfilled, naturally enough a psychic tension was produced, which issued in dreams concerning the dead. Visions of them were seen. These visions naturally led to the impression that these slumberers left their dwellings at

night and roamed abroad. Hence arose the idea of a double or second self, which lingered around and was in some way dependent for its existence upon the same kind of nourishment which had supported the body previous to death. Consequently, food was taken at regular intervals to the tombs of the dead in order to nourish the soul of the departed.

Haeckel emphasizes a somewhat different factor. In his *Riddle of the Universe*, he seeks to account for the idea of immortality in what he calls a "necessity of emotion." Taking his cue from Kant, that the conviction of immortality is not a postulate of the pure or theoretical reason but of the practical or ethical reason, he demolishes, to his own dogmatic satisfaction, all the arguments hitherto advanced in support of a rational belief in an after-life, and then, having done so, raises the question, how did this transcendent delusion ever gain its grip upon the human mind. His answer is that it sprang up out of two fundamental emotional cravings of the human soul, the desire for a better condition of life than is here enjoyed, and the desire for a happy reunion with loved ones in this better land by and by. Being pressed on every hand by innumerable adversities, and being denied a thousand delights which the heart most eagerly desires, the crucified emotions are said to have taken refuge in consoling dreams of a blissful existence beyond the grave.

Others emphasize the element of aspiration as the fundamental motive in giving rise to the belief in an after life. Primitive man, it is said, launched out upon some great undertaking, but before completing his task he is brought face to face with the numbing fact that he is about to die. Not being allowed to carry out his cherished plan, he commits the execution of it to the hands of another. This, however, fails to satisfy the lofty aspirations of his heart. Proxy attainment will not do. Without himself his undertaking will be spoiled. No other mind can adequately conceive his ideal, and no other hand can adequately execute its attainment. He must complete the task himself. And so, the wish being father to the thought, as is always the case, there arises in his mind the settled conviction that he will complete his task, that the present life with all its golden possibilities is but an earnest of a future life in which all the broken efforts of to-day shall be brought to a successful issue in the larger attainments of to-morrow.

But, someone asks, how can such a theory of the origin of the belief in immortality explain the universality of this belief as it exists among primitive peoples? Granted that such an idea did by some happy accident strike its roots into the soil of some imaginative soul which was especially favored by native endowment and local environment for the reception of it, how did it come to disseminate itself so universally and at so early a date as the Neolithic Age? The answer given by the genetic hypothesis is that the universality of this belief rests upon a broad psychological principle, the unity of action in human intelligence. Upon this fact the whole science of psychology rests. Unless all normal minds functioned in a somewhat similar fashion, there could be no such a thing as a science of psychology. There could be psychologies of individuals, but no psychology of man as such. Speaking of this law of unitary mental activity, Dr. Brinton says, in his *Religions of Primitive Peoples* (p. 6):

"And here I must mention a startling discovery, the most startling, it seems to me, of recent times. It is that these laws of human thought are frightfully rigid, are indeed automatic and inflexible. The human mind seems to be a machine. Give it the same materials and it will unfailingly grind out the same product. So deeply impressed by this is an eminent modern writer that he lays it down as a fundamental maxim of ethnology that 'we do not think, thinking merely goes on within us.'"

The bearing of this broad psychological principle upon the universality of the belief in immortality among primitive peoples is clear. The same fundamental laws of psychic activity operated everywhere, giving to all men a like reaction to the data of experience out of which the belief originated.

In an article in *Harper's Magazine* (13), on "The Survival of Human Personality," Dr. Alexander F. Chamberlain has given, from the genetic point of view, a very clear presentation of the supposed transmutations through which the idea of survival passed in its early development in the race. At first, primitive man had no conception of a personal immortality. The surviving spirit had little or nothing in common with the personality previous to death. Oftentimes it was looked upon, even, as an evil spirit full of malevolent restlessness. But as the idea and appreciation of personality became clearer in the minds of men, the tendency arose to postulate personal identity in the after life:

"One great step was taken when man began to look upon himself as something more than a mere reproductive being. As von Negelein has pointed out, so long as man was regarded as a reproducer of offspring simply, personality and its high implications were impossible and unthought of. The perpetuation of the race having been assumed, the individual might drop out of sight without concern or damage. The birth of his son made the father a mere cipher in the community. The extent to which such a belief could be carried is seen in the ancient Hindu practice, in accordance with which the father who has repeated himself in his son, after imparting to the latter the sacred *Veda*-knowledge, which constitutes him the very image of his parent, retreats soulless, as a beggar, into the forest. His personality has become extinct on earth, and its survival in another world would be a superfluity. At this stage of human thought self-repetition, not the evolution of personality, was the care of mankind. And woman fared much worse than man, whose appendage she was. She is conceived of at this period as soulless often and devoid of all personality, as also is her child until the soul and the personality of his father are transmitted to him."

The writer then proceeds to show how this impersonal idea was transmuted by slow degrees so as to take on the idea of a personal survival. The first motivation to such a change he finds in hero-worship, and, according to some, the first class of heroes to be immortalized with personal survival was the warrior class. In an age when the dominant interest of man was physical prowess, naturally enough the warrior came to be regarded with special veneration. His worship to the community was supreme. Indeed, of such transcendent value was his personality to the life of the community, that when he died upon the battlefield fighting for his people it was an easy transition in thought to follow him on in imagination into the other world where he was supposed to survive in full possession of his personal powers to complete the struggle which he had here begun. Having thus risen by slow degrees from the plain of a belief in a mere impersonal survival to the exalted plain of a belief in the personal immortality of the warrior, it was an easy movement in human thought to extend this honor to other great benefactors of the community. And so priests, doctors, poets, and artists all came at an early date to be candidates for this glorious distinction of personal immortality. Once having started in this direction, there was no obstacle to impede progress until all men were included within its embrace, and thus by slow but sure degrees the race came to its noon-day conviction of a universal, personal survival.

Such, in brief, are the three leading hypotheses set forth to account for the origin of the belief in an after life. Which of these views best accords with the facts of the case must be left for each individual to decide for himself. And this, we are happy to say, is an entirely safe proposition, for no man's welfare either here or hereafter is in any way conditioned by the validity of the theory which he may hold with regard to the birth of humanity's idea of an after life. If the idea itself can bear the pragmatic test, the manner of its origin has, after all, only a theoretic interest.

III. GROUNDS UPON WHICH THE BELIEF RESTS.

In the interest of clearness we shall divide the arguments advanced in support of immortality into three groups, the *philosophical*, the *scientific*, and the *religious*.

1. *Philosophical grounds.*

At what particular time in the psychic development of the race man began to philosophize concerning his belief in an after life, seeking to buttress his sentiments and convictions with more or less well-reasoned arguments, we do not know. So far as we do know, it remained for Plato to be the first to formulate arguments which carried with them the authority of a rational demonstration of an after life. The crucial thing in Plato's position was his belief in inherent immortality. Primitive man, as we have seen, was long in coming to this conception. To him, personality was immortable rather than immortal. But with Plato the idea of inherent immortality stepped out from the shadows of primitive vagueness and once for all made itself felt as a determining factor in the religious and philosophical thought of all succeedages. In a somewhat recent work Dr. J. A. Beet (5) traces out the influence of Plato's views upon the formulation of the Christian doctrine of a future life. In a brief résumé of the ground over which he has travelled he says:

"We have now traced the popular and traditional doctrine of the endless permanence of all human souls to the teaching of Plato and to the school of philosophers of which he is the most illustrious representative; and have endeavored to prove that it was altogether alien from the phrase and thought of Christ and his apostles so far as his teachings and theirs are embodied in the New Testament; and that it entered into, and subsequently became prevalent in, the church mainly through the influence of

Plato, apparently in the latter part of the second century. We have also considered the teaching of several modern theologians, but have not found any one who seriously endeavors to prove that the immortality of the soul is taught in the Bible" (p.88).

With this background of Plato's importance in the field of philosophical argumentation for immortality, let us ask, what were the grounds on which Plato based his belief and whence did he derive it? It is commonly understood that Plato was indebted for his views regarding an after life chiefly to Pythagoreanism, the Greek religion, and the Greek mysteries which were essentially immortality cults. The nerve of his argument is contained in his "Phaedo." In this dialogue Plato has put into the mouth of Socrates his mature thought concerning a future life. In prison, on that fatal day when Socrates drank the poison hemlock, he tells those around him why it is that he can face death so cheerfully. It is because death has no power to destroy his soul. Analyzing the arguments advanced by Plato's Socrates, they are as follows: The soul is seen to be immortal from the fact of its capacity and desire for knowledge which it cannot attain in this life; from the law of contraries which runs all through life and according to which rest prepares for labor and labor for rest, day ends in night and night disappears in day, and so life terminates in death and death in life; from the intuitive character of knowledge, all knowledge being a product of reecollection; from the simple and indivisible nature of the soul, only compound substances being capable of dissolution and death; and finally, from the immutable goodness of God, God being too good to destroy so beautiful a thing as the human soul.

These arguments carry little weight with them today. The second, third, and fourth, namely, those based upon the law of contraries, the reminiscent character of knowledge, and the indivisibility of the soul, are the merest ghosts of the human imagination. They rest upon the most arbitrary sort of assumptions. Only the first and last, namely, that based upon the capacity and desire for unattainable knowledge, and that based upon God's appreciation of the aesthetic value of the human soul, carry any sort of weight for present-day thinking.

From the time of Plato on, Greek philosophy ran a zig-zag course in its attitude toward the doctrine of immortality. Aristotle was ambiguous on the subject, the Epicureans denied it.

the Stoics accepted it in the cosmic sense, and the Neo-Platonists virtually deified it. Throughout the Middle Ages, and up to our own day, numerous philosophical arguments have been advanced in support of the belief in an after life, all more or less colored with Platonism. In a general way these can be grouped under six different rubries.

The first is the *metaphysical* argument. It assumes that mind and matter are two distinct entities, each capable of existing apart from the other.

The second is the *analogical* argument. On the basis of numerous analogies drawn from nature, such as the transformation of energy, the metamorphosis of the chrysalis, and the winter slumber of certain hibernating animals, it is argued that the soul will certainly survive the changes involved in physical death. The classical exponent of this mode of argumentation is Bishop Butler, of whom Huxley said, "Read Butler and see to what drivel even his great mind descends when he has to talk about the immortality of the soul."

The third is the *teleological* argument, which regards man as purposefully endowed with capacities and powers which fit him for attainments far in advance of anything to which he can possibly achieve in this present life.

Closely related to this is the *moral* argument. This world, it is said, is a scene of injustice. Not infrequently do the virtuous die unrewarded and the vicious unpunished. If death ended all, human life would be a tragedy. But death does not end all. It is the dropping of the curtain between the scenes of one continuous drama of soul-life. It will require the second scene to even up the moral situation to the complete satisfaction of man's deepest sense of injustice, and since justice demands such a scene, we are assured on the ground of the moral argument that such a scene is forthcoming. Kant's argument for the immortality of the soul falls under this same general rubric. To Kant, obedience to an inner sense of duty, the "Categorical Imperative," as he called it, is the supreme obligation resting upon man. Obedience to this inward moral monitor should always lead to happiness, and in a perfect state of existence always does lead to happiness. But man's present state, says Kant, is not one of perfection, and so, as a matter of fact, virtue and happiness do not always go hand in hand in this life. But they are intended to do so, and since their perfect

unity is not attained here there must be another life in which this unity is attained. Such was the argument of Kant. The weakness of it is clear. On the ground of moral progress, supposing the day should ever come when in this present life virtue and happiness should always go together, what need then would there be, on the basis of Kant's argument, for an after-life? The goal of attainment for which that life was posited would be reached here and now, and Kant's heaven would be left dangling in mid-air with all of its logical underpinning knocked out from under it.

The other argument set forth in support of the belief in immortality is the *ethnological*. Mankind the world over, holds the idea of an after life. This fact, it is thought, carries with it a very strong presumptive argument in favor of immortality. This mode of reasoning is, of course, as old as the Eleatics. It lies at the very roots of Parmenides' great philosophic assumption, an assumption which held its place in the foreground of philosophic thought all the way down to the time of Hegel, namely, that "the thinkable is the real." But if this were true, says the critic of the ethnological argument, then my latch-key should always be in my pocket whenever I reach for it, for whenever I do reach for it I think it is there. But as a matter of fact it is quite often not there. In such a case the thinkable is certainly not the real. My latch-key is not in my pocket because I think it is there. Neither is my soul immortal, says the same critic, because I think it is or because all men may think it is. On the same ground, it is said, we should be able to prove the reality of ghosts and witches.

So far, then, philosophic speculation has helped us but little in the laying of a solid foundation on which to build our hopes for an after life. If such a foundation can be found, it must evidently be sought for elsewhere.

2. *Scientific grounds.*

Turning now from philosophy to science in search for light concerning the possible grounds on which to rest a rational belief in immortality, we are confronted with a great variety of personal attitudes. In a general way, scientists can be grouped into three classes on the basis of their attitude toward the subject of immortality. One is the *unbelieving* class. Reflecting upon the particular group of scientific data with which

they are especially familiar, those who constitute this class have come to the settled conviction that there is no such thing as personal immortality. Science, for them, furnishes not only no suggestion of such a thing, but, what is more, it furnishes suggestions which are somewhat opposed to such a view. In the interests of intellectual honesty, therefore, they are obliged to affirm that they do not and can not accept the traditional teachings of religion which posit the personal survival of man beyond this life.

Opposed to this group stands the *believing* class. For them the data of science are but a fragment of the sum-total of all the data upon which human beliefs are to rest. What and if science does not warrant a belief in personal immortality, it is said. Science is but a late comer upon the field of human history. Its best findings in any department of knowledge are as yet very limited. To make all beliefs square to its present disclosures would be a hasty step indeed. It has yet much to learn which may greatly modify its present findings. Besides, there are other interests than those of science which demand our serious attention. To cast them aside is to play the foolish part. We need to be progressive, but our progress should always be conservative, holding fast to all that is valuable in our inheritance from the past while we push ever onward into new fields of investigation. Religion, while it may not have had a stainless career, is not altogether an unmixed evil. It has its claims, and these should be recognized. For the most part, the belief in immortality has been a great moral blessing to the race. It has comforted the sorrowing and guided the aspiring. And since there is as yet no positive disproof of the belief, either scientific or otherwise, we do well, it is said, to hold fast to it, conserving it as one of the efficient agencies making for the highest moral development of the race.

Midway between these two extremes stands the *agnostic* class. They neither affirm nor deny the fact of an after life. They simply say, we know nothing about it, it is an open question, it may be true and it may not. If there is such a thing, it is barely possible that some day we shall be fortunate enough to have clear evidence of it. That being so, let us possess our souls in patience, waiting the day of larger disclosures toward which our present age is rapidly advancing. And so we have, as already stated, these three attitudes among scientists, the nega-

tive believer who says there is no future life, the positive believer who says there is a future life, and the neutral believer who says there may and there may not be a future life, I know nothing about it, I stand on absolutely neutral ground and shall continue to stand there until more positive evidence is forthcoming. Clearly enough, to the first and last of these three classes, the negative and neutral believer, science in its present state has no suggestion whatever to offer in support of a rational belief in an after life. But to the second class the matter stands somewhat differently. While not accepting any of the data of science as furnishing a positive proof of immortality, yet they regard some of its findings as furnishing more or less presumptive evidence in that direction.

(a) *The conservation of energy.*

Chief among the postulates of science which are looked upon as pointing toward the possibility of a future life is the doctrine of the conservation of energy. As all know, it is one of the basal assumptions of science that the sum total of all energy in the universe is a constant factor. Amid the multitudinous changes of nature, energy, we are told, is constantly being changed from one form into another but without any increase or diminution of its quantity. Energy in the form of mechanical work may successively pass over into electricity, light, and heat, and in turn be reconverted again into mechanical work, and when the process is completed, we have exactly the same amount of energy with which we started, provided no loss has been sustained on the way. Working inductively on the basis of such experiments as these, the far-reaching inference has been drawn that no change in the whole great universal flux of things ever creates or destroys any energy. It simply converts energy from one form into another. And the same, we are told, is true of mass. As yet we know nothing that can effect the quantity of a given mass. We may subject it to all manner of changes, mechanical or chemical, and yet its quantitative value remains constant. It must be admitted, of course, that such a doctrine as this is nothing short of a far-reaching scientific assumption. As yet, no one has subjected all energy and all matter to the test. But so far as experimentation has been carried the assumption holds, and for all practical purposes it may be regarded as possessing universal validity.

And now for the bearing of this fact upon the belief in immortality. Granting that mind is a form of energy, why, it is asked, should the human mind present an exception to this universal law of the conservation of energy which holds throughout the entire domain of the physical universe? If it is reasonable to believe that all the energy entering into the physiological processes of the body during the course of a life-time is conserved without loss, even after death has disintegrated the elements of the body, is it not equally reasonable to believe that all the energy entering into the psychical processes of the mind, which ran their course parallel with the physiological processes of the body, is also conserved even after the dissolution of the body by death? Present day physiology, of course, forbids us assuming any such thing as an interchange of energy between body and mind. Carefully conducted experiments seem to have shown conclusively that the law of the conservation of energy holds within the realm of the human body. No process of thought nor act of will ever creates any energy in the nervous system. The only source of energy for that system is physical nourishment, and it has been clearly shown that the amount of energy expended by the different physiological processes is exactly proportionate to the amount of energy obtained through nourishment. This being so, we are at present obliged to conceive of a human being as constituted of two parallel streams of energy, which run side by side throughout the whole course of life, each keeping pace with the other yet neither overflowing its banks at any time to empty its waters into the other. If, now, we are justified in saying that one of these streams is conserved after death, and we know that it is, are we not justified in supposing that the other is conserved also? This, we are told, is a much more scientific view of the case than the opposite, which affirms the conservation of the stream of physical energy and the annihilation of the stream of psychical energy. If one persists, and we know that it does, then why not the other?

So far, the advocates of the belief in immortality on the ground of the doctrine of the conservation of energy seem to have the logic of the situation on their side. But, says the opponent of this view, even though the logic of the situation be granted, at best it can argue only for an impersonal immortality. While it is true that the energy of the body does persist after death, yet it does so not as the formative principle of a distinct individual.

vidual, but in a disorganized condition. So for the psychieal side, it is said. Even though the energy of the mind may persist after death, yet, on the basis of the analogy assumed, we are allowed to postulate at most its persistence only in a disorganized, impersonal condition, for if these two streams of energy run their course in a perfectly parallel fashion all though the life of the individual what warrant have we for assuming that at death they enter upon divergent courses? Such a supposition, we are told, begs the whole question and is at heart utterly unscientific. And so, there we are. On the basis of the doctrine of the conservation of energy cosmic immortality, therefore, seems highly probable, while personal immortality seems highly improbable.

(b) *The conservation of value.*

But there is another principle operative in the field of science which is sometimes quoted as favoring a belief in human survival. It is the principle of the conservation of value. Science tells us that this earth on which we live came to its present condition through the operation of certain definite forces which worked by slow degrees through millenniums of ages. Beginning with a sort of undifferentiated ball of gaseous nebulae, it is assumed that accretions and condensations gradually took place giving rise to our solar system with its great network of revolving planets. In the course of time the temperature lowered, a rocky core was formed, the surface of this core crumbled into soil, the waters collected into deep basins to form the seas which in turn became the cradle of life. This life, at first a mere unicellular speck of protoplasm, slowly evolved into multicellular forms of life, giving rise at last to the highly organized vertebrate, the fish. One day this daring Columbus of the sea in one of its bold innovations ventured out upon the land, took to breathing, developed lungs out of gills, legs and wings out of fins, and thus arose reptiles and birds. Some of these land creatures then improved their condition by becoming viviparous, and thus was ushered in the reign of mammals. Finally, out of mammalian development came the flower of the animal series, man himself. At first he was hardly distinguishable from his twin brothers, the apes, but very soon he began to show his distinctively human qualities by his unique intellectual and moral advancement, until behold him in this twentieth century the

lord and master of creation. All through this process of development, we are told, there was present one very distinctive factor, namely the conservation of values. Wherever nature was fortunate enough to hit upon some quality that had in it special worth for the higher ends toward which the whole process was blindly moving, there attention, as it were, was focused until that quality became a fixed factor in the great evolving system. Labors in this direction were, of course, not always successful. Numerous species on which untold ages of patient toil had been expended, eventually retrograded and became extinct. Devolution as well as evolution marked the whole course of the movement. As one has aptly put it, "The privilege of going to hell has ever existed throughout the whole process of organic evolution." And yet, in spite of all these blind alleys of partial retrogression, the general trend of the whole movement was ever onward and upward, so that the forces of the universe have not labored in vain but have attained sublime success in the conservation and reinforcement of their best productions.

Such has been the course of events so far. Each new age has been a distinct advance upon the preceding one, reaching, as we have, the present age with highly refined moral personality as the ripest product of the whole process. And now comes the question as to the ultimate goal of all this. Is the process to stop here? Is moral personality, with all of its marvellous possibilities, and for the production of which all the creative energy of the universe has worked with infinite patience through millenniums upon millenniums, a mere transient bubble to be burst by the hand of physical death? Is this supreme value of the universe, for the creation of which all other values have been merely auxiliary, a mere will-o-the-wisp which the forces of nature have been vainly chasing through all the ages? Was Heraelitus right? Is the universe nothing more than a grinding mill with an empty hopper? Is no grist ever ground out? Does nothing of permanent value ever emerge out of this gigantic process of "becoming" with all of its sacrifice and suffering? Where in all the universe have we ever yet seen this developing process turn back upon itself, and what grounds have we for assuming that it ever will do so? Is it not far more reasonable to suppose that death, instead of being the annihilation of personality, is but an incident in a great cosmic process of evolution, and that this

highest value so far attained, instead of becoming extinct, is conserved and made the nexus of union with another order of existence which is as much in advance of the present as the human is in advance of the animal? Unless this be so, then the universe is indeed a "riddle" as Haeckel has denominated it. And so, the belief in personal immortality, we are told, is the necessary correlate of the scientific doctrine of the conservation of value which lies at the very basis of the whole evolutionary hypotheses. As T. H. Green has expressed it, "it is impossible to believe without intellectual confusion that a system whose visible goal is the evolution of personality ends in the extinction of personality."

To be sure, strenuous opposition has been offered to this idea of personal immortality, as supported by the conception of the conservation of values. The principal point of attack has been the fact of the correlation between mind and brain. Physiological psychology has shown us that all mental processes, so far as we know anything about them, are intimately correlated with corresponding brain processes. What the exact nature of this correlation is no one as yet knows. But whatever its exact nature may be, it is there. Destroy those centers in the brain that function for speech or sight or hearing and you render at once the subject mute or blind or deaf, as the case may be. The evident conclusion seems to be that if you destroy all the centers of the brain, as is the case in death, you thereby destroy all the psychical operations which have been correlated with those centers. In his little book on *Human Immortality* (38), the late Professor William James has sought to clear the ground of this objection. He recognizes two kinds of functional dependence, a productive and a transmissive function, and in his judgment the functional dependence of the mind upon the brain is not a productive but a transmissive function. Thought is not a product of brain activity in the sense that bile is a secretion of the liver. If it were, then, of course the destruction of the brain would involve the annihilation of the mind. But thought, he holds, is rather transmissively dependent upon brain activity. It may exist quite independent of all neural processes and yet without those processes be utterly unable to make itself known. In such a case the destruction of the brain would in no wise involve the annihilation of the mind. In the thought of Professor James, the nervous system stands related to the physical

world on the one hand, and to the mental world on the other hand somewhat as the Atlantic cable stands related to Europe and America. You may destroy the cable, but in so doing you do not destroy either Europe or America. You simply cut off their means of inter-communication. So for the nervous system. Destroy it and the line of communication between mind and the external world is gone, but mind itself is in no sense destroyed thereby.

A less scientific, but somewhat ingenious, attempt has been made by various other writers to solve this problem attempted by Professor James. The view assumes that there is encased within the visible body a semi-material body of like shape and size, which serves as the connecting link between the physical and the mental. At death this transparent duplicate takes its departure from the body with the soul, and serves thereafter as the material basis of the soul's activity. If the reader is interested in this solution of the problem, he will find a good discussion of it in D'Albe (17), Björklund (8), and Frank (22).

(c) *Spiritism.*

In recent years science has interested itself in seeking to establish objective demonstration of the validity or invalidity of the belief in immortality. Assuming that there are surviving spirits, the aim has been to get into speaking communication with them. To this end, certain individuals are chosen as "mediums" through whom these spirits communicate their thoughts to certain inhabitants of earth. The supposition is that in some way, quite unknown to us of course, the soul of the medium vacates the body for a time during which period some spirit from the other world takes its place as the "control" of the medium, making use of the physiological mechanism of the body as a means of communicating its thought either by vocal utterance or by written language. Claims to performances of this sort have been in existence for a long time, but no scientific attention was given to them until within recent years. The first systematic effort to study them was made by the British Society for Psychical Research. When this Society was organized in 1882, one of its aims was the investigation of the claims of spiritism. This aim it has pursued with much diligence. Its findings, not only in this field but also in the fields of tele-

pathy, crystal-gazing, hypnotism, clairvoyance etc. are simply enormous.

Out of all that has been done by this Society, both in England and America, have evolved three distinct attitudes with reference to the subject of spiritism. One is the attitude of *implicit faith* in an objective demonstration of the existence of spirits. It is believed by not a few that clear evidence has been established of actual communication with departed spirits through the agency of mediums. A second attitude is that of *suspended judgment*. To the members of this class, much of the evidence collected by the Society seems to warrant a belief in the validity of spirit-communication, and yet the possibilities of error are sufficiently great to act as a counter-balance, leaving the mind in a state of suspended judgment. A third attitude is that of *radical scepticism*. It is held by the members of this class that all the data of the Society bearing upon the subject of spiritism can be adequately explained on the basis of multiple personality. The exit of a medium's soul out of the body and the entrance of a departed spirit in its place is said to be nothing other than the splitting off for the time being of a fragment of the medium's normal personality and causing it to function in an abnormal way. This rôle it very soon learns to play with singular skill. Clues of knowledge suitable for its purposes which are carried over from the normal state, suggestions received from those present at the time of the seance, and venturesome guesses some of which fit while many do not, these form the stock in trade of the split-off personality or assumed "Control." Of all the mediums studied by the Society, none has been more baffling than Mrs. Piper of Boston. Professor James called her his "white crow," with reference to the whole subject of spiritism. While fraud has been repeatedly discovered in other mediums, no fraud has as yet been made out in connection with the seances of Mrs. Piper. A careful study of her case has been made of late by Dr. G. Stanley Hall and Dr. Amy E. Tanner. The results of their investigations have appeared in a recent book by Dr. Tanner (64). The book is a wholesale slaughter of the spiritistic hypothesis. It seeks to explain not only Mrs. Piper's case but also the whole body of spiritistic data gathered by the Society for Psychical Research on the basis of multiple personality. Naturally enough, the book has called

down upon its authors a volley of criticism from certain members of the Society. What effect the book will ultimately have upon this whole movement yet remains to be seen. It is hoped, however, by many who agree with its interpretation of the facts, that it will serve, at least, to counter-balance certain extravagances which have manifested themselves in connection with this study of spiritistic phenomena.

Taken as a whole, what has the study of spiritism done by way of confirming the belief in immortality? Its chief service has been to call attention to the subject, and in an age of materialistic tendencies this has had its value, no doubt. But so far as furnishing positive evidence of immortality is concerned, its results are of a doubtful character to say the least. And what else could be expected? The world of disincarnate spirits is rather an awkward sphere for science to investigate. It is a sufficiently difficult task to gather valid scientific data on this mundane world of ours, but to collect valid scientific data from a super-mundane world, and have it transmitted to earth through the channel of a pathological personality, seems like a hopeless task indeed. And further, supposing that a considerable body of trustworthy scientists should succeed in gaining what to them would be incontrovertible evidence of communication with spirits, and supposing they should couch their findings in a permanent literary form, how much weight would their testimony have for the generations following them, by way of settling once for all the fact of immortality? Would it have any more weight than the evidence for the resurrection of Christ, contained in the New Testament, has for the average scientist to-day? He snaps his finger at such evidence. To him it is a case of establishing miracle on the basis of human testimony, a task which Hume convinced most of the scientific world years ago can not be accomplished. Strange conceit this is of the scientist that he should regard his own word as of so much more value than that of a company of honest fishermen two thousand years ago. Free communication with disembodied spirits can never be a commonplace of human experience. If such a thing is possible, and possible only through certain select mediums, then it must ever remain a sweet luxury for the few, and, as such, an extraordinary and rather miraculous occurrence. That being so, it can never carry with it the weight of a universally convincing proof of human survival, according to the verdict of science itself. We

would not under any consideration put a handicap upon scientific investigation in any field, but it does seem as though there must be a better way for a noble soul to build up its assurance of immortality than by raking among the pathological abnormalities of multiple personalities.

So far, then, the scientific grounds for a belief in immortality are on about the same footing with those of philosophy. Neither one is conclusive. While there are certain phenomena which seem to point in the direction of personal survival, there are others which seem to point just as definitely in the opposite direction, leaving us, from a scientific point of view, in a state of suspended judgment.

3. Religious grounds.

But philosophy and science are not the only points of view from which the belief in an after life may be considered. In fact, they are not the primary standpoints from which to view this subject. In the last analysis the question of immortality is a religious question. As John Fiske has said, "it must ever remain an affair of religion rather than of science." Scientifically we may never be able to demonstrate the fact of an after life, assuming that there is such a life. And yet, the rank and file of humanity ever has believed, still does believe, and for aught we now know will continue to believe in a future life, notwithstanding the negative testimony of science. The reason for this is to be found in the fact that the belief is fundamentally motivated by considerations which are essentially religious. And this is legitimate. As has already been stated, religion has its rightful place in the general scheme of human affairs. And when religion is pressed to its ultimate psychological analysis it is found to concern itself chiefly with the emotional aspect of man's mental life. We may not wholly agree with Schleiermacher's definition of religion as a "feeling of dependence," and yet Schleiermacher put his finger on the right place when he found in feeling the essence of religion. Other elements enter into it of necessity, but here we are at the center. As one has said, "Religion is the meeting of spirit with spirit, the flush of happiness, the thrill of satisfaction, the sense of peace, the glad realization that now at last a hunger, keener than physical hunger, has been appeased by the heavenly bread. God and the soul have met, and in the shock of that meeting there

has come to the soul an emotion of loving fellowship which is the very heart of religion." Of course, it must be understood that religion has to do with cognition as well as with emotion. The preacher struck a wrong note, when, in the course of his sermon, he said: "Few things have done more harm in this world than thought. Don't put me down, my dear friends, as a thinker, put me down as a believer." The audience is said to have remarked afterward that the preacher had placed before them a very unnecessary precaution. Such an attitude is, of course, a travesty on religion. And yet, it serves to show by way of exaggeration where the primary interests in religion lie. They lie not in the rational processes of cognition, but in the affective processes of the emotions. And this being so, we shall find on close investigation that the belief in immortality, which is primarily a religious belief, finds its strongest support, not in the intellect where philosophy and science move and have their being, but in the affections where religion moves and has its being.

Taking the Christian religion, which is pre-eminently the religion of personal immortality, there are two fundamental motivations to the belief in a future life. One is the attitude of Jesus himself toward the future, and the other is the doctrine of his resurrection. Which of these two has had the greater influence in the past it would be difficult to say. Possibly the balance has held a fairly horizontal position. But to-day there is a slight inclination on the side of the former. The deeper men's lives become rooted in the conviction of a personal God, to whom they are related in a vital and filial way, the less do they look for objective proofs of immortality, and the more do they come to rest the whole burden of their faith upon that inner sense of assurance which results from a loving and trustful attitude toward God. And this, we are told, is the true Christian ground on which the belief in immortality should ever rest. It was the one ground on which Jesus' belief in immortality rested. While it is true that he did at one time argue for immortality with the unbelieving Sadducees on the ground of the teachings of the old Testament, yet he did so for their sakes and not for his own. His own belief had its roots not in any book but in a great experience, the sense of Sonship. The fact of an eternal and immortal God to whom he was related by an indissoluble tie of filial affection was one of the most real

factors in the consciousness of Jesus. His whole life may be looked upon as the unfolding of this conviction, and his whole attitude toward the future was the blossom of this conviction. When he spoke of the future, it was his "Father's house" to which he was going and to which he would ultimately lead his people. He had no long drawn out arguments, based upon logical deductions, to offer in support of his belief. The future life was to him as real as the present life, and all because he was the Son of an immortal Father, whose immortal life he shared. And ultimately, it is said, here is where the Christian's faith in immortality should ever rest, not so much in the objective evidence of the resurrection of Christ, valuable as that may be, but in the subjective evidence of God's life in the soul. We are to take our stand where Jesus took his stand, not upon logic, but upon the experience of the heart in its relation to God. Am I God's child, have I the divine life in me? If so, I am the immortal child of an immortal Father, and in the sweet consciousness of this fact my heart should rest.

IV. PRESENT STATUS OF THE BELIEF.

Having thus outlined the different forms which the belief in immortality has assumed, the different theories which have been advanced to account for its origin, and the different grounds on which it has rested, we are now ready to consider the present status of the belief as determined by our own empirical study. No sweeping deductions can be made from our limited survey. The results obtained are suggestive rather than exhaustive. In order to ascertain approximately how this subject of an after life is lying to-day in the minds of intelligent, thinking people, the following list of questions was drawn up and distributed over a wide area both in America and Canada.

1. Do you believe in man's immortality? If not possessed of a *belief* in immortality, do you hold it as a *hope*?
2. What kind of immortality do you believe in, personal or cosmic or merely influential?
3. Are all men immortal? If not, who are?
4. What are your reasons for believing in, or not believing in, man's immortality?
5. What is your conception of the *state* of the after life? Is it a mere continuation of the present state or is it different?
6. Did the question of immortality in any way lead to your "*conversion*" or acceptance of the Christian faith, in case you have accepted it?

7. Have your views on immortality undergone any radical change with the lapse of years? If so, when, and in what respects?
8. If given your preference, which would you choose, immortality or annihilation? Why?
9. What influence has your belief in immortality upon your own conduct, character, and life?
10. In your judgment, how did the belief in immortality originate in the race?
11. In your judgment, has the race been profited or not by its belief in immortality? If profited, how? If not, why?
12. In your judgment, is the belief in immortality increasing or decreasing in the race? If either, why and among what particular class or classes?
13. In your judgment, has the belief in immortality acted in any way as a cause of or as a preventive against suicide?
14. In your judgment, what effect would a complete annihilation of the belief in immortality have upon the race, directly and ultimately?
15. Has the modern pulpit changed its message regarding immortality? If so, how, and with what effect?
16. What weight do you attach to the general belief in immortality as an *evidence* for immortality?
17. What was the attitude of Jesus toward immortality, and what weight do you give to his attitude?
18. What value do you attach to the doctrine of the resurrection of Christ as an evidence for immortality?
19. Is science to-day in conflict with a rational belief in *personal* immortality? If so, how?
20. In your judgment, can the fact of immortality, if it is a fact, ever be established on scientific grounds? If not, why not?
21. Is a belief in immortality necessitated by the doctrine of evolution? If so, why? If not, why?
22. Is a belief in immortality necessitated by the doctrine of the conservation of energy? Why?
23. In your judgment, has "THE SOCIETY FOR PSYCHICAL RESEARCH" in England and America made any contribution toward a solution of the problem of immortality? If so, what?
24. Should children be taught adult views of the after life or be left to frame their own views of it?
25. Does the desire to be reunited again with loved ones act in any way as a spur to your belief or hope in immortality?
26. Has the thought of "hell" in any way influenced your life?
27. What is your age?
28. Is your sex male or female?
29. What is your occupation?
30. Any remarks or suggestions.

The parties to whom copies of these questions were sent were in most cases the writer's own personal acquaintances from whom he had every reason to expect serious and honest answers. One hundred and seventy such answers were secured. Of these,

forty-six belonged to the High School level, twenty to the college level, and one hundred and four to the professional level which included lawyers, physicians, teachers, preachers, etc.

We shall deal with the professional class first. Of this group seventy-five believed in personal and seven in cosmic immortality. Thirteen rejected the idea of a future life altogether. The only immortality for man, they held, is that of influence. Nine were uncertain as to the kind of future life they believed in, but vaguely hoped for a continued existence of some sort.

Fifty believed that *all* human beings are immortal. Fifteen affirmed that only a *part* of humanity will survive death, that part being "the good" and "believers in Christ." Twenty-six were in doubt in regard to the matter, and thirteen affirmed that none are immortal.

As to the reasons given for the belief in a future life, the teaching of the Bible was named fifty-three times, the general belief in immortality thirty-four times, the incompleteness of this life eleven times, the doctrine of the conservation of energy as applied to personality five times, the doctrine of evolution or of the conservation of values three times, the influence of early training seven times, the influence of the dead twice, the law of the fitness of things twice, boundless aspiration, dread of extinction, and simple faith were each named once.

Fifty reported themselves as having experienced no important change of view, while fifty-four reported radical changes of view. The character of the changes indicated were a turning away from a belief in inherent to a belief in conditional immortality; a turning away from a gross material conception of an after life to a more refined spiritual conception of unfettered psychical activity; a turning away from a belief in only human survival to a belief in the survival of all animal life; a turning away from the conception of a heaven of mere song to a heaven of service; a turning away from a definite belief to a rather vague hope; and a turning away from all belief and hope to a state of utter disbelief. The particular time in life at which these changes occurred were:

"After reading the Origin of Species and the Descent of Man;" "after my second year in College as the result of my philosophical and psychological studies;" "after my graduate work in science;" "after my theological and psychological studies;" "during early adolescence;" "at the age of twenty-five;" and "after a careful study of the Scriptures."

One said the doctrine of immortality had been an important factor in helping to upset his faith in Christianity as a whole. His case is so extraordinary that I feel constrained to note it somewhat in detail. He is an eminent physician, fifty-one years of age. I quote his own words:

"I believed in immortality up to the age of fifteen. By twenty-three I had become somewhat doubtful, as my belief in the Bible as the 'Word of God' was fading out, but, as I had never looked closely into the matter, I kept my judgment in suspense. At a later age, I developed consumption of the lungs and became fully persuaded that I had only a few months to live. I then resolved to attempt to settle the matter, and, as I felt that the belief in immortality was bound up with that of the inspiration of the Bible, I began my investigation at the first chapter of Genesis in connection with Adam Clarke's Commentaries. With every chapter my belief in inspiration faded. I did, for a short time, try to persuade myself that Jesus was really divine and was sent by a benevolent Deity to teach the human race, but further study forced me to give up the New Testament also. With the belief in Christianity as a divine system went the doctrine of immortality. Nearly thirty years more of reading science, old theology and new theology, together with such casual thought as I have been able to employ, have only confirmed the conclusions framed then. I would, however, if given my choice prefer immortality to annihilation, provided I could be assured against excessive pain and monotony. My reason is that there is so much more that I want to know. I would like to spend—not eternity perhaps—but a very, very long time examining into the mysteries of the universe."

There were other returns in which the changes in belief indicated were just as radical as this, but the case of this man seemed especially significant in view of the fact that the readjustment of his belief took place as a result of a careful investigation of the Scriptures and that at a time when death seemed near at hand.

Ninety-five preferred immortality. The reasons given were:

"For the joy of loving and serving;" "for the sake of the improved conditions expected;" "for the sake of a life of harmony with God;" "because of my repugnance of the idea of annihilation;" "because life is sweet;" "from a desire to solve life's enigmas;" "in order to complete this incomplete life;" "for the opportunity of progress;" and "for the joy of living and working without tiring." Two preferred annihilation, one giving as his reason the fact that "annihilation is nature's order to which I cordially submit."

Twelve had no preference, except to prefer such as should be, whether annihilation or immortality.

As to the influence which this belief has upon character and life, eighty-two said that it has a beneficial influence. The expressions used were:

"It inspires me to altruistic service;" "it makes life worth living;" "it makes me desire to grow like God in character;" "it restrains me from evil;" "it inspires progress in personal holiness;" "it holds me to the right;" "it gives dignity and range to my life and character;" "it stimulates fidelity to duty;" and "it gives my life hope and purpose."

Seventeen said the belief had no influence upon their life. Five were unable to tell whether it had or had not an influence upon them. As to its racial influence ninety-three affirmed that the race has been profited by the belief. Nine were in doubt in this respect. One expressed the opinion that the belief has been a positive hindrance to the race in that it has diverted man's attention from the proper business of life, which is the material and moral improvement of this present world, and has focused his attention upon another world which he knows nothing about and will never reach. One said the belief was both a help and a hindrance to humanity. In the case of some it inspired hope and progress, while in the case of others it fostered depression and even insanity by holding up before the mind the gruesome picture of loved ones roasting in a hell of endless torment.

Twenty-seven held that the belief is decreasing. There was pretty general agreement that this decrease is found principally among the educated classes. One, however, was of the opinion that the decrease is confined chiefly to the religiously liberal classes of Northern Europe who are temperamentally shallow and cynical in their mental characteristics. As to the causes of this decline, it was thought to be brought about:

"As the result of scientific study, which demands the evidence of the senses as over against that of mere faith;" "as the result of the doctrine of evolution;" "as the result of the psychological fact of the correlation between mind and brain;" "as a result of the teachings of pagan religions;" and "as a result of the present-day greed for gold." Thirty, on the other hand, said that the belief is increasing. Some distributed this increase among all classes, others confined it to the educated, others said it is increasing wherever Christianity is being taught, and one made bold to affirm that "it is increasing among all classes, except a few college men and a few fool preachers."

Eleven were of the opinion that the belief is relatively stationary.

With regard to suicide, fifty-seven held that the belief in immortality has acted as a preventive. As evidence of this, it was cited that there are few suicides among Roman Catholics, who as a body hold firmly to the doctrine of immortality; that the greatest number of suicides are found in non-religious communities where the belief in an after life is not held, as is shown by a study of French and German suicides; and that religious workers among persons of suicidal tendencies are at one in their testimony to the great restraining power which this belief has over persons contemplating the act of suicide. One teacher was very emphatic on this point. He said: "It is indeed a powerful preventive, as I know from personal experience in dealing with persons of suicidal tendencies." One called attention to the fact that among primitive peoples this belief has acted as a cause of suicide. Firmly believing in the reality of a future life, these people rushed on by self-inflicted death to enter into that life. Twelve said that the belief acted both as a cause and a preventive, citing examples like those given above. Twelve expressed the opinion that the belief has had no influence either for or against suicide, suicide being the result of a pathological condition of mind with which the belief in a future life has no connection whatever.

Eighty-five were of the opinion that an annihilation of the belief would work untold harm to the race, both immediately and ultimately. The particular lines of harm indicated were:

"It would lower the value now set upon human life and thus cause a reversion to the animal state;" "it would dull aspiration;" "it would take away hope and destroy man's peace of mind;" "it would check spiritual development;" "it would usher in the reign of unrestrained immorality;" "it would increase suicide amazingly;" "it would destroy the moral and religious sanctions that now sustain the race;" and "it would obliterate all altruism and spiritual aspiration."

One replied with the following quotation from the late Senator Hoar:

"No race or nation will ever be great or will long maintain greatness unless it holds fast to the faith in a living God, in a beneficent Providence, and in a personal immortality. To man as to nation, every gift of noblest origin is breathed upon by this hope's perpetual breath. Where this faith lives are found courage, manhood, power. Where this faith dies, courage, manhood, and power die with it."

Two expressed the opinion that an annihilation of the belief in a future life would prove a blessing to humanity in that it

would give greater emphasis to the worth of this present life and thus elevate the general moral tone of society. Both, however, were of the opinion that the belief should be destroyed gradually rather than suddenly. Three said that an annihilation of this belief would have no important effect, either immediately or ultimately.

The relation of the modern pulpit to the belief in an after life was variously estimated. Sixty-two were agreed that the pulpit has changed its message concerning the future. The lines of change indicated were varied. Some held that the present-day pulpit has turned very generally from a belief in personal to a belief in cosmic immortality. Others, that it has turned from personal to influential immortality. And still others held that it is rapidly moving toward an acceptance of the doctrine of reincarnation. There was pretty general agreement, however, that the pulpit of today is saying less about an after life than the pulpit of earlier days had to say about it, and that, when it is spoken of, the idea of hell is almost, if not quite, ignored. Most of this class of respondents were of the impression that this change is for the better in that it leads to the acceptance and formation of a good life from higher motives than that of fear. A few, however, said that this change is for the worse in that the pulpit is failing to use the motive of fear which, they said, has been the great moral educator of the race. One of this class expressed the belief that the reason why the pulpit of to-day is either silent altogether or else exceedingly cautious in its utterances about the future is because both preacher and people alike are at the present time utterly at sea on the whole subject. Twelve were of the opinion that the modern pulpit has not changed.

Seventy-seven said that Jesus assumed the fact of immortality, and that his attitude carries with it the greatest weight possible as an evidence for the reality of an after life in view of the fact that he was the most spiritually minded teacher that the world has ever known. Fifteen, however, took the opposite view and said that the attitude of Jesus carried no more weight than that of any other good man. Two, in fact, said that his attitude carried less weight than that of an intelligent scholar of to-day. To quote their own words:

"The testimony of Jesus to an after life is of no more value than that of any other man of his day, and is not to be compared with that of a

modern scientist of good standing;” “Jesus imbibed the belief in immortality from his environment and was not in as good a position as we are today to judge of its truth.”

Twelve said they had no idea whatever what Jesus’ attitude was toward the belief in an after life.

In regard to the doctrine of Christ’s resurrection, seventy-six held it to be the crowning evidence of a future life. A few others were inclined to attach less evidential value to the story of the resurrection, regarding it merely as a co-ordinate factor in the general group of evidences for an after life. All of these seventy-six respondents, however, were at one in their belief that the resurrection of Christ is a well authenticated fact of history. Fifteen, on the other hand, said that the story of the resurrection is not an established fact of history, and, therefore, carries no weight as an evidence for immortality. Two physicians replied in substantially the same terms, the exact words of one being, “The teaching concerning the resurrection of Christ is by no means an established fact. It is utterly lacking in historical confirmation.” One man said, “Even if a physical resurrection did take place, it would by no means prove immortality.” One scientist of wide repute said, “While I believe in personal immortality yet I do not base my belief upon the doctrine of the resurrection of Christ. I regard Hume’s argument as never having been answered.” Hume’s argument, as we all know, was that “Nothing that is of less frequent occurrence than the falsity of human testimony can be proved by testimony.” Thirteen said that they had never given the story of the resurrection any thought, and were not in a position, therefore, to say what bearing it had upon the belief in an after life.

Fifty-five were of the opinion that science is not in conflict with a rational belief in personal immortality. Fifteen took the opposite view. One psychologist, of international reputation, said, “It is, I believe, impossible to disprove personal immortality by scientific reasoning, because of the lack of data one way or the other. I think, however, that science makes it extremely improbable.” An eminent physician says:

“Science, so far as I am aware, finds no evidence upon which to found a rational belief in personal immortality. Since the scientific spirit teaches us to believe only those things which are proved, to disbelieve those which

are disproved, and to hold our judgment in suspense in regard to other matters, we must be content to leave, at least, the doctrine of personal immortality in doubt."

Thirty-four had no idea how science stands related to the belief in personal immortality.

As to the possibility of science proving the reality of an after life, granted that there is such a life, fifteen believed such a thing possible. One scientist of note said, "No man can foretell what science will be able to do." Another scientist said, "Science has already so far outstripped in its discoveries the expectations of a generation ago that it would not be at all surprising if in this matter of an after life it should also outstrip our present expectations and lay bare to us facts which now seem utterly beyond the limit of its apparent sphere." Sixty, on the other hand, were of the opinion that science can never establish the fact of an after life, granting the reality of such a life. The grounds upon which their convictions were based can all be summed up in one sentence, namely, science can never prove the existence of a future life because it has no data upon which to work and can obtain no data, for the reason that science deals only with the experiential facts of man's present life while immortality lies entirely outside the sphere of such experience.

Forty-one regarded the doctrine of evolution as lending no support whatever to the belief in an after life. To quote the words of one, "The doctrine of evolution argues more for mortality than it does for immortality, for if the lower species are mortal, as we know they are, why not the higher species, including man himself?" A prominent physician says:

"The doctrine of evolution appears to me to oppose a belief in personal immortality. Individual plants and animals, species, races, nations, planets, stars, systems, and now it seems perhaps even the chemical elements, arise, grow old, and die. The elements of which they are composed live on and are reincarnated in other forms, but that which distinguished them—their individuality—disappears. Why should we expect an exception to be made in favor of one, even the highest, species of animals?"

With minor variations, this was the line of reasoning followed by all of those indicated above. Opposed to them stood twenty-eight who regarded the doctrine of evolution as furnishing rather strong presumptive evidence in favor of personal immortality. The gist of their position has already been given under

the head of "the conservatism of values" in discussing the scientific grounds of the belief.

In like manner did opinions differ as to the evidential value of the doctrine of the conservation of energy. Thirty affirmed that it has no value as an evidence for *personal* immortality but that it does favor the idea of *cosmic* survival. Says one, "Is my mind 'energy' or some manifestation of it? If so, I would expect it to live on after death but not in the form of my personality. As a matter of fact I believe that mind is as indestructible as energy or matter." Another says, "Only the imagination of a protagonist could detect any analogy here." Another says, "If the doctrine of the conservation of energy furnished any support to the idea of personal immortality then every living creature from time immemorial to time immemorial must be immortal." Another says, "Life and energy are not in the same category, so that the conservation of the one by no means argues for the conservation of the other." Twenty-nine took the opposite view and said that the doctrine of the conservation of energy does support a belief in personal immortality. In fact, one prominent scientist gave this as the only ground of her belief in personal immortality, "the doctrine of the conservation of energy as applied to personality."

Forty-eight were of the opinion that "The Society for Psychical Research" has made no contribution whatever toward a solution of the problem of immortality. Two believed that it has done something for the belief by calling general attention to the subject. Eight took the opposite ground and said that this Society has made a most invaluable contribution in that it has established beyond all reasonable doubt the validity of spirit-communication.

Sixty-one favored the idea of children being taught adult views of immortality. Thirty-one objected to this. The reasons given were that:

"Children are shrewd enough to frame their own views, which they do;" "it is wrong to inculcate views into a child's mind which may later have to be repudiated. Teach only those things to a child which are known to be true and which the child will never have occasion to repudiate, and let all debatable matters like that of a future life take care of themselves;" "children should not have adult views of religious matters thrust upon them but should be given the Bible and allowed to frame their own views therefrom;" "it is better for the child not to force into its mind adult views upon any subject but rather to guide its processes in the framing of

its own views;" and "it is of much greater importance to teach the child how to obtain immortality than to attempt to teach it about immortality."

Twelve were in doubt as to whether children should or should not be taught adult views of an after life.

It was acknowledged by fifty-nine that the desire to be reunited to loved ones acted as a spur to their belief in a future life. Two couched their sentiments in the following phrases:

"I long for the touch of a vanished hand;" "I would like to see my mother. God grant that I may go to her." Here I should add the ease of a young lawyer from whom I obtained the following statement. I had given him a copy of our *questionnaire* some months before this, with a promise on his part to fill it out and return it to me. Months passed by and the syllabus was not returned. One day he came to me with this statement:

"I am sorry to say I have never been able to fill out your syllabus. I took it home, laid it on the shelf in the dining room, and every day took it down and looked over the questions and talked them over with my wife while engaged in the noon meal. Honestly, I have worn out that sheet of paper handling it over and looking at the questions, but I have not answered one of them and I cannot answer them. When I try to reason this matter out on the basis of logic I say to myself, of course there is no future life. But, on the other hand, my father died a few years ago and I cannot but believe that I shall see him again. That is how I think and feel, and, if you can reconcile that contradiction you know what my belief in immortality is."

With regard to the belief in "Hell," fifty-five said that it never had any influence over their life. Forty affirmed that it had. A few specified as to the exact nature of this influence. One said, "the thought of hell has had an influence for good over my life ever since I can remember." Another said, "the thought of hell hindered me from joining the church for a year or two." A third said, "for a time the thought of hell upset my faith in everything and caused me much misery." And another said, "only as a child did the thought of hell have any influence over my life, and then it introduced into my experience an element of tragedy which was entirely needless and which interfered for a time with both my mental and moral development."

Some of the "Remarks" appended to our returns were of considerable significance. One psychologist of wide repute says:

"If I should try to sum up my views in general, I should say that the whole question is one that has become a side issue in my life,—one on which I do not hold any very vital opinions, such as I do have being rather in the negative. I hold them lightly and in a way to be somewhat easily changed, I suppose, by scientific evidence if any were forthcoming, or by those fundamental emotional determinants (which I think are at the root of the belief in those that hold it strongly) if any should rise in my own life."

Another says:

"My impression is that all these questions refer to reason, omitting the great field of feeling, which may be just as meaningful as that which our poor intellects can comprehend. The only uncontested argument for immortality, uncontested because unanswerable, is the argument of the heart. When I see injustice, suffering, sorrows of parting, and incompleteness in this life, my heart longs to give those who desire it another life where all may be righted. This is best expressed in Browning's *Saul*. But, as I said above, my reason works otherwise, and to it the immortality of influence, as set forth in George Eliot's *Choir Invisible*, seems most desirable."

Another says:

"I regret to say that in my present state of mind I cannot give a very satisfactory response to the questions set. If I were to reply now, it would be from the standpoint of a pretty rank agnostic, and you know very well what the character of such a reply would be. It may be that this is only a temporary state with me. I hope it is, for I am getting very little comfort out of it."

The Mayor of a large city writes:

"Your circular was duly received and I have read it over several times. I did not realize before how limited my knowledge was along the lines you suggest. There are so few items in the list of questions that I could answer with satisfaction to myself that I do not feel justified in answering even the more simple questions. Candidly, if I could satisfactorily answer those questions, I ought to be able to write after my name all the letters that Clark University gives for degrees."

Turning now to our College and High School returns, we find only one in each of these two groups expressing doubt in the reality of an after life. All the rest believed in immortality, and all, except one, in *personal* immortality. With the exception of one other thing which will be noted below, this was the only feature of special importance to be observed in these two groups.

From all the above returns, it will be seen that the belief in *personal* immortality far outstrips that of any other form of survival. Seventy-two per cent. of all our respondents hold to a belief in the preservation of personality in a future life. The idea of an impersonal survival does not seem to fascinate

the imagination of most people. If they are to survive, they want to know it and to consciously participate in whatever the future may have for them.

Another disclosure of importance is that relating to the time and cause of changes in belief. Fifty-two per cent. of our respondents reported themselves as having passed through a period of radical change regarding their belief in a future life. The time at which these changes took place were almost invariably that of later adolescence. This, as we know, is the college period, and the causes assigned for these changes indicated were said to be, in almost every case, the effect of the study of science and philosophy during the college course. An interesting side-light upon this aspect of the subject is furnished by our college and High School returns. Out of the forty-six copies of our syllabus which were distributed among High School pupils, forty-six copies were returned, all answered. Out of the one hundred copies which were distributed among college students, only twenty were returned. The distribution of these latter copies was placed in the hands of four college professors, one in each of four different colleges. One of these colleges returned fourteen copies, another six, and the other two none. Of the forty-six respondents from the High School level, only four reported changes of view regarding the future. Of the twenty respondents from the college level, on the other hand, fourteen reported changes of belief. It would seem from all this, then, that the time of radical readjustment of belief in immortality is during the college period or the time of later adolescence. And the intensity of this process of readjustment seems to be pretty accurately measured by the small number of those who are willing to commit their views to paper, and also by the large percentage of changes in belief found among those who are willing thus to commit themselves. All this, of course, comports with what we have long since known, namely, that the age of adolescence is the age of psychical upheaval and of radical readjustment of beliefs, a fact which carries with it a tremendous pedagogical significance, as all must admit.

One other important fact should not be overlooked. While it is true that, for various reasons, many are now questioning the validity of the belief in a future life, yet the almost unanimous verdict of our returns is that an annihilation of this belief would work untold harm, both immediately and ultimately.

Only seven venture a contrary judgment. And the reason for this solicitude is placed wholly on the ground of its practical moral value. It is held that this belief has been one of the most potent incentives to a good life that has motivated human conduct. In Pragmatic phraseology it has "worked," and, hence, according to Pragmatic logic, it is "true." But does it "work?" Does the belief in a future life put man in more helpful and healthful relations with his environment? I am inclined to think that it does. No doubt life would still have worth even though the belief in immortality were destroyed. But with the destruction of this belief, life would certainly lose a large percentage of its worth for most people. It is by no means a cheap belief. Its power to enrich life is great. It is at once both humanizing and expanding. Nothing can more effectively kill out the brute in man and spur him on to the attainment of high moral manhood than the thought of immortality. What else can strip a human soul so utterly bare naked of everything but itself as this thought of the future? And, surely, if anything should induce a man to be good, it is the contemplation of one day having nothing to fall back upon but himself. What a hell such an experience is for some people. They dread to be alone. They are such poor company to themselves that unless they have a book or a friend or some exciting pleasure to divert their attention from themselves they are utterly wretched. There is a Book that asks this question: "Where-withal shall a young man cleanse his way?" and the same Book answers, "By taking heed thereto according to thy Word." For a man to take heed to his way in the light of his immortal destiny is a most powerful cleanser from all brutal defilement.

And not only that. The belief in a future life is not only humanizing but it is also expanding in its effects upon character. It gives to human endeavor its most enhancing orientation. It says to every laborer, do your best, you are not carving a statue of ice to be melted down by the hot rays of annihilation, you are carving a figure out of materials that are indestructible, do your best therefore. Such has ever been the appeal of the belief in immortality to the human heart. And wherever this appeal has been responded to, there do we find our noblest character and our highest service. A belief, therefore, that has blessed the race with such results as these we can ill-afford to abandon. And we are pleased to say that as

rational beings we are not obliged to abandon it. So far as the writer is aware, no field of human research has as yet demonstrated the denial of immortality. The burden of proof is not with the man who affirms, but with the man who denies, a future life. He has the instincts of the whole race against him. Are these instincts false? They may be, but it remains to be shown. In my inner heart of hearts I have the conviction, however I may have received it, that my life is destined to unfold into a higher order than the present. This conviction rules and motivates all the activities of my life. Who will say that it is a delusion? It may be, but I await a positive demonstration of it. Till otherwise proved, I shall cling to my belief in a personal immortality as one of the most precious boons, not only of my own life, but of the life of the race.

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SATAN AND HIS ANCESTORS, FROM A PSYCHOLOGICAL STANDPOINT.

PART I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT.

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INTRODUCTION.

The original purpose of this paper was to cover the entire field of devilology in an extensive rather than an intensive way; but, as time and space were limited, it became necessary to confine it to Satan and some of his immediate ancestors.

The distinction between "demons" and "devils" has not always been strictly adhered to, because they have not at all times been so clearly separated in the minds of their advocates. In general, however, "demon" simply means a natural agent of physical (and sometimes mental) pain or suffering. These did evil because it was a part of them, and no one expected anything else of them. From such a standpoint, theoretically, they could not be blamed, but, because of inconsistent man, this has not always been the case. A "devil" proper is one who does evil for its own sake. He could do either, but chooses evil in preference to good.

The first half of the paper was meant to deal simply with the historical development of Satan and his forbears. It has been impossible and needless to draw the line very distinctly. Many attempted explanations would creep in from a more philosophical standpoint.

The second half has its special introduction. In brief it is an attempted explanation of the rise, growth, and death of Satan.

My view-point has changed somewhat as I progressed, which accounts for some seeming inconsistencies. I am especially indebted to President Hall for his timely suggestions and general oversight. Dr. Theodate L. Smith gave me some valuable points on application of Freudian analyses. My pastor, Rev. Allyn K. Foster, helped me with the outline; and Dr. Paul Carus made some helpful suggestions on the last half.

I have drawn freely from Conway's *Demonology*, and am greatly indebted to Carus' *History of the Devil*,¹ and Réville's little book, *The History of the Devil*.

SUMERO-ACCADIA.

The earliest forms of religion cannot be known because savages keep no satisfactory records, but the earliest known civilizations had their devil. This is found among the Sumero-Accadians, who occupied Mesopotamia about 4000 b. c. The Accadians were invaders of this already civilized land of the Sumerians, a nomadic, Semitic race, possessing very little civilization but wonderful adaptability; the Sumerians were already highly cultured, being especially rich in religious ideas. The Accadians adopted the religion of the Sumerians, out of which they developed and perfected our first demonology. The Sumerians designated their god by a star, which leads one to believe they thought of him as a real star, or at least as inhabiting the heavens; the Accadians later developed this into Bel-Marduk, a Sungod. Likewise they changed the three classes of evil spirits of their predecessors into seven. R. C. Thompson (43) has recently translated these cuneiform texts of the early Sumero-Accadians into English. He gives the invocation against the Seven Evil Spirits thus:

"Seven are they! Seven are they!
In the ocean deep seven are they!
Battling in Heaven seven are they,
Bred in the depths of the ocean.
Nor male nor female are they,
But are as the roaming wind blast;
No wife have they, no son can they beget;
Knowing neither mercy nor pity,
They hearken not to prayer nor supplication.
They are as horses reared among the hills,
Of these seven (the first) is the South wind,
That none can (withstand).
The second is a dragon with mouth agape.
The third is a grim leopard,
That earrieth off children—
The fourth is a furious beast (?)
The fifth is a terrible serpent.
The sixth is a rampart,
Which against God and king—
The seventh is an evil windstorm.
These seven are the messengers of Amu the king.

Bearing gloom from city to city,
Tempests that furiously scour the heavens,
Dense clouds that over the sky bring gloom.
Rushing windgusts casting darkness over the brightest day,
Forcing their own way with baneful windstorms.
Mighty destroyers, the deluge of the storm-god.
Stalking at the right hand of the storm-god."

One sees in this that these spirits were not strictly devils; they did evil because they could not do otherwise, and so come in the class of evil demons. A real devil, such as they later developed, must be a malignant being who, having choice of right and wrong, chooses the wrong, and does evil for its own sake, in opposition to the god who always does good.

Magical rites, spells, and enchantments were used, in addition to this invocation, to free the possessed from the *tabu* under which these spirits held him. Sometimes auxiliaries were resorted to, such as meteoric stones, and pure water, which they imagined came from the realm of their gods. The priest or magician must know some words of power as, "By Heaven be ye exorcised," or "By Earth be ye exorcised." They reasoned that, as their gods had power over all things, evil included, they must be invoked in this hour of need. In fact, all magical rites are based on this assumption; if not, why ask aid of their gods? The priest also had to know something of the nature of the ailment. He must, at least, know the name and some of the characteristics of the demon before he could combat him. This assumption through the ages has been a great impetus to the study of the science of medicine. In looking for causes of the *tabu*, diagnosis could easily develop into a system of cure; because the aid of the unseen god would grow to be of less and less use, as the real cause was found out.

Gallu, of the old Sumerians, changed to Tiamat by the Accadians, gradually grew to be more powerful than any of the other seven. He assumed all malignant forms proper to devils, and became the enemy of Bel-Marduk. Paul Carus describes him as a huge monster, half eagle, half beast, with claws and horns; and identifies him as a personification of the destroying southwest wind. Evidently this was their greatest enemy and could be easily thought of as the arch-enemy of their sungod, Bel-Marduk.

As time advanced, he gradually combined many other vices with those he already had, and, as is the case with most devils, had to bear the blame for all the short comings of men. One writer describes him now as a huge sexless monster, who prowled the streets at night, haunting human souls that had wandered away from their fellows into luckless places, holding sway until exorcised by a priest. He never seems to have gained the eminence of a tempter, but was, in some manner, believed to be the cause of evil.

Their hell seems to be ruled by a different demon, but probably the same was meant, and only a different name was used. Schrader, in *Die Höllenfahrt der Istar* (Giessen, 1874), describes it as translated from the terra-cotta tablets of the library of Assurbanipal. He called it *Mat la namari*, "the land where one sees nothing," or *Mat la tayarti*, "the land from whence no one returns." It seems to have been a huge mansion situated at the center of the earth, which was governed by Nergal, the Assyrian Mars, and his wife, Allat. It was rather a place of captivity than punishment. The souls are guarded, as they flit about in darkness, eating only dust. Istar alone was represented as being punished, and that because of her pride. Every part of her body was smitten with disease, that had previously been adorned with jewels.

EGYPT.

The Egyptians had a lower conception of the power of their gods than any other ancient nation. This was possibly due to their fertile soil and favorable environment which rendered life easy and gods less needed. Their gods seem to have had no divine superiority to man except in pre-existence, and greater intelligence. They could be slain, as was Osiris. They had to send messengers to communicate. They wreaked vengeance on each other. In short, they possessed all human faculties and passions in a greater degree; and their godship consisted in using these powers of greater intelligence. The effects of which they were cognizant were generally thought to be those of magic and witchcraft.

Osiris was the good god, who was slain by Set, or Typhon. Plutarch (31) gives a detailed account of their contests. Set, by some trickery, enticed Osiris into an ark which closed on him when he entered. Set and his companions now put this to float in the river Nile. His wife, Isis, bemoaning his fate,

hunted until she found him in the ark which was imbedded in a tree-trunk supporting the porch of the king's house. She secured the ark, but watchful Typhon, finding it again, tore the body into pieces. Isis, ever faithful, gathered each part up and buried them separately. Horus, his son, now came out of Hell to help the mother avenge his father's death. They succeeded in worsting Typhon, but did not fully overcome him. W. M. Flinders Petrie, in the *Religion of Ancient Egypt*, says:

"Osiris was a civilizing king of Egypt, who was murdered by his brother, Set, and seventy-two companions. Isis, his wife, found the coffin of Osiris at Byblos-Syria and brought it to Egypt. Set then tore up the body of Osiris and scattered it. Isis sought the fragments, and built a shrine over each of them. Isis and Horus then attacked Set and drove him from Egypt and finally down the Red Sea."

Professor Petrie is well able to judge on such matters, and this opinion that their later theophanic conceptions were based on earlier tribal wars should carry great weight.

Osiris, who ruled both lower and upper Egypt, became a god, after being dead a few years. Tradition always enhances the virtues of heroes, and, among simple-minded folk, gives them god-like qualities. Likewise, Set became the god of the Asiatic invaders who encroached upon the Egyptian territory. Being the god of an enemy, he was soon believed to be a devil and all their misfortunes were heaped on his head. Plutarch well illustrates this: "For it is not drought, nor sea, nor darkness, but every part of nature that is hurtful or destructive that belong to Typhon." The warfare waged against the desert in keeping back the encroaching sands from their fertile soil, the parching sun that withered their growing crops, were attributed to their agency. The life-giving Nile was thought to be the gift of Osiris. Reasoning from this, they believed anything moist came from Osiris, and their opposites, anything dusty, dry, fiery, or in any way repugnant to moisture, came from Typhon. They even speculated as to the color of these deities from such results, believing Osiris to be black, because anything is darker when wet, as earth, hair, clouds, etc.; and picturing Typhon as a reddish pale deity, from lack of color in the dreary desert. Then, too, spring time is bright and colored, while autumn is dull and death-like.

They never gave up all the human attributes of these deities, even after they were thought of as great natural forces. They

believed Typhon, who was barren, to have been greatly angered, when Osiris cohabited with Nephthys, his brother's wife, to give plant life in these regions. Typhon, seeing the melilot plant, knew his wife had been unfaithful to him, so he became more and more determined to keep back the life-giving Nile. He was aided in this by the Queen of Ethiopia, as the Southern wind, who drove back the clouds, causing rain to fall on the upper Nile. He even became master of the Nile, and caused it to draw in its head and take a contrary course.

The people of Egypt seem to have been rather passive spectators of all these battles of the gods. The essential idea of worship was to secure the favor of the god rather than to avert evil influences. They had no confession to make, and had no thought of pardon. Each related that he had not committed the forty-two sins; and, if this could be substantiated in the balances, when his heart was weighed against his evil deeds, he was permitted to enter the boat and be carried to the Elysian fields. Should the evil deeds out-weigh his heart, he was devoured by one of Typhon's monsters, or sent back to the upper world in the shape of a pig.

They never really thought of a real hell as Typhon's realm. Earth was bad enough in their conception of it. Their Sheol, or Hades, was the realm of shadows or region the sun traversed at night; and in some vague way Typhon was connected with this, being thought of as the sun; but he did not rule it, nor did he punish people there. He only made possible such a place, where demons of all kinds dwelt. There were abnormal beings resembling ibises, monkey-shaped crocodiles and ravens. The dead were naturally thought of in connection with these, but retribution or punishment was not dreamed of.

E. A. Wallis Budge says:

"The dead who attained the everlasting life became in every respect like the divine inhabitants of the earth, and they ate the same meat and drank the same drink, and wore the same apparel, and lived as they lived."

Their Elysian fields were only imaginative plains very similar to those of fertile Egypt.

PERSIA.

We now come to a more philosophic age. It is a relief to turn from the childish wrangles of Accadian and Egyptian deities to the more mature ideas of Persian Dualism. Zoroaster

was the founder of Persian Dualism. Some have thought him to be a mythical figure because of his many demigod-like characteristics; but the majority of the evidence shows him to have been a real prophet, who proclaimed his philosophy to the Persian people about 1200 B. C. James Freeman Clarke, in his *Ten Great Religions*, states his belief that he was a teacher under Vitisça of Bactria, concluding that he could not have lived later than 1200 b. c., because this kingdom was abolished by the Assyrians in 1200 b. c. Spiegel, in *Erân, das Land zwischen dem Indus und Tigris* (Berlin, 1863), considers him as contemporaneous with Abraham, therefore living about 2000 b. c.

It is very important to know, with a pretty good degree of certainty, just when he lived, so as to understand properly the evolution of his system of religion. We need to know just how much of his Dualism existed when he began his work, and how much he himself invented.

The earlier religion, before he appeared on the scene, was monotheistic in the main, yet the nature-gods were also worshipped, according to Pictet and other authorities. Conway thinks Zoroaster came from India, bringing with him these high ideals of religion and liberty, which no doubt he had painfully and sadly gleaned from contact with the corrupt and autocratic Brahman priests. Finding a suitable soil for the growth of his ideas, he tried to reconstruct and remodel the religion of the Persians to fit his more philosophical ideas. He advocated a kind of moral religion arising from a revolt against the Pantheism of India. It was essentially based on justice and right, being dualistic in essence.

Frances Power Cobbe, in an essay on Persian Dualism, says that it was not always dualistic, that good was a positive thing, the conception of Ahura Mazda, or Ormuzd; and that evil only the opposite, which was developed by Zoroaster into a being with a power almost equal to Ormuzd.

Zoroaster could not be so optimistic as to accept the Pantheism of India. He could not say, "whatever is, is right," for some things he knew were wrong, and he could only account for evil and wrong by ascribing it to an Evil Being. God, to his mind, could not cause the wrong. Ahriman, the antagonist, the enemy, must be its source.

There seem to have been before him two religious parties; those who worshipped the *daēvas*, or nature gods, and those who worshipped Ahura Mazda. Paul Carus says:

"Zoroaster not only degraded the old nature gods into demons, but also regarded them as representative of a fiendish power which he called Angro-Mainyush, or Ahriman, which means the evil spirit." (5, pp. 52-53.)

Conway also thinks Zoroaster saw the need of a devil to explain the existing state of affairs, as these two antagonistic religious parties were almost equal in power and number of followers. Zoroaster's philosophy of the cause of good and evil could hardly be anything but dualistic. He was of the Ahura party, and could easily and naturally think of the god of the *daēvas* as co-existent with his god Ahura. He could conceive of this great power behind his antagonists only as a rival god almost equal to his own.

Probably Ahriman was a result of both of these developments in the mind of Zoroaster. His earnest, philosophical bent, in looking for an explanation of the evil existing, would be greatly aided when he conceived his enemy to be identical with the enemy of good in general.

However he got his system, we cannot help admiring his idea of the cause of good and evil. To him Ahriman was not created by Ormuzd, but, like him, existed from the beginning, as a rival power—not equal, to be sure, but of great might. There is a peculiar fascination about this idea of a devil as always independent of the god. In this respect, it is greatly in advance of many religions, that regard their devil as the scape-goat or servant of their god, who, all powerful himself, makes the poor devil do the horrible and wicked things that he himself would not do. Ormuzd was not catering to public opinion, in avoiding the evil by making Ahriman do it, but fought incessantly this devil whom he could never quite overcome.

Plutarch tells us of some of the romantic things, as he expresses it, told about Ahriman, viz., that they believed certain plants belonged to him; that water animals were under his sway.—hence happy the man who killed them; that darkness was his realm, and light his greatest enemy; that he tried to match every creation of Ormuzd with a wicked mimic. Clarke supplements this by saying he matched all but man whom he could not match, hence he became more determined than ever

to destroy him. By continued warfare he hoped to overcome both Ormuzd and his proto-type man.

Ahriman was indeed the most diabolical in purpose of all devils conceived of by men. He was a kind of a divine devil, a creator and inspirer of all wickedness.

Zoroastrianism, however powerful Ahriman might be, was optimistic in the extreme. Man would finally triumph over all his schemes. Justice must be meted out. The pious Parsee, who carried on this warfare faithfully, could not be condemned. Even the Sufis, who, perhaps, were a little less optimistic, thought the soul would be divided rather than good should not be rewarded. Conway tells of a vision related by a Sufi, where he saw a man, who was all in hell except one foot, which was entwined with flowers. He had been very wicked in everything, but this foot had kicked a bundle of hay within reach of a hungry ox.

Zoroaster taught that good would finally triumph, and all would be saved.

THE EARLY HEBREWS.

The early Hebrews worshiped the Elohim, or nature gods. They were thought of as brute forces of nature, having no moral qualities whatever. They created the heavens and earth and all therein. This was the best explanation of the existing state of things to their primitive minds. They saw the marvelous works of creation and gave it a creator—a kind of teleological conception, which made the designer act by law, thereby relieving him of moral characteristics. The splendor and awe of nature did not fill them with any adoration or praise for its originator. They were a part of the creation, and the Elohim could not have acted otherwise than as they did. *Elohim* is always used in the singular, though meaning more than one. This shows a tendency to centralization even here.

Renan says the Semite believed he was living amid a supernatural environment. The world was surrounded and governed by the Elohim, myriads of active beings very analogous to the "spirits" of the savage. They had no distinct proper names, as had the Aryan gods, hence were always used in the singular. Elohim is everywhere; his breath is universal. Jacob erected an altar to him for his work, "and he erected there an altar and called it El-Elohe-Israel."

Jehovah was an entirely different being, and of a later conception, when these gods were thought of as doing right or wrong; that is, when the moral attribute entered into their make-up they became *Jarch*,—singular, because of Hebrew centralization and deep religious convictions. Jehovah, to them, meant a god of both good and evil. *Elohim* is translated in our English Bible as “God;” *Jarch*, as “Lord,” and *Jarch Elohim* as “Lord God,” according to Conway and other good Bible scholars.

Miss Cobbe says:

“When the first Hebrew conception of the Elohim had settled into strict monotheism, wherein Jehovah alone was adored as the sole God of Israel, the theology of the age attributed to him the doing of every act, and the inspiring of every thought, both good and bad.” (12, p. 156.)

The Germans call this “theocratic pragmatism.” It hardened Pharaoh’s heart, caused a lying spirit, etc. The Jews had no question as to its author. Jehovah could do these things without blame. He sanctioned theft, in Exodus XI. 2: where the Israelites are advised by Jehovah to borrow jewels of their neighbors. He advised vengeance, in Numbers XXXI. 2: “Avenge the children of Israel of the Midianites; afterward shalt thou be gathered unto thy people;”—and, in the same chapter, he sanctions rape and murder,—verses 16 and 17: “Now, therefore, kill every male among the little ones, and kill every woman that hath known man by lying with him, but all the women children that have not known a man by lying with him, keep alive for yourselves.” He believes witches should be destroyed, in Exodus XXII. 18: “Thou shalt not suffer a witch to live;” again in Leviticus XX. 27: “A man also or woman that hath a familiar spirit, or that is a wizard shall surely be put to death; they shall stone them with stones; their blood shall be upon them.” He deceived the prophets, and then brought death upon them for their false prophecies (I Kings XXII. 23, and Ezekiel, XIV. 9).

When the early Hebrews became monotheistic, it was strictly so; they had no use for a devil; Jehovah was equal to the task of both. In the *Pentateuch*, *Joshua* and *Judges*, all written before the conquest of Canaan, according to Renan, the devil is not once alluded to. They speak of lying and evil spirits, and of heathen gods, but could not have believed in a devil, or some

mention would have been made of him, especially in an age when the supernatural was seen in everything.

When the journey to the Promised Land was planned, Javeh seems to have become more human. He talked to Moses face to face (*Exodus XXXIII. 2*). He refused to go with them because of their stubbornness: "For I will not go up in the midst of thee; for thou art a stiffnecked people: lest I consume thee on the way" (*Exodus XXXIII. 3*). This is a beginning of their later idea of Javeh—"God is eternal; man lives four days; God governs the world with justice and omnipotence, yet there is injustice everywhere. Man is audacious to complain; and yet he has a right to complain." Their philosophy wavered between these two conceptions. If Javeh was human, he must possess human inconsistencies, he must be partly good and partly bad. National individualism demands a special god, and Javeh as such must be the protecting deity of Israel, declaring that they were right when they were wrong, aiding them against their enemies, and expecting their thanks when the victory was won.

Javeh, when he became the national god of Israel, was necessarily very selfish. He assumed all the outlines of the ethical conscience which had adopted him. The Israelites of this period were not highly civilized, yet, they preferred righteousness and goodness. They projected themselves into Javeh, and attributed their vices as well as their virtues to him.

THE SERPENT.

The Serpent in the Garden of Eden was evidently regarded as mythical by the Hebrews, as it is never spoken of again. It was, doubtless, borrowed from Persia and India, and could not have been a devil then, in view of other facts. It appears in Eden as a talking animal,—the like of which has been very common to early folklore of all nations,—and very likely represents the conflict between man and the wild forces of nature. The Elohim build no fences, forbid no fruit. Javeh says, "You shall not eat!" Nature won, and man, as a real man, emerges conquered by the forces of nature. The basis of this is found in Persian Dualism. Ahriman tempted the first pair through his evil son, Ash-mogh, the two-footed serpent. The Persians got their idea of it from the Brahmans in India, who believed that Ahi, the Vedic serpent monster, was conquered by Indra,

who crushed his head for temptation, and for drinking the Soma, a plant monopolized by the gods. One sees in the Soma a likeness to the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil. Conway believes it to be the same as the Soma of India, the Haoma of Persia, the Kvasev of Scandinavia, to which are ascribed the intelligence and powers of the gods. If we substitute Rahu for serpent, Devas for God, Adeva Suktee for Eve, Adima for Adam, Soma plant for Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil, Amrita for Tree of Immortality, and re-read the story in Genesis, we have a pretty good rendering of the old Aryan myth. The curse of the serpent, who should forever be condemned to crawl on its belly, can be explained only by reference to this Aryan origin. It would be no curse for a serpent to have to crawl forever on its belly, for that is its natural way of moving, but in India nothing could be a greater curse, for there all forms were thought to be born again into higher and higher forms of life.

This Aryan legend could be admirably used to harmonize the first (Elohistie) chapter of Genesis and the second (Jahvistic). In the first, "God created man in His own image; in the image of God created He him; male and female created He them." He told them to be fruitful and multiply, to replenish the earth and have dominion over it. This was finished on the sixth day, and God rested on the seventh.

Now, in the second chapter we read, "And the Lord God formed man out of the dust of the earth and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life and man became a living soul." The Lord, seeing it was not good for man to be alone, created Eve from a rib taken from his side. He emphasized her complete dependence on man; and, in striking contrast to the first chapter, did not command them to be fruitful and multiply.

Lilith was the traditional name of this first woman created before Eve. She quarrelled with Adam for supremacy, and finally flew away from him over the Red Sea. When she saw the blissful state of Adam and Eve in the garden, woman-like, she was envious and began to plan their fall. As the Elohistie worshippers were supplanted by the worshippers of Javeh, this incident would have been almost forgotten, and, as is often the case when handed down through successive generations, left only its shell, which, filled in by later Persian ideas, showed

them a likely and easy solution of sin, and was so represented in the Fall.

Michael Angelo portrays Lilith in the Sistine Chapel as the serpent in the temptation of Adam and Eve. She was supposed to have beguiled the serpent on guard at the gate of Eden to lend her his form, so the curse on the serpent could have meant that she was to forever keep that form. She is represented in this painting with a serpent's body and a woman's head. Adam, man-like, is shown stretching out his arms to this fair temptress, wholly enamored by her charms and great beauty.

Conway, who has studied this subject more closely than anyone else, believes, however, that Eve's fall represents the passionate nature of woman before she was brought under such rigid restraint by a tribe wanting to preserve its tribal purity. The serpent, he says, might have been of the sons of Elohim (as nature), who tempted Eve and thwarted Jehovah's plan to have his own pure race. The Elohistic and Jahvistic parties were contending for supremacy, and these early myths would be colored by their own conflicts. Elohim tempted Abraham to slay Isaae, but Jehovah stayed his arm. So here Eve really thwarted Jehovah's purpose by yielding to the man, only meant to be her helpmate, by bringing forth children, who intermarried with the Elohistic creations, and the rivalry continued. Cain and Abel could not have obtained a wife, if other tribes had not coexisted. Jehovah says to her now: "I will greatly multiply thy sorrow and thy conception; in sorrow thou shalt bring forth children; and thy desire shall be to thy husband, and he shall rule over thee." (Genesis III. 16.)

This view does not seem to harmonize all portions so well as the Lilith theory, yet it has many points in its favor. Jehovah again utilized Sarah, because she was barren, to realize his aspirations, in the birth of Isaae, for a family of his own on earth. Rebeeca was likewise sterile, though she gave birth to Jacob and Esau, through the intervention of Jehovah. Rachel bore Joseph and Benjamin, by Jehovah's power; Mary gave birth to Jesus, though she had known no man.

It is easy to see how a serpent was thought of as a demon. "He was the most subtle beast of the field," and at the same time the most dangerous enemy. He could strike unawares, and his bite was deadly because of the unseen poison. His soft,

noiseless, gliding movements, wingless, footless, yet swift and graceful; his forked tongue darting back and forth, suggesting the deadly lightning, would cause primitive man to imagine it aided by some diabolical power. Whatever were the causes for the serpent as tempter, it does not seem plausible that it was thought of as their devil; at least, it was not alluded to again, and could not have been the same Satan described in Job, and, farther removed, in Zeehariah. It was evidently only a mythological explanation, partly gleaned from other lands, yet explaining, in accordance with the philosophy of their time, that grave problem.

JOB AND ZECHARIAH.

Satan, as an adversary of man, is freely used in the Old Testament, as in Job I. 6-12, where Satan came with the sons of God, and was given permission by God to afflict Job. Again, in Zechariah III. 1-2, it is so used,—Satan stood at Joshua's right hand to resist him, and God said, "The Lord rebuke thee, O Satan." In Psalm CIX. 6, the word Satan is used in this same sense in the authorized version, but it is translated "adversary" in the Revised Version.

C. C. Everett states that Satan in the Old Testament must mean adversary, or opposition, since in the Hebrew the article is used and Satan as a proper name could not be intended. But there are passages where some kind of a personal being is undoubtedly meant, as in Job I. 6-12, where God converses with Satan. One could hardly converse with anything not personal. Satan could be one of the evil spirits of the Lord spoken of in I Samuel XVI. 14: "But the spirit of the Lord departed from Saul and an evil spirit from the Lord troubled him."

Outside of the Apocrypha, I can find Satan only as a fiend, or opponent of the Deity used once, viz.: I Chronicles XXI. 1, where he is represented as being able to scheme out the destruction of Israel by provoking David to number Israel. The best Bible scholars agree that I Chronicles was written about the third century before Christ, hence, Persian Dualism could have influenced their idea of Satan as an adversary to make him a fiend.

Pfleiderer thinks that, after the Maccabean war of liberation, opposition between kingdom of God and the world caused them to transform these angelic spirits into emissaries of Satan.

In Job, Satan is not diabolical at all. He is represented as coming with the sons of God to present themselves to the Lord, and God as conversing freely with him. (Job. I. 6-12.) He seems to be a malicious servant of God, who gave him permission to afflict Job. He grew over zealous and became an accuser-general. Paul Carus calls him an adversary of man, not God. Everett says he was sceptical, not of righteousness in general, but of the righteousness of certain individuals; and concludes that this doubt itself would show a great zeal for holiness. Satan wanted, as servant of God, the complete devotion of the highest. Réville, on the same, says:

"Satan has become so suspicious through his constant practice as public prosecutor, that he believes in no human being's goodness, not even in that of Job the just; and supposes the present manifestations of piety to result from interested motives." (36, p. 15.)

Emphatic stress is laid on Satan's subordinate position here, on the absence of all but delegated power; no power of spiritual influence is attributed to him. He could control only outward circumstances.

He is not a tempter at all, and does not in any sense try to outwit God, or argue his case against the Almighty. Job's wife could bid him "curse God and die," and Satan remained only as an interested spectator. A real devil will argue his case, will make concessions or compromises, giving present desires in order to gain his point in the future, which will always be more important than his concessions.

In Job, no promise of a future reward is held out. Job gets his reward here, later in life. Satan nowhere expects to gain his soul, his punishments are earthly, and so Job's rewards for resisting them. The beauty and grandeur of this allegory are nowhere surpassed. Faithful Job could not be induced to renounce God. These awful afflictions caused him to wonder why God so punished the Just, and made him want to argue the case, but he would not renounce Him.

So in Zechariah, Satan is still this angel of accusation employed by God, who, over-stepping his bounds, delighted to convict even the innocent like a state's attorney who *must* convict. In Zechariah III. 2-3, we see Joshua, the high priest, standing before the angel of the Lord, clothed with filthy garments, and "Satan standing at his right hand to resist him;" and the Lord said unto Satan, "The Lord rebuke thee, O, Satan, even

the Lord that hath chosen Jerusalem rebuke thee; is not this a brand plucked out of the fire?" after which the filthy garments were taken off and a mitre was placed upon his head.

Cheyne says: "Zeehariah thought that the colossal calamity of Israel was due to a heavenly being called Satan whose function was to remind God of human sins which otherwise He might have been glad to forget." (9. p. 18.)

Réville explicitly states that *Job*, *Zechariah* and *Chronicles* are the least ancient of the sacred collection; Conway thinks them written after the captivity, and Everett holds to the same belief. We can get a very likely solution here of their problem of evil, if this be the case.

The early Hebrews had little use for a Devil. Jehovah was equal to the task of both God and Devil in their estimation of Him. As their civilization advanced and their respect and adoration for Jehovah grew, they abstracted His evil qualities and attributed them to His servant Satan. They could not believe their God guilty of such horrible deeds. Pfeiderer says Satan was regarded as God's crown-prosecutor and accuser of sin as early as the (post-exilic) book of *Chronicles*. He concludes with Réville that this change took place between the writing of II Samuel and I *Chronicles*. In II Samuel XXIV. 1, we read: "And again the anger of the Lord was kindled against Israel, and he moved David against them, saying, Go number Israel and Judah." In I *Chronicles* XXI. 1, it says: "Satan stood up against Israel, and provoked David to number Israel." These chapters are practically the same in other respects, telling of the destruction of Israel from this numbering. This shows how their reverence and adoration of Jehovah had grown even during the period of captivity. They felt a theological necessity for exonerating God from responsibility for wickedness, and so put it on His servant Satan. Doubtless their captivity was very conductive to this idea. It must have been very humiliating and revolutionizing. In moments of solitude, they would surely think their God had forsaken them to let them be led captive into the enemy's country. Their long years of faith in their God, their deep religious nature, their traditional belief that they were God's chosen people, came to their rescue, and showed them, as they thought, that they, not God, had an opposer; that because of their sinful ways God had permitted this to be done. He would not lead them into such humiliating

servitude, and could not have an antagonist himself. He tested their faith as a people, and this was allegorically represented in Job.

APOCRYPHA.

That Javeh had rivals is shown in the commandment, "Thou shalt have no other gods before me" (Exodus XX. 3). Another verse says: "Thou shalt not worship any other god." "He that sacrificeth unto any god save unto the Lord only, he shall be utterly destroyed" (Exodus XXII. 20). He rebuked Aaron for making the Israelites a golden calf. Naturally, these antagonistic gods would be diabolical to the Israelites; they were the recognized gods of their enemies, hence would be their enemies and even of their own God. These approach devils more than Satan did in the Old Testament. Before the captivity these were regarded as demons, as in Deuteronomy XXXII. 17: "They sacrificed unto devils, not to God, to gods whom they knew not, to new gods that came newly up whom your fathers feared not." This term, and a similar one in Psalm CVI. 37, are translater "demons" in the Revised Version.

But, after the captivity, these demons or satyrs took on the characteristics of Ahriman, the Persian devil. Asmodeus, Beelzebub, Azazel, Samael and Mammon were the principal ones created in this period. They occupied different districts, or had different duties. Some were never thought of as very powerful or antagonistic, while others were very much so. They were essentially the gods of their enemies, and their power would be measured by the amount of opposition they encountered when meeting the enemy. Especially antagonistic are those mentioned in the Apoerypha, due to its being a later production. Persian ideas had had to become well grounded. Asmodeus in *Tobit* is of this type. C. C. Everett says: "He is Ahriman with hardly a change of name."

Beelzebub, as god of the Phoenieians, originated from a pun on Baal; and Gehenna (Hell) from the place where Moloch was worshipped in the valley of Tophet, according to both Conway and Carus.

The following is a very striking passage in regard to one of these evil deities:

"Aaron shall cast lots upon two goats, one for the Lord and the other for Azazel, and Aaron shall bring the goat upon which the Lord's lot fell and offer him for a sin offering. But the goat on which the lot

fell for Azazel shall be presented alive before the Lord to make atonement with him and to let him go to Azazel in the desert." (Leviticus XVI. 8-11, Revised Version.)

This is probably a reecognition of Azazel as the god of the desert; and the goat as an offering was given to placate him, and to gain his protection over their flocks and herds. The Israelites often forsook their god when out of his territory, and it seems that it was not always discouraged by Him. Javeh, who resided at Sinai, was not the god of agriculture, and could not be relied upon for good crops, so their worship was directed to Baal, when earthly blessings were asked for.

Samael was regarded as the devil or demon of strife. Conway believes this to be a result of the tribal conflicts of Jacob and Esau. The tribe of Jacob was weaker, though more cunning than the mountain-tribe of Esau. The plain-tribes had to live by trade and extortion. The selling of Esau's birthright was doubtless an instance of Esau's tribe being cheated by Jacob's. Of course, the stronger mountain-men would retaliate when they discovered they had been duped. Jacob's prayer to God, the wrestling with the angel, the presents, etc., to Esau,—all illustrate these conflicts and their outcome. If Jacob and Esau were real personages, whose armies thus contended with each other in their life time, the Israelites, or Jacob's tribe, would see an evil demon, Samael, who carried this on after their death.

THE GOSPELS.

In the New Testament Satan assumes a more independent attitude. His kingdom is arrayed against the Kingdom of God. His hierarchy of evil angels contend with the good angels of God. He is opposed to Love, Truth and Purity, which are God's prime attributes. He is a tempter pure and simple, who tries to lead souls away from God by portraying God's carelessness and harshness, by appealing to man's will for false independence, and, especially, by presenting to the appetites and passions their objects in a pleasing form. In this he reaches his highest state as a tempter, and a devil. He even quotes scripture to prove his points, presenting his ease with all beauty and attractiveness to make evil appear good. He possesses a superhuman personality, uses this wisdom to tempt men away from God, and then punishes them for what they could not help doing. At least, it amounts to that, for a poor, weak

human being would have very little show when such a powerful being was arrayed against him. Freedom of the will would be out of the question. Yet there is a solution,—our temptations will never be above what we can bear, with every temptation God will make a way for our escape. This shows Satan's subordination to God. This is even acknowledged by Satan in Luke IV. 6, where he tempts Jesus by offering him all the kingdoms of the world, the power of which was delegated him to give. Again in Matthew XII. 29, Satan can be bound; in Mark I. 24 and 34, and III. 11, the devils recognized Jesus' power and came out at His bidding. Surely if the minor disease-devils recognized Him, Satan, the prince of devils, would too.

The apostolic idea seemed to vacillate between Satan's great power and his subordination. Paul regards him as a thorn in the flesh meant for our moral advantage. Yet he is the ruler of the world, and its God (John XII. 31, XIV. 30, XVI. 11; 2 Cor. IV. 4). All the kingdoms of the world and the glory of them are his to bestow (Luke IV. 5). His followers exceed those of God (Matthew VII. 13-14). He deceives the whole world and almost destroys the very elect (Matthew XXIV. 24). He inflicts disease, fever (Luke IV. 39); dumbness (Matthew IX. 32); blindness (Matthew XII. 22); epilepsy (Matthew XVI. 39).

Paul's idea of his power seems to have grown. He first thought of him as an obstacle to his work, but, later, he attributed to him all thwarting and hindering influences. He conceived him as a wolf in sheep's clothing, a being entirely opposed to God, who stopped at nothing to gain his point, as "One who opposeth or exalteth himself above all that is called God or that is worshipped" (2 Thess. II. 4).

John speaks of the spirit that opposes Christ,—not God,—as the antichrist. Christ, at this date, had greatly supplanted the old Jewish idea of God, and all opposition to the spread of His gospel was attributed to the antichrist. Nero became the great antichrist. Political conditions favored compromises with these antichrists. Rome ruled the world, and, at this time, to be a Christian was to be unpopular from a political standpoint.

Bierer, in his *Evolution of Religions*, believes the early Christians even imagined Satan and his angels were overrunning the world, causing persecution of Christians, the whole heathen

world being in league with him to crush our Christ and Christianity.

Jesus evidently believed in the existence of a personal devil, according to the records that have come down to us, or sanctioned a belief he knew to be false. His contemporaries believed in evil demons and devil possessions, and he would not have used language to confirm this, if he had thought otherwise. Although many of his discourses pertaining to Satan and devils were undoubtedly symbolically used for bases of teaching higher moral truths, his teachings as a whole, fairly and honestly analyzed, teach a personal being antagonistic to God and Himself. The three temptations have been twisted and turned to make Satan only the personification of evil. From an unprejudiced perusal of all three temptations, one sees Satan to Jesus was a real living being, who could converse, argue with and tempt Him. Surely He, if believing Satan was only the personification of evil, would not have related such a realistic parable to His credulous, superstitious hearers. It makes Him dishonest to so interpret it. In Matthew VIII. 31, we see His belief, when the devils in the maniacs begged to be permitted to go into the herd of swine. This would have been a favorable opportunity to correct an erroneous impression. When the people, astonished at His power over devils, asked Him to depart out of their coasts, if He had not actually cast out devils, why did He so teach them? In Matthew X. 1, He gave His twelve disciples power against unclean spirits to cast them out, and to heal all manner of sickness and all manner of disease. In Matthew XII. 27-29, He argues that one could not cast out devils by Beelzebub, the prince of devils, that a house divided against itself could not stand. Paul believed Jesus to have conquered the evil spirits (Col. II. 15),—"and having spoiled principalities and powers he made a shew of them openly triumphing over them in it." In 1 John III. 8, we read: "He that committeth sin is of the devil for the devil sinneth from the beginning. For this purpose the son of God was manifested that He might destroy the works of the devil."

If Jesus used Satan as only representing a personification of evil, how are we to know God was not in the same sense a personification of good? The language seems to be no more symbolic in the one case than the other.

There seems to be no other alternative but that Jesus believed in a real living devil, and demon possessions, and so taught His disciples and followers. Harnack says: "The notion of people being possessed was current everywhere, nay even the science of the time looked upon the whole section of morbid phenomena in this light." He concludes that it is not strange that Jesus and His disciples should share this belief, that we too would believe the same thing, if the newspapers and scientific magazines took up the cry. In speaking of Jesus' belief in this, he says: "There can be no doubt about the fact that the idea of two kingdoms of God and the devil (long since cast out of Heaven and will also be defeated on earth), was an idea which Jesus simply shared with the rest of His contemporaries." (24, p. 58.)

Yet Jesus speaks of our evil thoughts as proceeding out of our hearts and not from an outward Satan. Surely He did not share in all the current conceptions of demons. The problem is very complex and has been the source of many apologetics. Christ's sayings are colored by the human media through which they are given to us, as He Himself wrote nothing. In the fourth gospel we find scarcely a trace of a belief in a personal Satan.

Some have argued that Christ's humanity was so complete that He must have shared in the cosmic presupposition of his time, and, as demonology was a part of the existing science, He, to be human, must have shared the belief. They argue that no moral world would have been conceivable, if intermoral relations between personalities had not been taught, especially as their whole animistic philosophy was so grounded in this. (Cf. Hastings' *Bible Dictionary*.)

It has been suggested we do not know that Jesus conceived of a personality in the strictly individualistic sense. He seems to speak of Satan as an anthropomorphic being, it is true, but, aside from using the science of His time, could He not somehow have understood the problem of evil even better than the philosophers of the present? (I do not mean to imply any superhuman or divine aid here for I am treating this on a historical basis only.) Could not Jesus have worked out this problem, which to us, in any form, is still a riddle? He lived in an age when many devout Jews lived pure and upright lives, yet his example towers so far above them as to be a monitor

for all ages. He obeyed the laws of the land, and the Jewish laws that were not inconsistent to His belief, yet set new standards, which, though not revolutionary themselves, have revolutionized the world. In a matter of fact way, while conforming to the Sabbath, He showed the orthodox Jews that the Sabbath was made for man and not man for the Sabbath. May He not have conceived Satan in some such higher sense that we have not learned yet? President Hall, in a lecture on the Psychology of Jesus, said, "If we seem to be abreast of Jesus in our ideas of sin, there is a vast amount to learn yet, and here the psychology of Jesus seems beyond our own."

Jesus rejected many of the superstitions of His age, and the only reason we can see as to why He did not reject this one was, that He, in a way unknown to us, could combine it with His own ideals. If this be the case, until we know personality better, reason bids us reject any idea of a personal devil. In the light of our present knowledge, and in the common acceptance of personality, such a recognition involves us in more difficulties than it explains. The idea of a just and powerful God cannot be correlated with such a powerful antagonist.

Whatever idea we may have of God, whether He be a personality, a spirit, a shadow, a substance, a force, a law, or what not, the idea of Satan is disgusting and unfounded, if an entity is understood by the term. The opposite of God is Satan, but it is and must be a negative term, denoting the absence of good and God, rather than an independent antagonistic creation.

Ralph Waldo Emerson (19) aptly expresses it thus: "Demonology is the shadow of Theology. The whole world is an omen and a sign, why look so wistfully in a corner? Man is the image of God, why run after a shadow?"

According to the Biblical account, Satan, as a personal entity, is a paradox and really defeats his own purpose. Robert Ingersoll asks, "Why should this devil, in another world, torment sinners who are his friends to please God his enemy?" (25, p. 50). He goes on to show how the devil was duped, when he tempted Judas Iscariot to betray Jesus; for if Christ had not died, then all mankind would have been lost. So, why did the devil defeat his own purpose?

It does not help matters to say the devil was deceived, that he did not know Jesus was divine, for that puts the deception on God, who used Satan as a tool for this diabolical scheme.

It makes God a cheater and a deceiver. According to the Bible, Satan must have thought Jesus was the Son of God. The disease-demons recognized Him, even calling Him the Holy One of God (Luke IV. 34). If they knew this, surely Satan, the prince of devils, knew it too. Satan virtually acknowledges this himself in the three temptations, where he begins each temptation by saying, "If thou be the Son of God, do so and so."

Crusoe's man Friday's question, "Why God not kill Devil?" has never been adequately answered. Church philosophers and scholastics have strained their conscience to make him a necessary being, saying that, without an antagonist, we could not be good. Some have tried to make themselves believe the question was ludicrous, but withal it forces itself upon the mind, and his existence cannot be correlated with a just and omnipotent God.

The comment of Celsus on the absurdity of Satan has an unanswerable truth that we intuitively perceive, viz.: that the Son of God suffered death at the hands of Satan, yet we are commanded to defy him, that he will come again and work miracles, pretending to be God and that we poor, weak human beings are to vie with the God man in combatting him. The Son of God was overcome, yet we are charged to fight against him, at our peril. Why not punish the devil, instead of threatening poor wretches he deceives? What an absurdity to Celsus! Do we wonder at the futility of missionary efforts, when their philosophy has such a basis? Do we wonder over poor Wu Chang's surprise that Christians, pretending to believe in the horrors of hell's torments, are so oblivious to the fact that it excites no comment, but, when a few people are murdered in the Turkish massacres in Bulgaria, they are aroused to frenzy.

The apostles often used Satan and the devil in a figurative way to represent evil, as did Jesus in Mark VIII. 33, and Matthew XVI. 23, "Get thee behind me Satan!" when referring to Peter; but the New Testament, as a whole, undoubtedly teaches of Satan as a fallen angel, who is now a personal antagonist to God. The whole description of his power is spiritual in nature and influence; and the demons and devils subject to him are the physical agents (Matthew XII. 24-26; Matthew XXV. 4, Eph. VI. 12).

This conception of him as a fallen angel had its root in the old Jewish theology. We have seen the gradual development of Satan there, and this is really only a continuation of it. He was completely divorced from God here, and the best possible theory was that he had fallen from his high state of archangelship. He must have been an archangel there, they reasoned, or he could not be so powerful in his fallen state. God would not create anything essentially and originally evil, but could give freedom of choice. So arrogant Satan rebelled, and was cast out. The New Testament does not speculate as to the cause of this, but gives it as a fact, as in Luke X. 18:

"I beheld Satan as lightning fall from heaven." In Rev. XII. 7-9 we read: "And there was war in Heaven: Michael and his angels fought against the dragon, and the dragon fought and his angels, and prevailed not; neither was their place found any more in Heaven. And the great dragon was cast out, that old serpent called the Devil, and Satan which deceiveth the whole world; he was cast out into the earth, and his angels were cast out with him."

In 2 Peter II. 4 and Jude 6, there is also reference to this fall. He is to forever remain in this state. The Bible teaches no reconciliation as dreamers have dreamed of. Toy says:

"There is no hint of a possible change in Satan's moral character. The New Testament leaves him at the beginning of a new dispensation, as the embodiment of evil, to abide forever, but in chains and darkness, shorn of his power, impotent any longer to disturb the moral order of innocence. Its solution of the problem of evil is practical not logical nor philosophical." (44, p. 164.)

Even if we cannot accept the Biblical interpretation of the problem of evil, Christianity need not be given up, nor even suffer therefrom. It has too many good things that we can believe and practice. Narrow opinion, based on a few texts in the Bible, holds that we must accept all or none. With reason as our only guide, we can accept all that we can conscientiously believe, and let the rest take care of itself.

THE EARLY CHRISTIANS.

The early Christian fathers believed that failure in crops, droughts, famine, pestilence, etc., were due to the influence of the devil. Origen classified them as demons, according to their vices. Cyril of Jerusalem ascribed to the devil an obdurate heart, and incorrigible will. Gregory Nazienzen (*Orat.*, XL. 10,

p. 697) believed that water of Baptism can quench the arrows of the evil one, and that Satan can have no power over Christ. He was deceived by his human appearance, and thought him to be a mere man. So the Christian who is united to Christ by faith can resist him. Tertullian (in *Apol.*, I. 23) says:

"But how from certain angels corrupted of their own will a more corrupt race of demons proceeded, is made known in the Holy Scriptures. Their work is the overthrow of man. Wherefore they inflict upon the body both sickness and many severe accidents, and on the soul perforce sudden, strong extravagances. Their own subtle and slight nature furnisheth to them means of approaching either part of man. Much is permitted to the power of spirits as when some working evil in the air blighteth the fruit or grain, and when the atmosphere, tainted in some secret way, poureth over the earth its pestilential vapours. They command the gods to the captive understandings of men, that they may procure for themselves the food of sweet savour."

Justin Martyr, Athenagoras (fl. 176 A. D.), and others, believed devils fed on idol sacrifices and used this means to get them.

Tertullian believed they were sorcerers because living in the air near the stars they could learn their secrets, the threatening of the skies, etc.

Hagenbach says:

"The orthodox fathers believed that everything which was opposed to the light of the gospel and its development, as well as the numerous persecutions of the Christians, to be the work of Satan and his demons. The entire system of Paganism, its mythology and worship, and, according to some, even philosophy was supposed to be subject to the influence of demons." (22, p. 198.)

Yet, with all his power for evil, and his temptations to lead men astray, Gregory the Great calls him a stupid animal, since he entertains hopes of Heaven without being able to obtain it, and is caught in his own net.

In general, the Christian Fathers of this early period combined many of the Gnostic and Manichaean notions with Christianity. Satan was a powerful antagonist, dressed in Pagan clothes. He was possessed with worldly wisdom. He could tempt and deceive men but not God. It was held by them that the atonement of Christ was "a ransom of blood," a sort of trade whereby God bargained with the devil to give him Christ, a perfect man and, therefore, independent of the devil's claims, as a discharge of his claim on man. St. Irenaeus

taught that mankind had been as slaves of Satan since the Fall, and God could not justly take away the right without making some concession. Yet their conception of God allowed them to believe He could thus deceive and dupe the devil by bartering this Holy man. Knowing that, the devil could not keep him in hell, Origen admits that the devil had made a great mistake; that he did not know that he could not keep Christ in Hell. This is a horrible conception of a God. They showed, by their faith, how they would have acted in similar circumstances, and so made Christ and God worse than Satan himself.

DARK AGES.

The Devil of the Dark Ages conformed to the ideals of the time. Every form of nature was seen as a benevolent or malevolent factor. Superstition was at its height, and witchcraft reached its zenith. Conway says:

"What we call the Dark Ages were indeed, spiritually a perpetual *séance* with lights lowered. Nay, human superstition was able to turn the very moon and stars into mere bluish night tapers, giving just enough light to make the darkness visible in fantastic shapes, fluttering around the prince of darkness, or non-existence in Chief!" (15, p. 240.)

It was during the early part of the Mediaeval period that Satan, as Prince of the World, was so strongly believed in. As long as Pagan rulers occupied the throne of the Caesars, public opinion of the Christians saw the world in Satan's grasp. At last, Christianity triumphed, and Rome became the seat of the Holy Roman Empire, which lasted until 1806. Satan now had to assume a different attitude, so easily regained the power he had lost. When Christian missionaries carried the Gospel to the Northern nations the idea of Satan found a fertile soil. These Germans were grossly ignorant and superstitious. Satan to them was a real personage, who could and did seek and devour men's souls. With their polytheistic ideas, it was natural that Satan should be so thought of. Even the bishops, intoxicated with success, believed they were combating Satan and his hosts in converting the heathen. One does not wonder that the poor savage northern tribes believed so implicitly in the devil. The old Celtic and Teutonic gods gradually died out, but vestiges of their existence remained in the shape of fairies, bogies, water-sprites, dwarfs, etc. The Teutons, while professing Christianity, half believed their old gods were angry for being for-

saken, and so exercised some power of evil over them. This would lead to devil bargains and witches' powers. These demons,—diabolized gods,—were seen as frogs and wolves. Cats always accompanied the witches.

Gradually the origin of these spirits was forgotten, and Satan ruled again with all their added qualities. He was seen in nightly orgies, dancing until sunrise with his faithful followers. The sighing of the wind through the pines was heard as his voice. Signs and omens were used to drive away his influence. Every obstacle, however slight, was attributed to him. People really believed in the devil, and lived accordingly. It was not like twentieth century orthodox belief in him, in name only, even by those who think they believe in him in reality; they do not live it now.

Abbott Richalmus says (*Liber Revelat.*):

"When I sit down to holy studies the devils make me feel heavy with sleep. Then I stretch out my hands beyond my cuffs to give them a chill. Forthwith the spirits prick me under my clothes like so many fleas, which causes me to put my hands there; and so they get warm again, and my reading grows careless."

They thought when food did not taste well the devil had taken away their appetite, and salt, which has always been regarded as the enemy of the devil, was used to bring it back.

WITCHCRAFT.

With such a belief, witchcraft could not be avoided. Paul Carus says:

"One of the most characteristic features of the pre-scientific age is man's yearning for the realization of that which is unattainable by natural means. The belief in magic will inevitably prevail, so long as the dualistic world conception dominates the minds of the people, and, in that period of civilization, supernatural deeds are expected as the indispensable credentials of all religious prophets. It is the age of miracles and witchcraft." (5, p. 269.)

It is true the miraculous element was not emphasized very much in this period, but prayers for selfish interests in opposition to natural laws, laying on of hands, faith-cures, holy water, etc., demonstrate belief in it. Miracles are very closely akin to witchcraft; they are regarded as a setting aside of natural laws by God, while witchcraft is the same thing, only employed by Satan. This was recognized by the church officials, and every

known means was used to prevent its being used by Satan's agents.

Those who denied the power of witches were referred to Exodus XXII. 18: "Thou shalt not suffer a witch to live," and to Saul's account of the witch of Endor. Such denials were almost as heretical then, as a study of higher criticism is now. Sir Matthew Hale, in England, and Cotton Mather, in New England, bitterly resented any such scepticism.

From such a recognition in the time of Constantine until a more scientific age, laws against magicians were enacted, and witches and sorcerers punished. This finally culminated in the horrible persecutions of the Inquisition in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. This will always be a blot on the fair name of Christianity. All kinds of torture and horrible deaths were devised for the witches, sorcerers, and heretics. Gibbon calculates that the number burned alone exceeded, in one country of Europe, all the ten Roman persecutions.

As science triumphed, and came to be regarded as God's laws, rather than the works of the devil, superstition and witchcraft receded, yet breaking out at times in all its ancient fury, as in Salem, 1692. Sir Walter Scott, writing in 1824, says:

"From this I am taught to infer that tales of ghosts and demonology are out of date at forty years and upward; that it is only in the morning of life that this feeling of superstition comes over us like a summer cloud, affecting us with a fever that is solemn and awful rather than powerful." (39)

Most superstitions of the present are results of this awful nightmare. It is hard to discard old national beliefs. Science still smart under its sting; and it is still regarded by many ignorant ministers as contrary to the Bible, and consequently of the devil. The things our fathers did and believed surely leave their trace, and in the most cultivated minds are not always discarded when known to be wrong. The sign of the cross, and the taking of an oath are as much products of this belief, as the ordeal by water which rejected the guilty.

DANTE'S DEVIL.

Dante's *Divine Comedy* really pictures the hell of Roman Catholic Christians, instead of any devil. In the last part of the *Inferno*, he portrays Satan enclosed and frozen in his ice palace. All the horrors of a northern winter are exaggerated

here, to make this picture appear as gloomy as possible. One wonders why a resident of sunny Italy should thus portray hell and its ruler. He was not accustomed to northern winters, and the desolation and horror accompanying them, so he must have borrowed his idea. Paul Carus gives us an interpretation, taken from Dr. Ernest Krause's work. He believes that all the myths symbolizing the death and resurrection of the sun to have originated in the northern countries, where their greatest friend, the sun, seemed to die and be resurrected again. Naturally, this period of "no sun" would be dreary and desolate, and would in time be thought of as ruled by their enemy. Heaven has most generally been the idealization of our pleasures and desires, and hell the opposite. Dr. Krause argues that Dante followed closely these Teutonic legends, which had become the possession of the Christian world through Saxo Grammaticus, Beda Venerabilis, Albericus, Caedmon, and others; and cites as a proof of this that most southern people have pictured their hell as a burning sulphur-lake instead of the wintry desolation of an ice-palace. Paul Carus says:

"Dante's portraiture of the evil demon whom he calls 'Dis' agrees exactly with the appearance of the principal northern deity of evil, as he was commonly revered among the Celts, the Teutons, and the Slavs. 'Dis' has three faces; one in front, and one on each side. The middle face is red, that on the right side whitish yellow, that on the left side black. This the trinity idea was transferred to Satan on account of the ill-shaped idols of the crude art of northern civilization.

"Dante's description of Dis reminds us not only of the three-headed hoar-giant of the Eddas, Hrim-Grimnir, who lives at the door of death, but also of the trinity of various pagan gods, especially of Triglap, the triune deity of the Slavs." (5, p. 249.)

MILTON'S DEVIL.

Milton's idea of the fall of Satan from Heaven was doubtless taken from Caedmon's poem of sixty-four lines, describing this as resulting from ambition to rival God. He and his followers were represented as being cast out into hell already prepared, and were thus punished by an already existing devil. He wove this idea into a powerful epic, which has influenced our belief in Satan more than the Bible itself. Isaiah XIV. 9-17 embodies this theme in part, but it evidently refers to the war on earth instead of in Heaven. The oppressed Hebrews, who believed themselves to be God's chosen people, could see nothing else but

that Satan had become prince of the world, embodied in their cruel oppressors.

Milton took up this theme, and wove it into such a great literary production, that men have taken it for a revelation, believing their opinions were taken from the Bible.

The following paragraphs are the substance of David Masson's masterly analyses of Milton's Satan, as taken from his work on *The Three Devils*.

Milton's idea was not like Luther's, to portray the devil, but for literary effect. He traces the fall of this ruined arch angel from the epoch of creation when Satan, traveling from star to star, concocted this gigantic scheme of ambition and revenge.

Milton had great difficulties in representing a supernatural condition of beings and at the same time to construct a plausible story that was not like one of Aesop's fables. It would be difficult to retain Satan with all that power as an object or person, yet he weaves it in forcibly:

"Thus Satan talking to his nearest mate,
With head uplift above the waves and eyes
That sparkling blazed; his other parts beside
Prone on the floods extended long and large
Lay floating many a rood."

His infinitude of space in hell is made comprehensible by the description of a gate to enter. His Satan was exempt from the law of gravitation, easily floating from star to star; this seems to be a masterly stroke to describe his power over the world and worldly things.

Milton does not give his creatures any more intelligence than human beings. He brought the philosophy of the devil down to earth, showing him to have ambition, desire and revenge, and to have acted as man would act in similar surroundings.

His presentation of Heaven was not a locality, but an infinite distance, stretching out on all sides; underneath was the equally infinite, howling, angry night. This space in Heaven was peopled by innumerable hosts of angels and angelic beings, four of whom, Raphael, Gabriel, Michael and Satan, had power over all others, and were next in creation to God himself. Satan did the work of God faithfully and earnestly until becoming so absorbed in his service, like a human being, he forgot his Master, and imagined himself to be the *all*. When God called the four together to announce his only begotten Son King on the Holy hill of Zion, Satan frowned and became a rebel. He had not meditated this rebellion, nor laid schemes as to how he could outwit God, but on the impulse of the moment he was angered beyond recall. He had felt himself so great and now was to have two masters instead of one.

In his revolt, a third part of the angels went with him, being so accustomed to him as their ruler. Beelzebub, a high official, was his intimate friend, so were Moloch, Belial, Mammon, etc.

One cannot help admiring his independence, as pointed out by Milton; with his chosen band of followers, he had rather reign in hell though in torment, than serve in Heaven in peace.

Beelzebub was his faithful helper, when this scheme of revolt was laid. In the wars that followed, he was not warring against God, but against his fellow-angels, whom he knew and feared not. He was too wise to expect to conquer God, when he had only one-third of the heavenly hosts on his side, for, when the Messiah interfered, Satan and his hosts were expelled from Heaven, fleeing themselves before his thunder.

God now determined to create a new kind of being, who, though lower than the angels, could work themselves up; so he made Adam and Eve, and placed them in the beautiful Garden of Eden.

Satan now resolved to do all evil, because good would delight God, yet, as he visits the world for the first time, his thoughts were not evil, but sad and noble. He reasons with himself and maps out his course again for evil,—only because of opposition to God, and began his career as Prince of the World by tempting Eve. He is a worthy hero here.

Milton makes Satan the embodiment and type of the English Lord fighting the true church of Christ, as he termed the Puritans.

GOETHE'S DEVIL.

The various Faust legends of Marlowe, Klinger, Goethe, all portray Mephistopheles as the personification of desire in this world. Mankind has always sought for knowledge and pleasure. Goethe beautifully embodied these as Mephistopheles. He saw that neither cruelty, falsehood, malice, nor pride could be the great evil of the world, but that it must be ambition to know and the selfish desire for pleasure. Mephistopheles was only meant to typify the evil spirit of his time, and portrayed by Goethe only in a literary way. If Goethe believed in a devil it must have been other than Mephistopheles for he tempted mankind only in these special ways. He was not a development of evil, but a full-grown representation as it exists now, and, as such, is a devil to the very core. He fulfils his part of the bargain to the letter, and cannot be charged with unfaithfulness. He drags Faust from scene to scene, from pleasure to pleasure, giving him all that he asks, but, in the end, demands and receives his soul. He knows where all screws are loose, and loosens others. He does not repent, and seems never to have a twinge of conscience. This powerful being is an index to the earlier thinking of his age. The priests and ministers were so narrow that they could not correlate pleasure and piety. Philosophers, who had dug out some new idea in regard to the universal explanation of things, were represented as dangerous enemies

to mankind. Astronomers, who made the stars look larger, were shunned. Chemists, who worked with crucibles and test-tubes, performed their magic by the aid of the devil. Such ideas, coupled with this false sense of piety, the absence of mirth and pleasure, would lead to devil-bargains. It must have been a great concession to give up the brilliant and gay world, its pleasures and enjoyments, to the devil. He must needs have been, as Goethe represented him, powerful and strong.

PRESENT THEOLOGY.

Both the Catholic and Protestant ideas in regard to Satan changed greatly after the Reformation. This was due to the intense interest aroused in all lines of study by the Renaissance, and especially by Luther's activity in this field. Luther, himself, strongly believed in a personal devil, even throwing his inkstand at him one day in his study. He could not shake off the years of early training, but he gave such a stimulus to a scientific study of theological problems that some of his contemporaries and many of his successors were able to do so,—both of the Catholic and Protestant faiths. Those who held to this belief saw it modified so as to hardly be recognized as the same thing. So long as such things were unquestioned, and accepted on priestly authority, they would not change; but, when people began to think about eternal punishment, devil-possession, etc., being based solely on Church authority, or a few texts in the Bible, they would naturally wonder whether matters of such vital importance would stand on such slender bases.

Another factor, which was conducive to this change, was the different environment of the Teutonic races as compared with the old Jewish and Roman life. They lived amid the beautiful, natural scenery of the forests, and encountered no animals stronger than the wild boar, deer and wolf. They could not understand and appreciate the monsters described in *Revelations*, so resorted to distorted and caricatured forms, and bestial combinations to represent their devils. This was carried to such an extent that Satan became an object of mirth, and, even now, we smile when his name is mentioned.

When the Protestants became pretty strong rivals with the Catholics, what one did was represented as diabolical by the other. Luther's devil, as a holy monk, although real to him,

was undoubtedly conceived in this light. He was an emissary of the Catholic church to revile him to return, showing him what he had lost by withdrawing. Probably there was a great sum of money included in the temptation. On the other hand, Luther, in reviving language and educating the people, was a devil to the priests. They saw what they might lose,—“These knowers will become as one of us!” The exorcisms, practiced by the Catholics against evil spirits and witches, were denounced by Protestants as coming from the devil. To them holy water and the sign of the cross were idolatrous and ignorant. Even while inwardly believing in their efficiency, they thought it a kind of casting out devils by Beelzebub, the prince of devils. The Catholics, as a body, contend with the Protestants, the Protestants split up in a thousand and one sects, believe all the others wrong but themselves. The masses in all yet believe in a personal devil. The educated clergy have almost entirely abandoned the idea, but are afraid to preach it, because many of their best members would not stand for it. Some, independent of the salary, have dared to do so.

Many, it is true, preach the higher morality, and salvation by character as the core of Jesus’ great teachings; others ignore completely all attempts at explaining the Biblical problem of evil; while a host of them are still fundamentally interested in keeping their members out of Hell. They still base all the worthy ideals held up by Jesus on the selfish standard of gaining a happy home in Heaven, and avoiding individual punishment in Hell.

Rank egotism is the incentive to all such teaching, and, as such, has done irreparable harm. The ministers alone are not responsible for this, but it is for them to change it. The same Mediaeval songs that inspired the butchers of the Inquisition are used in our twentieth century hymn books. Only about a month ago I heard the following song in one of Worcester’s largest churches:

“O come thou rod of Jesse, free
Thine own from Satan’s tyranny;
From depths of Hell thy people save,
And give us victory over the grave.”

Such philosophy surely has lost its hold on a twentieth-century cultured mind. The minister of the present has the problem of the ages on his shoulders. When a young college fellow,

filled with modern psychology and philosophy, goes back to his country-town, or even his city-home, the gap is too great, he cannot bridge it. His pastor, who still gives him Mediaeval theology, cannot inspire him any more. So he rejects it all. It would not be so bad, were the results seen only in him, but his influence is wide and many go with him in destroying our beloved Christianity. Surely there is no question more vital; and we, as teachers and psychologists, should help out this great movement in protecting Christianity, which is the only secure basis for the morality of our nation.

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THE DEATH OF PAN: POETRY AND SCIENCE.

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Plutarch records this story: In the reign of the Emperor Tiberius, one Thamus, a pilot, steering near the coast of Paxos, heard suddenly a loud voice, which bade him proclaim "Great Pan is dead." Upon his arrival at Palodes, he had the news announced from the poop of his vessel. No sooner was this done than there was heard a great noise of lamentation, Nature giving vent to her profound grief.

With the death of Pan, the gods hid themselves in the remotest corners of the universe, and the oracles ceased. The Naiads forsook the rivers, the Dryads the forests, the Oreads the hills and mountains. The disinherited gods turned to pale silent ghosts. The "glory and the loveliness" of things seemed to have passed away altogether. The heart of Nature grew cold, and her sleep-pressed lids shut out from the sight of men her beautiful eyes, while her face counterfeited death. Down to Hades, where were congregated the wandering shades of men, swept the ghostly throng of deities, and "the good old days" were by forever.

The death of Pan, which legend assigned to the reign of Tiberius, was, by other stories, made coincident with the birth or the ascension of Christ, and the early Christian world took up the fable of the passing of the great heathen deity and made it one of the signal proofs of the triumph of the new religion. So it came about that, later, two quite different groups of poets sang of the death of Pan.

The heathen bards, who still survived, naturally enough, assumed the strain of lamentation for the disappearance of the ancient glories and the beauties of the old mythology, solacing themselves with the belief, sometimes, that the divinities of sky, earth, sea, and air, were, after all, not really dead, but only sleeping, or wandering far from home, and would one day return to make the whole world glad. Some, however, were absolutely pessimistic, glimpsing the departed greatness only, with no hope of its future restoration.

Christian poets, jealous of the fame and honor of their religion, sang the downfall of the old gods as the necessary prelude to the regeneration of the world. Some of these sought even to identify Pan with Satan. Others, with Milton, in his magnificent *Ode on the Morning of Christ's Nativity*:

“The oracles are dumb;
No voice or hideous hum
Runs through the archèd roof in words deceiving.
Apollo from his shrine
Can no more divine,
With hollow shriek the steep of Delphos leaving:
No nightly trance or breathèd spell
Inspires the pale-eyed priest from the prophetic cell.

The lonely mountains o'er
And the resounding shore
A voice of weeping heard and loud lament;
From haunted spring and dale
Edgèd with poplar pale
The parting genius is with sighing sent;
With flower-inwoven tresses torn
The Nymphs in twilight shade of tangled thicket mourn.

In consecrated earth
And on the holy hearth
The Lars and Lemures moan with midnight plaint;
In urns and altars round
A drear and dying sound
Affrights the Flamens at their service quaint;
And the chill marble seems to sweat,
While each peculiar Power foregoes his wonted seat.”

connect the legend with the birth and not the crucifixion of Christ, perhaps a more poetic treatment of the theme.

Later poets of Christian raees, too, bewailed the passing of the beauties of heathendom. This was a common feeling in the last years of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth as a reaetion against the materialism and scepticism of the age. For the continent of Europe, Sehiller voiced the sentiment of grief over what had been lost, and vainly wished it back. His poem, *The Gods of Greece*, is perhaps the most ambitious discussion of the topic we possess. Part of it may be quoted here:

“Then through a veil of dreams
Woven by Song, Truth's youthful beauties glowed,
And life's redundant and rejoicing streams
Gave to the soulless, soul,—where'er they flowed.

Man gifted Nature with divinity,
 To lift and link her to the breast of Love;
 All things betrayed to the initiate eye
 The track of Gods above.

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Art thou, fair world, no more?
 Return, thou virgin-bloom on Nature's face;
 Ah, only on the Minstrel's magic shore,
 Can we the footstep of sweet Fable trace!
 The meadows mourn for the old hallowing life,
 Vainly we search the earth of good bereft:
 Where once the warm and living shapes were rife,
 Shadows alone are left.

Cold from the North, has gone
 Over the Flowers the blast that killed their May;
 And to enrich the worship of the One,
 A universe of gods must pass away
 Mourning I search on yonder starry steeps,
 But thee no more, Selene, there I see!
 And through the wood I call, and o'er the deep,
 And,—Echo answers me.

Deaf to the joys she gives—
 Blind to the pomp of which she is possessed—
 Unconscious of the spiritual Power that lives
 Around and rules her—by our bliss unblest—
 Dull to the Art that colors or creates,
 Like the dead time-piece, godless Nature creeps
 Her plodding round, and, by the leaden weights
 The slavish motion keeps!

To-morrow to receive
 New life, she digs her proper grave to-day;
 And icy moons, with weary sameness, weave
 From their own light their fulness and decay;
 Home to the Poet's land the Gods are flown;
 Light use in *them* that later world discerns,
 Which, the diviner leading-strings outgrown,
 On its own axle turns.

Home!—and with *them* are gone
 The hues they gazed on, and the tones they heard,
 Life's beauty, and life's melodies,—alone
 Broods o'er the desolate void the lifeless Word!
 Yet, rescued from time's deluge, still they throng
 Unseen, the Pindus they were wont to cherish,
 Ah,—that which gains immortal life in song
 To mortal life must perish!"

Thus sang one of Germany's greatest poets. The fact that one half his genius was meant for science prevented Goethe, the greatest of all, from treading altogether the same path. Goethe, too, lamented the glories of Greek mythology, but he was too great a seer not to glimpse something of the brilliant dawn of science soon to break over all the world. Himself both poet and scientist, he prophesied the future of true genius.

The legitimate successors of the mourners for the departed nature-spirit of old Greece are to be met with in those poets, who, a little more than a century ago, sang of the misfortunes of mankind incident upon the advent of science (then twinned with materialism of the grosser sort), which was to do for the modern age what the coming of Christianity had done for the ancient, and complete the ruin of the beauty and the glory that made the primitive world a Paradise, wherein the gods veritably walked and talked with men. The whole epoch seemed permeated with the belief that poetry and science were in absolute and eternal antagonism, a great gulf, never to be overpassed, stretching between them. Burke, in his *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, declared: "But the age of chivalry is gone; that of sophisters, economists and calculators has succeeded." Contemporary poets, stunned by the common materialism, saw in science only the enemy of the beautiful, if not also of the good and the true.

Campbell gives expression to this feeling in his poem, *To the Rainbow*:

"Triumphal arch, that fill'st the sky
When storms prepare to part!
I ask not proud Philosophy
To teach me what thou art.

Still seem, as to my childhood's sight,
A midway station given
For happy spirits to alight,
Betwixt the earth and heaven."

Keats, in *Lamia*, is even more pronounced:

"Do not all charms fly
At the mere touch of cold philosophy?
There was an awful rainbow once in heaven;
We know her woof, her texture; she is given
In the dull catalogue of common things.
Philosophy will clip an angel's wings,

Conquer all mysteries by rule and line,
 Empty the haunted air, and gnomed mine—
 Unweave a rainbow."

According to Haydon, Keats (and Lamb agreed with him) declared that "Newton destroyed all the poetry of the rainbow by reducing it to the prismatic colors;" and only two years before his death he wrote—

"O, for an age so sheltered from annoy,
 That I may never know how change the moons,
 Or hear the voice of busy common-sense!"

But, enamored of Greek mythology as he was, and wearied by the cares and ills of life, the verses in which he dedicated his *Early Poems* to Leigh Hunt prove that he was not altogether without some idea of the other blessings of mankind:

"Glory and loveliness have passed away;
 For, if we wander out in early morn,
 No wreathed incense do we see upborne
 Into the east, to meet the smiling day;
 In woven baskets, bringing ears of corn,
 Roses, and pinks, and violets, to adorn
 The shrine of Flora in her early May.

But there are left delights as high as these,
 And I shall ever bless my destiny.
 That, in a time when under pleasant trees
 Pan is no longer sought, I feel a free,
 A leafy luxury, seeing I could please,
 With these poor offerings, a man like thee."

And, in his famous sonnet *On the Grasshopper and Cricket*, he affirms the eternity of "the poetry of earth."

Coleridge lent his voice also to the chorus. Those words of Schiller, which he so well translated, reveal his mood:

"The intelligent forms of ancient poets,
 The fair humanities of old religion.
 The Power, the Beauty, and the Majesty
 That had their haunts in dale or piny mountain,
 Or forest, by slow stream, or pebbly spring.
 Or chasms, or watery depths; all these have vanished,
 They live no longer in the faith of reason;
 But still the heart doth need a language; still
 Doth the old instinct bring back the old names;
 Spirits or gods that used to share this earth
 With man as with their friends: and at this day
 'Tis Jupiter who brings whate'er is great.
 And Venus who brings everything that's fair."

The whole "Lake School" of poets held practically similar views. Indeed, Stedman, in his *Turnbull Lectures on the Nature and Elements of Poetry*, says: "The chief contributions of the Lake School to our definition are the recognition of the imagination and the antithesis of science to poetry."

Wordsworth, the great leader of this school, saw further than his fellows. He wrote:

"These mighty workmen of our later age,
 Who, with a broad highway, have overbridged
 The foward chaos of futurity,
 Tamed to their bidding; they who have the skill
 To manage books, and things, and make them act
 On infant minds as surely as the sun
 Deals with a flower; the keepers of our time,
 The guides and wardens of our faculties,
 Sages, who, in their prescience would control
 All accidents, and to the very road
 Which they have fashioned would confine us down,
 Like engines; when will their presumption learn,
 That in the unreasoning progress of the world
 A wiser spirit is at work for us,
 A better eye than theirs, most prodigal
 Of blessings, and most studious of our good,
 Even in what seem our most unfruitful hours!"

But he likewise composed these lines which really bespeak the unity of the poet and the man of science:

"From Nature doth emotion come, and moods
 Of calmness equally are Nature's gift:
 This is her glory; these two attributes
 Are sister horns that constitute her strength.
 Hence Genius, born to thrive by interchange
 Of peace and excitation, finds in her
 His best and purest friend; from her receives
 That energy by which he seeks the truth,
 From her that happy stillness of the mind
 Which fits him to receive it when unsought."

Others than the "Lake poets" sorrowed with Schiller. Bryan Waller Proctor, or "Barry Cornwall," as he was better known, wrote—

"O ye delicious fables! when the wave
 And woods were peopled, and the air, with things
 So lovely! why, ah! why has science grave
 Scattered afar your sweet imaginings?"

Passing to America, we find Edgar Allan Poe making the same onslaught upon science:

"Science, true daughter of Old Time thou art,
Who alterest all things with thy peering eyes.
Why preyst thou thus upon the poet's heart,
Vulture, whose wings are dull realities?
How should he love thee? or how deem thee wise,
Who wouldst not leave him in his wandering
To seek for treasure in the jewelled skies,
Albeit he soared with an undaunted wing?
Hast thou not dragged Diana from her ear?
And driven the Hamadryad from the wood
To seek a shelter in some happier star?
Hast thou not torn the Naiad from her flood,
The Elfin from the green grass, and from me
The summer dream beneath the Tamarind tree?"

Burke's lament over the passing of chivalry was extended by Macaulay, himself both critic and poet, to include poetry. Not only did he declare that "the most wonderful and splendid proof of genius is a great poem produced in a civilized age," but he gave utterance also to the famous dictum: "As civilization advances, poetry necessarily declines," which opinion, even twenty-five years ago, was one of the stock themes of debating clubs and literary societies all over the English-speaking world. The best answer to such views found expression in the blunt words of the *Noctes Ambrosianae* of Christopher North:

"Shepherd. What think ye, sir, o' the dogma that high imagination is incompatible wi' high intellect, and that as science flourishes poetry decays.

North. The dogmata of dunces are beneath the reach of redemption. A man may have a high intellect with little or no imagination; but he cannot have a high imagination with little or no intellect. The intellect of Homer, Dante, Milton, or Shakespeare, was higher than that of Aristotle, Newton and Bacon. When elevated by feeling into imagination, their intellect becomes transcendent, and thus were they poets, the noblest name by far and away that belongs to any of the children of men."

The idea that poetry is of the heart and science of the head, and that these two elements of the human individual and their expression in culture are in complete antithesis, moved Robert Burns, doubtless, to pen his biting verses:

"What's a' your jargon o' your schools,
Your Latin names for horns and stools;
If honest Nature made you fools,

What stars poor grammars!
To I better or ten my spades and shovels
Or knapsack-bambers.
A set o' dull conceited masters
Concuse their brains in college classes
They gong in ranks and come off issues.
Plain truth to speak,
And soon they climb to Mount Parnassus
By this o' Greek.
One we be spark o' Nature's fire
That's all the learning I desire.
Then, though I wade through life and vice,
As plough or cart,
My nose though namely in urea
May touch the bear."

This poem was evidently in the mind of Lowell when he wrote *An Incident in a Balkan War*, in which he has treated the subject in a thoroughly optimistic vein:

"He that hath been majestic
In life or death since time began,
Is native in the simple heart of all
The angel heart of man.

And now among the numerous poor
Great deeds and feelings find a home
When cause is shadow in the golden bire
Of classic Greece or Rome.

All thoughts that mould the age begin
Deep down within the primitive soul,
And from the many, slowy toward one,
To One, who grasps the whole."

Lowell, however, had no false idea of the eternal antagonism between poetry and science or between poetry and civilization. One of the wisest sayings in his *Henry M. Bracken* is this: "In the earliest ages science was poetry, as in the latter poetry has become science."

The day when science was poetry saw the glories of Greek genius, and the present age, when poetry is becoming science, prophesies an expression of the human mind in true song beside which the literature of the Hellenic era will seem but a moon of magnificence, compared with the small and all-inspiring sun. When science and culture are truly wedded the real glory of poetry will begin to appear. Even now the dross in the desert bid us make straight the paths for its coming.

The prelude to that great outburst of song may be said to have been written by Mrs. Browning, reacting from Schiller's *Gods of Greece*, wherein is set forth what she terms "a doctrine still more dishonoring to poetry than to Christianity." Her poem, *The Dead Pan*, treats the theme in masterly fashion from the Christian stand-point:

"O ye vain, false gods of Hellas,
Ye are silent evermore!
And I dash down this old chalice
Whence libations ran of yore.
See, the wine crawls in the dust,
Wormlike,—as your glories must,
Since Pan is dead.

Get to dust, as common mortals
By a common doom and track
Let no Schiller from the portals
Of that Hades call you back,
Or instruct us to weep all
At your antique funeral.
Pan, Pan, is dead.

By your beauty, which confesses
Some chief Beauty conquering you,—
By our grand heroic guesses
Through your falsehood at the True,—
We will weep not earth shall roll
Heir to each god's aureole—
And Pan is dead.

Earth outgrows the mythic fancies
Sung beside her in her youth,
And those debonair romances
Sound but dull beside the truth.
Phoebus' chariot course is run:
Look up, poets, to the sun!
Pan, Pan, is dead.

.
Truth is fair; should we forego it?
Can we sigh right for a wrong;
God Himself is the best Poet,
And the Real is His song.
Sing His truth out fair and full,
And secure His beautiful.

Let Pan be dead.

Truth is large: our aspiration
Scarce embraces half we be.

Shame, to stand in His creation
And doubt Truth's sufficiency—
To think God's song unexcelling—
The poor tales of our own telling—
 Wheu Pan is dead.

What is true and just and honest,
What is lovely, what is pure,
All of praise that hath admonished,
All of virtue shall endure;
These are themes for poet's uses,
Stirring nobler than the Muses,
 Ere Pan was dead.

O brave poets, keep back nothing,
Nor mix falsehood with the whole;
Look up Godward; speak the truth in
Worthy song from earnest soul:
Hold, in high poetic duty,
Truest Truth the fairest Beauty!
 Pan, Pan, is dead."

The New Christianity and the New Science are in no mortal antagonism.

Matthew Arnold, not less eminent as a critic than as a poet, wrote:

"We should conceive of poetry worthily, and more highly than it has been the custom to conceive of it. We should conceive of it as capable of higher uses, and called to higher destinies, than those which in general men have assigned to it hitherto. More and more mankind will discover that we have to turn to poetry to interpret life for us, to console us, to sustain us. Without poetry our science will appear incomplete, and most of what now passes with us for religion and philosophy will be replaced by poetry."

Dr. D. G. Brinton tells us that "The poetry of science will be the inspiration of the religion of the future." Happy day, when the two real "makers" among the sons of men, poets both, and both men of science, unite to discover and then to picture the good, the true and the beautiful throughout the universe of man! It is more than accident that Tyndall has been called a poet among men of science and Tennyson a scientist among poets! It was Tyndall who wrote of the man of science (cited by Berdoe, p. 62):

"He lives a life of the senses, using his hands, eyes, and ears in his experiments, but is constantly being carried beyond the margin of the senses. His mind must realize the sub-sensible world, and possess a

pietorial power; if the picture so formed be correct, the phenomena he is investigating are accounted for. Imagination with him does not sever him from the world of fact; this is the storehouse from which all its pictures are drawn; and the magic of its art consists, not in creating things anew, but in so changing the magnitude, position, and other relations of sensible things as to fit them for the requirements of the intellect in the sub-sensible world."

Said Christopher North (cited by Berdoe, p. 62), combatting the idea that science and imagination must always be at daggers drawn:

"What is science? True knowledge of mind and matter, as far as it is permitted to us to know anything truly of the world without and the world within us, congenial to their co-existence. What is poetry? The true exhibition in musical and metrical speech of the thoughts of humanity, when colored by its feelings throughout the whole range of the physical, moral, intellectual and spiritual regions of its being.

"Poetry and science are identical—or rather, that, as imagination is the highest kind of intellect, so poetry is the highest kind of science. It is only in an age of science that anything worthy the name of poetry can exist."

No matter how great the triumphs of science in the future, poetry will still be the source of its noblest and truest expression. As Shelley tells us, in that eloquent plea for his art, *A Defense of Poetry*:

"Poetry is indeed something divine. It is at once the center and circumference of knowledge; it is that which comprehends all science, and that to which all science must be referred. It is at the same time the root and blossom of all other systems of thought; it is that from which all spring, and that which adorns all; and that which, if blighted, denies the fruit and the seed, and withdraws from the barren world the nourishment and the succession of the scions of the tree of life. It is the perfect and consummate surface and bloom of all things; it is as the odor and the color of the rose to the texture of the elements which compose it, as the form and splendor of unfaded beauty to the secrets of anatomy and corruption."

But it is Wordsworth, curiously enough, whose poetry incarnates some of the deepest and wisest thoughts of science, and he has best described the league existing between the Poet and the Man of Science:

"Poetry is the first and last of all knowledge: it is immortal as the heart of men. If the labors of the men of science should ever create any revolution, direct or indirect, in our condition, and in the impressions which we habitually receive, the poet will then sleep no more than at present; he will be ready to follow the steps of the man of science,

not only in those general indirect effects, but he will be at his side, carrying sensation into the midst of the objects of the science itself.

"The remotest discoveries of the chemist, the botanist, or mineralogist, will be as proper objects of the poet's as any upon which it can be employed, if the time should ever come when these things shall be familiar to us, and the relations under which they are contemplated by the followers of the respective sciences shall be manifestly and palpably material to us as enjoying and suffering beings.

"If the time should ever come when what is now called science, thus familiarized to men, shall be ready to put on, as it were, a form of flesh and blood, the poet will lend his divine spirit to aid the transfiguration, and will welcome the being thus produced as a dear and genuine inmate of the household of man."

In our pride of race and culture we are too prone to think that towering mountains and broad oceans separate the poets of today from their fellows of the long ago when, as Emerson said: "Every word was . . . a poem." Yet, even as all primitive men were largely poets, so, in spite of the vicissitudes of the ages, all poets are largely primitive men in the highest and best sense of the term. Unbreakable links bind together the first poet of our race and the last. As Dr. D. G. Brinton well says, in a brief essay on *Primitive American Poetry*: "We may look on their poetry as the biologist does on the rudimentary forms of organic life,—low in structure, if you please, but, after all, those which reveal to us most clearly the laws which underlie the highest forms." The poets who foreshadow, the one rudely and carelessly, the other majestically and deliberately, the future of their art, are Whitman and Browning, whose victory over the "musty rules of meter and prosody," subordination of poetic devices to thought, and defiance of the artificialities of grammar, clearly mark out some of the chief characteristics of poetry in the centuries to come. And these characteristics are nearly all, if not all, such as are found in the poetry of primitive man, having been abandoned during the development of alleged culture for reasons akin to those which account for the teaching of Latin in grade schools to the detriment of the mother-tongue, the resort to war as a method of propagating Christianity and American political principles, the use of corsets and other excrencences of the age for which no real justification exists.

Biese, in his interesting work on the *Philosophy of the Metaphoric*, seeks to show how near the mind of primitive man is to the growing thought of today: The child's instinct, the sav-

age's *naïveté*, the wisdom of the genius and the philosopher are one. The universe really is animate, ensouled, and man could not do otherwise than think so. The ensoulment of all is the first unitary thought of mankind.

Alexander Swieochowski, a Polish man of science, published, some few years ago, a book entitled *The Poet as Primitive Man*, in which, using the literature of his own language to draw upon, he seeks to show how closely, and in how many respects, the poet of today resembles the savage of the early ages of mankind. But, while so doing, the author magnifies the difference between the poet and the man of science, conceiving the latter as freed from the ties which bind the poet to the men of other days.

And the poetry of primitive man and the science of civilized man are not so divergent in their origins after all. From a certain point of view, indeed, they are, in their essentials, one. As Vignoli says in his suggestive book on *Myth and Science* (p. 131):

"This faculty, inward function, and process of mythical and symbolical facts led in course of time to the evolution and beginning of knowledge, which is first empirical and then rational. Therefore, we must repeat, the extrinsic and intrinsic perception, the specification of types, and their modification into a unity which was always becoming more comprehensive, are the conditions and method of science itself, which is only developed by means of this faculty. Hence the elements and intrinsic logical form of science are identical with those through which mythical representations and the inward life of the human intelligence are developed."

In other words:

"The act which produces the myth is therefore the same from which science proceeds, so that their original source is identical. The same process which constitutes the fetish and myth also constitutes science in its conditions and form, and here we find the unique fact which generates them both; science, like myth, would be impossible without apprehension, without the individuation of ideas, and the classification and specification of types."

The solidarity which makes science is the same solidarity which aforetime made myth. Even in the range from savage myth to American science of the twentieth century *Natura non facit saltum*. Moreover, Dr. Franz Boas, in his illuminating study of *The Mind of Primitive Man*, taking the ground that "mythology, theology, philosophy are different terms for the same influences which shape the current of human thought, and which determine the character of the attempts of man to

explain the phenomena of nature," compares the rôle of folklore in shaping primitive science with "the enormous influence of current philosophical opinion upon the masses of the people," and "the influence of the dominant scientific theory upon the character of scientific work."

Emerson, wise as he was, overstepped the mark when he declared so dogmatically: "You may as well ask a loom which weaves huckaback why it does not make cashmere, as expect poetry from this engineer, or a chemical discovery from that jobber." Here he had forgotten the cardinal distinction between an implement and a man. Every human being is a maker, but every loom is made. The engineer does sometimes burst into song. Here is a poem by an engineer:

SPEAK KIND TO THE BAIRNS.

"Speak kind to the bairnies, the wee toddlin' treasures,
The ingle-neuk angels that banish a' strife;
Their innocent plays are the source o' their pleasures,
Their lauchin' an' rompin' the soul o' their life.

O! wha could be thrawn wi' a bairnie's sweet smilin'?
Wha, wha to their cuddlin' an' kissin' is blind?
The heart maun be deid to a' beauty beguilin',
That canna thole bairnies, an' speak to them kind.

Our freen's may be caudrife, our toil may be weary,
Our way may be sma' aff the little we earn,
But rich in affection, we, joyous and cheery,
Wad gie our last bannock to comfort our bairn.
O! what has a man on this earth to be proud o'?
Were't no' for the nurselin's by heaven designed
To licht'en the life that they show him the good o'?
Sae thole wi' their capers an' speak to them kind.

Sair, sair, are the tears o' the bairnies neglectit,
Their wee hearts are broken beneath a harsh word;
They love to be loved wi' a love unrestrictit,
An' joy when their troubles are couthelie heard.
Hoo happy to ken we hae some that aye love us,
Come age, or come death, they will bear us in mind;
They'll drap a love-tear on the green sod above us,
An' sigh as they say that we ever were kind."

This seems to be good poetry and sound "child-study" doctrine besides. The author of this poem, William Allan, was an engineer. As an engineer, he served in the Royal Navy, in the Glasgow ship-yards, and on a blockade runner during the War of the Secession in America,—it is his poem, "Kit, the

Courier," that records sympathetically the story of the last moments of Stonewall Jackson. He has published several volumes of verse, including many tender poems of child-life. He has since become a master-engineer, and a successful man of business, of whom we read: "He writes poems and songs, too, with the same hearty 'fung' and energy with which he builds engines and advocates the rights of man, and all in the intervals of a busy work-a-day life." He has also been knighted by his sovereign. So at least one engineer has climbed the slopes of Parnassus' hill. And there are others.

Another Scotchman, Alexander G. Murdoch, styled "a poet of rare and approved quality," and likewise a singer of child-life, began his career as an engineer in the ship-yards of the Clyde. Emerson forgot, too, that in the days of old every worker was a poet, as Dr. Bücher has so admirably shown in his recent volume on *Work and Rhythm*. It is possible today for the engineer to become a poet, because, in primitive times, every engineer was a poet. Indeed, it is largely the divorce of labor and song, accompanying, but not necessarily a permanent characteristic of, our great civilization, that has made some of our civilized communities so barren of real poetry. Just as the association of poetry and war has kept a halo about the head of the devotees of a barbaric art, so has the separation of work and song degraded the laborer and kept him from rising equally with the most dignified classes of mankind. Not only is the laborer worthy of his hire, as civilized man says, but he is also worthy of his song, as primitive peoples have unanimously asserted.

The occasion to which Wordsworth looked forward may have already arrived, for the new doctrine of evolution is "creating a revolution, both direct and indirect in our condition, and in the impressions which we habitually receive." And the poet is now beginning to tell the world in beauty and in truth the new order of things born of the brain and genius of Darwin and the innumerable host of students of man and of nature whom his epoch-making thought has called into existence.

In his acute discussion of *The Individual*, Prof. N. S. Shaler observes: "The main difference between practical and poetical minds of like general capacity lies in the use which they have become accustomed to make of the spontaneously offered germs of thought." It is thus, more a question of method and habit

than of absolutely discrete endowments of the intellect. No people, at the present moment, are so practically-minded as the inhabitants of the United States, and yet nowhere else is there to be found such an abundance of excellent newspaper-verse and fugitive poetical literature. Nor has any other land in the world developed so extensively or so well the art of commemorative poetry, as our school and college occurrences, social reunions, public ceremonies, and occasions of family, local, state and national importance amply prove. Many an American man of genius has begun by being a class-poet, and it was an incident rather than a necessity of his after-life that when he devoted himself to science he forsook the Muses altogether. The amount of good poetry written by men of science in their youth, or again in green old age, when the individual undergoes a sort of renascence, is another fact in point. So, too, is the appreciation many men of science have had for the poet and his art.

Huxley, in many respects the man of science *par excellence* of the nineteenth century, left on record his testimony to the services of the poet to science, when he proposed that Tennyson should be made a Fellow of the Royal Society on equal footing with some of the most illustrious men of science in the world. Of Tennyson himself, Huxley said: "He was the only modern poet, in fact I think the only poet since the time of Lucretius, who has taken the trouble to understand the work and tendency of the men of science." He praised, in particular, the "insight into scientific method shown in *In Memoriam*," and declared it to be "quite equal to that of men of science themselves." And when the greatest poet of his day died, he had the unparalleled honor of having a poem composed in his memory by the foremost man of science, for Huxley paid tribute to his friend and interpreter in an ode of considerable merit, published in the *Nineteenth Century* for November, 1892.

This poem, by a great man of science on the death of a great poet, deserves reproduction here. The words are represented as spoken by the Minster in which Tennyson lies buried:

"Bring me my dead!
To me that have grown,
Stone laid upon stone,
As the stormy brood
Of English blood
Has waxed and spread
And filled the world,

With sails unfurled;
With men that may not lie;
With thoughts that cannot die.

Bring me my dead!
Into the storied hall,
Where I have garnered all
My harvest without weed;
My chosen fruits of goodly seed;
And lay him gently down among
The men of state, the men of song:
The thought-worn chieftains of the mind:
Head servants of the human kind.

Bring me my dead!
The autumn sun shall shed
Its beams athwart the bier's
Heaped blooms: a many tears
Shall flow; his words, in cadence sweet and strong,
Shall voice the full hearts of the silent throng.
Bring me my dead!

And oh! sad wedded mourner, seeking still
For vanished hand-clasp: drinking in thy fill
Of holy grief; forgive, that pious theft
Robs thee of all, save memories, left:
Not thine to kneel beside the grassy mound
While dies the western glow; and all around
Is silence: and the shadows closer creep
And whisper softly: All must fall asleep."

Huxley was not the only man of science who mourned the death of Tennyson. Dr. Daniel G. Brinton, the American anthropologist, one of the most eminent scientific men of our age, thoroughly appreciated the poet, and said that he "often went to him for light upon scientific perplexities." Like Huxley, too, Dr. Brinton published an important poem after middle life, though on an entirely different topic,—*Maria Candelaria*, the aboriginal American Joan of Arc.

Dr. Brinton has also left on record, in his *Pursuit of Happiness*, his opinion of the benefit poetry is to a man of science. After enumerating the wise maxim that in matters of reading one ought to "read all kinds," for "variety is the guiding principle," and "reading in ruts" is to be avoided, he observes (p. 161):

"For one branch of literature I must, however, put in a special claim, as it has been such a pleasure to me, ever since I learned to read, and that is Poetry. I have heard it sometimes said that this is a taste of

youth, and dies a natural death with advancing years. My own experience is quite the contrary. The delight we derive from accurate rhythm, melodious words, fine thoughts, and the depicting of deep emotions, ought to increase as our experience of the world and wider learning make us more familiar with them."

How, then, can men of science help loving and appreciating a poet, whose felicitous summings up of the results of their investigations are at once beautiful and generally accurate? Lucretius, we all know, is an ancient poet with quite a modern flavor. In his great poem, *De Rerum Natura*, barring its onslaughts on religion, we meet with many flashes of genius, that almost anticipate evolutional doctrine. Take, for example, his description of the civilizing of man out of his fierce and savage origins:

"The first mankind began their former rude,
And hard-enduring natures to relax;
Effeminate made by warmth, their shivering limbs.
No longer could endure the open sky;
Love mined their savage strength, and children's arts
Subdued the untamed temper of their sires.
Their neighbors 'gan to join in social league
With mutual bonds 'gainst violence and wrong;
Their tender children and the female sex
Clung for protection to the stronger man;
The tender mother fostering her child,
With gentle gesture, and with soothing words,
Then feelingly proclaimed that all the weak
'Twas fit the strong should pity and protect.
But not at once could concord reign supreme,
Faithful tho' many held to plighted faith;
Else had the human race become extinct,
Nor could have drawn their generations out."

Here is the same doctrine that Professor Sutherland has recently elaborately demonstrated in his two large volumes on *Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct* (London, 1898).

But Lucretius' thoughts are often crude and his verse still oftener cruder yet. Note the difference, when a master of form like Tennyson takes up the strain. In his dramatic monologue, *Lucretius*, the English poet states the atomic theory of the old Roman thus:

"A void was made in Nature; all her bonds
Crack'd; and I saw the flaring atom streams
And torrents of her myriad universe,
Ruining along the illimitable inane,

Fly on to clash together again, and make
 Another and another frame of things
 Forever."

Note also how the English poet has *résuméd* the story of evolution in the 118th section of that wonderful song of life and death and death and life, *In Memoriam*:

"They say
 The solid earth where on we tread
 In tracks of fluent heat began,
 And grew to seeming-random forms,
 The seeming prey of cyclic storms,
 Till at the last arose the man;
 Who threw and branch'd from clime to clime,
 The herald of a higher race,
 And of himself in higher place,
 If so he type this work of time
 Within himself, from more to more;
 Or, crowned with attributes of woe
 Like glories, move his course, and show
 That life is not as idle ore,
 But iron dug from central gloom,
 And heated hot with burning fears,
 And dipp'd in baths of hissing tears,
 And batter'd with the shocks of doom
 To shape and use. Arise and fly
 The reeling Faun, the sensual feast;
 Move upward, working out the beast,
 And let the ape and tiger die."

There are other happy summings up of scientific theories, such as these:

"This world was once a fluid haze of light,
 Till towards the center set the starry tides,
 And eddied into suns, that wheeling east,
 The planets: then the monster, then the man."

"The moanings of the homeless sea,
 The sound of streams that swift or slow
 Draw down the Aeonian hills and sow
 The dust of continents to be."

Again, in later years, Tennyson sang of *The Making of Man*:

"Where is one that, born of woman, altogether can escape
 From the lower world within him, moods of tiger or of ape?"

Man as yet is being made, and ere the crowning Age of ages,
Shall not æon after æon pass and touch him into shape?

All about him shadow still, but, while the races flower and fade,
Prophet-eyes may catch a glory slowly gaining on the shade,
Till the peoples all are one, and all their voices blend in chorie
Hallelujah to the Maker 'It is finish'd. Man is made.' ''

Scientists of the evolutionist school have told us of one of the great factors working towards the end of perfecting man. The evidence thereof and the investigator's way of putting the argument can be read in Havelock Ellis' *Man and Woman*, where the rôle of the child and its mother in shaping the destinies of the race is demonstrated. Tennyson, too, has sung of it:

"The woman's cause is man's; they rise or sink
Together, dwarf'd or godlike, bond or free:
For she that out of Lethe scales with man
The shining steps of Nature, shares with man
His nights, his days, moves with him to one goal,
Stays all the fair young planet in her hands—
If she be small, slight-natured, miserable,
How shall men grow? but work no more alone!
Our place is much: as far as in us lies
We too will serve them both in aiding her,
Will clear away the parasitic forms
That seem to keep her up but drag her down—
Will leave her space to burgeon out of all
Within her—let her make herself her own
To give or keep, to live and learn and be
All that not harms distinctive womanhood.
For woman is not undevelopt man,
But diverse: could we make her as the man,
Sweet Love were slain: his dearest bond is this,
Not like to like, but like in difference.
Yet in the long years liker must they grow;
The man be more of woman, she of man;
He gain in sweetness and in moral height,
Nor lose the wrestling thews that throw the world;
She mental breadth, nor fail in childward care,
Nor lose the childlike in the larger mind;
Till at the last she set herself to man,
Like perfect music unto noble words;
And so these twain, upon the skirts of time,
Sit side by side, full-summ'd in all their powers,
Dispensing harvest, sowing the to-be,
Self-reverent each, and revereneing each,
Distinct in individualities,
But like each other even as those who love.

Then comes the statelier Eden back to man;
Then reign the world's great bridals, chaste and calm;
Then springs the crowning race of human-kind."

What man of science has said these things better or more truly? This passage of Tennyson's is one of the jewels of English literature and one of the truths of science in a setting whose beauty is its rightful ornament. Who shall say that there is an eternal antithesis between poetry and science? Or who shall divide, in this man of genius, the one from the other? Have we not here a happy prophecy of their union in the future, an irrefragable proof of their belonging together?

There is another poet-scientist, in some respects the greatest master of song his race has seen since unrivaled Shakespeare filled the world with the masterpieces of the Anglo-Saxon mind. More than any one else, Robert Browning is the poet of evolution. A genius, wedded to a genius, and leaving behind him a descendant not unworthy of his parent's fame, artistic, learned, traveled, de-insularized, democratic, he represents more than any other single individual of our epoch the type of man evolution at its best can furnish the world.

Of him Dr. Berdoe says, in his *Browning's Message to his Times* (London, 1893):

"The scientific method, it is true, is not in favor with the minor poets; and it is not given even to all the greater to combine with the highest poetic faculty the deeper insight into the hidden things of nature possessed by Robert Browning. In him . . . the poetic and scientific methods are not merely found together, but are truly combined; and throughout his works are scattered abundant evidence that he, with keen vision, has seen far into the workings of Nature, and ennobled his phrase and verse from the study of her phenomena."

I will not unduly lengthen this essay with the innumerable passages which illustrate the beauty, the strength, and the eloquence of the great English poet as a man of science, for he was known and loved in America long before our slower cousins over-sea waked into full knowledge of the seer who dwelt among them. All are doubtless familiar with some of these illustrations and but a single example,—that noble prophecy of the future of our race from *Paracelsus*—will be cited here:

"Progress is
The law of life. Man is not man as yet.
Nor shall I deem his object served, his end

Attained, his genuine strength put fairly forth,
While only here and there a star dispels
The darkness, here and there a towering mind
O'erlooks its prostrate fellows: when the host
Is out at once to the despair of night,
When all mankind alike is perfected,
Equal in full-blown powers—then, not till then,
I say begins man's general infancy.
For wherefore make account of feverish starts.
Of restless members of a dormant whole,
Impatient nerves which quiver while the body
Slumbers as in a grave? Oh, long ago
The brow was twitched, the tremulous lids astir,
The peaceful mouth disturbed; half-uttered speech
Ruffled the lip, and then the teeth were set,
The breath drawn sharp, the strong right-hand clenched stronger,
As it would pluck a lion by the jaw;
The glorious creature laughed out even in sleep!
But when full roused, each giant limb awake,
Each sinew strung, the great heart pulsing fast,
He shall start up and stand on his own earth,
Then shall his long triumphant march begin,
Thence shall his being date,—thus wholly roused,
What he achieves shall be set down to him.
When all the race is perfected alike
As man, that is; all tended to mankind,
And, man produced, all has its end thus far:
But in completed man begins anew
A tendency to God. Prognostics told
Man's near approach; so in man's self arise
August anticipations, symbols, types
Of a dim splendor ever on before
In that eternal circle life pursues."

Browning marks a new era in the poetic art, the epoch now gathering in strength and beauty from having accepted the fact of evolution, not as an enemy of the Muse's art, but as its peer and co-worker in the unending task of gladdening the heart and broadening the mind of man with the search after and the demonstration of the true, the good and the beautiful in man and the infinite universe around, beneath him and above.

In the words of Dr. Berdoe (p. 57):

"It is not demanded the poet that he should ignore the beauty of the rainbow till he has studied Frauenhofer's lines. What we do say, is, that neither the scientist nor the poet alone comprehend Nature till they borrow from each—the one the reverence and the worship, the other the learning and loving study, that united make up the true spirit in

which she is to be approached. In Robert Browning, there is the happiest combination of these requisites."

Let us of today thank heaven that we were inhabitants of this earth at a time when Darwin searched and Tennyson and Browning sang, and be ready to greet, perhaps, ere we meet the common fate of men, the Darwin-Tennyson-Browning, who shall be the consummate "maker" of his age.

AN ORIGINAL CONTRIBUTION TO THE TERCENTENARY OF THE KING JAMES' VERSION OF THE ENGLISH BIBLE.

By ALEXANDER F. CHAMBERLAIN, Ph. D.
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The three hundredth anniversary of the King James' version of the English Bible has been already celebrated in many ways, and other observations of this important event are yet to come. One interesting aspect of the question is concerned with the translation of the Bible, in whole or in part, into the numerous languages of savage and barbarous peoples in all quarters of the globe.

The toll of these is now large, but there still exist many into which nothing, except in certain cases, the Lord's Prayer, or some portion of the liturgical literature of the Catholic church, has been translated. By Protestant hands quite often nothing at all has been done, and from that point of view these languages are virgin soil.

Such a tongue, *e. g.*, is the Kootenay, of southeastern British Columbia and northern Idaho, which forms one of the fifty or more independent linguistic stocks recognized by American ethnologists as existing north of Mexico. The author of this brief article has been engaged on the study of the Kootenay language for a number of years, having first investigated these Indians in 1891 under the auspices of the British Association for the Advanceement of Sciencee. As a small, original contribution to the literature of the tercentenary of the King James' version of the English Bible, it has occurred to him to offer a translation of a few verses into the language of the Kootenay Indians,—the first ever made of any portion of this section of the New Testament, as follows:

1. Núpqane Jésus yúnok'áine áqktsemákinek. Aqkowoktléets yoquáqe, sáusak'áine. Tlaqáqe néis netstáhatlnintékes.
2. Aqki kakétl'ne, nopqátl'ne:
3. Tsitlsúkitlkókine tlítltitine, tsukwáte áqkitlméyet amákis.
4. Tsitlsúkitlkókine netlá'ne, tshatlsúkitlwí'ne.
5. Tsitlsúkitlkókine k-asáhane, tshátlsúkwátine kápes amákis.

6. Tsitlsúkitlkókine tsitlsúkine nowásine, nókonókthumáine, tshatlikine kápes kápsins.
7. Tsitlsúkitlkókine kákipáimiek, tshatlkkákipamík' nám'ne.
8. Tsitlsúkitlkókine katlwí'ne ókwenámo súkine kápsins, tshatlnúpqane Yákasinksnawáskes.
9. Tsitlsúkitlkókine kátlanánanám'ne, tshátlaktlékine Yákasinksnawáske aqkáqltenintékes.

The verses translated are Matthew V. 1-9, in English:

1. And seeing the multitudes, he went up into a mountain: and when he was set, his disciples came unto him:
2. And he opened his mouth, and taught them, saying,
3. Blessed are the poor in spirit: for theirs is the kingdom of heaven.
4. Blessed are they that mourn: for they shall be comforted.
5. Blessed are the meek: for they shall inherit the earth.
6. Blessed are they which do hunger and thirst after righteousness: for they shall be filled.
7. Blessed are the merciful: for they shall obtain mercy.
8. Blessed are the pure in heart: for they shall see God.
9. Blessed are the peace-makers: for they shall be called the children of God.

This translation is, of course, not perfect, but it is, doubtless, quite up to the average of Bible translations into primitive tongues, if not beyond it; and the passages rendered are by no means the easiest. To make the matter clearer the following explanatory vocabulary may serve:

1. *Amakis.* Oblique case of *amak*, "land, earth, country;" *kape amak*, "all the land," "earth;" *aqkitlmeyet amakis*, "sky land," "heaven."
2. *Aqkaqltenintekes.* "His children." Oblique case, plural, of *aqkaqlte*, "child."
3. *Aqli.* "And."
4. *Aqkitlmeyet.* "Sky." Hence *aqkitlmeyet amakis*, "heaven,"—literally "sky land—its."
5. *Aqkitlmeyet amakis.* "Heaven."
6. *Aqkowoktleets.* Oblique case of *aqkowoktleet*, "mountain."
7. *Aqktsemakinek.* "People."
8. *Kaketyl'ne.* "Speaks to." From the radical *ke*, "speak, say."
9. *Kakipaimek.* "They are merciful." Literally "they forget (or forgive)."
10. *Kapes.* Oblique case of *kaqe*, "all," "every;" *kaqe amak*, "earth," "world;" *kaqe kapsin*, "everything."
11. *Kapes kapsins.* Oblique case of *kaqe kapsin*, "everything."
12. *Kapseins.* Oblique case of *kapsin*, "thing."
13. *Kasahane.* "They are meek." Literally "not evil (or not evil-minded)." From *sahan*, "bad," the negative *k-a*, "not," and verbal *-ne*.

14. *Katlanananam'ne.* "They are peaceful (the non-fighters)." From *tlanaman'ne*, "they fight," and the negative *k.a*, "not."
15. *Katwi'ne.* "They think." From the radical of *aqkitlwinam*, "heart," "mind."
16. *Neis.* Oblique case of *ne*, "he."
17. *Netla'ne.* "They mourn (they weep)." From the radical *etla*, "weep."
18. *Netstahatlnintekes.* "His disciples." Plural, with case ending, of *netstahatl*, "youth, young man."
19. *Nokonoktlumaine.* "They are thirsty."
20. *Nopqatl'ne.* "He teaches." A transitive form with suffix *-tl*, from *nopqane* or *nupqane*, "he sees," or "he knows." To "teach" is literally "to make see (or know)."
21. *Nowasine.* "They are hungry." From the radical *owas*, "to be hungry," the verbal prefix *n-* and the verbal *-ne*.
22. *Nupqane.* "He sees." From the radical *upqa* or *opqa*, "to see."
23. *Okwenamo.* "Always." Composed probably of *okwe*, "one," and the temporal suffix *-amo*, "time," "season."
24. *Sausak'aine.* "He sits down (rests)."
25. *Sukine.* "They are good." From the radical *suk* or *sok*, "good."
26. *Tlaqage.* "They arrive." Contains the particle *tla*, "again," and *wage*, "they come."
27. *Tlittliititine.* "They are poor (possess nothing)." From *tlititine*, "to have things," with the privative *tlit*, "without," "deprived of,"
28. *Tshatlaktlekine.* "They shall be called." From the verb *kaktlek*, "to be called (or named)," the particle *tshatl*—indicative of the future tense, and the verbal *-ne*.
29. *Tshatlikine.* "They shall eat." Future tense of *ikine*, "they eat."
30. *Tshatlkipaimek'nam'ne.* "There shall be forgiveness (or mercy)." A sort of verbal noun, from *kakipaimek*, "forgive" with the suffix (of verbal and other nouns of like meaning) *-nam*, the future-particle *tshatl*, and the verbal *-ne*.
31. *Tshatlnupqane.* "They shall see." Future tense of *nupgane*, "they see."
32. *Tshatsukitlw'i'ne.* "They shall be comforted." Literally "they shall feel good in their hearts (or minds)." From *suk*, "good," *aqkitlwinam*, "heart," "mind," etc.
33. *Tshatltsukwatine.* "They shall have." Future of *tsukwate*, "they have," "they possess."
34. *Tsilsukine.* "They are righteous." Literally "they are very good." From *sukine*, "they are good," and the particle *tsitl*, "very."
35. *Tsitsukitkokine.* "They are blessed." Literally they are "very glad (or very happy)." The word seems to contain the prefix *tsitl*, "very," the radical *suk*, "good," and the stem *itlqo*, "body." So "blessed" would primitively signify "(feeling) very good all over one's self,"—this easily takes on the spiritual meaning.
36. *Tsukwate.* "They hold (or possess)," "they have."

37. *Takasinkinawaske.* "God." A word introduced (made up from Indian components) by the whites. It seems to mean "He who made us with His hands."
38. *Yoquage.* "He climbs." From *yo* or *yu*, "up," and *age*, "to go."
39. *Yunokaine.* "There are many." The radical is *yu*, "up," "upon."

The Indian words are spelt phonetically according to the continental vowel usage, and the chief accents are indicated in the text. It will be noticed that in narration the Kootenay language employs throughout the historic present (e. g., *kakétl'ne*, *nopqáll'ne*, etc.), which adds to the realism of the story.

LITERATURE: BOOKS, ETC.

The social basis of religion, by SIMON N. PATTEN. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1911. 247 p. (American Social Progress Series.)

The writer seeks here to weld together the ideas acquired in his two earlier works. He wishes to create an economic interpretation of history and science and also to trace social progress, and religion seems to be the point of union between these views. He seeks to use the economic interpretation of history to explain degenerate tendencies in civilization, and in social psychology he sets forth the opposing forces of regeneration. The latter is psychic and personal; the former objective and economic. This gives religion a scientific basis and his doctrines are transferred from the traditional field to that of science.

The use of the Bible in the education of the young, by T. RAYMONT. New York: Longmans, Green & Company, 1911. 254 p.

The writer attempts to act as an intermediary between the Bible expert and the busy teacher. Some of his chapters, therefore, are literary, others pedagogic. He has written especially in view of the needs of ordinary day school teachers, elementary and secondary, for among them he believes there are those who are interested and can be helped. So, in the Old Testament, he deals with the literary side and the teacher's survey, and the same in the New Testament. In the last part, he speaks of the course of instruction, the preparation of the lesson, modes of presentation, and appends a bibliography and chronological tables, with a comparative view of schemes of biblical instruction.

Miracles in the New Testament, by Rev. J. M. THOMPSON. London: Edward Arnold, 1911. 236 p.

The chief part of this book consists of a critical examination of the miracle stories of the New Testament leading to the hypothesis that the original events underlying these traditions need not be regarded as miracles. Considerably more evidence is required for miracles than for other events. The general view here is that they happen pretty much in the form in which they are related, although there is a growing body of evidence that they were not originally miracles. Detailed proof is wanting that these diseases were of a kind amenable to faith healing and the tendency to exaggerate Jesus' successes and ignore his failures is strong. The writer takes up the evidence of Paul, of Q, of Matthew, Luke, the fourth Gospel, birth, resurrection, etc.

Jesus von Nazareth, Mythus oder Geschichte? Von JOHANNES WEISS. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1910. 171 p.

This work is developed from Berlin lectures and treats of the religious and historical problem of sociologic methods and personality, discusses the hypothesis of Kalthoff, of Drews, Smith on the pre-Christian Jesus, describes the methods of historical religion, the myth of the dying God

and the dying Messiah in Judaism, the life of the Son of Man, the influence of myth on Christendom, the resurrection, the incarnation, Frazer's hypothesis of Haman and Mordechai, the Gilgamesh epic, Jensen's theory and method, temptations, the extra-Christian sources, Paul, tradition, the origin and transference of Mark, the source of the Sermon on the Mount, the originality, genuineness and transmission of Jesus' words.

Hat Jesus gelebt? Von ARTHUR DREWS. Berlin: Kultur politischer Vorlage, 1910. 93 p.

Jesus, Vier Vorträge von VORNEMANN, VEIT, SCHUSTER & FOERSTER. Frankfurt: Moritz Diesterweg, 1910. 119 p.

Ist das "liberale" Jesusbild widerlegt? Von HENRICH WEINEL. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1910. 11 p.

Die Geschichte Jesu und die Astrologie, von HEINRICH G. VOIGT. Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs, 1911. 225 p.

Hat Jesus gelebt? Von D. HERMANN. Berlin: Schöneberg, 1910. 54 p.

Hat Jesus gelebt? Von CURT DELBRUCK. Berlin: Possische Buchhandlung, 1910. 34 p.

Hat Jesus gelebt? Von ADOLF JULICHER. Marburg: N. C. Elwert, 1910. 37 p.

We simply give here the titles of the chief reactions which Professor Arthur Drews' work has evoked in Germany from scholars of various standpoints. Drews' bold hypothesis is that no such person as Jesus ever lived, but that his image developed slowly as an accretion of many mythic and historical tendencies which shot together in folk-lore, rites and myths, without any conscious purpose to deceive. He claims that thus Christology is lifted above the murky air of historical criticism and that the sublime image of Jesus stands out as the supreme human ideal. Learned as he is, and extensive as his studies for years have been, the fact that Drews was not a specialist in this subject, as well as its extreme position, has added to the hostility with which his views have been received. After a considerable conspiracy of silence, the work may be said to be in the focus of discussion now.

Rest Days: A Sociological Study. By HUTTON WEBSTER, Ph. D. (Reprinted from the University Studies, Lincoln, Nebraska, Vol II, Nos. 1-2, January-April, 1911.) Lincoln, 1911. 158 p.

Dr. Webster, who is Professor of Social Anthropology in the University of Nebraska, is already known through his work on *Primitive Secret Societies*, published in 1908. The present monograph, which the author intends to issue later in amplified form, treats of the following topics: Periods of abstinence at critical epochs (e. g., *tabu* days among the Hawaiians, *lali* days among the Bornean Land Dayaks, and *genna* days in Assam); periods of abstinence after a death and on related occasions (here are discussed the primitive attitude towards death, tabooed days following a death, and taboos observed during feasts of the dead and at expulsion of ghosts); periods of abstinence at sacred times and seasons (the conception of holiness, holy days in the lower and the higher culture, quasi-holy days,—the days of abstinence of the Todas, tabooed days in West Africa, quasi-holy days in archaic civilization); periods of

abstinence connected with lunar phenomena (superstitions relating to the moon, taboos observed at changes of the moon); lunar calendars (lunar months and weeks, the hebdomadal cycle); the Babylonian "evil days" and *Sabattu* (the "evil days," the cult of seven and the planetary week, Babylonian lunar weeks; taboos observed on the "evil days," the *sabattu*); the Hebrew Sabbath (the Sabbath in the Old Testament, the Sabbath as a lunar festival, taboos observed on the Sabbath); periods of abstinence at unlucky times and seasons (the conception of unluckiness, unlucky days in the lower and the higher culture). This covers a wide field and such a well-documented study is a welcome addition to the literature of this important religious and sociological topic. Among the points more or less emphasized by Dr. Webster are these: The wide prevalence of *tabu*-conceptions and related ideas "in the lower culture and even amongst peoples of archaic civilization" (p. 4). Very frequently "the connection of a holy day with a particular divinity is not primary and direct, but comes rather as an after-thought," and "the period dedicated to a god and observed with abstinence may have been once tabooed for other and quite different reasons" (p. 35). With many primitive peoples, "the moon, rather than the sun, the planets, or any of the constellations, first excited the imagination and aroused feelings of superstitious awe or religious veneration" (p. 62),—the doctrine of "lunar sympathy" is widespread, and many primitive peoples "watch carefully the changes of the moon and describe them by appropriate names" (p. 99). The seven-day week seems to belong with Semitic antiquity (p. 101), but it is rather difficult to sustain the theory of borrowing in the case of the Tshi and Ga peoples of West Africa. The Sabbath originated as a lunar "festival." The general conclusion reached is that: "It is fairly obvious . . . that the belief in days lucky and unlucky has operated, like other superstitions, to retard the development of mankind. They hinder individual initiative and tend to prevent the undertaking of lengthy enterprises, which may be interrupted by the recurrence of an unfavorable period. Their elaborate development compels fitful, intermittent labor rather than a steady and continuous occupation" (p. 156). Both in ancient Rome and in modern Ashanti the belief in unfavorable seasons can be said to "directly affect political and social progress," for then "assemblies could not be held, nor courts of justice stand open, nor armies engage the enemy, when the unlucky day came round." The hands of the astrologer and the magician too were strengthened by such conceptions. On lucky days, there was often "a tendency to work beyond one's strength because assured of success." There is, however, a bright side to the picture. As the author observes (p. 157):

"To the student of primitive religion and sociology nothing is more interesting than the contemplation of that unconscious though beneficent process which has converted institutions based partly or wholly on a belief in the imaginary and the supernatural into institutions resting on the rock of reason and subserving human welfare. Though the origin of tabooed and unlucky days must be sought in gross superstition, sooner or later they acquire a social significance and may then be perpetuated as the primitive holidays long after their earlier meaning has faded

away." Again, "the passage of the holy day into the holiday, beginning in the lower culture, promises to reach its culmination in the thorough secularization of all the great festivals of the Christian year" (p. 158). This transition, going on under our very eyes, exemplifies the saying that "human nature is always ready for the shift from fast to feast." There are of course some moot points in this monograph. To the literature on the primitive attitude towards death (pp. 21-23) should be added a reference to Dr. Farabee's paper on the Macheyengas of eastern Peru, published in the *Proceedings of the American Antiquarian Society* for 1909. It is doubtful if the suggestion made on page 4 will be adopted: "It would conduce to clearness if 'taboo' as an English word were used solely as a substantive with the corresponding verbal forms 'to taboo' and 'tabooed.' The word should not be employed as an adjective; for this purpose the native *tabu* may be conveniently retained, since the Polynesian term has a double meaning not adequately rendered by any one English expression." It is hard to modify our mother-tongue which has a *Sprachgefühl* quite its own.

A. F. C.

Die Entwicklung des menschlichen Geistes. Ein Vortrag von MAX VERWORN. Jena: G. Fischer, 1910. 52 p.

This essay, originally an address delivered in August, 1910, before the meeting of the German Anthropological Society at Cologne, is of interest here on account of the peculiar views of the author concerning the religion of primitive man,—his views on "physio-plastic" and "ideo-plastic" art are bound up with this conception. According to Verworn, the "eolithic culture" of the Tertiary epoch was "the age of the sense-impressionist mind" in the race; then, in the later Tertiary and the Diluvium, the archeolithic and paleolithic culture appeared,—"the age of the naïve-practical mind" (in the archeolithic culture we have "the beginnings of the practical-inventional combination of chance observations"); paleolithic culture represents "the flourishing of naïve-practical observations and inventions and the activity of a naïveesthetic sense"); from the close of the paleolithic culture down to the present time we have had "the age of theorizing." The "age of theorizing" can be divided into two sections, the first of which, "the stage of dogmatic-speculative thought," lasts from the close of paleolithic culture to the time of the Occidental Renaissance in the 15-16th century A. D., and the second, "the stage of critical-experimental thought," from the Renaissance down to to-day. The first section may also be subdivided into "the period of imaginative-religion speculation" (neolithic, paleolithic, bronze and iron ages), and "the period of scholastic-rationalistic speculation," including the culture of Greece, Rome and the Middle Ages. It was in the "period of imaginative-religious speculation" of the stone age, when "the happy realism of the paleolithic hunter had gone by forever, yielding place to the gloomy, solemn ideas of a mystical belief in souls and spirits," that *naïveté* was supplanted by *speculation*. The most important conception of this period, says Verworn (p. 40) "is the idea of the soul, the mother of the dualism of soul and body." Thus arose, according to Verworn, from observation

of the process of death and dream-life the doctrines of spiritism, ancestor-worship, fear of demons, cult of gods, etc., and a whole system of religious conceptions began to crystallize, which very soon had all man's thinking and feeling and his willing and acting in their power. Art was not the only thing that suffered, in passing from the "physioplastic" to the "ideoplastic" stage. These ideas the author has also expressed, with more detail in regard to art, in another essay, *Zur Psychologie der primitiven Kunst* (Jena, 1908), where he attributes the repression of the earlier "physioplastic" art and the birth of the "ideoplastic" to the appearance of "the conception of the soul-idea and the consequent dualistic division of the human being into body and soul." The religious notions developing from this idea afforded the conditions necessary for the development of "ideoplastic" art, which to-day characterizes children of civilized races and nearly all primitive people. It is fair to say that the author has not proved out satisfactorily his contentions either as to the art of primitive man in its relation to that of children or of the modern human race, or as to the development of religion and its effects upon prehistoric esthetics. Such theories, when submitted to the anthropological-psychological test, seldom survive. Both religion and art are broader and more human than Verworn would have us believe, at all ages of human history.

A. F. C.

Truth and Reality. An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge. By JOHN ELOF BOODIN. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1911. 334 p. \$1.75 net.

The author, who is Professor of Philosophy in the University of Kansas, discusses truth and the mental constitution, the nature of truth, the criterion of truth, truth and its object, etc., from the point of view of one who regards mind as instinct, holding that "all of our fundamental adjustments or categories, viewed from the point of view of individual development, are instinctive or organic adjustments; that the stimuli, which constitute the environment, are simply the occasion for calling into play the structural tendencies of the organic growth series, and that such categories as recapitulation, imitation, and accommodation are pseudo-categories, stating certain results from the point of view of consciousness, but not explanatory of the real process of consciousness" (p. 15). This, too, "applies to the whole history of individual consciousness, and not simply to its initial stages." The author feels bound to maintain that "progress must take place through spontaneous variations and natural selection, though tendencies must be made definite and effective through external stimuli and the process of experience," and that "the possibility of education is determined by our evolutionary heritage." Professor Boodin intends the book, which is dedicated to the late William James, to serve, in a way, as an orientation of pragmatism, whose main issues he desires to emphasize "in the bewildering amount of discussion and misunderstanding to which the pragmatic movement has led." The larger part of Chapter XVII. (pp. 307-326), which treats of "The Reality of Religious Ideals," was, we are informed, "given as a lecture at Harvard in 1899, practically before the move-

ment had started." The pragmatic view of religion is taken, viz., "the progressive usefulness must prove the greater objectivity of the content," and "the truest and most objective religious ideal, then, is that which can furnish the completest and fullest satisfaction of the demands and longings of evolving humanity" (p. 325). Christianity is highest, "because it, as no other, furnishes, in the simplest and completest way, that environment of the soul which satisfies and makes objective its yearning for the highest good." It has, too, the supreme and satisfying personality of Jesus. While Christianity "neither can nor must claim any exemption from this test of the completest ministry to human nature," its ideals and the personality of its founder, are the assurance that it will "extend itself, in the centuries to come, to the ends of the earth." The past of religion is expressed in Professor Boodin's statements that "our religious tendencies determine our religion, not the opposite," and "if we lack the feeling toward the supernatural and the sense of dependence, religion is not for us." Its future is outlined thus (p. 41): "As the difference in creeds and the dread of hell disappear, religious denominations will separate in their worship on the ground of the real psychic preferences of individuals as regards the emphasis of the ethical, the mystical, the esthetic or the philosophic tendencies—always with the possibility, of course, that the more primary tendencies of custom and loyalty may keep a man where he does not psychologically belong." In the library of pragmatism this book deserves a good place.

A. F. C.

The Cambridge Manuals of Science and Literature. Vol. 4: The Idea of God in Early Religions. By F. B. JEVONS. Cambridge: at the University Press, 1910. X, 170 p.

Ibid. Vol. 8: Early Religious Poetry of the Hebrews. By E. C. KING, D. D. Cambridge, 1911. XVI, 156 p.

Ibid. Vol. 9: The History of the English Bible. By JOHN BROWN, D. D. Cambridge, 1911. VIII, 136 p.

Ibid. Vol. 3: The English Puritans. By JOHN BROWN, D. D. Cambridge, 1910. 160 p.

Ibid. Vol. 11: The Rise and Development of Presbyterianism in Scotland. By THE RIGHT HON. LORD BALFOUR OF BURLEIGH, K. T., G. C. M. G. Cambridge, 1911. 172 p.

The handy and useful series of "manuals of science and literature" now issuing from the Cambridge (England) University Press includes a number of volumes upon topics connected with the origins and development of religion and religions. Professor Jevons, in his discussion of *The Idea of God in Early Religions* treats of the idea of God in mythology, in worship, in prayer, and of the idea and being of God. He finds mythology "of little use in our search after the idea of God," holding that "myth-making is a reflective process, a process in which the mind reflects upon the idea, and therefore a process which cannot be set up unless the idea is already present, or, rather we should say had already been presented" (p. 60). Mythology is thus, "of itself sufficient proof that gods are, or have been, believed in; it is the outcome of reflection and inquiry about the gods, whom the community approaches, with

mingled feelings of hope and fear, and worships with sacrifice and prayer" (p. 56). The folk-lore of most Christian peoples contains traces of "gods dethroned." In like manner, according to the author, "ritual of this kind, not associated with the names of any gods, is found amongst the Australian tribes, and may be the wreckage of a system gone to pieces,"—here there is always danger, as Professor Jevons notes, of running into the error of times gone by, when students of mythology "found, or thought they found, in mythology, profound truths, known or revealed to sages of old." As to worship, the author is of opinion that "religion has never anywhere developed without rites, for they "are indispensable, in the same way and for the same reason, that language is indispensable to thought." The development of religion without rites is as impossible as the development of language without thought. The many different forms of religion "are all attempts—successful in as many very various degrees as language itself—to give expression to the idea of God" (p. 107). Personal religion becomes possible only as personal self-consciousness develops, and when religion becomes personal it involves man's fellowmen as much as himself, and grows to be thereby "more than ever before, the relation of the community to its God" (p. 105). On some of the moot questions of the science of religion Professor Jevons expresses himself thus (p. 120): "The theory that spell preceded prayer and became prayer, or that magic developed into religion, finds as little support in the facts afforded by the science of religion, as the converse theory of a primitive revelation and a paradisaical state in which religion alone was known. For what is found in one stage of evolution the capacity must have existed in earlier stages; and if both prayer and spell, both magic and religion, are found, the capacity for both must have pre-existed." Just as man spoke ages before he had any idea of the laws of speech or the rules of grammar, and reasoned millenniums anterior to his acquaintance with formal logic, so his religiousness long antedated any knowledge on his part of principles of religion, etc. It is the prayers of savages, who are nearest to the condition of primitive man, that "furnish the material from which we can best infer what was the idea of God, which was present in their consciousness at those moments when it was most vividly present to them" (p. 140). According to the author, "the idea of God as a being whose will is to be done, and not man's, is a distinctly Christian idea," in non-Christian religions it being really a question of man's will, and not God's. The highest development of religion "is the substitution of the love of God for the desires of man, which makes the new heaven and the new earth" (p. 150). Evolution is radiative and dispersive and not continuous on one and the same direct line. Thus "fetishism, polytheism and monotheism are not different and successive stages of one line of evolution, following the same direction," for "new forms of religion are all re-births, renaissances, and spring, not from one another, but from the soul of man, in which is found the idea of God" (p. 158). It would be well, if writers upon religious topics such as this made larger draughts upon the material now accessible concerning the religious ideas of the American Indians, and

placed not so much dependence upon the Australian data, excellent as a good deal of it is and must be.

Dr. King's volume on *Early Religious Poetry of the Hebrews* "is intended to embrace the poetry of Old Testament times as distinguished from the poetry of the Synagogue," and in *religious* poetry is included "the whole outcome of that probation whereby the suffering Nation was fitted to prepare the world for God." In the translations the form and rhythm of the Hebrew originals are imitated as far as possible. This volume will serve as a most desirable aid to the reading of the Old Testament, which contains so much of the early poetry of the Hebrews.

In his *History of the English Bible*, Dr. Brown treats of Anglo-Saxon versions, Wycliffe's Ms. Bible, Tyndale's printed translation, Coverdale's and the Great Bible, three rival versions (Genevan, the Bishops' Bible, the Douay version), the authorized version of 1611, and the revised version of 1881. In small compass a large number of interesting facts are given, with the addition of facsimiles, reproductions of title-pages, etc. This little volume tells the story of a great monument of English speech from its beginnings in 670 A. D. to its latest transformation in 1881. In *The English Puritans*, Dr. Brown discusses the chief topics involved in the story of this aspect of English religious life: The origins of the Puritans, vestments and ceremonies, the Puritans and the hierarchy, presbytery in episcopacy, absolutism and liberty, Puritanism in its triumph and downfall. As there were reformers before the Reformation, there had been Puritans before that century (1558-1658 A. D.), from the accession of Elizabeth to the death of Cromwell, which has come to be termed "the Puritan period." Moreover, "puritanism was not so much an organized system as a religious temper and a moral force, and, being such, it could enter into combinations and alliances of varied kind" (p. 1). Besides the Pilgrim Fathers, who sailed in the *Mayflower* in 1620, there were other Puritans, who were not Separatists in the sense of these, Puritans who *separated* themselves from the corruptions in the Church of England, but not from the Church itself. The rule of the Puritan fell with Cromwell. The difference between the Presbyterians and the Independents and the objection of "the English conscience" to the Solemn League and Covenant, imposed by force were also a factor in the result. The counter-revolution of 1660 was no direct revulsion of feeling against Puritanism. As the author says (p. 154): "Puritan institutions in the seventeenth century fell with Cromwell, but Puritan ideas did not fall with the institutions in which they had been embodied. They had done a great and permanent work in the sacred cause of liberty. The Puritans arrested the growth of absolute government in England." When it was "the turning-point of national destiny," then, "it was Puritanism that came to the rescue." The battle for constitutional liberty had been fought and won, and, "if Puritanism fell, it fell in the hour of victory." Lord Balfour of Burleigh's sketch of *The Rise and Development of Presbyterianism in Scotland* lays stress upon "the constitutional development of Presbyterianism in Scotland, both internally, and in its relation to the State," and emphasizes the fact that, "throughout the whole history of the Reformed Church in Scotland one of the

most outstanding features will be found to be the overwhelming desire to maintain the independence of the Church from all secular control, and the most characteristic feature of the disputes which went on during the reigns of the Stewart Kings (especially James VI and I, and Charles I) was the failure of those monarchs to appreciate the Scottish sentiments of Patriotism, Protestantism and Freedom." The Reformation in Scotland was consolidated by the massacre of St. Bartholomew in 1572 and when Knox died, he had seen "the triumph of the cause to which he had devoted his life" (p. 59),—for "the spirit of Scotland was now at one with the spirit of Knox in the great matters of faith and freedom." The overthrow of episcopacy and the episode of the Covenanters are matters of great significance. Presbyterianism survived persecution and entered into its own when, as a result of the accession to the throne of William of Orange, the British king took oath to maintain "the government, worship, discipline, rights and privileges of the Church of Scotland." As the author notes (p. 117), "the signing of this oath is the first official act of the sovereign, and on it depends his claim to the allegiance of Scotsmen." Of modern religion in Scotland the author observes (p. 162) that, "however widely the Scotland of the twentieth century may differ from the Scotland of Knox and Melville, it cannot be denied that their principles, shorn of some vigor and brought into proportion by experience, rule the ecclesiastical life of Scotland to-day," and "Presbyterianism has justified itself in Scotland by its adaptation to the religious needs of three centuries and a half." Not the least source of its strength has been "the happy combination of the clergy and the laity in the same courts," something that has "kept the Church in constant sympathy with the mind and needs of the country." Some happy method of "combining the principles of national religion and spiritual independencies," may yet be found to draw together the Church of Scotland and the United Free Church in one great "Scottish Church, national, free and Presbyterian," foreshadowing the reunion of all Christendom.

A. F. C.

Neujüdische Stimmen über Jesus Christum. Gesammelt von LIE. JOH. DE LE ROI. Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung, 1910. 54 p.

In this pamphlet, which forms No. 39 of the Publications of the Institutum Judaicum in Berlin, edited by Dr. Hermann L. Strack, the author, a retired minister in Schweidnitz, has gathered together from all parts of the globe (Europe in particular), opinions of eminent Jews of to-day concerning the personality of Jesus and the future position of Jewish thought with regard to him; also extracts from the writings of Jewish historians, etc. Some of these opinions are noteworthy, considering the approval which the views of Drews, in denial of the historicity of Jesus, have met with in certain Jewish circles. In Germany, Professor M. Lazarus (d. 1899); in France, Joseph and Theodore Reinach; in Italy, Cesare Lombroso (d. 1911); in England, F. Adler, C. G. Montefiore, O. J. Simon, I. Zangwill, I. Harris, etc.; in Sweden, Professor G. Klein; in Russia, S. M. Dubnow; in America, H. Weinstock, Dr. Kohler, I. Singer, Morris and Marcus Jastrow, J. H. Hoffmann, J. Krauskopf, etc.,—all these are among those who have expressed the opinion that the Jews

should claim Jesus as one of themselves and claim for their race all that through him has come to the world. The entrance of the Jews into the general current of life all over the globe makes the ultimate result of the whole matter a mere question of time. It is, indeed, inconceivable that a highly-endowed race, like the Jews, will continue to refuse to admit that "the greatest born of woman," the one personality destined to receive the admiration and the approval of all mankind, was a Jew, a good Jew, and the genius *par excellence* of all Jewry. Some day the name of the Galilean will be honored, by the side of, and beyond, Moses, Isaiah and the rest of his glorious predecessors in the history of human thought in Palestine.

A. F. C.

Die allgemeine Mythologie und ihre ethnologischen Grundlagen. VON PAUL EHRENREICH. Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung, 1910. VIII, 288 p.

The author of this book, which forms Part I of Vol. IV of the *Mythologische Bibliothek*, published by the Gesellschaft für Vergleichende Mythenforschung, is an anthropologist *vom Fach* and a specialist in the ethnology of aboriginal South America, etc. The topics treated are: Comparative and general mythology, problems of general mythology, the ethnological method, mythological stages of development, the materials of mythology, mythological personification, mythic forms, interpretation of myths, mythological personages and their interpretation, the migration of myths. Like articulate language, myths or Märchen are lacking to no people on earth, so far as is known, and Dr. Ehrenreich observes (p. 3): "The myth *per se* can be comprehended only as a general human phenomenon. The most primitive human intellectual activity reveals itself in mythic thought, the objective product is myth-material. The whole conceptual world of primitive man is mythical, but the mythical view of the world is not limited to the youthful stage of mental development, but continues to exist throughout all stages of civilization. It forms the mother-soil of the religious life as well as of the beginnings of science, until, at last, with the perfection of abstract thinking, the scientific conception of the world takes its place. But the process is not excluded altogether, for, as we know, the ancient, mythic conceptions, come forth again and again from the depths of the folk-mind. In so doing, however, they find expression less in the creation of new mythical stories than in the mythical formulation of natural science or of religious ideas."

One cannot expect every people to be in possession of, or to have possessed, every myth. Moreover, the development of myth-material may be quite different with one people as compared with another. As the author rightly says (p. 3): "It depends upon *Anlage*, mental activity, local conditions, as well as upon the linguistic character of the people concerned. It has no direct relation to height of civilization. Highly developed peoples, as, e. g., the Romans, often remain at a very low stage of mythology, while the opposite frequently occurs. Lithuanians, Slavs and Finns, North American Indians and Polynesians show a surprising wealth of mythopoetic fancy, which, however, is not at all conditioned by any higher evolution of religious ideas." From the point of view of ethnology, according to Dr. Ehrenreich, "myth is rather a phenomenon

of race-psychology than of the history of religion" (p. 6). The real kernel of mythology is the "nature-myth,"—this is the lowest stratum, the matrix of all mythology, the universal, common possession of early man. The "Urmthyologie" of mankind can be deduced or reconstituted from conceptions common to all peoples, from views of nature serving all peoples and all human beings as the basis of their imagination-products, irrespective of time and place (p. 45). This common property, according to Dr. Ehrenreich can be nothing less than ideas about the cosmic bodies, sun, moon and stars, together with ideas about the terrestrial environment of man and certain *motifs* derived from dream-life, etc.

This common mythic material of the primitive stage of mankind, includes the following (p. 61):

1. Beast-fables of the simplest form.
2. Like tales of the origin of remarkable geological forms, rocks, lakes, etc.
3. Tales of sun, moon and the striking constellations, etc.
4. Tales of the origin of striking biological phenomena,—birth, death, sex-functions and distinctions, etc.
5. Hero-tales, chiefly in close relation to cosmogony.

The simplest forms of mythology are to be found among the Australians, Papuans, etc., the South Africans and the Indians of East and South America, while some of the North American Indians, the North-Asiatics, the Polynesians and the West-Africans suggest in their myth-stuff the Teutons, Slavs, Letts and Finns, and "correspond in a way to the picture which we might reconstruct of a primitive Indogermanic mythology" (p. 63). Here too belong Japanese, Mexican and Peruvian mythology, but when we reach the Babylonians, the Egyptians, the Hindus, etc., we find that sacerdotal mythology and folk-mythology have been altogether separated, and, hence, comparison with primitive forms is not immediately possible. The development and extension of mythology are conditioned by such internal forces as the evolving intellectual, social and economic life of the people, and by such external factors as the mutual influences of peoples and contact with higher civilization. Religion, agriculture, secret societies, etc., are powerful here. The story of the gods and the cult-legend, e. g., give the myth the character of a conviction of faith (p. 82),—they create for religion firm form of belief. Plastic art "gives mythic forms plastic precision." All the higher mythologies "are at the same time calendar-mythologies, for all cult-acts need to be fixed in time, like the agricultural rites from which they have proceeded," and the gods "become symbolic representatives of those periods of time, for whose astral basis they stand" (p. 86). How far one can go in the direction of recognizing the influence of higher upon lower culture may be seen from the "pan-Babylonian theory," so recently current with many Orientalists. This theory "would interpret all the myths of the world as precipitates of the ancient Babylonian (or, generally, the ancient Oriental) astral religion, i. e., as the popularized form of a primitive astral-lore, which comprehended in itself both science and religion" (p. 91). The myths of the American Indians offer many problems with respect to the question of independent origins and borrowings from outside.

Of nature-myths, "moon-myths are the most universal among men and resemble one another the most" (p. 114), and "in moon-myths we find the greater agreement between the higher and the lower mythology," but one would go too far to maintain that the primitive mythology was completely lunar. Among the animal-tales it is the "explanatory myths" that exhibit the greatest resemblances in form (p. 142). To the discussion on "mythological personification" (p. 159) it may be added that the personification of abstract ideas among the American Indians is not so rare as might be thought,—e. g., the personification of "fatigue" among the Nez Percé, the Kootenay, etc. Concerning the "forms of myths" much must be left unsaid until we have the myths "as related by the uncivilized man in his own tongue;" argument from imperfect and abbreviated texts in another language, not understood by the narrator is unscientific and unsatisfying. Dr. Sapir has recently emphasized this need of the native text for the understanding of the form of American Indian myths.

As to myth-interpretation, Dr. Ehrenreich holds (p. 194) that while not every myth is a nature-myth, "it is only after failing to find an explanation from the nature point of view, that we should look about for something sociological or animistic." For most of the great epic-hero-poems of the ancient civilized people a sky-mythological basis can be assumed, and their astral or calendaric basis demonstrated (p. 222). In regard to the long-debated question whether the hero is a degenerated god or an elevated man, the author notes that gods can become heroes and that men can reach the height of heroes as well, and both of these things can happen in a variety of ways and for divers reasons (p. 234). Dr. Ehrenreich's volume is the most comprehensive attempt of recent years, by a competent authority, to resuscitate the "science of comparative mythology," which had fallen upon evil days through the mistaken labors of Max Müller and his school. While it is not possible to accept all of his "lunar hypotheses," his general discussions and arguments have much to commend them, at present at least.

A. F. C.

PERIODICAL LITERATURE.

BY ALEXANDER F. CHAMBERLAIN.

1. *Amazons*. A. F. Chamberlain's article, "Recent Literature on the South American 'Amazons,'" in the *Journal of American Folk-Lore* (vol. 24, pp. 16-20), discusses the views of Ehrenreich, Lasch, Friederici and Rothery. Dr. Ehrenreich classes the Amazon myth among tales seeking "to legitimize the union of the males over against the aspiration of the women,"—divers legends, so it seems, have been intentionally modified in this direction. Lasch holds it to be "neither a historical nor a new culture-myth, but a mythic narration specially invented to explain social arrangements." It has been made serviceable for the purposes of the men's organization. Friederici demonstrates that the Amazon problem is quite complicated and that "there are several Amazon legends, and also other Amazon tales, which in content and in origin are very different from one another." Dr. Friederici rejects the view of Ehrenreich and Lasch that the South American Amazon legend originated among the northern Caribs. Rothery's book, *The Amazons in Antiquity and Modern Times* (London, 1910) covers a wide field, but lacks the bibliographical orientation and scientific accuracy of the brief studies of Lasch and Friederici, the essay of the last being, up to date, the best treatment of the subject in print.
2. *Apollo, the Greek calendar, etc.* In his article on "Die älteste griechische Zeitrechnung, Apollo und der Orient," published in the *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft* (vol. 14, 1911, pp. 423-448), M. P. Nilsson concludes that the opinion of von Wilamowitz that Apollo was no native Greek god, but derived from Asia Minor, is gaining ground, and seeks to strengthen this theory by arguments derived from the Greek calendar, festival-times, etc. Apollo, as the patron of month-reckoning, and because of his connection (as no other god) with a particular day of the month, viz., the seventh, is doubtless Oriental, since the seven-cult belongs there. The great religious movements generally reached Greece from without, and Apolloism was no exception. With it came the demand for reconciliation, the observation of certain rules and days, etc. In Greece coalescence with native cognate elements took place. Asia Minor looks Babylonward, and an early debt of Greece to Babylon, etc., is suggested here. The later clarifying and elevation of Apolloism (as found e. g., in Aeschylos) is a master-stroke of the Greek mind,—the dross went to Orphicism, etc.
3. *Begging monks of India*. In the *Archivio per l'Antropologia* (vol. 40, pp. 374-380), Prof. Domenico del Campana has an article "Intorno ai Sadhus dell' India inglese, monaci mendicanti." The Sadhus

(the Sanskrit word signifies "pure"), are a sect of religious mendicants, deistic in belief, monogamic as to marriage, abstainers from luxuries, tobacco, opium, betel, etc., and practicing resistance and the use of force only for personal defense. They are found chiefly in Delhi, Agra, Jeypore, Jairakhalad, etc., but a few also live scattered elsewhere in British India. De Gubernatis, when traveling in India (see his *Peregrinazioni indiane*, 1886, 1887), saw them near the sacred city of Lahore and visited one of their convents. The founder of the sect was a miracle-worker named Dadú, the son of a woman of Ahmenadab, and the story of his life, the *Dadupanthi*, is their sacred book. The clothing of the *Sadhus* is scant and their ornaments and religious paraphernalia rare. Professor Del Campana was able to obtain a set for his ethnological collection. The *Sadhus* are still reckoned heretics by the Brahmins. In cult they are rather eclectic, and Krishna is one of the deities worshiped by them. They are not idolators, but cater somewhat to popular superstitions for eleemosynary reasons.—In the *Baessler Archiv* (vol. 1, pp. 143-154), the new journal of the Baessler Institute in Berlin, W. Planert writes of *Religiöse Bettler in Südindien*, treating in detail of religious affinities, dress, paraphernalia, performances, etc. Among worshippers of Shiva the Pandaram beggars are most noteworthy; among those of Vishnu, the Sattadaver.

4. *Burials préhistorique and modern African*. The article of H. A. Junod, on "Deux enterrements à 20,000 ans d'intervalle," in *Anthropos* (vol. 5, 1910, pp. 957-968), makes comparison between the conditions of burial of the famous *Homo mousteriensis* discovered by Hauser in 1908,—this préhistorie "Frenchman" must have been interred some 20,000 years ago,—and the burial customs, etc., of the modern Baronga of South Africa. Belief in continuation of the soul after death seems indicated. The position of the body, the arrangement of the limbs, etc., are discussed (the bending of the legs and of one arm, while the other arm is stretched out,—this characterizes the skeleton of Moustier, and M. Junod suggests *rapprochement* with certain rites of the Baronga). Details of a Baronga burial are given.
5. *Chinese state-religion*. Hr. Otto Messing publishes in the *Zeitschrift f. Ethnologie* (vol. 43, 1911, pp. 348-375) an interesting article "Ueber die chinesische Staatsreligion und ihren Kultus." The history of the Chinese state-religion, from the earliest times (as represented in the Shu-king, the Shi-king, the Li-ki, and other sacred books) is given, with an account of the Temple of Heaven, at Peking, and other more modern developments. The author points out that it is to Buddhism, "the only foreign culture-element that has hitherto gained a lasting foothold in China," that the emphasis upon priesthood, temples and picture-cults is due,—these directions of religious expression and activity being anciently unknown. He also emphasizes the lofty moral tone of the old Chinese cult, which in respect to its pure content, its expression and method of representation rose far above those of the other civilized peoples of antiquity. When its deities were at the level of national polytheism, they were nevertheless

pure and chaste; there was no Bacchus or Venus and religious acts were devoid of obscenity, etc. The conceptions of Yin and Yang for the Chinese "were never popular deities, but rather philosophic theories or physical facts." The anti-foreign "instinct" of China has prevented the country from being "the arena of foreign god-ideas" to the extent that this has occurred in other ancient civilized lands, such, e. g., as Persia, Greece, Rome; and "in spite of the later intrusion of Buddhism, China has been able to preserve its religious individualism over against a religious cosmopolitanism." According to Messing the religious ideas of the Chinese, as represented by the traditional data concerned with the oldest, prehistoric, perhaps half mythical period (*ca.* 2500-1200 B. C.), were "monotheistic; then after the Chu period (the Chu dynasty began in the 12th century B. C.), where real history begins, a change to the dualistic conception (heaven and earth) occurs; in a third period (since the 6th century B. C., and lasting down to the present time) another change to a materialistic, or rather agnostic, view with a slight echo of monotheistic conception is to be noted.

6. *Civilization.* To *Logos* (vol. 2, 1911, pp. 1-25) G. Simmel contributes an article on "Der Begriff und die Tragödie der Kultur," the core of whose argument consists in the statement that, unlike the old Franciscans who declared of themselves that *nihil habentes, omnia possidentes*, the men and women of rich and overburdened civilizations, must say of themselves *omnia habentes, nihil possidentes*. The typical problematic situation of the modern man is "the sense of being surrounded by an endless number of culture-elements, which for him are not without significance, but at the greatest depth, not really momentous, and which *en masse* are somewhat oppressive, since he cannot inwardly assimilate each individual thing, nor yet simply reject it, because, so to speak, it belongs potentially in the sphere of his cultural development."
7. *Day of atonement.* In the *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft* (vol. 14, 1911, pp. 130-142), H. Grimme discusses "Das Alter des israelitischen Versöhnungstages," reaching the conclusion that the Jewish day of atonement has claims to be regarded as an old constituent of the law. He is also of opinion that the "three-festival" list of *Deuteronomy* is not older than the "five-festival" list of *Leviticus* and *Numbers*.
8. *Deluge-legend.* In the *Korrespondenz-Blatt d. D. Ges f. Anthropologie* (Jahrg. 41, pp. 82-83) is an abstract of a paper on "Die Flutsage der Cora-Indianer und verwandter Stämme," read by Dr. K. T. Preuss at the meeting of the German Anthropological Association at Cologne in August, 1910, and based on material collected by the author during his investigations of the Mexican Indians in 1905-1907. The basis of the Cora deluge-legend is the conception of the underworld and the night-sky as water and the identifying of both. The night-sky is also thought to be a water-snake, and with this the deluge is directly connected,—the flood is pictured as darkness spreading all over the earth and continuing until the rising morning star kills the snake

with an arrow and light then reigns again. Lake Santa Teresa, the only body of water in the Cora country, is looked upon as the remains of the deluge. The people who sprang into the lake, in order to escape the serpent, became stars in the sky. In another deluge-legend of the Cora Indians, found also among the Huichol, the moon-goddess, Takútsi Nakavé, informs a man of the coming of the flood and tell him to hollow out a tree-trunk. Into this he puts fire and certain seeds and after he has got in the goddess herself sits upon the boat and steers it safely through the waters (the night-sky). In a myth of the Mexicano Indians the morning-star is continually watching over the water-snake, lest the earth should be completely submerged. With the Cora Indians the watery deep is called *tikantse*, i. e. "place of night," and *tikantse* is at once a region of moisture, rain and fertility in the night-sky. Out of the night-sky come (from mythic places of birth, life, vegetation, moisture, rain, etc.), children and plants. In the underworld are to be found things that appear upon earth. Tétewan, the goddess of the underworld, has faces in every direction (according to Dr. Preuss she is thus the star-filled night-sky). She reaches up to the earth's surface and is also the deity of the waters springing up from the underworld. These legends of the Cora and related Indians of the Mexican Sierra Madre, collected by so careful and competent an investigator, as is Dr. Preuss, have great value for the interpretation of primitive religion and mythology.

9. *Fish-symbol.* In the *Archiv f. Religionswissenschaft* (vol. 14, 1911, pp. 1-53, 327-392), I. Scheftelowitz has a monograph on "Das Fisch-Symbol in Judentum und Christentum," in which are discussed all aspects of the fish as a Jewish and a Christian symbol. Among the Jews the fish in water was the symbol of a believing Israelite, and this figure was transferred to the Christian by the early Church Fathers (p. 5). According to Scheftelowitz, who treats at some length the question of the "Messianic fish," among the Jews and its relation to the Messiah and previous attempts to explain the Christian *Ichthys*-symbol (pp. 6-53), the Jewish messianic fish, Leviathan, was known to the early Christians and *Ichthys*, as a designation for Christ, was likewise derived from the Jews. The Jewish idea of a fish (the Leviathan) that appears at the same time as the Messiah is, Scheftelowitz thinks (p. 327), a further development, due to later astrological influences, of the Old Testament idea (in Ezekiel) that the favorite food of the dead in the Messianic realm would be fish. Both at Jewish festivals and in the paintings on the Catacombs fish appear as the symbol of the food of the dead, and hence, the idea is again of Israelitish origin. Its ultimate provenance is from the older nature-religion conceptions. The fish also occurs as a symbol of protection against demons and as a lucky sign,—here we can go back to Babylon as well. Fish-amulets, used by the early Christians against demons are ancient in the Mediterranean region; and the Messianic fish has been specially developed from very primitive ancestors. Concerning the fish as the symbols of ancestors or ancestral spirits, we learn of

the presence of fish-figures in graves of the pre-Christian period and of a view rather widely prevalent among primitive peoples and others that human beings, after death, turn into fish. Sometimes, no doubt, this idea is due to the thought that the soul of the dead, in order to reach the land of the blest, must cross a great ocean. As a symbol of fertility, the fish has a wide distribution, being connected with increase of children, cattle, etc., and with sex. Taken altogether, in the fish-symbol, the early Christians borrowed most, if not all of its direct significance from preceding Jewish religious and mythological ideas. In connection with Scheftolowitz's monograph should be read the article of Dr. Paul Carus, in the *Open Court* (vol. 25, 1911, pp. 385-411) on "The Fish as a Mystic Symbol in China and Japan," where several points of *rapprochement* with the Judaeo-Christian lore of the fish are to be noted. According to Dr. Carus certain Chinese data "bear a close resemblance to European legends in which the fish symbolizes the sun." The goddess Kwan-yin is represented very often with a fish,—she "is a female form of Buddha which originated in China." In the same journal Dr. Carus also discusses "The Fish in Brahmanism and Buddhism."

10. *Folk-religion, etc., in Spanish America.* The article of A. M. Espinosa on "New-Mexican Spanish Folk-Lore," in the *Journal of American Folk-Lore* (vol. 23, 1910, pp. 395-418), contains some items of interest to the student of the origin and development of religious ideas. Among the Spanish people of New Mexico "no one is born a witch; witchcraft is a science, a kind of learning which may be learned from other witches." The New Mexican idea of dwarfs is embodied in the statement that "dwarfs (*los duendes*) are individuals of small stature, who frighten the lazy, the wicked, and, in particular, the filthy." Some of the figures of folk-belief in Spanish New Mexico are: The evil one, the weeping woman, the bugaboo (*el coco*), the devil (*el mashishi, el diablo, el malo*, etc.), the monster viper, the basilisk, etc. Ghosts also figure prominently. There are also many beliefs and superstitions about spirits, sleep and dreams, the "evil eye," various diseases and their cures, the heavenly bodies and meteoric phenomena, luck and ill-luck, etc. The New Mexicans "do not worry much about the Devil," as a simple sign of the cross will scare him away; so he seems not to be an important factor in their folk-lore. Among other epithets attached to the Devil may be mentioned *aquel gallo*—"that (old) rooster," and *pata galán*—"pretty legs" (so termed in a riddle). The "monster viper" is mixed Indian and Spanish. A specimen ghost-story is given on page 407. The moon is believed to exert influence on children even before birth. If a pregnant woman goes out to see an eclipse of the moon, "the moon will eat up the nose or lips of her offspring;" and of a child born with such deformities, the saying goes, *selo comió la tuna*, "the moon has eaten him." The recently formed Chilean Folk-Lore Society has set about collecting and preserving the folk-lore of the country, both Indian and Spanish. One of the most important contributions published up to the present is the monograph of R. A.

Laval on "Oraciones, eusalmos i conjuros del Pueblo Chileno," in the *Revista de la Sociedad de Folk-Lore Chileno* (vol. 1, 1910, pp. 75-133), treating of folk-prayers, charms, incantations, etc., in comparison with those now or formerly current in Spain. The Spanish texts of 126 prayers of all sorts, 24 charms, etc., and formulae used for children, and 21 incantations are recorded,—all from oral tradition. In the course of transmission from generation to generation some curious changes in words and in phraseology have taken place, a curious example of which is cited on page 77. The up-to-date character, which sometimes marks folk-thought is seen from the fact that we find in No. 36 the words

"Te adoro, Jesus divino,
Que vives entre la nieve,"

a distinct reference to the now famous statue of the "Christ of the Andes" erected in 1904, on the high mountains where Chili and Argentina meet, as a symbol of peace. In connection with the folklore of Spanish America reference may be made here to J. V. Cifuentes's *Mitos y supersticiones recogidos de la tradición oral* (1910), in which will be found information concerning the chief figures of Chilian folk-mythology, a considerable number of which have been drawn partly or wholly from Indian sources. In Chili, as in New Mexico, the Devil is only of secondary importance, being eclipsed by local mythical personages. The *duendes* are "elves, fairies, dwarfs, little infant-faced angels, who cannot reach either heaven or hell, but must abide in the air."

11. *Latin in folk-lore.* The article of Ramon A. Laval, "Del Latin en el Folk-Lore Chileno," in the *Revista de la Sociedad de Folk-Lore Chileno* (vol. 1, 1910, pp. 1-25) treats of the occurrence of Latin words and phrases in the Spanish folk-lore of Chile. In sayings, refrains, popular verses, anecdotes, etc., are to be met with fragments and vestiges of Latin, some of them due, doubtless, to the colonial period when, outside of the University of San Felipe, the only educational institutions in the country were the convents, where Latin was the basis of all instruction. Some few years ago the compulsory teaching of Latin in Chile ceased, and to-day it is taught only in the seminaries and convents, and in the Instituto Pedagógico for those who intend to devote themselves to the study of languages. Most of these macaronic verses in imitation of liturgical texts, Latin words scattered through joco-serious poems, etc., have been transferred from the folk-literature, etc., of Spain. The one saying that is clearly Chilian, *Beati indiani quia manducant charquicanem* is attributed to Pope Pius X, who, earlier in life, as a simple priest, was in Chile as secretary to Monseñor Muzzi in 1824.
12. "*Manumissio in ecclesia.*" In the *Rendiconti d. R. Ist. Lombardo di Scienze et Lettere* (Sec. 2, vol. 44, pp. 619-642), Dr. P. de Francesco publishes an article "Intorno alle origini della 'Manumissio in Ecclesia,'" in which he argues that the *manumissio in ecclesia* is not, as Golopedo and many after him have maintained, derived from the

hierodulism of Hellenic law, a form of manumission in use among various Hellenic peoples under the form of fictitious sale of the slave to a divinity (e. g. slaves wishing manumission were brought to Delphi and sold to the priest of Apollo in front of the entrance to the oracle), which later on took shape as a simple declaration of the manumitter before a local magistrate (e. g. in Boeotia),—the last traces of this form of manumission are to be found in the second century A. D. According to Dr. Francisci the very form and constitution of the *manumissio in ecclesia* suggest that there is no connection between it and hierodulism or manumission by fictitious sale. The *manumissio in ecclesia* is not an innovation of Constantine, but a form already used in the primitive Christian communities, who had already a Greek formulary,—all that Constantine did was to give solemn juridical value to an act already quite common in practice. The evidence requires us to abandon the theory of the origin of the *manumissio in ecclesia* from fictitious sale to a deity. Its relation to the ancient Greek manumission by consecration to a divinity may still be maintained, but the special form was probably developed first in Christian communities of the Orient speaking the Greek language, from which it passed to the Occident with Christianity and was finally consecrated by the official recognition of Constantine.

13. *Marking, branding, etc.* Under the title of "La miraculeuse histoire de Pandare et d'Echédore," P. Perdrizét gives in the *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft* (vol. 14, 1911, pp. 54-129) the results of his investigations concerning the question of "marking" in antiquity, in connection with the tale of Pandarus, the Thessalian, and the transference of the stigmata on his forehead to Echedorus. The author discusses in detail the meaning, etc., of all manners of "marking," "branding," "stigmatizing," including *stigmata, grammata, marks and signs, tattooing, the signaculum of confirmation, the mark of the miles Christi, "sign of the hand"* and marked hands, the military sign, etc.; also cauterization, scarification, tattooing, etc., in various forms, to mark slaves and property, as a mark of soldiers, as a religious token. It is curious to note how recently branding has disappeared from the penal codes of Christendom. Tattooing, apparently, was common in pre-Hellenic Greece, but not highly favored in classic times. Branding cattle was widely prevalent in antiquity. Slaves and recruits were often "marked." Perdrizet is of opinion that the military mark was probably of religious origin, being a special variety of the religious *stigma*. Its ultimate derivation would be from Syria.
14. *Modern cult of the dead.* In the *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft* (vol. 14, 1911, pp. 302-303), L. Deubner cites some interesting facts concerning the requirement in the wills of several persons between 1880 and 1910, in Russia, Germany, etc., that the surviving relatives or donees of the deceased shall hold a festival, or dinner, on the anniversary of his birth or death, etc. One such individual suggested

that, when young people happened to be present at his death-festival, cheer should prevail, and dancing indulged in.

15. *Modern curse and malediction.* In the same Journal (pp. 315-319), R. Wünsch gives texts of two quite recent anathemas. The first, dating from 1910, is the conjuration of a French woman to have "Great St. Exterminus" torment the soul and mind of another woman living in Paris. The second, belonging to the year 1911, is the work of a female "seer" in Königsberg (Prussia), who practiced all sorts of "magic" with certain books of the Old Testament.
16. *Mysticism, etc.* In an article on "Mystik und Metaphysik," in *Logos* (vol. 2, 1911, pp. 92-112) Sergius Hessen touches, among other things, upon the relation of mysticism and religion. For him, "in spite of its nearness to the religious field, mysticism, as pure experience, need not coincide with religion." Religion "does not, like mystical experience, like outside culture, but forms a part of it; it crystallizes itself in concrete things, such as church, prayer, dogma." However close religion may stand to the mystical sphere proper, it is not "the last thing." The mystic ocean surrounding the island of objectivity is endless.
17. "Nama-cult of the Sudan. In a brief article on "Le culte du Nama au Soudan," published in the *Bull. et Mém. de la Soc. d'Anthrop. de Paris* (6.S., vol. 1, 1910, pp. 361-362), Fr. de Zeltner treats of a form of native "religion," known as the *Nama*-cult, the chief feature of which is certain colored wooden fetishes (or *namas*), which are kept in a hut under care of the *dibi* or head of the cult. Sanctuaries of this "religion" are to be found in the village of Niaumala, district of Kita. A number of the *namas*, confiscated by the authorities in a village of the district of Bamako, are now in the Musée du Trocadéro, Paris.
18. *Philosophy of religion and psychology of religion.* The question of the lines of division between the philosophy and the psychology of religion is discussed by Dr. Th. Hoepfner, in an article, "Beiträge zur Scheidung zwischen Religionsphilosophie und Religionpsychologie," published in the *Zeitschrift f. Religionspsychologie* (vol. 5, 1911, pp. 37-56), originally an address before a Masonic lodge in Eisenach. In the study of religion, both philosophical-logical criticism and the psychological method are necessary in order, on the one hand, that the basis of our views may be tested and the great eternal and human ideas comprehended, and on the other, that the significance of mental content and mental processes may not be overlooked or misinterpreted.
19. *Placenta in folk-lore, etc.* In the *Archivio per l'Antropologia* (vol. 40, 1910, pp. 316-352), Professor G. Bellucci has an article on "La placenta nelle tradizioni italiane et nell'etnografia," in which he has gathered together a mass of data concerning the placenta in Italian folk-lore, with indications of corresponding ideas and practices elsewhere in the world, among uncivilized peoples, etc. The investiga-

- tions of the author were suggested by the discovery of the remains of a human placenta in a spring in the commune of Magione (Umbria) in 1907. It was found that the women of Magione believed that placentas must be thrown into springs or running water, it being thought that the descent of milk in the breasts of the woman with child and the securing and preservation of a large quantity of milk, stood in relation to the slow maceration of the placenta, such as could be verified if it were thrown into and kept in the water. The belief also prevailed that if the placenta were suddenly dried the mammary glands would also dry up and suckling become impossible.
20. "*Primitive monotheism.*" In the *Revue de Philosophie* for September-October, 1911, J. Linard discusses (pp. 390-416), under the title "*Le monothéisme primitif d'après Andrew Lang et Wilhelm Schmidt,*" the views as to the nature of religion and the idea of God prevalent among uncivilized peoples according to Andrew Lang and Father Schmidt (editor of *Anthropos*) in their recent writings. Lang draws his evidence for the existence of a sort of "*primitive monotheism,*" from all parts of the globe (Fuegians to natives of New Guinea), Father Schmidt considers particularly the Pigmies and the Australasians. The rôle of animism, according to Lang, was to clarify the conception of deity. Exuberant mythology has sometimes "*buried*" the idea of a creator, a supreme being, etc. Lang sees in sacrifices an attempt to please or appease spirits,—this also weakened the "*idea of God;*" Schmidt rather a token of gratitude to the author of all. Father Schmidt's articles in *Anthropos* have been reprinted as a monograph, with the title *L'Origine de l'idée de Dieu, Etude historico-critique et positive* (Vienne, 1910, 316 p.).
21. "*Religion*" and "*Superstition.*" In the *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft* (vol. 14, 1911, pp. 406-422), W. F. Otto has an article, "*Religio et Supersticio,*" wherein he discussed with some detail the meaning and use of these terms by the Romans, etc. According to the author, *religio* "is originally and primarily a *feeling*, more exactly the feeling of holy awe, anxiety, doubt, or fear, aroused in the human mind in face of something unusual, inexplicable, etc." Later, with the appearance of priests and stated religious offices, the word assumed a secondary meaning, viz., the attitude of the citizen toward the supernatural,—"*represented without fear or doubt in the form of the recognized national deities and so rightly venerated.*" This view of the matter was expressed by W. W. Fowler in an essay on "*The Latin history of the Word 'Religio,'*" in the second volume of the *Transactions of the Third International Congress for the History of Religions* (Oxford, 1908).—Hr. Otto's article was ready for publication before the appearance of Fowler's discussion. He agrees with Marett, who, in his *The Threshold of Religion* (London, 1909), says (p. 13), "*of all English words, Awe is, I think, the one that expresses the fundamental Religious Feeling most nearly.*" *Religio* has in it something negative and something positive. The word *supersticio*, according to Otto, meant originally "*excitement,*" then

excitement of fear," etc.; it belongs with *extasis*, but with a certain difference. In the later development of a state-cult, *superstatio* came to denote something reprehensible, a superfluity of *religio*. The etymology of *religio*, Otto thinks, is from a verb *relegere*, "to be careful," the opposite of *neglegere*. From the basal meaning of *relegere* the signification of rite and cult can be made clear. In his Königsberg dissertation, published in 1910, *De verborum "religio" atque "religiosus" usu apud Romanos quaestiones selecta*, which is criticized at some length by Otto, M. Kobbert opposes the view that *religio* primarily signified a feeling, and that from that meaning all others must be derived.

22. *Roman ex-votos.* It is not generally known that the Archeological Museum of Madrid contains a rich collection of terra-cotta *ex-votos* (not yet published), found about 1868 by the Marquis of Salamanca at Calvi, near Rome. Their number is so great that they may have come from a shop. There are several hundred figures of animals (pigs, cattle), heads of human beings, masks, feet, hands, breasts, genital organs, etc., besides many figurines of the Tanagra type. A brief account of some of these (particularly those representing deformed and diseased limbs, organs, etc.), is given by Dr. F. Regnault, in his article on "Collection d'ex-voto Romains du Musée Archéologique de Madrid," in the *Bulletins et Mémoires de la Société d'Anthropologie de Paris* (Sér. 6, vol. 1, 1910, pp. 258-265). The *ex-votos* of feet show clearly that the Romans suffered from their sandals.
23. *Song recitative in myths.* The rôle of song in the non-ceremonial acts of American Indians, and, perhaps, of some other more or less primitive peoples, is emphasized by Dr. E. Sapir, in his article on "Song Recitative in Paiute Mythology," in the *Journal of American Folk-Lore* (vol. 23, 1910, pp. 455-472). The subject is of great interest since, "not infrequently in America, particularly where song enters in, mythology is closely linked with ritual; but as Paiute myths have, as far as could be learned, no ritualistic aspect whatever, the term 'non-ceremonial' as applied to them seems justified" (p. 455). The Indians in question are the Kaibab Paiutes of southwestern Utah and northwestern Arizona. As Dr. Sapir points out, the obtaining of so many texts of Indian myths in English only has had certain disadvantages for while the myth thus obtained "may sometimes be more complete as a narrative than the same myth obtained in text," it will also "nearly always have much of the baldness and lack of color of a mere abstract." It can therefore be affirmed that "had most or all of the many American myths now already published been collected as fully dictated texts, there is small doubt that Indian mythologies would be more clearly seen to have their peculiarities of style and character as well as incident." There is undoubtedly a considerable effort made in American Indian myths "to make characters interesting as such," and this has probably been one of the factors in the development of the myth recitative, which may not be original with the Paiutes, but borrowed from or suggested by some-

thing similar among the Mohave, who possess long song-myths, since "there is reason for believing that the Mohave or other Yuman tribes have exercised a considerable influence on the musical stock in trade of the Paiute." In Paiute the song recitative "is not peculiar to any particular myth, but always to a particular character, there being as many distinct styles of recitative as there are singing characters." The narrative portions of the Paiute myth are always recited in a speaking voice, but the conversational passages, "are either spoken or sung, according to the mythical character who is supposed to be speaking." The Porcupine, Chipmunk, Skunk and Badger talk rather than sing. Among the singing characters are Wolf, Mountain-bluejay, Gray-Hawk, Sparrow-Hawk, Eagle, Lizard, Rattlesnake, Red-Ant, Badger-Chief and Iron-Clothes (a mythical personage). The coyote rarely uses song (e. g., on the death of his brother Wolf). A number of interesting points in connection with the wordings, pronunciation, etc., of the texts of these songs are noted by the author, while, "from the musical point of view, perhaps the most remarkable fact to be noted in regard to these recitatives is the variety of rhythms employed." In eleven examples obtained by Dr. Sapir "no less than five meters can be illustrated" (p. 470).

24. *Sun myths.* In the *Journal of American Folk-Lore* (vol. 23, 1910, pp. 473-478), Mr. A. C. Parker, himself of Indian descent, has a brief article on "Iroquois Sun Myths," in which he gives the English text only of a legend of "Three Brothers who followed the Sun under the Sky's Rim." According to Mr. Parker, although it is probable that this legend contains modern features the portion relating to the sky and the sun is, in the belief of the Indian narrator, very old. In Iroquois mythology as here represented, there are three somewhat conflicting ideas of the sun: 1, as the messenger of the creator and the patron of war; 2, as the face of the first mother; 3, as the father of mankind of earthly origin. Some of the data suggest that "Iroquois mythology in its present state has been derived from several sources." One of these factors is doubtless the adoption of conquered and associated tribes, both of Iroquoian and of Algonkian lineage. Among the Onondaga, of the Grand River Reservation (Ontario), the leader of the sun-ceremony carries a wooden effigy of the sun. The survival of certain sun-ceremonials among the Canadian Iroquois is ascribed by the author to the fact that these Indians were longer under the influence of the old religion, receiving later the "revelations" of Handsome Lake, the Seneca "prophet," who, about 1800, by his teachings, tabooed most of the Iroquois folk-beliefs "and almost entirely revolutionized the religious system of the Iroquois of New York and Ontario."

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THE GENETIC VIEW OF BERKELEY'S RELIGIOUS MOTIVATION.

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Geneticism, which I believe to be at once the philosophy and the psychology of the future, regards the world not *sub specie eternitatis*, but *sub specie generationis*. It recognizes both pragmatism and absolutism, and justifies each as factors in its higher synthesis. It holds that all things in life and mind will find their ultimate explanation only when all the stages of their origin are simply but correctly described, and their evolution set forth with maximal fulness. It believes that nothing that mind is or does, has been or has done in the past, or will be and will do in the future, is without its sufficient reason; that this is true of all mental products, whether they be the apparent incoherence of mania and verbigeration, or philosophical problems such as whether unpereeived objects exist, whether we think of things differently from what they are, why Plato postulated good, and Spinoza substance, as their absolutes, and so on. It would subject all these themes to its own psychoanalysis, and also the study of practicalities from Kant to Schiller, James and Dewey, in order to find out the deeper meanings and their latent content. It assumes that Thorndike's meliorism, Strong's substitutionism, Pitkin's world-picture, Tawney's purposive consistency, and all the newest and oldest problems of epistemology, and the present struggle back towards the *terra firma* of realism, even in religion, do not one of them say all that they mean, and some only a small part; that most of the expressions of psychic life are more or less symbolic, and that their half-concealed,

half-revealed meaning will be brought out only when we can get through and back of their form in consciousness and tell what deeper tendencies they express and how historically they came to take on their present forms. With Perry, geneticism holds that the theory of knowledge arose from postulating matter without qualities and mind without extension, and that consciousness must be reduced to a form of energy, but that this objective is only another aspect of subjective psychology. W. F. Marvin (*Syllabus of an Introduction to Philosophy*, p. 129) says, "Consciousness is nowhere, that is, it does not exist in space," "nor is it a non-extended point in space," "it is, in fact, non-spatial." And McCosh says practically the same. What relation then can it possibly have with the brain or nerves? Can it move, or can anything in it move? Is it in time?

It is frankly admitted that, so far, geneticism is little more than an ideal with even its program but partially developed, but it affords a new and lofty viewpoint from which to survey with equanimity and with a wide horizon all the conflicts of present opinion, and to give them fairly a true perspective. It can already rather completely solve some problems, although, at present, it asks a score of questions for every one it can answer. For this reason, it will not appeal to those who seek completeness, or believe that we have already arrived, or that it is noon-day rather than a very early morning hour in philosophy. Thus, it is not a view that will commend itself to those who seek finality, still less to those who have already accepted or wrought out a closed system. All these should be warned betimes that their place is not in the camp of the geneticists.

Geneticism began but recently and obscurely with a few empirical data, its view being for the most part neglected by those who wrought in the field of mind, and we were very modest. But its growth has, of late, been amazing, and far beyond the early dreams of its originators, or the knowledge of those who have neglected it. It is already beginning to read its title clear to become the chief stone of the corner, entirely ignored though it still is by most of the guild of system-builders. From the observation of simpler and higher animal forms, and of the minds and conduct of children, normal and defective, it has already come to realize that the great speculative

minds of history are but children of a larger growth, that each system is only a set of more or less carefully wrought-out returns to nature's great unwritten *questionnaire*, which, from long before the days of the Sphinx down, has always been asking what is man and his place in the world, what can he know, what should he do, how feel, how did he and all his problems arise from great Mother Nature, and what will be his end? To the geneticists, all philosophemes, whether of children or adults, wise or otherwise, are only more or less precious data for studying human types of soul, temperament, diathesis and disposition.¹ Hence the geneticist can never be a materialist or an idealist, a dogmatist or a positivist, or any of the rest, because to him each is legitimate and has its own justification, and expresses a type of character and mental tastes and opinions, which it is his task thoroughly to know and sympathetically appreciate and, in the end, harmoniously synthetize into a new and greater harmony, nothing less than the symphony of man-soul itself. Those who need to do so may still make the personally-conducted and well-traveled tour through Locke, Berkeley, Hume and Kant, viewing the absolute idealism of the theory of knowledge, the best lesson of which is the realization that every psychic bane produces its own antidote or antiseptic, in this case, the new realism of the immediate intuitionists like Stumpf and, in a different way, Mach and Bergson; while others may prefer Schurman and the old short eirenit of the Scotch philosophy (Reid and Stewart) of common sense, which bars this *détour*.

The epistemological mierobe is most infectious at the very dawn of the teens, as so many studies have shown. At no age is the mind so prone to sudden and spontaneous obsessions of the question-mania regarding ultimate things. The collections of childish queries and speculations upon these themes should be very suggestive to philosophers. Like childish distempers, however, all these insistent questionings as to what knowledge and reality really are are innocuous and leave a very wholesome immunizing agency behind them, unless they come too

¹ As an early illustration of this tendency, see "Visualization as a Chief Sourcee of the Psychology of Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley and Hume," by Alexander Fraser. *Am. Jour. of Psy.* Dec., 1891. Vol. 4, No. 2, pp. 230-247. Also his "The Psychological Foundation of Natural Realism." *Ibid.* April, 1892. Vol. 4, No. 3, pp. 429-450.

late in life, when they are much more severe and the effects more lasting and harder to recover from.

Thus, while the geneticist yields not even to the metaphysician and epistemologist in his appreciation of the great philosophic systems, he regards them in a very different light. He sees in none of them ultimate or eternal truth, but considers them as expressions of two things: *First*, of a certain age, race and nation. Not one of these systems could possibly have been developed in any other time or environment. Thus, like the ancient prophets each has always a primarily historical and never a scientific value. Their authors do not address us or our time, but others of a very different one. This is the new, historic, versus the old dogmatic and partisan view, which since Zeller and Fischer has been progressively recognized. Discipleship takes us out of our own age into that of one that has passed and gone. Many of the problems and issues that inspired both methods and conclusions of the great classical writers are simply dead from atrophy, or they are settled; and it is robbing the grave to resurrect them, save as an academic exercise in the history of thought and culture.

The *second* determining element in the old systems is the personality of the philosopher himself, for his biography is always the other key to his scheme of things. Idealists, epistemologists, dogmatists, empiricists, and all other schools, are some more, some less, temperamental as well as creedal. Philosophers have been always partisan, criticizing and rejecting those of other sects. Each interprets the universe according to his own individuality and is not content, like scientific men, to contribute a tiny brick to the same vast temple others are building. To the geneticists, these schools and creeds must always be studied judiciously, comparatively, sympathetically, but none of them can ever possibly be regarded as a finality. Each represents a species of the genus, "man of culture." A philosophy is the very acme of self-expression, as science often is of self-abnegation and subordination. There is no other field, not even literature or art, in which a man of education can vent himself with more self-abandon over so wide an area, and can choose his own periscope almost anywhere in it. He cannot be a specialist, but must be a generalist. He alone can follow his own thought freely, fearlessly, wherever it may lead him, weaving into it any color or patterns that seem to him good,

provided only he weave a careful or well-wrought picture. More than any other writer's, a philosopher's opinions are matters of his own taste, which no amount of disputation can change. If expression be the supreme luxury, the speculative philosopher attains this felicity of complete self-indulgence in his own opinions most completely. To be carefully explained by posterity, has been called the highest criterion of success in authorship, and we may add that, to explain the philosopher psychologically, is one of the chief new duties which our science now owes to the great speculative minds of the past. For geneticism, they all represent what Hegel characterizes as an animal kingdom of mind. They challenge us to study their types. No other intellects have ever blossomed so fully, none written so confessionally or revelatorily of what is in man's soul. *In vino veritas*, that is, men are all drunk with the spirit of truth and the passion to utter it, to show forth their inmost soul, only we must have the wit to do much interpretation. Psychological criticism thus must go back of what these systems say, in order to find all or most that they mean. They thought that they expressed certain things in certain ways. We shall find that they expressed very different things in very different ways. We must first take the trouble of understanding their own consciousness and, to do this, must often lay bare what they would fain conceal. We must seek for a deeper motive for all they said. Their documents tell us how the world looked from beneath their own skull-pans, and we must not only vividly revive their images and sentiments, as a starting point from which to proceed to a further analysis, comparison, interpretation, diagnosis of *Anlagen*, but trace out genetic stages to their causes and motivations till we understand them far better than they could possibly understand themselves. This genetic psychology is far vaster than all systems or creeds, for these are but two of the many fields it cultivates.

Appallingly great as is this task, even it is but part, for the geneticist must also consider not only the latest twigs on the old tree of psychic life, as represented by the most cultivated adult men and women of to-day, but he must consider all phases and stages of development of mind in every animal form, with each extinct species of which a specific type of soul-life went out and was lost to the world. He must peer wherever possible into the past, list and scrutinize every vestige of

psychic adaptation from the very beginning, and everything else that may serve as a key to what is gone, so as to restore the missing links of mind wherever possible. Hence, while he must introspect to the uttermost, he must realize that what he finds in himself is only a small and fragmentary part of the entire world of mind and that objective methods and data must be his chief reliance; that he must, in a new sense, become a citizen of all times, lands and climes and the spectator of all events. He must especially be on his guard against becoming a banalistic provincial solipsist in his own field or a stand-patter of any school. To be a humanist, large as the term is, is not enough.

What, for the geneticist, is the most perfect type of knowledge, and what wins man's most complete belief? It is sensation, which is also the first and oldest of all psychic processes. Seeing is believing. What sane man, with normal senses, ever really did or could doubt the great body of their deliverances? Countless generations of beings have relied implicitly on their evidence. Had they not for eons been the most trustworthy of all witnesses, no psyche would ever have been evolved and animal life without them is inconceivable. Subjectively considered, sensation is not only the primordial but the most direct and immediate of all intuitions, and has, from the first, shaped not only all vital functions but structures into conformity with and adaptation to the external world. Now, what is the essential feature in all sensation? What is its purpose and end? Not the act of perception itself, as Berkeleyans aver, but a real outer object independent of the percipient, not his erect, project, or any extradition of his consciousness. If we perceive, we perceive something not ourselves. Whether it be perceived truly as it is, or in a symbolic way, every candid analysis of the act of sensation or perception finds an object over against a subject, a counterposed non-ego over against an ego. Thus, there is an ineluctable realistic basis, no matter how transformed it be, to every true perception. This bottom fact, the exceptional cases of illusions and hallucinations should no more discredit than the fact of the existence of idiots and deviates of many kinds should shock our confidence in sanity, or sickness and weakness make us doubt health and strength. For the most part, then, the senses are the most truthful of all our faculties, the creators of automatisms and habits, the sovereign

lords of behavior and conduct, the mother of mind throughout both the animal and human world. They may err, but they do so rarely or under peculiar conditions, and all errors tend to be corrected. Most of the defects philosophers are so fond of charging up against them are really faults of interpretation, showing no lack of faithful deliverances on their part. Indeed, so invincible is their testimony, that, where subjective stimuli cause false sensations, they do not need to be very often repeated to compel belief in the objective reality they falsely assert, so that, as Helmholtz says, the soundest mind can not long remain proof against habitual illusions of perception. To suspect the habitual veracity of sense thus brings panic and confusion and is due, on the part of those who stress them, either to an exceptional number of illusions in their own experience, or else to some often hidden motivation or unconscious wish which causes them to over-emphasize the exceptional fallacies of perception and to interpret sound in the light of unsound experiences, rather than conversely, as they should. Implicit belief in the senses, therefore, is the most common form of sound common sense, for there is no reality or certainty in the universe that can begin for a moment to compare with that of a thing seen, felt, or otherwise sensed. That gives us a paradigm of every other kind of reality, knowledge, and certainty, the degree of which is directly in proportion as it approximates this, which can never be suppressed. The very etymologies of every one of the terms designating the so-called higher or more complex psychic processes show how sense forms and images of the various types pervade all mental processes. Even science, according to Avenarius, grows perfect just in proportion as it formulates the universe in terms of possible sense-experience, for this makes us able to think the world with the greatest economy or conservation of mental energy.

Conversely, whatever we try to take out of the sense-world loses reality just as far as we succeed in the attempt. To deny space relations of extension and position to *anything*, even God, soul, thought, is to rob it of its most essential reality, and condemn it to lead a hovering limbo-life in the pallid realms of nominalism: it is to cut the tap-root of genuine belief in its existence, because everything that truly is, even mind, thought, soul, God, is somewhere, although we may know nothing as to its position, size or shape. For the geneticist, thus, sense is

the foundation of everything in the psyche; and one of his great problems is to trace, step by step, how the world of mind evolved from this basis. To impeach its witness, is, therefore, to make psychology and philosophy air-plants striking no roots into mother-earth, and to rob them of the most essential criteria of truth. It condemns philosophizing to do its business with a paper of currency of promises to pay, when there is no specie basis.

This being so, the geneticist who must explain, evaluate and find partial truth in all things, deviative as well as normative, must tell us why, for instance, Berkeley and the subjective idealists came to proclaim sense-perception bankrupt, and must weigh their evidences, must ask what was the underlying motive of their elaborated solipsism, their rejection of what is so cardinal and inexpugnable. What was the deeper faith that underlay their honest doubts, for that these always exist, the geneticist, for whom there is no error, must always assume.

For this new psychoanalysis, despite the little known of his early family life, the case of Berkeley offers us, on the whole, a most favorable example. His biographer, Fraser, speaks of his "singularly emotional disposition." Irish, his fervid genius may in many points well be compared with that of his great Irish precursor, Scotus Erigena, the morning-star of medieval, as Berkeley became of modern, scholasticism. The dreamery and imaginings of this "romantic boy," "distrustful at the age of eight years," and "so by nature disposed for new doctrine," as he says of himself, were matured by a country-home near an old castle, such as fired the genius of Walter Scott, till at the age of eleven he was sent to the nearest town-school at Kilkenny, the Eton of Ireland, where he spent the four most susceptible years of pubescence. "Precocious," well-prepared and finding the curriculum easy, there is a tradition, says Fraser, that "he fed his imagination with the airy vision of romance and thus weakened the natural sense of the difference between illusion and reality." He was also very susceptible to the charms that nature had lavishly spread about this region, which he loved to explore and to feel all its thanatopsis and other mystic moods, and the inevitable provocation to speculate as to its meaning and man's origin, and place in all the mighty scheme. How deeply he could appreciate this is seen

in one of the very earliest of his writings, an account of a visit to the cave of Dunmore near by.

At the age of fifteen, in 1700, he went to Trinity College, Dublin, where, some three years later, he began his lately discovered (printed in 1871) *Common-place Book*, kept for years, which gives us exceptional insight into the seethings of his mind. In it he communes with himself, apparently with no thought that any other eye would see these jottings. In this precious, almost confessional document, we see that the revered gropings and obstinate questioning so germane to childhood, as it begins to merge into manhood and realize things in a new way, had not in his case been left to fade into the light of common day, but that he had mused and pondered over them with rare fascination. His enthusiasm and perfervid fancy teemed with queries concerning the true meaning of reality in the world of sense. We find here a consuming desire to promulgate a new doctrine which should "make short work of all the supposed powers of dead unconscious matter;" should banish perplexity and contradiction, sap the roots of religious scepticism, and bring a new harmony of science and theology. All these centered in his new-old scepticism concerning things we see and touch, or the *visibilia* and the *tangibilia*. He would make a great *coup*, which should bring consternation to the erities of religion, by his *tu quoque* argument that students of nature also work by faith, knowing the material world only by a system of symbols slowly evolved and associated in ways that could be subjected to a most destructive criticism. During his thirteen years at Dublin, which he left at twenty-eight, this Guy Fawkes of naïve natural realism had pretty well matured and had serappily laid his plot against common sense, but had done it in the sweetest unconsciousness of all the negative implications that ever since have flowed from it. He would impeach and discredit the most ancient trusted oracles of mankind by a flank movement against the erities of transcendentalities, by showing that matter too was really immaterial, was only a practical postulate on the plane of sense, which must be, in fact, everywhere accepted by an act of faith. He would subjectify even the objects of perception, and make each individual the creator of his own physical world, and bring to Modern Europe the old Indie psychosis of *maya*, which looks out upon nature as only a phantasmagoria of magic-lantern effects projected upon the *tabula rasa* of time.

and space, the objective reality of which latter it never occurred to him to doubt. Things are only phenomenal; *noumena* are spiritual, higher, surer, truer, in fact, the only actual realities. Though not deeply concerned for things ecclesiastical, caring little for the conventional orthodoxy of his day, he was heart and soul a religionist, and most of all concerned to vindicate the ways of God in nature and mind, and to subject science to faith. Long he pondered the ways and means of the most effective propaganda of these doctrines, so that they should bring most startling consternation into the camp of the scientists, whose claims constituted the chief atmosphere of academic Dublin, which he found saturated and fermenting with them, for nowhere in Britain was there any center of scientific interest and activity to be compared at that time with Trinity, which had so lately been awakened to the new light.

To a youth of Berkeley's genius, whose mind was still full of the dreams of boyhood, all this was stimulating to the point of exhilaration and yet baffling to all his deeply-rooted and hitherto fondly-cherished tendencies. He was charmed, yet recusant; drawn, but repelled. Where was the place, and what was the justification, in an atmosphere so charged and saturated with science, for a purely idealistic diathesis, closing in about which the world of law and necessity brought almost claustrophobic symptoms? He could not, like the more prosaic Lotze, whose soul was long perturbed by the same antithesis, admit that the mechanical view of the world was everywhere present, but everywhere subordinate, for this would imply compromise, and of this the Berkeleyan type of mind never knows even the meaning. Ordained at the age of twenty-four, preaching occasionally, he had given hostages to the Christian religion, and his impetuous temperament, chafed as it was, stormed at by free-thinkers like Tolland, John Browne, Molyneux (in his new dioptries), Locke, Newton, Hobbes, Descartes, Boyle and the great Greeks (for he became Greek professor at the age of twenty-two), his realization that "things are thinks," to use Bronson Alcott's expression, brought thus a great revolution, and also a profound peace to his perturbed soul. This was all new and most stimulating to him. He felt that his own view would clear up "all those contradictions and inexplicable, perplexing absurdities that have in all ages been a reproach to human reason." He knew too that there was "a mighty set of men" who would oppose

and vilipend him, but he vows to cling to his transforming thought. With it, he says, he has "a heart of ease," knowing that things of sense are ideas, a thesis, as Fraser says, "not intelligible to his contemporaries and immediate successors, and he had only an imperfect consciousness of it himself." He sought with the greatest enthusiasm to restore spiritual beliefs and higher ideals of life in a materialistic age. He was really "against his own intention, opening the door for the most thoroughgoing scepticism and agnosticism ever offered to the world."

This made Berkeley the *enfant terrible* of modern philosophers, the arch-sceptic of all sceptics, casting doubt upon the most fundamental belief of the world. Never has there been a philosophy so purely one of temperament and so infectious to those of like diathesis. To the sedentary aloofness from practical affairs of academic life and isolation greater for speculators than for those in any other chairs, he added his own visionary temperament, his theological bias, and the special incitement of finding himself in the midst of the hottest battle so far waged between science and faith, where, with lines closely drawn and combatants in serried array on either side, he would be a new David coming forth with his sling against the great Philistine, science. But here the simile ends, for his sling did chief execution in his own ranks, which have ever since been more discomfited than have either the scientists or the every-day naïve realists. His great secret of visual and tactal immaterialism consisted in applying what Loeke had said of the secondary to the primary qualities of matter, and it was both inspired and used as a method of causing physical things to vanish and to reveal in their places the eternal spirit and universal reason. The early stages of his writings were negative, while later the dominating motive was more in evidence. We live and move and have our being in God. We realize this "intellectually, philosophically and practically by assimilation to God who is reason and spirit and reality, so supreme" that, in His presence, the sensible world fades away and only things unseen are really eternal.

Thus we find the underlying motive deeper than his own consciousness, a bias probably never realized by himself. His all-dominant wish was to exalt the cause of faith and reason above, and at the expense of, that of sense, not content like Paul to postulate a new special organ of transcendentalities, to

parallel the domain of the sensory, thus giving us a dual world order; not quite a visionary, he yet believed the pipe-dreams of his own imagination until this faculty had become so vivid as to claim the same credence as sense. Like Swedenborg, he was satisfied with the mystic and absorbed contemplation of things divine till the physical world seemed empty and forgotten, as to the ecstatic newer Platonists. To these views he turned with special fondness in his old age. Incapable of the unique ontological method of Parmenides or Spinoza in resting everything on the deductive or mathematical elaboration of an absolutist's creed, his pugnacious Irish disposition impelled him as Philonous to carry aggressive warfare into the Hylie Court with the new weapon that turned the burden of proof on his adversaries and opened a new mine of psychological veins of doubt beneath their very feet, by convincing all who put their trust in sense of a credulity if not a superstition even grosser than that which scepticism had charged up against religionists. Thus, by breaking the bonds of sense, human might be sublimated into divine thought as in his later writings, especially in *Alciphron* and *Siris* he seeks to do positively. Even Mieromegas on the dog star, with his thousand senses, got no satisfaction, but only growing perplexity from them. Thus, this author of the philosophy of a recrudescient Hindu *maya* gave the world a shock, which for subsequent students in the field brought actual disenchantment with nature by tarnishing its pristine charm and immediateness, and those who felt its full force and then succeeded in facing it down, returned to the world somewhat as convalescents, after grave disease, look out through the sickroom windows upon the palpitating life of man, while they muster strength again to face the world with courage and resolution as recuperative agencies bring them back to it again. They have trod the way of death far enough toward the end to have lost their way back for a time, but this experience was necessary, and was prescribed, in fact, not only as giving immunity against all less mortal microbes of doubt, but because those sick nigh unto death may return to life with a more vivid sense of the reality of things unseen beyond the veil.

His Bermuda scheme occupied a prominent, if not the chief, place in his mind from the age of thirty-six to forty-six. Realizing, from his travels on the continent and his life in London,

the corruption of Europe, which, to his pure soul, seemed to predict ruin, his ardent social idealism led him to plan a college on the Bermuda Islands, 600 miles from land, where both the sons of British colonists and native Indians from the continent of America could be educated. Long he schemed to raise money for his Utopian institution on these beautiful summer islands, to which his fancy gave a halo of romance. When Swift privately married Stella, and the unhappy Vanessa, whom he had never seen, bequeathed to Berkeley her fortune of some 3,000 pounds, this asset and the charter and grant from Parliament, together with private subscriptions, seemed to him to warrant the realization of his hopes, and so, in 1829, he landed, not at the Bermudas, but at Newport, where he began his bucolic life, wrote and waited for the special grant of 30,000 pounds which had been voted for his project, but which Walpole never sent. Here too he wrote his *Alciphron*, which marked a distinct advance from his phenomenological standpoint to an actual hypostatization of Plato's ideas, and here he inspired Samuel Johnson and Jonathan Edwards. But, after nearly three years, he sailed for home, a disappointed man, never having seen the Bermudas nor his college, but consoled by his transcendental speculations. In America, he charmed everyone, as he always did, and gave a great impulse to metaphysical speculation to the few scholars here inclined that way. He had found consolation for the disenchantments of immaterialism in a greatly augmented sense of the reality of the supernal world, where alone *noumena* were found. All phenomena were only media through which we discern the intelligent and divine spirit. Religion alone is the perfection of man. Indeed, we can see God even more truly than we can see nature or the soul of our friends. Reason is begotten of faith. All nature is but a revelation of God. Thus Berkeley sought to regenerate the New World by his new idealism. In the crude practical civilization of this country, as it was in his day, where the chief energies of men were directed to the conquest of nature, the enthusiastic espousal of his crude idealism by the chosen few was a contrast effect of reaction from a materialistic civilization, and suggests the strange success of Dr. William Harris' propaganda of Hegelism in the raw culture of St. Louis, thirty years ago. Pioneer-life complemented itself by crass religious creeds, while the few more thoughtful

minds turned to a crass philosophy which was the diametrical opposite of their practical lives. Thus extremes met, and this effect was heightened by the fact that Berkeley's socialistic ideas were favored by the callow Utopian democratic dreamerries of our pre-Revolutionary days.

This was the most romantic of all romantic missionary enterprises, and might almost be compared with the South Sea Bubble and the tulip-mania.

In remote rural Cloyne, where, after a period of controversy, the last eighteen years of his life, from forty-nine on, were spent, when famine and fever had ravaged the region, and his own health was impaired, he sought a panacea for all bodily, as hitherto he had for all mental and social ills, and found it in tar-water, and his *Siris* or chain of aphorisms on this subject was written and became at once by far the most popular of all his works. The culminating thought of his life was of a universal agent, the one true remedy of remedies, the great reality revealed though concealed by sense. This nauseous drug, now shrunken to a very humble place in the medical pharmacopoeia, became the only drug in his household, and about it he spun a system of philosophical halos. It became the fashion, and factories were established to make it. It was to open a new era to the world. Though itself a phenomenal drug, it had behind it the infinite source of life, and those charged with it would make unprecedented advances, physically, mentally and morally. It thus became, as his biographer says, the ruling passion of his closing years, and yet he slowly sank into melancholy, a baffled ontologist.

In all this, his type of reason was somewhat paralleled twenty years ago by Brown-Séquard and his disciples' advocacy of testicular extracts, which many savants here and in Europe used with great confidence in their amazing rejuvenating effects. Unlike modern American idealistic professors, who left others to draw the ineluctable practical consequences of their creed in the theory and practice of faith-heal, he did not hesitate to enter the therapeutic field himself. If there be a universal sin-heal, as Christianity teaches, which all must experience to be saved, there must also be a universal bodily panacea. If there be one supreme creative energy, why not a sustaining and curative one? No doubt tar-water—ten grams of tar-water to ten grams of faith—did work cures, but so can almost anything

else, provided the faith be not wanting, and provided the remedy be not particularly harmful. But how sedulously explain that it was not the tar-water itself, for that was only phenomenal, but the great principle of life back of it which brought the cures? Here we psychoanalysts find a remarkable rerudescence in Berkeley's mind of the transubstantiation psychosis which the Medieval Church experienced in the doctrine that the bread and wine of the Saerament were made into the veritable body and blood of Our Lord. As the one regenerated the soul, so the other did the body, not by its phenomenal material, the pitch and resin, but by its inner principle, the vital life, which expressed the life-giving energy of God, who had singled it out and imparted to it a unique and special power. Berkeley sought no patent for his new medicine, although perhaps no patent medicine was ever so effectively advertised on so high a plane.

Siris won the author, then but little known outside of England and her colonies, immediate and world-wide fame, and was translated into many languages. That and his further writings on tar-water were the largest of his works, save *Aleiphron*, and by far the most scholarly, with allusions to a wide range of philosophic literature, which was generally lacking in his other writings. Very many, if not most, of his contemporaries knew him by this treatise only, which is now almost entirely ignored by both the history of philosophy and epistemologists. Those who treat his *Theory of Vision*, *Human Knowledge*, *Aleiphron*, *Philonous* and *Hylas* seriously, usually wish his *Siris* forgotten, but to the geneticists, it is precious and indispensable, and it absorbed the chief energies of nearly a decade and a half of his maturest years. In it he not only hypostatized ideas, as he had begun to do in the *Aleiphron*, but passed from the standpoint of Plato almost to that of the Neo-Platonists. Tar-water is charged with pure empyrean fire. It is not only the soul of all vegetable life, but the theoretical fire of the thermal principle. It is the soul of the world, which will go out when the world cools off. It is the principle of life, which the plant bequeaths to the animal world. Thus, the chain passes from the physical to the spiritual. Deity is spiritualized tar-water, a universe of ideas realized in living persons, they and it derived from absolute being. It is the link between physics and metaphysics, medicine and theosophy. It is some-

times compared with Plato's *Timaeus* for unintelligibility. The type of emanationism it represents is rather more Heraclitic than Alexandrian.

The tar-water psychosis in Berkeley was an expression of the unconscious wish of his soul to fill the great void which existed in almost every great and thoughtful mind till evolution, now supplemented by geneticism, came. Tar-water was more than his "flower in the crannied wall" to start with, and it became in the end the embodiment of his one and all. It was to him all that ether means to the physicist, and protoplasm to the biologist, noumenalized. In the beginning was tar-water. It was the primal source and therefore also the regenerator of life; the supreme quintessence of the alchemist, sifted out of nature by pine and fir trees, the most precious bequest of the plant-soul. It was the supreme type and symbol too of salvation and of deity. As the great and good before Christ, Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, and the rest were said to have anticipated the great salvation of the cross, so Berkeley by this chain of aphorisms filled the void that yawned and ached, consciously or unconsciously, in nearly every soul, before evolution came to fill it and he gained by his tar-water dreameries all that he could of the wished fulfilment or the lasting satisfaction which the genetic view of the world always has and always will give those who know what is to be known, and put their faith in and cast their burdens upon it, for the sake of its great uplift. This was the latent content of his patent emanationistic dream. This is the mother-lye of nature, and, at the same time, the web of thought spun from nature to nature's God. "Ohne Phosphor (=tar-water), kein Gedanke." It was more than Pflüger assigns to cyanogen. Indeed, it was more than the essential ingredient in the sacramental blood and wine of the soul-communion, for it regenerates the body as well as the soul. Thus idealists always take amazing liberties with the world of things as they are, but Berkeley outdoes them all, for his brooding had bred a profound sense of the unreality of facts. Otherwise, he never could have gone against them so naïvely with such a flimsy tissue of speculations. No philosopher is so like the Baconian spider who ejects a mesh of web from its spinnerette on the top of a picket and then floats from the air suspended by it. For subjective idealists there can be no criterion of truth, save the fitting coherence of ideas, one with

another. Here there is no logical consistency, but only the crassest syncretism of *quod libet* eclecticism. The same ingenuity might have made any object, element, or drug whatever, as credible a catholicon. Not a living soul ever did or could accept his system, not even the Hermeties, and Fraser himself is only painfully apologetic. Many delusions of the madhouse have been more systematized. Thus the time has surely come when we must ask whether these sickly vagaries of Berkeley, which haunted all his maturer years, may not be used as a wholesome admonition to youth to cleave close to reality, to wreak the fullest intensity of belief upon the world as it is to sense, lest they too cripple their own souls, and be left to believe any lie that speculative fancy, which has filled the world with metaphysical ghosts, may suggest. This is the Nemesis of immaterialism. That Berkeley's soul still goes marching on in the academic world to-day and is not relegated to the sibilant limbo of mere historicity is not creditable to our philosophic sanity, for, measured by higher modern standards of normality, his soul and career are simply pathological, although as a case for psychoanalysis, he will long be of unique interest. It is not therefore ghoulish to dig up and mutilate even a decent corpse like his, if it lies right athwart what has become a most traveled highway, where it trips and hems most and maims a few who traverse it. He wished posterity to judge him chiefly by his tar-water philosophy. We certainly cannot ignore it. When any professor to-day draws about himself the awful and inviolable circle of academic freedom, I would pause long before invading it. I would reflect how, in Germany, Fechner was allowed to teach that plants and planets were besouled, that the psyche of the sun and moon were regnant deities; how Bauer thought that the Gospels were myths, when myth had a very low connotation as mere fancy; how Zöllner, the great Leipzig astronomer, lectured on slate-writing tricks to demonstrate spiritism; how Kirsehmann was allowed to teach red socialism right across the street from the most absolute monarch west of Russia, but I would not forget that Hygeia is a goddess on whose shrine authority is compelling us more and more to make oblations of even liberty — personal, social corporate, academic — and Berkeleyism with its languishing mental involutions brings such a unique blight and murkiness, and raise the question of mental and moral hygiene; and there are

others in the history of philosophy that need this new, higher criticism and censorship on the grounds of academic sanitation. Eddyism is the inevitable logical consequence of New England transcendentalism, and Emmanuelism is the conclusion of academic epistemology. The authors of these systems of thought did not have the courage or the practical efficiency to draw conclusions, but left that to Mrs. Eddy and Worcester. Berkeley had the courage to apply his system.

Alciphron or the Minute Philosopher, contains seven dialogues, written in America, which are chiefly devoted to an attack upon British free-thinkers, deists, theists and atheists. Lysicles stands for a light-hearted worldling Mandeville, who taught that private vices were public benefits. Against Shaftesbury's reduction of conscience to good taste and virtue to beauty, Euphrator shows that aesthetics is not sufficient to inspire virtue or morality, but that we must have faith in God, whose existence we know by the same evidences that we know that the souls of our friends exist.

The *Analyst*, which followed, attacked infidel mathematicians and astronomers and the minute philosophers who dealt in infinitesimals rather than men of the world. It sought to show that force was as inconceivable as grace. The doctrine of continuity and fluctuations, the basis of calculus, he thought very minute and philosophy resting on presuppositions that were quite as much credulity as faith. His antagonism was specially directed against the astronomer Halley who could not accept the hypothesis of God because he could find no place for him in the universe.

Thus, to go back early in his life, when man is normally in the closest touch with his environment in nature, Berkeley committed himself to the hyperidealistic creed that degraded nature to a mere set of symbols, making a great negation before he had wrought out the great affirmation which always and only can justify denial. Berkeley's mature and later life furnishes us with the spectacle of a pure, ardent, ingenuous soul that had early mutilated itself, and ever after was seeking consolation in the spiritual for losses in the physical world, and this is the motive with which his philosophy is still taught. To wean from nature, impels man to take refuge in something higher. Full consolation, however, Berkeley never found, as may have

happened with a more abstract thinker like Spinoza and one with less ties to and sympathy with mundane things. His later sadness was that of an ontologist who, despite all his subsequent findings in the transcendent world, felt himself baffled and defeated. He, too, felt the malign spell of the spirit and method he had conjured up, which has paled life in so many since. How can one agnostic to the real world of sense be truly gnostic to spiritual verities? He did not pass through nature to nature's God, but found Him by turning away from nature as effectively as anchorites renounced the world.

Also, genetically, affirmations precede rather than follow denials. His scepticism was the most radical in all the history of philosophy. To be sure it was the *jeu d' esprit* of the lush, life-loving, gifted adolescent, sentimentally a perfervid lover of nature, and always preferring to live where her great heart beat strongest, in the country. A temperament that peculiarly needs to feel the authoritativeness of objective reality when it subjectifies it all, does experience a great and dizzying temporary exaltation, a mild inebriation, which is the great charm of epistemology, in the thought that the majestic spectacle of sky, landscape, sea, and even the works of man and the being of one's friends, are phantasmagorical evolutions of our individual selves, that all we thought to be from without is really from within the individual. This is a delusion, to some measure of which the adolescent soul is normally prone, as it breaks the chrysalis of childhood and first really looks out into the wide world of nature and man, but it is legitimate only as dreamy reverie. It is a stage full of significance, but it should be evanescent, for it is only a waking dream belonging to the realm of poetry and myth, and indeed abundantly expressed in both, but not fit for prose, still less for science, the very root of which it cuts. Berkeleyan immaterialism has its place again in senescence, as a stage of its involution, for the weary soul withdrawing from earth. Its phenomena are those of renunciation. This, the long list of scientific men from Huxley to W. K. Brooks, who have been fascinated by it, after a life of devotion to nature and science, shows. The flitting introversion of youth is only like so many other things, a very faint anticipatory fore-gleam of old age, and, if intensified in early life and taken seriously, brings senescence before its time. If

we have found anything in a life's experience with philosophy better than the world of sense, then of course we turn from the latter to the former, but this withdrawal and valedictory must never be first or forced. Youthful nature need not be "sicklied o'er with this pale cast of thought," which belongs only to those who have achieved a wholesome culture, and a Ciceronian or perhaps even a Metschnikoffian old age. Subjective idealism is a kit of tools too sharp for college youth to more than handle with great circumspection. The immaterialism argument is the most desperate of all vengeances that religion, the spiritual and ideal view of the world, has ever attempted to take upon all who in all ages have scoffed at its faith. If all its masked batteries are exploded in the youthful soul, progressive atrophy results, for it tends to wean both from aesthetic and scientific devotion to nature's form and phenomena. Thus, do the young men completely infected with it ever thereafter achieve anything worth while in either art, or science? Are they not all just at the time when they should be superlatively real and earnest, sad precocious wiseacres aloof, superior, always brandishing a few simple phrases with endless variations and chanting a theme of *vanitas vanitatum* as old as Ecclesiastes?

There is now quite a literature with many well-described cases of abnormal weakening or loss of the sense of reality and of the outer world (in Wernicke's allo-psychic field). These patients feel that all objects of sense are unsubstantial, fading, shadowy, and this brings depression, alarm and distress. Is this really a house, a tree, my brother, or am I dreaming? I can make nothing seem real. Am I awake? This is their plaint. It is especially the *visibilia* and *tangibilia* that are affected. This disorder usually begins with states of fatigue; is seen sometimes in involutions and in *dementia praecox*, and it also predisposes to these conditions. The only explanation so far suggested is that two things occur in such cases, first the muscular tension and response which sensation normally excites, and which has been the chief factor in the so-called extradition of consciousness or of sensation, is weakened or lost; and secondly, that the usual associations evoked by the act of perception are not aroused, that is, the patient does not see with all he has seen, touch with all he has touched, but this single experience is isolated from its natural complexes. F. H. Pack-

ard¹ describes a remarkable patient of his who when fatigued saw all solids as flat surfaces, as Berkeley says we all really do. In looking over this literature² I cannot find evidence of any case on record who ever read Berkeley, and he certainly never read of such cases. It would be interesting to know what both they and he would have said of each other. To him, they would have illustrated the sense of phenomenality or immaterialism, but they are mentally crippled thereby. They in turn might have felt the fears which go with this distemper allayed by finding that they had only drifted toward the position advoated by a great philosopher. But, had the perusal of his writings led them to the feeling that their senses were deluders, he would have had only their imprecations. They certainly have felt precisely what he wishes us all at least to know if not to feel, viz., the unreality of the objective world. Can we have a logical conviction that the verdicts of sense are false, without sooner or later coming to feel more or less as these patients do? Should we strive to attain this realization of unreality? Are not these patients, in fact, practical Berkeleyans, who, had they taken him in dead earnest, would thus be realizing precisely what he argues for? There may be different answers to this question, but one thing remains certain, viz., that the degree of intensity of the sense of reality of things rises and falls with the degree of muscular tension or reaetion and also with the range, irradiation and vividness of association. With loss of the reality sense goes relaxation or atrophy of muscular tonus and narrowing of the breath and richness of association among the synapses, or a shrinking of the field of apperception. Thus a Berkeleyan creed must inevitably bring some loss of vigor, of the energy and fidelity of response to facts and events in the outer world. If the doubt is held to in a Piekwickian way, in the sphere of purely reasoned events, the weakening of response would lie more in the domain, not of reflexes but of deliberately planned voluntary conduct as directed toward outer reality. Again, with this distemper

¹"The Feeling of Unreality," *Journal of Abnormal Psychology*. June, 1906. Pp. 141-147.

²Very conveniently summarized by A. Hoch. "A Review of Some Recent Papers upon the Loss of the Feeling of Reality and Kindred Symptoms." *Psy. Bull.* 1905. Vol. 11, pp. 233-241.

of mind are generally associated disorders in the somato- and auto-psychic field.

These disassociative states, with their depressive syndromes, involve retarded and weakened movements, both of body and of mind. Most tests of sensation show no defect whatever, save in a few cases, and very slight analgesia. Even ideas and feelings are dim. There is also loss of interest owing to psychasthenic lowering of self-activity. Recognition fails; parts of the body are not felt unless touched or possibly moved. The eye does not reach out; the patient does not know how things before him look when his eyes are closed, and there is a growing sense of insufficiency and aboulia with progressive agnosia. This is the precise opposite of Janet's conception of the most perfect normality, which consists in the most vital recognition of and response to present environment and the greatest absorption in it.

Just in proportion as this loses its power, the soul loses its grasp on things. From growing indifference and *nil admirari* the psyche may gradually pass to the opposite state called the *délire de négation*. In this state, the hold of presentative words is weakened and those of symbolic words increased.

Many from Aristotle down have recognized that the eye only perceives color and shade, that size, figure and motion are common to sight and touch, that rays of light converge to a focus in the eye and diverge again, inverting the image on the retina, and not a few (quoted by Fraser) before Berkeley have realized that we have to learn how to correlate and interpret the crude material of sensation and have seen the representative and symbolic character of impressions, that we never see but infer distance and that the bonds between sight and touch are knit up in early life; but all this pertains to the genetic or evolutionary history of the individual and the race. Hence, the fact that the adult immediacy of perception is acquired does not affect its validity. To consciousness itself the immediacy is indecomposable and the certainty is beyond all possibility of doubt. Philosophers have fallen into the inveterate fallacy that has been so characteristic of theologians that whatever is evolved cannot be perfect, that a unity made up of elements is not complete and that to demonstrate stages of development impairs the perfection of the product. But the legitimate inference from all Berkeley's facts on which he bases his new theory of vision

as well as all the very much we have learned since in this field is that God and nature have spent much time and made many a trial and error and effort in evolving senses that now act perfectly, instantaneously and truly and thus have been triumphantly successful and have not blundered or failed in their work. As atomism does not destroy spacial continuity, nor the paradox of Achilles and the tortoise disprove motion, so the fact that mental powers have been acquired by many tedious and intricate genetic stages does not invalidate their action. Thus in his vision-theory he is only a geneticist without knowing it and so was led to draw negative and destructive when he should have drawn positive and constructive conclusions. His and all analyses of perception only make the immediacy and certainty with which it now acts all the more precious and all the more trustworthy. Had Berkeley enjoyed the unimpaired healthful common-sense respect for reality that characterizes men who have attained real efficiency, he never could have blown the Bermuda bubble, which was only a dreamer's reaction to a world not real enough to be treated with proper respect. This plan has always been thought to be one of the wildest and weirdest of all schemes in the whole history of education. Had Berkeley not been sickened, like the medieval alchemists, by drinking his own elixir, he could never have evolved his almost lunatic creed concerning tar-water. He, doubtless, believed in this as profoundly as he believed in the external world, and probably far more so, but with the weakening of his sense of everything in the allo-psychic field, he had no criterion of truth, and so, because he believed in tar-water, that was the nostrum of all nostrums. It needs only a slight psychoanalysis of Berkeley's mind to show that his creed both expressed and had eaten into his life, most of which was spent in rural isolation, as if practical realities rather repelled him, making his mind his own kingdom, and like Descartes, occasionally coming into the great world to launch some scheme so fantastic that had it not been made plausible by a simple, attractive personality, great persuasive power and scholarly ingenuity, would have sent those who held it to the madhouse with delusions of greatness. This distemper often goes with disorders in the somato- and auto-psychic spheres, that is, the patient's notion of the reality of his own body and of his inmost ego is impaired, and so, the self in its psycho-physic aspect suffers. Whether this

tendency is logically or psychologically associated in the field of philosophy with loss of outer reality, we shall discuss affirmatively in the case of Hume, and show how, while Berkeley's self had been unduly exalted, that of Hume had been unduly mortified, and that his denial of cause and self was directly favored by tendencies and experiences in his own life.

It was Hume (*Treatise of Human Nature*, 1739 and *Inquiries*, 1748) who read only Berkeley's early sceptical writings, and who would have abhorred his positive religious views, who, if he did not save the Berkeleyan negative way of thought from progressive oblivion, developed it with a vigor of thought far greater than that of Berkeley, and lent to it the influence of his name, which shone with a wider luster. It was Hume who made Berkeleyism an integral part of the history of philosophy. Hume's chief motive was to weaken the hold of theological thought, rather than to strengthen it, so that, even if Berkeley contributed anything that strengthened the religious faith of mankind, Hume used Berkeley's prime principle far more effectively to upset faith. Indeed, Hume almost saved Berkeley from being a joke. Moreover, was it not significant that Fraser, at the *mortuus salutamus* age of eighty, edited Berkeley almost as his valedictory to life, as if saying "Farewell, vain world, I'm going home." Geneticists see all three dimensions of life, never forgetting the temporal perspective, as even experimenters are now prone to do. For psychoanalysis trivial and undetermined details are often graver than those of seemingly serious import. Geneticists believe that philosophy is the love and pursuit of wisdom, and may even prefer its pursuit to possession, and do not feel compelled to decide even between parallelism and interaction.

Can man accept only so much that is given from without? Are there more or less fixed quanta of *credibilita*, whether percepts, facts or faith? Is the faculty of belief easily over-taxed, so that elimination at either end of the scale that connects sensuous and spiritual intensifies absorption in and doeility to the other? Must we put out either the inner or the outer eye in order to see more clearly with the other? Does active doubt in the world of metaphysics or of physics depend on appereception of or quickened interest in the other? Is the carrying power of the soul for sense weakened, if we practice it for spiritual

things, and *vice versa*, as we often conceive reason and faith to be rivals, one flourishing at the expense of the other? Must we specialize in cleaving to the one and rejecting the other? If this be so, can we not say that Berkeley inverted the natural order by turning from sense before he had felt the natural impulse which had, in every thinker of the past, who has grown negligent of sense, given him the only normal motivation to do so, viz., absorption in metaphysical or spiritual verities? They have never scuttled the ship of sense before they have been well established with all their belongings on the ship of faith. They have become denizens of the higher before they forswore their allegiance to the lower kingdom. They have built secure heavenly mansions before they vacated the earthly tenements of sense. They have not burned this world in order that their homelessness here might impel them to seek a higher one.

Finally, no subjective analysis of the process of seeing and touching can ever reveal anything but a simple, immediate, unitary act of direct intuition. Berkeley's analysis is essentially not subjective, but objective. It regards nerves, brain processes, conjectural developmental associations, observations on those restored to sight, babies, etc., and only by this method can the act of perception appear to be complex or in any way accessible to doubt. Introspection can never doubt that e.g. if we see a stick, we could put forth our hand and touch it. If we knew nothing of the anatomy and physiology of the eye and central nervous system, or of abnormalities, we normal adults could never possibly even distinguish between *visibilia* and *tangibilia*. The Berkeleyan procedure, therefore, is an objective construction, according to which a series of sense images of what might and approximately does go on in the brain, which from the standpoint of psychology is only an abstraction, is taken inward and used to confuse thought. It is an alien point of view, imported from the objective into the very different subjective sphere. Otherwise, we could never conceive that a sensation or perception could occur without a real outer cause, independent of it and persisting, indifferent as to whether it was perceived or not. Thus, the psychologist, if he remain true to his own consciousness, will always be able to see that things perceived are really outer things. Though I may not know all about their meta-sensuous nature, they are external and inde-

pendent of myself. To deny this, means to impair the foundations of the very idea of causation and of the ego, both of which find their best paradigms in the perceptive process.

The *New Theory of Vision* wrecks youth and leaves ingenuous souls floating *in gurgite vasto*. The wreckers thus have them at their mercy. Euclid rests back on a more primitive eye-geometry, which it amplifies and confirms. But Berkeleyism rests only upon the dreamy reverie of fatigue, and daily life, to say nothing of serious science, is its standing refutation.

SATAN AND HIS ANCESTORS, FROM A PSYCHOLOGICAL STANDPOINT.

PART II. RISE, GROWTH AND DEATH OF SATAN.

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INTRODUCTION.

From the brief sketch of Satan, and some of his ancestors and contemporaries, one sees what a powerful influence the Devil has had on human kind. Many times his attributes have been contradictory and not well understood by his believers. He has often assumed the guise of pleasing forms, and has even been called God; but something diabolical has swayed all lands. What is back of this Devil-psychosis? Surely such a world-wide belief has some foundation. It is not the purpose of psychology to investigate the historicity of his existence, except in so far as it touches the experience out of which that belief arose. G. A. Coe says: "Anything that has taken a strong hold of man has a reason for existing." (13, p. 100.) It is our purpose to form some conclusions regarding the Devil from this standpoint.

FREUDIAN THEORY.

Freud believes that most of our thought-processes go in the foreconscious (*das Vorbewusste*). These can be called up at will. In addition to these, he says, there are certain complexes in the unconscious proper (*das Unbewusste*) which cannot be voluntarily called up. They never present themselves in their normal way, but appear as incongruous ideas expressed in dreams, lapses, etc. He holds that these complexes were once pleasurable in the early life of the child, but that the energy-relations of the psyche have changed so that they would be very unpleasant, if they became conscious now. He postulates a censor to keep these in the unconscious field. This is less vigilant at certain times, and the complex comes into consciousness, but only in a distorted form. It takes this circuitous route and apparently different form to protect itself. It must not

become conscious as it is, for the mental state is wholly different from that of the earlier years in which the complex was repressed. So, to avoid mental pain, it takes the line of least resistance, and seizes on some insignificant later experience and makes it the predominant element in the dream or working state of certain neuroses.

Around this recent experience the censor weaves in the threads of the complex, making it a blind, as it were, by which to let off this accumulated energy without permitting consciousness to be bothered with the unpleasantness its becoming re-known would entail.

Besides this change of psychic accent (*Verschiebung*), there is another process known as condensation (*Verdichtung*), which makes the ensuing dream more complicated. A single idea, obtained from recent experiences, may be made the burden-bearer of many and varied repressed ideas.

The factor of change to the opposite also aids the censor in presenting the disagreeable idea in pleasing terms. As in later dreams, and in real life, children are very solicitous for their parents' welfare, which was an opposite tendency to the real complex caused by the child's becoming aware he must not dislike the parent.

More direct and far easier to psychoanalyze is symbolic substitution, as, for instance, on the day previous to a dream, the patient may see something that reminds his unconscious complex of a similar state of affairs, and, however incongruous it would appear to us, it is made the principal or manifest content in the dream. The latent content can be found by a skilful psychoanalyst by retracing some of these steps.

Freud bases his theory of dreams being the fulfilment of repressed wishes almost wholly on the early sex-life of the child. He argues that sex plays a greater part in the early life of the child than we have imagined. He believes that sex-satisfaction is obtained on the body of the child as in thumb-sucking, etc., and, in addition, there is an external sex-attraetion, which is first felt toward the mother. He doesn't make this any unholly or repulsive thing, but a perfectly legitimate work of nature. It seems to him to be necessary for the sexual development of the child. There would naturally arise an enmity toward the parent of the opposite sex, and a wish that he were dead, which, to the child's untrained mind, would only mean that

he be taken away, so he himself might be supreme in his mother's love. Of course, this affection, expressed toward his mother, and by her toward him, is the only shape his sex thoughts take. Perhaps back of it, and unknown to him, lies the real sex-attraction, which, when only dimly realized, becomes a disagreeable thought. This censor now comes to his aid, and represses it so completely that he could never know he experienced such, except for the psychoanalyst.

Freud suggests that this same psychoanalysis could be applied to myths. From an evolutionary standpoint, the child repeats the life of the race, so, why may not many of our myths be so analyzed?

It is my purpose to apply such, in an empirical way, to the idea of the Devil. This, to be sure, is a very complex problem, and my deductions at most can be theoretical only and mere guess work at times. Psychoanalysis is a new field to me, and I hope that any deduction that is too strained may be excused on these grounds.

Using race as a sociological unit, may it not have forgotten many processes analogous to those of the individual? May not its horizon have broadened and its consciousness *in toto* have found certain ideas unpalatable? If so, in an analogous way this same censor repressed them in its life, and the Devil, could be, in Freud's own language, as regards the individual, "the created output in a sublimated manifestation of various thwarted and repressed wishes of which it is no longer conscious."

The race has not meant to create a Devil, any more than we have meant to dream bad dreams. He has been a necessary construction, and, like the dream, an outlet for otherwise nauseating conscious thoughts. There has been a change of psychic accent, a condensation, a change to the opposite and symbolic interpretation here, as well as in the individual, to save itself.

To be sure, not all race-repressions have been from sexual causes; but, as these seem to be most potent in Freud's psychoanalyses, I shall take them up first. Many of the Devil's present characteristics cannot at all be connected with sex, in view of our present knowledge, yet the reader must again be reminded that the problem is complex and psychoanalyses new; doubtless, if better understood, sexual motives could be found for many characteristics not even guessed at now. Sex has been one of

the most powerful influences of the race-consciousness in its development. This is shown by the phallic element in certain religions. The adoration of the male principle of generation was a simple and natural way of expressing child-like emotions on this subject. This conception was helped by ancestor-worship, which was learned from about the same cause. Sexual worship was a pure and holy thing; a simple and natural way of expressing their feelings in a primitive state. It represented life and birth; it was the most mysterious part of man's nature. Sexual pleasures were made more of by some savage peoples than now. Their circle of pleasure was more limited than with civilized man, so their grosser forms of sensuality were over-emphasized as seen in animals to-day.

PHALLIC AND SERPENT WORSHIP.

The many ancient carvings found in India, Egypt, etc., indicate rather conclusively that many of their religious ceremonies were connected directly with phallic worship. Of course, not all religions have been phallic in origin, but it has probably been a more prominent feature in those of India than has been generally believed. J. H. Rivett-Carnac, Professor Stephens, of Norway, Sir G. W. Cox, and others who have studied this subject, believe phallic worship was essentially the earliest form of religion there. The rock-carvings, the sculptures, and many later beliefs are evidence of this. The magician's staff is simply a representation of the *phallus*, which, like it, created new things. The narrow-pointed obelus (obelisk) of Egypt points clearly to this same origin. The *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, under the head of Phallicism, says that phallic emblems are found in Mexico, Central America, Peru, and in other parts of America. In Greece, phallicism, according to some authorities, was the essence of Dionysiae worship. *Chamber's Encyclopaedia* says:

"The phallus was an object of common worship throughout the nature-religions of the east. Originally, it had no other meaning than the allegorical one of that mysterious union between the male and female, which, throughout nature, seems to be the sole condition of the continuation of the existence of animated beings."

It is especially conclusive that the ancient rock-sculptures of India are crude representations of this early form of worship. Professor Stephens says of them:

"I look upon these things as late conventionalized abridgments of the Lingam and Yoni, life out of death, life everlasting—thus a fitting ornament for the graves of the departed."

As the race advanced somewhat, and direct phallic worship became repulsive (probably because these organs were organs of discharge), it became serpent-worship. This was only a childish symbolism, and, from its similar characteristics to pure phallic worship, must be analogous to the early symbolic changes in the child.

Mr. J. H. Rivett-Carnac in "The Snake Symbol in India," a paper published in the *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, states his belief that the serpent is a symbol of the phallus. He says, in speaking of the snake symbol of India, "In the Benares bazaar I once came across a splendid metal Cobra, the head erect and hood expanded, so made as to be placed around or above a stone or metal Mahadeo." He believes the serpent worship a modified form of phallic worship, as shown by rude carvings, and itself identical with the worship of Mahadeo, or Siva, the devil of India. He speaks of the Nagpanchami, or fifth day of the moon in Sawan, as a great fête, in the city, where unusual license is indulged in, and rough pictures of snakes in all shapes and positions are sold as valentines. As this was connected with the worship of Siva, who is not a devil entirely, they must have some significance.

Such things show the race still in its infancy; the symbolism has not become very complex yet, but the transference to Siva, who has some diabolical qualities, shows a probable origin of all devil-worship.

The race has not been young as a whole; various parts have advanced and progressed while their less favored brethren have remained in the early savage state. The culture gleaned by a certain tribe has been borrowed by the less civilized so, even nations and dynasties have skipped a few of the stages. From this complex whole we can get a few of the hidden meanings.

India offers a fair example for such study. We have seen how it was the early home of practically all our religions. Ideas worked out there have been carried to Persia, Chaldea and Egypt; and thence to the early Hebrews and on down to us. So belief in Siva as an early devil, whose form was the serpent, was doubtless due to the first outcropping of a repressed wish among our Indian kinsmen.

Phallic worship was purely and simply a fulfilled wish, and the guise of the serpent-form of the same is easily seen as a childhood social attempt to repress it.

Phallic worship was also directed to the female principle. The sacred tree worship of the Assyrians points to this phase. The fruit symbolizing creation could easily have been associated with the female sex. This does not, however, seem to be connected with the ancestors of the Devil, except, perhaps, in the myth of the Garden of Eden. The fruit, as representing children, might have been the result of a symbolism. The race interpreted the results of sexual attraction for the real attraction itself. This view harmonizes some early Biblical implications, which point to the fact that Jehovah wanted Adam and Eve to be his own pure race; that he meant Eve to be only a companion to Adam; and the fall was the fact that they brought forth children who married with the daughters of the Elohim, as did Cain and Abel.

This same sexual desire, conceived of as creation and light, was perhaps transferred to the sun as Typhon in Egypt. Typhon, as the god of the Semites, was worshipped as their life-giving, creative god. It was the same identical principle as is found in earlier India. It was sex transferred to the sun. When the Egyptians conquered the Semites, Typhon became a devil. We have seen already in the earlier historical sketch, how the tribal wars created him. This transference of worship to the opposite was not made in a day. A god could not be diabolized in so short a time, any more than sexual worship could grow repulsive. The two ideas helped each other. When he was seen as an ex-god, the dominant aversions to sexual worship would be quickly aroused when such a chance was seen for their incorporation in Typhon. He became an ex-god at the opportune time, and aversions and repulsions to such worship to their god were at once put off on his opposite. The sun, as life-giver, was too close to direct phallic ideas not to become also somewhat tabooed. The two incidents interpenetrate and cause each other. Sometimes they conquered the later development and worshipped Typhon, but the half-worshipful, half-fearful position explains pretty clearly their attitude of mind. Typhon was powerful, yet he must not be worshipped. He fought with and slew Osiris, yet in the end Osiris would conquer. To show conclusively its phallic origin, Typhon was

early represented as the sacred bull Apis or Muevis, yet this in itself may have only been so conceived by a part of the Egyptians; it at least is more primitive in its form.

In Greecee and surrounding countries we see a further transition from serpent to man. Aristophanes relates the story of the people of Phrygia on the Hellespont, who found there a people known as the *Ophiogencis*, or serpent-brood. They were believed to be in close touch with serpents and were said to have been conducted thither and changed into men.

Thucydides mentions a people of Aetolia called Ophionians living on the island of Cyprus. They were described as serpents with two legs,—the Ophite race. The Athenians were styled *Serpentigenae*: and there is a tradition that the serpent once guarded the Acropolis.

Several new symbols came in here, from opposition to people encountering these tribes; wisdom and tact of the enemy. The snake would fight, he was wise, these people had these characteristics, hence they were serpents.

The Greek religion is made up of gods and goddesses, whose principal aspect seems to have been sexual pleasures. The giving of the magic girdle to Aphrodite by Saturn shows its probable connection also with the serpent. These gods and goddesses resided on Mount Olympus and held sexual orgies that shew the sensibilities now; but it was not so then. Their gods and goddesses had to be proto-types of themselves, and their ideas of nature. So the sexual side received undue prominence. At a later date, sexual distinctions were lost and deities became sexless. Sir William Jones says:

" We must not be surprised at finding, on a close examination, that the characters of all pagan deities, male and female, melt into each other and at last into one or two, for it seems a well-founded opinion that the whole crowd of gods and goddesses of ancient Greecee and modern Barbarians means only the Powers of Nature, and principally those of the sun, expressed in a variety of ways and by a multitude of fanciful names."

If this be true, as we have intimated, it is the key to our psychoanalyses for the powers of nature are easily condensed or compressed into the one most mysterious and over-mastering power of nature, viz.: sex: and conversely, the various powers of nature could be easily adduced and personified from this one power itself. That is, that this great power could be a sufficient incentive for transference to, and speculations of

all the others. In the unconscious mind of the race the same repressed wish, which in its pure and original form had become distasteful, longed to be let into consciousness, but only succeeded when it assumed a pleasing and deceiving form in the simulation of the power of nature. Because this repressed wish was unpalatable, the harmful powers soon took the lead and a real devil was made. His harmful attributes were in proportion to their stage of advancement, and, consequently, their concept of sexual worship. When once the latter stage was reached, other tendencies aided and abetted his assuming worse proportions. The sexual origin was not guessed at nor known to them. It had served its purpose in the race development and saved them from themselves. Its prominence will not be kept in view from now on, except when we come to the modifications of Satan by the barbarous Teutons, who were then in a most primitive state.

TRANSITIONS AND CHANGES.

Going back a little, and approaching the same problem from another side, we see a different evolution for Satan. The Hebrews did not get their devil from the same sources as did the Greeks, whom we have first studied. They got their ideas from Egypt, Persia and Chaldea, and show a very different development as to details, though practically the same underlying causes are seen; only here were they differently conceived by an entirely different people.

The Egyptian dragon resembled the fearful crocodile that inhabited the Nile; the lizard guard at the mouth of Hell is a remnant of this same psychological selection of the Egyptian mind. The Chimaera, originating in countries where lions were man's greatest enemy, is a lion whose tail has on its end a serpent's head,—a mere vestige of borrowed tradition from early peoples whose greatest enemy was the serpent. The dragon, so often mentioned in the Old Testament, is a modified form of the serpent. He is more hideous and powerful. In Job XIII, the Leviathan figured there gives us a pretty good idea of him. He is described as having an awful form; his face had enormous doors and terrible teeth; horrible scales and claws covered his body; his breath was fire and smoke, which kindleth fire; his strength esteemed iron as straw; arrows could not make him flee, and spears only caused him to laugh; he

made the deep to boil. Truly none on earth were like him, and who could stand the sight of him, and be not cast down? This was evidently partly poetical, yet it means something. It was not Satan; the repulsive ideas were slumbering beneath the surfacee. This was an outburst, but Satan was not identified with it yet. Satan, as shown before, had a different origin to that of most devils. He was the servant of God, who did the wicked things for him; and he became Satan only because of a changed opinion of God. He was represented as possessing human form from the first, and was not at all connected with repressed wishes of the race in his origin. Demons and the other devils, Mammon, Belial, Azazel, Beelzebub, Samael, and Asmodeus served as an outlet for these. Asmodeus, as the devil of lust, shows his origin easily.

As Satan's position became less and less enviable, he took on, as was seen, the characteristics of all these devils, and with his new heritage reigned supreme in the early Christian ages. During the Dark Ages, he received a new set of attributes from the barbarous Teutons. His great beast-like proportions, not being comprehensible to them, were changed to fit the animals they encountered and feared and detested most, viz.: the ox, the goat, the bear, the wolf, etc. Not being able to find suitable horrible animals at all times, they made him take on a mixture of these repulsive qualities they knew of. He was made to represent the prejudices of their makers. He was black and hairy, he had hoofs and horns, serpents entwined him, and ugliness in general and repulsiveness were his chief attributes. M. D. Conway says: "The shape of the Devil and the combat with him have always been determined by dangers and evils that were actual, not such as were archaeological." He cites as a proof of this that the devil of some South African peoples is called *Muzungu Maya*, which means "wicked white man." This is directly traceable to the kidnapping slave dealers of former days, and explains why their devil is white.

Even in India, Siva is oftentimes represented as a white devil, and shows all too clearly the effects of English rule there.

Satan and, indeed, most devils have not been represented as ugly at first. There was no conscious need of their being so. This would have destroyed their purpose to seduce and tempt and lead astray. It is analogous to the transference to the opposite in psychoanalyses of the individual when devils are

believed or represented hideous. They were thought really beautiful, so were painted ugly to make the other fellow steer clear, and even to make themselves believe they were not attractive.

Probably the horns and hoofs and cloven foot were used to represent Satan because they were hideous. Daniel Defoe seems to think they were due to the fact of deceit. Early in the race-history, animals were classed as suitable for food,—therefore good, that had cloven feet; hence Satan had cloven feet to conceal his identity, at least to make believe he was good. But underneath it all one sees something of the symbolism of sex. The animal most generally known to these people was probably the goat. He is not repulsive as to appearance. His shaggy coat and cleanly manners are rather attractive; but he is the most lustful of all animals. The offensive odor of the male goat is at once associated with his sexual proclivities; and it would be easy to take his horns and hoofs as a symbol to what such proclivities now mean to the race. These, coupled with other ideas already handed down to the Teutons, made a pretty good devil. Probably the hairy body was so conceived for Satan from such animals, although this itself might have been less symbolical. It perhaps was a more direct childish symbolism handed down to them. There is something back of all this. Why have nations so diverse in every idea made a devil with hoofs and horns? The same underlying cause must have influenced them all, and sex seems to be the most probable explanation.

Leanness of devils is also hard to account for, except on this same basis; they are said to be so thin as to cast no shadow, and, no matter how fair a devil may be in front, he can be detected by the hollowness of his back. Doubtless hunger and scarcity of food aided this idea. Hunger was man's greatest enemy and his traditional enemy was Satan, so the two would be blended. Man could not get food because the Devil, his enemy, took it. Prayers were offered to these demons to let food alone. The saying of grace at dinner is probably a remnant of this. But back of all these secondary causes the germ of the ideals existed. The ill-health of prostitutes and sexual perverts was seen, and the symbolism was only carried out in their idea of Satan.

As man became more civilized, as his intellectual field broad-

ened and gave him more things to ponder over, naturally these earlier ideas would be lessened in sphere and influence. So we have a corresponding decrease in Satan's size, as shown in representations of fairies, bogies, elves, pignies, dwarfs, etc. The great serpent, which once eneircled the world to the mind of our northern ancestors, became the tiniest of serpents, and the large beast-like proportions in general were toned down to represent a more comprehensible Devil to a more mature race.

OTHER CAUSES AND AIDS.

Opposition to man and God has been very conducive to the creation and power of the devil; and its psychoanalytic equivalent is not difficult to see. Just as the child is unreasonably selfish, desiring the things that give it pleasure, at any cost, so the race has longed for more mastery and freedom. The child found his first enemy to be his father, who was his rival for his mother's love; the race has found them in the multitude of difficulties that encountered its progress. It is true the analogy is not complete, for the child that finds his father a rival and an enemy in childhood is generally more solicitous for his welfare in mature years, but who knows that the race is not still in its childhood in many respects? It cannot certainly be far past the adolescent stage, and, being so complex still, has many childish ideals. We can even now though see the same solicitous tendency in the race. We realize that opposition is not so bad, that it fosters interest and work; that barriers must be found and overcome. We court opposition in a way. Such things to the savage were never seen in this light. Things that opposed him were hated, and were fought and overcome in this attitude of mind.

Opposition, as a cause of certain devil attributes and characteristics, cannot be said to rest entirely on repressed sexual ideas, any more than can his physical appearance be entirely accounted for by same. Freud says:

"It is true that in another series of cases psychoanalyses at first traces the symptoms back not to the sexual, but to banal traumatic experiences" * * * "But we must consider these mighty wishes of childhood very generally as sexual in nature." (*Am. Jour. of Psychol.*, 1910. Vol. 21, p. 207.)

Any repressed wish tends to show itself in this substitution and sex as the prime motive can generally be seen, but opposi-

tion in itself to any racial want seems to have been most powerful here. When the individual want conflicted with the tribe or society that want had to be suppressed. As Professor Jevons has shown in his *Idea of God*, the fetish-individual-god had to give way to the tribal god, when their interests conflicted. These individuals' wants would not be eliminated but suppressed, and would seize on any opposition to give themselves an outlet, and enemies in general would be made up of the aggregate of individual concepts of evil things, which in turn were caused by being unable to realize their childlike wishes.

As man emerged from barbarism, the common good was more to be desired than individual welfare; but human nature is so constituted that selfish pleasure and individual good are ever making their demands. As this ideal social condition grew, man thought of this selfish desire as a shadow ever darkening his view ahead. These ideals restricted his individual liberty, and the brighter that social light the darker loomed this shadow.

This opposition has usually been found at first in natural barriers and treacheries. The savage sought his food, nature seemed to thwart him. He saw a devil behind the lightning that destroyed his home; a devil brought the invaders who stole his wife; a demon caused the disease that carried off his child. They were against him and must be devils. They easily fitted his notion of evil, and soon came to be the same malignant personage. Fear, dreams, and a lively imagination aided him very largely. Some one has said, "Man's first conflict was with his own quailing heart. His own cowardice was the devil, and his fear this evil one's power." A grotesque shape in the moonlight suggested an enemy; the cat's eyes in the distance became as large as saucers. Ingersoll has aptly expressed it thus:

"A man walking in the woods at night—just a glimmering of the moon—everything uncertain and shadowy—sees a monstrous form. One arm is raised. His blood grows cold, his hair lifts. In the gloom he sees the eyes of the ogre, eyes that flame with malice. He feels that something is approaching and runs, afraid to look back, until he falls exhausted at his door to tell the story." (25, p. 10.)

Of course, his children and grandchildren believe their father actually saw a devil for he was never known to lie.

This fear of the night was caused by the dangers of darkness; an enemy could more easily approach and the attacked would be at a greater disadvantage. Most animals of prey prowl around at night. Man, tired out from the toils of the

day, would be weaker then, and especially, if aroused suddenly from his slumbers, when his mental powers were scarcely awake. Enemies, fancied and real, were magnified thus, and even the breaking of a twig became the footfall of a powerful giant.

One slight likeness to a fancied enemy started the train of thought and the real picture stood out as a whole in consciousness, just as we think we see a friend on the street, when it is only a stranger whose nose resembles that of our friend. We look again, and see our mistake, for the stranger is so unfamiliar and unlike our friend we wonder how we could have mistaken him for such. The savage looked again, and, not seeing his antagonist, imagined he had miraculously disappeared, which added to his belief in his diabolical origin. Such fantasies were real to him. The dreams he dreamed were not only true while they lasted, but ever afterward. They were real visitations of corporeal bodies, that kept in touch with their departed dead, hence these visitations were interpreted as mystical and prophetic, instead of an index to childhood wishes, as they are now believed to be. They were more often bad than good, because childish wishes were not in accordance with mature ideals, so have been a powerful factor in the creation of devils.

Ignorance of science and law, among uncivilized peoples, has been another factor in devil belief. When their village was the center of the world, as each one appeared to be, they peopled the region beyond the distant horizon with horrible monsters and men-devouring giants. They had not learned the simplicity of nature in that unknown lands were similar to their own.

Distance always lends enchantment to the view, so the western world, especially, where the sun sank each evening, was believed to be worse than their own. Even in the time of Columbus, the poor sailors were bidden adieu, as if they were going directly into the jaws of these terrible sea-monsters.

Shadows and noises were no less real. Milton expresses their reality thus:

"And airy tongues that syllable men's names,
On sands and shores and desert wildernesses."

These people had their unsolved problems, and mysteries just as we; they explained them in a different and more childish way. When they saw a will at work, of which they knew nothing,

they naturally supposed it would hurt them. Conway shows how these deceptions and mimieries were often harmful, as the mirage which caused the traveller to grow careless with his drinking water when he saw so much ahead, only to recede as he approached, and so on to a death by thirst.

Man saw he had a companion who walked with him in the sunlight. He would commune with this other self and take the shadow for the substance. Seeing his brother asleep, he said the other spirit (breath) was ruling him. This belief was strengthened when his brother awoke to tell of his visit to other places, and of his encounters there. He knew it must have been the other self, because his brother's real self had not stirred. They reasoned that the other self must be like the visible self, and if a bad man died his ghost would be shunned and feared. "What the man was in life so his spirit must be after death." (23, p. 51.)

In animism the savage saw a spirit at work in everything around him. Dr. Chamberlain, in one of his lectures on Anthropology, said that Spence's idea that belief in immortality arose from dreams and death could not have been universally true at the beginning; these abnormal phenomena must have come later,—the common things in primitive life were the real originators; besides, it is impossible to class all primitive religions in one category. The point I want to make is this: that, when once the germ of an idea of an evil spirit has been developed other causes and very dissimilar phenomena aid its completion. To be sure, some are primary, and some secondary; and the present and traditional ideas are woven into one complex fabric, differently conceived by different peoples, yet, on the whole, a similar devil. When once one devil is imagined, others help him out, which have no foundation but the unbridled imagination. Some are brought in by the adopted sons of another tribe or traders, and incorporated with their own. Do we wonder at his great power and knowledge?

One can see how this same great devil would be an enemy of their god. He was their enemy and thwarted their plans. Their god was their ally who aided them in all things, even their wars of extermination. The struggle between tribes being incited by their respective gods, the god of one would necessarily be the devil of the other. The one, whose tribe was vanquished, would become a permanent devil because of lack

of support. The conquerors ruled and even incorporated the conquered many times into their own tribes, either as slaves or brethren. The god of the conquered tribe would be less and less thought of as a god even by his own people, because he had failed them when in need. Seeing the worship of the victorious god, and hearing their own god mocked, etc., would cause even the conquered to think in time he was a devil. Diabolized or ex-gods have created a devil for many peoples, and strengthened existing devils for others, either by being made to embody their evils or by transfixing their own to already existing devils. We see a remnant of this yet. Priests and clergy, not wishing to create or foster scepticism, termed other gods devils, instead of denying their existence. They had to call them such, to make them their own God's enemy.

The Devil reached a higher state, when he became God's enemy, just as he had when he became the enemy of the tribe, instead of the individual.

Things that opposed their plans would be attributed to the Devil. For instance, the "Devil's bridges," so commonly believed in during the time of the Crusades, were due to the actual danger the crusaders encountered in their journeys to the Holy Land. They had to cross various streams and the falling rocks caused by melting snow and avalanches were attributed directly to his agency as God's enemy.

When the Devil reached this state of being God's enemy, naturally he became wiser. He had to cope with divine intelligence and power, and to match his strength and cunning with God's. He learned to give present rewards to gain remoter ends; he became God's ape to mimic him, so as to appear good to the unsophisticated. Goethe represents Mephistopheles as teaching Faust's class and dwelling on the goodness of orthodoxy. Heretics were believed to go to the stake fearlessly and joyfully, because they were aided by the Devil. He protected their bodies from the flames, to serve as an example, only to torment them in a place where they could not be seen nor heard by men.

To show his ape-like characteristics, we have only to look at the Trinitarian conceptions of him. Didron (in his *Manuel d'Iconographie chrétienne*, Ieonograph H, p. 23) shows the French idea of the trinity of devil, of the fifteenth century.

Dante's Satan was three-faced. Eusebius called the Devil "Three-headed Beelzebub."

The sacrifices, homage, etc., paid to their god marked this fear in their hearts; the instinctive cry for help, the prayer to be delivered from Hell, superstitious practices, belief in signs and omens show their recognition of the Devil's sway. When they had done their uttermost to combat him, they would ask aid of their God. They believed they must help; they refrained from doing those things that would antagonize his Satanic majesty. No one would tempt fate by continuing a journey, if a black cat crossed his pathway. No one would look at a new moon through the branches of a tree. All these omens, which were termed bad luck originated because of the Devil's power. It is not our purpose to trace out their origin here, but simply to refer to them.

Many times it seems as if the greater part of many religious ceremonies was a propitiation to these diabolical powers, but one can see underneath the surface this was really secondary. Men saw that good things came slowly, but that evils were found easily, and everywhere. The evil things, being powerful, were more noticeable, and had to be thought of quite a little. Sacrifices paid to gods show this same propitiation, only it is given to God instead of the Devil. It was really to avert some evil. One could hardly see how a sacrifice could be offered to a purely benevolent deity. The flattering names and attributes given their gods show the fear and awe in which they were held. This was an unconscious worship of Satan, in so far as they feared God. They would not have feared a loving Father.

With all his power, Satan was subordinate to God. When sickness came, it was because the good power held aloof and permitted the evil ones to hold sway. They believed that by some act of their own they had caused God to permit such, but that he could expel the demon if he would; prayer then would be an asking for continued oversight, and, as such, was not really fear but reverence for His power.

When a devil held such sway as did Satan during the Middle Ages, devil-bargains must needs have been a result. Men imagined their souls were a choice bit of merchandise, which the devil was always ready to buy. Even church officials believed such bargains could be made, and did all in their power to prevent them. They were so stern in their rule, so exclusive

in their teaching, that poor, ignorant peasants, rather than endure the church's severe and unrelenting rule, sold themselves, as they imagined, to Satan. When once outside of the pale of the church, new pleasures, which had been forbidden them before, were now theirs. They argued that these must be of the Devil, because the world ruled by the church believed it; people shunned them, and they actually believed they were controlled by the Devil.

Present pleasures are so much more enticing to most men than later good that many, seeing the earthly pleasures enjoyed by their more favored brethren, would be ready to sell their soul too, if the results were not any more visibly felt than those they saw. To be sure, they believed Satan would demand their soul in the end, but that was afar off and did not weigh against the pleasures of the gay and beautiful world. Some imagined Heaven to be as stern and unrelenting as the church, so Hell might be better after all. When such a harmless thing as music was tabooed as the Devil's enchantment, one does not wonder at such bargains.

Even the legitimate acquiring of money was considered sinful, and the Jews, who were really more industrious and economical, were pointed out as aided by Satan in their prosperity.

A POSSIBLE AND AN ACTUAL DEVIL.

A modern Devil, to embrace the most general conceptions of his principal attributes, would possess great power and knowledge. He could tempt men to sin, and then have power to punish them because they sinned. He would control our thoughts, making us think bad things, when we would think of pure and holy things. Not only in the mental realm would he hold sway, but would bring us all physical pains and misfortunes that humankind is heir to. He would be behind the storm that destroys our homes; he would bring the disease that afflicts our bodies and carries off our loved ones. And last, but not least, he would be able, in opposition to an all-wise, omnipotent Father, to torment our souls in an eternal hell if we disobey, in the least, the commandments God has given us, and die with our sins unpardonable,—sins not necessarily bad, but like those of Dives, whose only condemnation was that he was rich.

He would possess the knowledge of arts and sciences that we lacked; people who searched for nature's hidden secrets would still be meddling with diabolical things, as when medicine was first suggested as an aid to prayer. These things, if efficient, were God's secrets, and meant to remain so, or they would have been revealed in His word. The Devil, as God's opposer, would always be glad to give them out.

Goethe's Mephistopheles is an embodiment of this idea in literature. He desires to gain poor Faust's soul, and, to do so, gives him all knowledge and power resulting therefrom. Calderon's Devil in the great Spanish drama, *El Magico Prodigioso*, refers to this phase of life. *El Demonio* is an example of a cultural and refined Spanish scholar. Politeness and courtesy are his graceful accomplishments. He is modest and unassuming as to his acquirements. When anyone asked him, if he had studied much, he replied, "No, but I have sufficient knowledge not to be deemed ignorant." The desire of knowledge and power are here shown as secondary to the gaining of the women he loved. Cifrano gave his soul to learn how to win the heart of Justina.

These masterpieces could never have been written had not such ideas been current in their time. They appealed to the people because they had something in common. Now we read them for their literary value only.

The Devil should be our opposer, whom we must fight with at all times. He tries to show us that black looks white, and that, apparently, evil things are really good. We must be on our guard against his wiles and subtleties. He begins by suggesting apparently harmless things, as taking a social glass at a banquet, only to lead us on by degrees until we are drunkards beyond recall. He is the ever present tempter to do those things which will harm us in the end, actually suggesting them to our bodily senses. He would give us some material prosperity, only to mock our conscience-stricken souls later, as when we are tempted by him to cheat our neighbor in some trade.

In the same vague way, he would be God's opposer as in Milton's *Paradise Lost*, trying to undo all good and happiness in general. According to some, he has actually been a pretty able rival for the Almighty. He is seen as Prince of the world, with its inhabitants in his grasp. It is most generally believed (if he is believed in at all) that in the end he will gain the

majority of souls. The oft-repeated quotation used by the clergy to exhort to be good shows this: "Enter ye in at the strait gate, for wide is the gate and broad is the way that leadeth to destruction, and many there be which go in therat." Matthew VII. 13.

This has been believed by them to refer to the actual road to hell.

These three characteristics noted above; power, knowledge and opposition to God and man, I should call his primary and fundamental traits. There are many secondary traits also attributed to him, such as lying, selfishness, miserliness, drunkenness, sexuality, etc. The connection is not always seen by those who attribute these things to him, and many times they contradict his primary qualities. Many believe he really possesses these traits, but does not mean to expose them, because a tempter and an opposer would have to be wiser than that. He could not gain many souls, if he showed himself in such detestable ways. The drunkard in the gutter, the miserly man, the liar, the prostitute, as seen by the individual, would not be tempting to imitate to say the least; while power, knowledge and opposition have attractions in themselves. Some of these secondary qualities have been explained to make him appear as bad as possible. Popular belief has done some psychoanalyzing in telling why Satan is a liar. He wanted to cover sins and iniquity, to conceal his badness, so as to flourish rankly. He represented the enemy of truth and light, and would, from the very nature of the case, be the embodiment of lies. Yet, according to their own argument and reasoning that he did not mean to show his lying proclivities, he did actually outwit them, for they accepted his word as law, they never actually caught him in a lie. From the time he told Eve the truth in the Garden of Eden, no direct lie is recorded against him. He has always kept his promises to the letter. The Devil-contracts (which represent the common consciousness) show that his mere word was accepted as law while he made man sign with his own blood. In all these he was more faithful than man. This is why I say lying is secondary, while really truth was his attribute, repressed yet outeropping at times, because Satan must not have good qualities. The cause of this unwilling and unrecognized attribute of truth was doubtless due to the fact that he could be relied upon if truthful. He had more

prestige when they knew he would do as he promised. They were sure of Hell, if they followed him. It added to his diabolical qualities, for it appealed to their reason, and made him more powerful.

In a somewhat different way, sexuality as a Devil-attribute has been secondarily adduced. Early peoples have considered sex as a pure and holy thing when rightly used, but then, as now, its use was abused, and it became tabooed. This abuse is the cause of its being a delicate subject to handle now in polite and refined society. It need never have been so otherwise. When its abuse was recognized and marriage laws instituted, violations of these were put off on Satan, as agent, instead of men and women. Man connected Satan with woman here, because she unconsciously tempted him. Her charms and powers could not be resisted, and her spell upon men was often his greatest evil. It is true she did not always mean to tempt him thus, but it is a feminine characteristic to play with fire and then get singed. Man could not say she was a devil, but the inference has been expressed in various ways. From the Old Testament legends, one sees woman's powers over the good and powerful rulers, as for instance, David and Solomon, Potiphar's wife, Jezebel, Salome, have been regarded as she scapegoats. Cleopatra probably influenced the Roman Empire more than any actual ruler. In all ages and lands, men have considered woman their inferior, but have never been able to shake off her influence and power. One can easily see how she was associated with evil powers, for, until recently, her rule and sway have been limited largely to her sexual qualities. When man saw she conquered by subtlety, even though she was a weakling and their slave, and, more often than not, that her influence in the use of these powers was bad, he would call her a devil, and make sex a devil-attribute.

Certainly, no one sees in the modern Devil all these characteristics; but such he would have, were a synthesis made of all his actual and inherited qualities. The actual Devil has been so restricted, even in the minds of the most unthinking, that the same mediaeval Satan is scarcely recognized. The minute germ has taken his place as the agent of disease: hysteria has been quite sufficient to explain demon possessions that were once attributed to him; and, even in actual insanity, patients

are sent to the insane hospitals to be treated for brain-lesions rather than the grip of the Devil.

We still have the ambition to know and do, but this is not considered to be of the Devil any more. It could be at most only so when directed to personal and selfish ends, a furtherance of which would hinder the progress of the race for the gain of the individual. This is truly of the Devil, but not in its former sense. We still call what opposes us the Devil. This is a sufficient Devil for us, and as such one we must fight and conquer, if we would enjoy real salvation.

GOOD QUALITIES OF THE DEVIL.

"Bad as he is, the Devil may be abused,
Be falsely charged, and causelessly accused,
When men, unwilling to be blamed alone,
Shift off their crimes on him, which are their own."

This quotation forms a good introduction to our chapter on the value of Satan. He has not been wholly bad, but has filled his place in the evolution of the race well. He has always been willing to bear our infirmities, when we wanted to rid our conscience of them. Many a poor sinner (and I do not imply any sarcasm here) has been eased by believing Satan caused him to do wrong. His heart was lightened, and his pathway made easier. Undoubtedly Satan has thus caused much indirect happiness. Worry and remorse, which would otherwise have been destructive to the mental and physical powers, have been shifted off on him, and human hearts made freer and lighter by so doing.

This transference of our badness to Satan is, however, only a minor point of his value to the race. Opposition to self and God has made him an unreckonable factor in our progress. Opposition in any form has always been an incentive in bringing out the best in man.

C. C. Everett believes the Devil has been a potent factor in the uplift of morality, that this personification of Evil has caused a more profound recognition of sin. He says men have been comparatively innocent before they invented a devil, and his origin can always be traced to some disobedience of their part, which, being objectified, added an incentive to its conquest.

To have an enemy to deal with, makes a man stronger, so an enemy of morals would make men better.

The man who has not encountered difficulties is not generally strong. He has not acquired the combatting instinct which has been so helpful to the survivors in the survival of the fittest. Opposition by rivals made the Athenian youth excel in oratory. It brought out the military genius of our great heroes, and, in general, has aroused the otherwise dormant traits of our inner selves. Perhaps it has helped more in a social than an individual way. Opposition to a tribe, clan, community, or state, causes concentrated effort among even discordant members, as during the Civil War the contestants of inherited feuds in Kentucky laid aside their differences to fight, as brethren, the hated "Yankees;" and, even though they failed, this bond of sympathy and common cause was not lost, and many were the feuds settled in this manner. Just so with regard to the devil. In olden times, when he was considered so powerful, union and strength were created by opposing him.

In another realm, he has been very useful too. He has always been very democratic and independent. Milton embodied this in his immortal epic and actually made him a hero who believed it "better to reign in Hell than serve in Heaven," though in torment. He has often defended the peasant from the over-exacting noble, giving justice as was deemed necessary, and never failing in its exactness.

He has not always been a bad fellow to oppressed people. He was conceived by them in opposition to priestly power and austere deities. They believed the priests were right, yet they secretly cherished their ideal attribute of justice. Carus says that monarchical Europe has generally characterized the Devil as the rebel in the universe, and that, in a sense, he has been, but generally these revolutions have been for good.

Satan has done great service to science; from the time he told Eve that she would become wise, if she ate the forbidden fruit, until the present time, there have been many to whom "forbidden fruit is sweet." Men have dared to do the forbidden, and many times only because of the dare. "Thou shalt not" oftentimes bears with it the implication that the thing would be good if we did it. This is almost the same as opposition, earlier discussed, but I wish to apply it here to priestly authority, and clerical mandates. Within the pale of the church, many harmless studies have been forbidden. The science of the Bible, supplemented by Aristotle, to the Scholas-

ties was supreme, and those who differed were aided by the Devil and forced to recant or die. This left them in the mood of Galileo, who kept a mental reservation, when forced to say the sun did move. Such opposition would cause a search for more conclusive proofs, and, as time passed, a belief in these. These Heaven-defying Ajaxes of Christendom, ostracized by the world, had to labor and work harder to defend their beliefs among so sceptical a people.

People in general have vaguely realized that the Devil is not all bad. Expressions like *Poor Devil*, *Le Bon Diable*, etc., show this. They have pity for the great giant-like creature, who is somewhat stupid in his bargains. He gets cheated many times, and it is all right for the best Christian to cheat him. Yet he is always faithful on his side, only giving his due part. His word is law in his bargains, but Christians have to sign their compacts with him in their own blood. Naturally, we would pity such a good, easy fellow. This same pity, in a less serious way, is expressed by our smile when his name is mentioned. It is rather the pity of stupidity. We realize we have gained at his expense. He has not been deposed, nor seriously injured, but we, in general, have got the best of the outcome. He was the perpetuator of the theater, until it became such a factor for good and enlightenment, then he was driven out. In the same way, he has preserved many things for our benefit, keeping them as his, while we thought them bad, only to give them willingly to us, when we were wise enough to appreciate them.

Defoe, in the *Political History of the Devil*, shows us how badly we treat him, and how little we appreciate his service. Defoe says it was bad that the Devil stirred up Christians to go to Jerusalem, then deserted them there, leaving the bodies of thirteen or fourteen hundred thousand Christians as a trophy of his work. Of course, the Crusades were the work of God, until they failed, then the poor Devil got it.

BAD EFFECTS OF THE DEVIL.

On the other hand, the Devil as taught has done irreparable harm. He does not mean to us now what he meant in former years. We can smile at his pranks and laugh over his discomfitures, but to our ancestors he was anything else but a laughable subject. This point cannot be emphasized too strongly.

He controlled men's thoughts and deeds, not only of higher religious thoughts and metaphysical speculation, but in the minutest details of everyday life. He was their accuser and spy. He tempted them to think and do bad things, and then laughed at their misfortunes. Surely they could not escape his influence, and power. It was fate that the world was in his grasp, and a weak, puny man had as well give up. This belief was universal. Uncultured people generally take this side of life more seriously than do cultivated and civilized people.

Such implicit belief in this great evil god necessarily stunted freedom of action and investigation. Just as Calvinistic predestination, which had its root in Devil-superiority, taught men it was useless to struggle, so Devil belief made it just as hopeless. If opposition did make a few strive harder to accomplish their aims, it did not work so with the majority. Most people, not having this spirit of aggressiveness inborn in them, have decided it best to give it up as a losing game, and, drifting idly along, let fate choose their pathway. Such a belief has been the cause of much of the sadness of the world. To people of limited intelligence and a less limited reasoning power, personal salvation after death has pre-eminently ruled their thoughts. Not having had many comforts in this life, the very thought of a future readjustment where the good man would be rewarded, gave them a new zest for living, and made life worth living. Anything that interfered with this hope cast a gloom over their whole existence. The Devil, as preached to them, had the world in his grasp. He would gain the majority of souls in the end. He was Prince of the world and its god. This being conceded to him, he did not need even to exert any efforts.

Do we wonder that such a belief hardened their hearts, and caused them anxiety and mental unrest? Conway says:

"Theology may induce the abject and cowardly to subject their human hearts to this process of induration required for loyalty to such powers, but in the end it makes Atheism the only salvation of the brave, pure and loving natures." (15, p. 416.)

Devil-teaching has its basis in fear, and such a motive may do for the time being, but in the long run it must be disastrous.

Ingersoll says:

"The consequences of devil-belief have been terrible beyond imagination. Millions of men, women and children, fathers and mothers, have been sacrificed upon this ignorant and idiotic belief." (25, p. 9.)

The bad effects have been universal in their results. It has destroyed the happiness of thousands, whom it did not profit in making better, and, as happiness, if not the goal, is the right of the race, its effects have been awful.

Only these direct effects of Devil-belief have been cited which were detrimental to the individual and consequently to the race. Many indirect results could be shown that have been equally bad. Literature, science, morals, and even religion, have been throttled and held back from their natural growth. Valuable libraries have been burned as of no use, because, if they had anything of value it was also in the Bible, if not, it had better be destroyed. Untold riches, as indexes of early race struggles, have been lost this way. Narrow views of orthodoxy, all traceable directly to Devil-belief, have hampered thought so much that freedom of expression in literary ways has been impossible. The Dark Ages, which were darkened principally by this insane shadow, could not contribute much to the world's store of knowledge, as long as such superstition ruled with such vigor. Science could not flourish, when men were tortured and even burned for expressing their honest opinions. Opinions were considered to be of the Devil, when they differed in the least from the church's accepted views. Men like Galileo were forced to recant their statement, when they knew they were right. Physicians were ostracized, who prescribed specifics and medicines, instead of prayer and charms. The science of medicine has been especially held back on account of this idiotic belief. The pious old surgeon of the fifteenth century, who searched and found the insensitive spot with a sharp needle thought he had found the "Devil's elaw," a sure sign of witchcraft: he had really found anesthesia on the body of a hysterical patient. Public opinion was back of him, however, and witches continued to be burned to the time of the Salem witchcraft craze.

When the Devil was seen back of all such phenomena, when he caused disease and death, there would be few incentives to hygienic living and right observance of nature's laws. He was above and beyond their control, and things might as well take their own course. It not only stifled the spirit of investigation in those who did not believe it, by silencing with mandates to the contrary, but was itself, from its very nature, the cause of great loss of health and life.

In the realm of morals, the results were equally baneful. It became a question of outwitting the Devil, of beating him around the stump and then doing as they pleased. It was not a question of doing right because it would make them better, but simply to escape the Devil; hence, if he could be deceived and outwitted, no moral incentive remained. They argued with themselves that probably he would not get them, if they did not live too wickedly, so morals on such a basis would be lax; or worse still, they relied on the probable goodness of God to set all things right in the end, and they wouldn't have to be so exact. No other incentive to pure living was held up to them. One can easily see how religion would suffer, as they saw no direct effects of the Devil's power, and as no other incentive was held out to them to be God-like, it would lose its interest and become commonplaece and *passé*, or else be rejected *in toto*, because of its inconsistencies. New England, with all her boasted heritages, realizes this, for she never boasts of her Salem witchcraft craze, and rarely mentions as a "Yankee" product, the preaching of Cotton Mather and Jonathan Edwards. Probably these things have caused more scepticism than the writings of Voltaire, Paine, and Ingersoll combined.

Probably, nothing is wholly bad, so the good things said about the Devil are to be taken in this light, for he has undoubtedly been more harmful than otherwise. Frances Power Cobbe, in writing of the Devil, says:

"It can hardly be doubted that it would be of a benefit to the world if this outgrown doctrine were confessedly abandoned. Such decaying exuviae of faith still clinging about us are unhealthful and embarrassing things at best. The proverbial wisdom of the serpent is displayed by rubbing off its skin at the proper time, and allowing a new one, however tender, to shine unincumbered; and not by stopping its ears to the voice of the charmer as the Fathers explained that feat."

The Devil has filled his place, and is no longer needed in the present advancement of the race. Theology has used him whether good or bad. He has been thought about and dreamed of in all possible combinations; but the tendency has always been to diminish his proportions, both as to actual size and influence, when his adherents advanced. Now he seems to have lost his entire support, and the time seems near when people will speak of him only in the past tense.

USELESSNESS OF THE DEVIL.

To the modern mind the Devil is a useless thing. Granting that he has done about as much good in the past as he has done evil, it seems to be to the best interest of Christianity to dispense with him now. He has long since been dethroned from the physical realm and had as well be undone from the mental realm. People have been greatly benefited since they realized that disease and premature deaths were caused by unhygienic conditions, instead of by a Devil. They get better results when physicians are allowed to use specifics and germicides than they did when prayer was directed to God to banish the disease demon, or to change his never-swerving laws.

Even for those who still believe in him at all, he has lost his sway and power of former years. He is a kind of impotent prince, tolerated in the same way that democratic Europe tolerates her powerless monarchs. They would be rid of him, if they knew how. He is only a silent tempter of the heart, who is to be combatted with prayer and moral efforts rather than exorcisms and charms. As the intellect advances, religious ideals must advance, and men have realized that they do not need the assurance of supernal things through the evidence of the bodily senses. Even the working man, surrounded by the educational advantages of our modern civilization, such as the daily paper, the unions, clubs and the theater, demands a why and a wherefore of things. He is not content to accept things on mere dogmatic authority. He has his own standard to judge by, and cannot be duped much longer. Social and political conditions have made him too democratic and independent to believe any such absurd thing. Man, with his broadened ideals, realizes that religious ends must be more social than individual. He sees that evil is not absolute but relative. What is bad to him, may be good to his neighbor, and vice versa. The root is deeper than the individual happiness or misery of one human being; the cause must be removed by going to the fountain head rather than by straining each minute drop.

Probably the greatest cause of his lessened efficiency is the decline of fear as a controlling factor in men's lives. It is almost impossible to comprehend the part fear once played. It was the principal element in law, morals and religion.

Rulers controlled their subjects by it, priests and clergy gained converts through its appeal alone; but happily now conditions have changed. Modern psychology and pedagogy have shown its usefulness in school life as an incentive to education. Preachers are no longer accustomed to use it as a motive in religion because such an appeal would be useless. G. A. Coe says:

"The modern man cannot be scared by the thought of death or of judgment, and if he could be the modern code would require him to conceal his terror * * * to lament this fact is to distrust the cause," (13, p. 34.)

William James says: "In civilized life it has at least become possible for large numbers of people to pass from the cradle to the grave without ever having had a pang of genuine fear." (*Psychology, Briefer Course*, p. 408.)

The psychology of sin has in all lands been translated into fable. Children and savages have to use objective realities to understand deeper subjective truths, but it seems time for twentieth century advancement to shake off this childhood heritage. The Devil and Hell are no longer necessary according to modern ideas of justice. Banishment from Heaven, whatever may be our conception of it, is sufficient. We only banish a criminal from society by imprisoning him to mete out justice for his wrong doing; so are the sinner and wrongdoer banished from earthly enjoyments and pleasures given to the good. C. C. Everett says: "Sinful acts are wrong, because they fill the place for the good acts."

THE DEVIL AND GOD.

Some have argued that a denial of the Devil's claims would invalidate those of God. That the Devil is a pragmatic necessity has been maintained by others. It is not the purpose of this paper to argue these questions, but it seems that from the simple exposition of his powers and growth one can see such claims are not well-founded. It seems that pragmatism would be stretched to its utmost limits to teach his existence in this age. It could not work long, so the best that could be said here would be to let this old doctrine die a natural death. It has been bolstered up long enough, and pragmatism, or what-not, could not hold it up much longer.

That a denial of the Devil causes scepticism as regards God has no foundation. The arguments for God as a Devil-opposer

do not hold now anyway, new hypotheses have been found. He is the absolute, not the half.

Scotus Erigena, the first of the Scholastics, writing about the middle of the ninth century, was the first to formulate the idea that evil is negative. He argued that as God is the only real being, separation from Him was but a negative reality, and if we deprive a being of everything good in it, we annihilate it. This idea has been advocated many times since, under various names, and with diverse ideas of God. Yet, on the whole the problem of evil has received scant consideration in comparison to other problems. Most of those who have studied it hold to a view similar to Scotus Erigena. Otto Pfeiderer, of the present generation, says:

"On the assumption that evil is an actual entity in man its existence cannot be explained or reconciled with origin of evil as a created being, but by supposing a corruption of human nature taking place in time and caused from without." (30)

Others have held that it is a disharmony of a yet defective organism. This seems to be quite a common view from an evolutionary standpoint. Rev. H. S. Bradley, in a baccalaureate address at Clark College, in 1910, said:

"Sin is not an innovation that came suddenly to an absolutely perfect being, but it is the survival or misuse of habits and tendencies that were incidental to an earlier stage of development, and were not originally sinful but actually useful and beneficial."

As it is not our purpose to discuss this topic in detail, only quotations regarding it are given from men who have studied this phase of the subject. These could be multiplied at length, but it is unnecessary, as from those given the trend of thought regarding it can be seen. Probably, not any one of these hypotheses has been the cause of evil, alone. It is more likely a result of various and diverse causes. One cause was more potent than another in one place, and the whole surely is a complicated result.

On such a basis, there is no need of a Devil. He is a useless appendage, outgrown and forsaken. This view that evil is not a reality does not invalidate God, for the same arguments are not used to substantiate Him, when we postulate His existence. To say that the Devil is an unwarranted personification adds to our concept of God. It makes Him more powerful, more

just and holy. In whatever way we conceive Him, whether a personality or a force, law or substance, He is enhanced by taking away an enemy whom He could but will not overcome. If we think of Him as a personal God, if we consider Him as nature and her laws, a devil is equally repulsive. Science teaches the unity and oneness of nature. She has no place for two contending systems, her laws are unity of a well regulated whole, and must necessarily be under one management.

Philosophers in all ages have called the *unknown* God, after explaining all they could, they come square up against the unexplainable; to be consistent thinkers, they have to postulate something here, and that something is their God. Other thinkers, not so philosophically bent, see some power above and beyond them, and call that God. They argue, with reason, that some unknown something must be back of it all.

The unthinking person, finding a ready and willing devil already created for him by various and sundry causes, chief among which have been distorted outeroppings of repressed social wishes, easily put on him his own ignorance and shortcomings. Away with such a hindrance! Let us face the evil and fight it as our own product, and make room for our God and ourselves.

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PSYCHIC RESEARCH AND HUMAN IMMORTALITY.

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While many millions of men have the conviction that individual immortality is the greatest of evils, and devote their religious energy to the taking of such measures as they believe will insure escape from that unpleasant condition, other members of the human family anxiously desire that very sort of immortality, and are striving to convince themselves that they will attain it. As fondly as the Buddhist desires Nirvana, so fondly, at least, the Christian longs for Heaven—or for some sort of a heaven.

For centuries the work of "authority" has been sufficient to the mass of Christians. Immortality they desired, and immortality the church (or the Bible) told them they should have. By asserting her control over the avenues leading to the other life, or at least her possession of final information concerning those avenues, the church has exercised a vast influence in the affairs of men. The dominant desire of immortality has been the fulcrum for the ecclesiastical lever which has moved the western world.

During the last few generations the deliverances of "authority" have been losing somewhat in weight, and men have worried more and more over the *proofs* of immortality. Does the church know what she is talking about? If we reject the church, must we admit that we have no grounds for a belief in the life after death? What are the possible proofs of the continuance of life and personality? These questions have been voiced more and more insistently and by an ever increasing chorus.

The actual search for proofs has gone to the most obvious quarter. If those who lived and are not now with us are still alive, we might be able to communicate with them, and get their testimony as to their existence, and perhaps some information concerning the conditions of that existence.

Communication with those "gone before" is not a new idea. Reliable history and plausible guesses based on relies of the

past do not take us back to a time when such communication was not attempted. But in the early periods the attempts were based on the desire to extract from the other world information concerning this world which would enable the possessor to "get the better" of his fellow men. In remote times men wanted "inside information" which would make them victors in battle; now they want tips on the stock market. The idea of using the occult line of communication to demonstrate the reality of the station at the other end of the line could not arise until the doubt of such reality prepared the way. The horde of soothsayers, clairvoyants, thaumaturgists, and "psychics" who ply their trades in all our cities (except where the police "run them in" as vagrants), are the representatives of a line which loses itself in the haze of antiquity: the ingenuous medium who serves as the nucleus for a group of "psychic researchers" is the product of the last half-century.

At this point it is necessary to draw a distinction which the public seems slow to grasp, and which removes a vast deal of misunderstanding when it is grasped. This distinction is between *natural mediumships* and *supernatural mediumships*.

We may define supernatural mediumships as *alleged production of physical effects without adequate physical means*. The lifting of tables, writing on slates, playing on banjos, production of "spirit photographs," pressure of ghostly hands, materializations and dematerializations, *ad infinitum, ad absurdum*, which form so large a part of the stock in trade of the professional medium, are one and all rank frauds. There is no more room for debate on this point than there is on the statement that an unsupported body moves towards the earth. That a woman or man untrained in science should discover a new form or manifestation of physical energy is so extremely improbable that it need not be considered in connection with the claims of supernatural mediums. If any such discovery should be made, it would be as rigorously and satisfactorily demonstrable as have been the X-ray and radio-activity. In every case where a supernatural medium has been investigated with passable thoroughness the imposture has been discovered. In a very few cases the verdict has been "not proven;" the investigators have not been able to plan the proper precautions. Thus, Kellar, the famous stage magician, was able to produce slate-writing under the eyes of the grave and learned Seybert

Commission, in broad daylight, and the Commissioners could not discover the simple trick he played on them. Kellar himself subsequently explained it. In the great majority of cases the medium simply will not allow adequate investigations.

There are only two ways in which the supernatural mediumships interest scientists. First, as means of amusement, like any clever trick whose analysis is entertaining, and second, as material for psychological studies in deception. To observe a stout medium with a raucous voice impersonating the "spirits" of deceased persons of various presumed ages, dispositions, and sizes, may be stupid enough; but to study the poor dupes, and observe how at the medium's suggestion they imagine what she is totally unable to counterfeit, is a chapter in psychology. When an elderly professor of physics declares that he saw a medium float in the air out at one window and in at another, the condition of the spectator becomes a matter of interest. Was he hypnotized, or was he open to suggested hallucination without hypnosis, or was he just a careless observer who overlooked conditions he should have noticed? In all tests the exact conditions under which the performance is carried out are all-important, and it has been abundantly shown that in investigating the supernatural the most careful man is woefully inaccurate in his observation. This is perhaps the most valuable result of the whole series of investigations.

In a natural mediumship the medium makes no claim of performing physical feats without physical means which are normally adequate. If writing is produced, it is the medium's hand which does the writing, and there is no pretense to the contrary. If information is given vocally, it is the mouth of the medium which utters the sounds. In short, all physical phenomena are produced in the ordinary physiological way. The only mystery, if there is mystery, surrounds the source of the information given by the medium, by voice or hand, and on this point there is at present a legitimate difference of opinion.

While the majority of the natural mediums rest under the suspicion (to put it mildly) of plain humbuggery, certain ones seem to be honest. Eminent scientists have made careful tests with these mediums, under conditions that seem unexceptionable, and have obtained results which have convinced several of these scientists that the mediums do indeed have some extraordinary source of information. Accounts of some of these ex-

periments may be found in the Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research. The experiments with Mrs. Piper are typical.

The small mass of data obtained from a few of these mediums constitutes the surd of the occult. The more sceptical scientists ascribe this residuum to chance. Let a medium give enough information, and a little of it is liable to be true; it would be strange if some were not; say these scoffers. Others find chance to be no explanation, some of the information seeming too definite and too copious to be accounted for in that way. Hence they adopt either the hypothesis of telepathy—that the medium reads the mind of some person and so obtains her information; or that of spiritualism—that the medium receives or transmits communications from the “spirits” of the dead.

Telepathy may be eliminated from the list of possible explanations, without much discussion. Experiments scientifically conducted have so far shown absolutely negative results. One person can “read the mind” of another only by the interpretation of physical signs—words, gestures, feelings of warmth, etc. So much may be stated with finality, for almost all psychologists are agreed upon this point. Moreover, telepathy, even if admitted as possible, seems an inadequate explanation for some of the mediumistic data, or at least in some cases there is no assignable person from whose mind the information might have been obtained.

The explanation which assumes communication between the medium and the “spirits” (whatever the word means!) of the dead has at least one virtue: it accounts for all the data. If one “spirit” doesn’t know a certain thing, it ought to be able to obtain the information from some other “spirit.” We can give no definite reason why the “spirit” could not acquire any information whatever. This very vagueness of the concepts of “spirits” and of their activities makes the hypothesis less objectionable to the psychologist than the telepathy hypothesis. The “spirit” hypothesis is too vague to conflict sharply with anything. We can demonstrate experimentally and theoretically that direct communication between the minds of living persons is improbable, but we can’t show anything with regard to the communication between a mind and such an indeterminate thing as a “spirit.” This negative attitude of psychology must

however not be construed as a positive indorsement of the "spirit" hypothesis.

What the future may bring forth for the interpretation for the few troublesome facts of mediumship, should not be opposed by the prejudices of hastily formed conclusions, but it is advisable to consider what inferences are to be drawn if the claims of the psychic researchers in regard to their data are substantiated.

Suppose there has lived in some far-away placee an old gentleman by the name of A. Blank. Suppose this old gentleman possessed a pocket knife, which he kept for a number of years, used daily, and prized highly. Suppose, after the death of the old gentleman, his son, B. Blank, living in a large eity, attends a seance by a psychie-research medium, and suppose that during this seance the medium, under the form of a communication from the father, tells the son how the knife came into the father's possession. Suppose the son has never previously been told the history of the knife, but that he subsequently finds out, by making inquiries in his far-away paternal home, that the incident was correctly reported by the medium. Suppose further, that the son was carefully disguised and presented to the medium under an assumed name, so that she should not draw upon any knowledge she might possess concerning the family, but that she nevertheless told him his father's name and the matter above mentioned. Suppose, in fine, that we are forced to the admission that the information must have come to the medium directly from the dead father (or prae-tically so). What, after all, have we admitted?

The spiritualist will claim that the "spirit" of the late Mr. Blank still exists, retains many of the traits of character of that individual, and is able to communicate ideas directly to the consciousness of the medium: or perhaps, in the abeyance of the medium's consciousness during a trance state the "spirit" is able to direct the hand or voeal organs thus released from the medium's normal control. The data will be looked upon as establishing the doctrine of individual immortality. It is true that the spiritualist assumption does violence to our laboriously acquired psychological knowledge, but, if one wishes to make a custard, some eggs must be broken!

As a matter of fact, the spiritualistic conclusion does not follow strictly from the premises which for argument's sake

we have admitted as per sample above. The revelations and communications obtained by the psychic researchers point to the dissolution of personality, not to its continuance after death.

Personality—that mass of habits of thought, feeling, and action—is built up gradually during the life of the individual. Granted that it does not disappear abruptly at death: it may disintegrate slowly, as it has arisen. The factors which will persist longest will of course be those which have been the most firmly knit together by being frequently active during life, or by being closely associated with the daily routine. We find in senile decay during life that the routine ideas, commonplace traits of expression, trivial recollections, etc., hold their own long after the more exalted characteristics of the individual's personality have passed away. It seems therefore perfectly natural that, if decaying personalities persist after the death of the body, the fragments which remain some little time in a fair state of preservation should express themselves insanely and trivially, when in some way they attach themselves to the consciousness of the medium.

If the "spirits" from which the mediums receive communications are living, flourishing personalities, we must be a bit disappointed that these communications consist entirely of the twaddle and trifles the psychic researchers so solemnly record; but, if they were mere fragments of personalities, we need not be surprised at their inconsequential deliverances. We may expect, moreover, that mediumship will fall always upon those who are mentally weak or diseased: decaying psychic fragments should be repelled by healthy minds.

The dissolution theory not only explains the alleged facts of psychic research more readily than does the spiritualistic hypothesis, but also demands less reconstruction of our scientific hypotheses. A psychic entity, separable from the body, is postulated by the spiritualists. The dissolution theory simply supposes this entity to be phenomenal rather than substantial, and to be subject to the ascertained principles of psychology.

It would be a dreadful calamity to the psychic researchers, if, setting out blithely to establish beyond a peradventure the doctrine of human immortality, they should seem to demolish it instead. Happily for the peace of mind of those who hunger for the doubtful blessing of indefinitely continued existence,

the phenomena of mediumship must still be regarded as interesting episodes, which possibly are worth investigating, but which are certainly very far from being bases for arguments of any sort. Moreover, if we should ever come to the point where the reality of the communications from the spirits can no longer be doubted, and thus the post-mortem decay of personality become a proven fact, the thirsters after immortality could console themselves with the reflection that a soul worth preserving would probably slough off the empirical personality when it escaped from the body. The conception of such a spiritual moulting is in fact discoverable in all respectable forms of spiritism.

THE WINNING OF RELIGION.

PART I. NEED PEOPLE BE RELIGIOUS?

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Wherever the English language has penetrated in the whole wide world, travelers and tourists find a building, large or small, grand and magnificent, or ignoble and insignificant, around which there is an association of great meaning, and whose memory, from among the rest of all the world's noblemen and great, is therein kept green and fresh. That association is of one of the great facts in the life of mankind, namely that man himself is not alone, nor yet his own master. That memory, instead of being the name of a great philosopher or scientist, a great historian or warrior, is the memory of the world's lowliest character, who, by his own self-abasement, has become the eternal sign and token of the world's redeemer—the lowly man of Nazareth. All alike agree in exclaiming in wonderment at the magnitude of his power and the majesty of his bearing in the lives of those who most truly emulate the example of this Lowly One of Galilee.

Why is it that this character of twenty centuries ago, who never passed beyond the limits and confines of his own small country, except for one brief moment, as it were, to cross over the borders of an adjoining state, and among a people who were at great enmity with his people,—why is it that this character has conquered peoples and nations and brought them in humility to his feet — and from the time of his appearance on the stage of action the world has ever been turning on a new pivot and towards larger and better things? Was time out of joint with itself when it produced a Christ of Galilee, or was each preceding age indissolubly bound to the other in vital and organic necessity and likewise to the age that produced the Christ? There are many answers given to these questions, answers as diverse as the races of men, each in some measure true.

I. Whatever else they may mean, they surely mean that there is something more in man than his body and his brains. They attest the greatest fact in the life of man; and it is in trying to arrive at an appreciative understanding and a sympathetic interpretation of this great fact in the race, that this contribution is made.

The psychological study of religion is forever making it clear that the mind of man is a great unitary force, and that, while man to-day is different in very many respects from earlier men in the world's history, he is yet so much essentially the same as to make no great moral difference. Jesus Christ has won such a place because of the inevitability of things in the race itself. And the world of men and life found in *him*, both compared and contrasted with his teachings, *the embodiment of their highest conception of life and character*. And where this is not true in just this manner, it is nevertheless true because *he has awakened man as to what God's thoughts of men are*. In other words, and despite the fact of denials from various quarters and sources, man is unlike any other creature on the face of the globe, because he has something besides bodily passions, besides language and besides intellect; he is a supersensual animal, and cannot be confined within the bounds of mere sense-perceptions. This has been true ever since man began, in spite of the favorite theory concerning the origin of man and his relations to the lower animal kingdom as given by the doctrines of evolution or descent. The great contribution of anthropology to our knowledge is, that, in the beginning, when man became man, he was so much man as to be for ever separated from his nearest congeners in the same kingdom by a barrier that can never be removed or by a gulf that can never be bridged. In the beginning man was man, and not monkey, nor any other animal than man himself.

While it is true that the human animal is different from animals of other species and varieties by the facts of language and intellect, it may be held that equally great differences lie more truly in the same realm that his merely bodily or somatic constitution occupy—and subject to the same laws of development or deterioration with it. Speech and intellect are correlative and interdependent facts in human life as a rule. Higher bodily organism and higher and more complex nervous organization go hand in hand; and from the higher nervous specializa-

tion we reach to the higher mental life in which we find intellect and the finer sense-susceptibilities. This is pre-eminently true of man, for it is here, in the realm of human life, that we find just that highest type of nervous development or organization, with the consequence of a true emotional and intellectual life. Man is man the world over, and throughout all the unfolding years—only as he is a volitional, an emotional, and an intellectual being, and only when these attributes of his true humanity become the masters of his body and the determining factors in the making of his character.

No man is truly satisfied who is satisfied with the meeting of his merely bodily needs and demands, for there is something in man other than his body. He must find satisfaction for the needs and demands of his intellect and thinking, and he must have some measure of satisfaction for his aspirations and his desire to will and to be. But it is no uncommon thing to see men and women more or less satisfied in the demands of each of these aspects of their lives, and yet they are not at peace. They are conscious of greater things that may be accomplished, of nobler lives that may be lived, of a still more beautiful character that can be attained. And such instances recall the confession of an early and learned saint of the Christian church: "Oh God, we were made for Thee, and our souls are restless until they find their rest in Thee."

And here, we must confess is the crux of the whole matter—God and humanity, naturally akin to each other, but alienated, separated, and lost to each other by the fickleness of our weak humanity, and with not an innate selfishness, but more truly a cultivated selfishness,—that one burning and blighting element which has wormed its way into our life, bringing with it destruction and death! Though this is true in the largest aspect of our modern and Christian civilization, it is not universally true. For there are primitive peoples to-day whose contact with the white man has not spoiled them, and they stand before us as the saving element of an imperfect humanity, because they are truer to the really generic traits and characters of the race that is the offspring of God Himself. Here we find the truly human characteristics of our common humanity in their simplest and most congenial forms. Those who have made man their one great object of study in life assure us that this fact is most truly emphasized to-day, or at any rate in recent years,

by reason of the effects of our own civilization upon modern primitive people. Along with our civilization there have gone, hand in hand (one might truthfully say), those cunningly devised means of destruction which are the product of a selfish civilization. The foot-prints of the missionaries of the Christian church made pathways for the commercial highways, which brought a greater disaster to the "savage" than the one from which to save him the man of God had left home and friends and fireside.

There are men of culture and leading in learned circles, who are of the opinion that there are people on the face of the globe who are naturally destitute of religion. Such assertions are not to be disregarded when coming from sources of scientific authority, but their reasons for such conclusions must be understood. Such men in this day are so exceedingly few in number that it may be safely said that such an opinion is the special property of but one or two men, chief of whom is the brilliant English scientist, Lord Avebury, who has recently gathered up the significance of science in general, and his own work in particular, as far as it applies to the fact of religion, and reaffirmed his conviction of half a century ago, that *religion is not one of the genetic characteristics of the race!* A lone and solitary figure he stands in mature majesty! On the other hand the multitude of modern scientists accept the fact that religion seems inherent in humanity.

The place which Anthropology in general has given to religion, as a generically human trait of the race, has been abundantly justified in late years by its twin daughters—Psychology and Sociology. Psychology especially has brought to us the true instrument whereby we may make a truer study of religion than could ever be made by the old order of the metaphysical philosophers, the theologian of the old order, or yet even the sociologist. The former two dealt more largely with words—often "to the subverting of the hearer," as the great Christian apostle designates it; the latter (Sociology) dealt particularly with the consequences of custom and culture which are but external to life, and not life itself. But in Psychology, as its name indicates, we have an instrument wherewith we may make excursions into what had been the inaccessible realms of experience—and behold, when we have cut our way into the heart of the thing and taken away all accretions and unnatural

accessions, we find the gem of unmistakable value to the world of flesh and blood in the form of men, *Religion, that part of man which made him one with God.* And there never was any doubt about God's existence, because it is indelibly written in the texture, the warp and woof of the human constitution.

There is a strangely significant analogy to this fact of primitive life in certain tendencies in the religious thinking of the modern world, what I would call the movement towards the simple fact of religion in the life of man. For instance, while not by any means accepting all the reasoning involved in the complete system of which it is a part, in "Christian Science," the fundamental truth is God and man brought together in Divine-human character by the means of unselfishness and love. The same is true of such other movements as "Divine Science," "New Thought," and "Faith Healing," etc. All such efforts are attempts to meet that deeper, yes, the deepest and truest nature of man, divested of the mere accidents of civilization and education. They are attempted answers to the cry of the human heart for its own home. And this is where we must consider the nature of religion and its place for all time in the economy of the race.

II. From the far-off days men have been cogitating about this fact in human life. It has always been recognized that man is a religious animal, and that, apart from the satisfaction of this quality in his life, no amount of wealth or possession of education could grant him peace with himself and with that other-self which makes for righteousness. Men of the ages and years, whose learning cannot be lost, and to whom the world will for ever be a debtor, have spent the ripest years of their life and knowledge in meditating upon and writing about this undeniable fact in the life of man. They have sought to find its true nature and place in life; they have tried to understand and explain it. Nor have their efforts been fruitless. In the search of their quest they have dug many treasures which make thinking in this direction easier for us, and enable us to understand more truly and more fully the meaning of the deepest things that the intellect of man can engage in. We are surely heirs to a vast heritage which cannot be despised by the highest or the humblest. And the true aim of education should be to make this heritage the property of all. Education and religion have always gone hand in hand, and true religion

has always been the sponsor of true education. Why? Because religion is at once the home of the soul of man and that which has made him at one with the great Source of all, and one with all the life that pervades the universe of God.

III. We have little or no care for an effort of man which tries to comprehend and for ever define religion in any set of words; that is to say, that religion can mean nothing more than the words which its definition includes. For just so often as that is tried will religion become a delusion. It cannot be made to keep within the confines of any circle of words any more than life itself can be confined within definable area and perpetuate itself. But we can state the simple fact of religion as that expression of the life of God in the soul of men which finds itself in serving the widow and the fatherless, and showing itself in the conscious exercise of unselfish service which has been described as Love to God and Man. Each passing age has tried to formulate the fact of religion in those terms of expression best suited to itself; and the definitions of religion are almost as innumerable as the sands upon the seashore. Some such definitions have nobly and well served their day and generation, and have been preserved in literature and life even down to our own day with a surprising degree of vitality. It is a surprising fact, full of significance, that each to whom religion means life will have his own definition of this greatest fact in his life: on the analogy of experience such a definition may be found to embody the *sentiments* of many other religious people in their own experience. But, from the very nature of the case, it cannot embody all that each will find satisfaction with. For it is the wonderful province of religion to fit so many and varied lives in so many and varied environments. Whether religion is the bond between man and God, we may be sure that it has a great deal to do with restoring man to the image of his creator: and all definitions, temporary as they must be, must make this the chief thing in religion when it is joined to human activity.

IV. But how did this Something we call religion originate? How came it to appear in the life of the race? Was it synchronous with the birth of the race in its emergence from the lower animal world, or is it the result of natural forces of development and subject to the laws of development and decay in the same manner that the structure of the body and all other

forms of organic life are subject to these laws? The story of the origin of religion is as fascinating as it is wonderful and diverse, and is a theme upon which the human mind can find much opportunity to dwell. Many are the ways in which it has been conceived that religion had its birth in the race, theories with which the common people ought to be acquainted just as much as the professional educator is acquainted with them. Religion has had such a wonderful fascination for men of very different temperaments and culture from the physicist to the psychologist, and each has his own technical way of speaking of this fact.

In Darwin's epoch-making book on *The Descent of Man*, he refers to the fact of religion and its development in the race; and speaks thus regarding religion as "belief in unseen or spiritual agencies," that contrary to the fact of all peoples believing in a God or gods—"this belief seems to be universal with the less civilized races." He seems to be quite content that religion is but such a belief; then he accepts, *in toto*, one might say, that doctrine of the origin of religion known as *Animism*, formulated by Dr. E. B. Tylor in 1865. This theory is that dreams first gave rise to the notion of spirits, and then the spirits were objectified and deified and man thus came to have his gods. In his monograph on *The Study of Religion* Dr. Jastrow points out the following objections to the animistic theory, as an explanation of religion: "Religious manifestations, however, precede even the appearance of *animism* as an explanation of the universe, and hence, as a theory for the origin of religion, the latter (*animism*) would be defective." This theory was, for a long time, in the balances, as it were, over against another once popular theory, given to the world a few years later—in 1870 to be more exact—by the brilliant candidate for honors as discoverer of evolutionary laws. In the *Fortnightly Review* for May 1, 1870, Spencer was able to formulate his theory of the origin of religion, after the collection of a vast amount of material from among modern primitive people, especially Australians, by an army of co-laborers. This theory accounts for the origin of religion in an extended belief in ghosts, shadows, and dreams, and is called *spiritism*. Neither the animistic nor the ghost theory of the origin of religion goes to its core. The source of religion must lie deeper than its manifestations of this character. Animism and ancestor-wor-

ship are *symptoms* of the actual religious experience of men. Each of these theories is true in a very narrow sense as Professor George Galloway, of Castle Douglas, Scotland, suggests in his important contribution to the science of religion, *The Development of Religion*.

Fetichism, totemism, and ancestor-worship have each been severally exploited as explanations, only to find, after a while, that they were as inadequate to explain the origin of religion as either the animism of Dr. Tylor (which has found the widest acceptance among scientists from the day of its announcement) or the spiritism of Spencer which has had little or no permanent place in the science of religion—despite the appearance of the remarkable book of a very loyal disciple, *The Religion of the Universe*, by Mr. J. Allanson Pierton. As Jastrow remarks,

"Still less satisfactory (than the theory of animism) is the theory chiefly associated with Herbert Spencer (*Sociology*, ch. 8-17), which traces religion back to the worship of ancestors under the guise of ghosts as its sole factor."

Another theory of the origin of religion is that which makes magic the mother of religion—of which the learned professor in the University of Liverpool, Dr. J. G. Frazer, is the enthusiastic sponsor. He holds and maintains that, in the failure of magic to hold men's minds and satisfy their deeper nature men turned to or developed religion—indeed a very ingenious theory! but one about as little accepted as the theory of Spencer. In a clever monograph on *Magic and Religion*, the versatile Scotch anthropological and folk-lore writer, Dr. Andrew Lang, shows good reasons for rejecting such a theory; and, in his Gifford Lectures on *The Making of Religion*, he takes up the various objections to the magic theory of the origin of religion.

Once more, it has been thought that the origin of religion was to be found in a revelation of God to man. The late Max Müller has left us his extended thoughts on this problem. To him there is a spiritual element in man which gave rise to a real religious feeling—which he characterizes as the "perception of the infinite." This led him to further describe religion as the yearning of the soul after God, with the consequence, as already stated, that the source of religion is in the human heart. We may never arrive at a satisfactory explanation of the origin of religion, but time spent upon its consideration is

never lost. It repays a thousandfold! The analogy, I would like to note, in passing, regarding the origin of religion in primitive times and the trend of religious thinking of a popular kind to-day, appears in the various modern movements after a simplification of religion as seen in the religious denominations of the world—and the utterance of the most powerful facts of God in human life. To quote Dr. Jastrow once more, we may say, that

"the origin of religion, so far as historical study can solve the problem, is to be sought in the bringing into play of man's powers of perception of the Infinite through the impression which the multitudinous phenomena of the universe as a whole make upon him."

V. Another thing that the historical study of religion unmistakably impresses upon us is its permanency in the human heart. When once aroused, we may safely say that it can never really be put to eternal sleep.

"It accompanies man throughout his career, making its presence felt in every step that he takes on the golden ladder of progress. * * * The manner in which he strives to secure a proper relationship between himself in the last instance dependent, will be subject to frequent, if not constant change, as the conception of this relationship gradually takes on a more ideal shape." (Jastrow, *Op. cit.*)

Being thoroughly convinced of the universality and permanency of religion, it would seem almost useless to ask "Do people need to be religious?" But there is every reason to believe that such a question is not only pertinent but needed to-day, especially as the distinction between Religion and Theology is generally vague in the popular mind.

VI. We have already seen that it is no easy task to define religion or yet to determine its entrance or mode of entrance into the life of the race. We can simply acknowledge the fact that it is, and for weal or woe, mortal man will be forever interested in it, for it is built in the very warp and woof of his being and constitution. The history of the rise and fall of nations indubitably enforces this fact in our consideration. But we may be able to come to some appreciable degree of understanding more fully what religion is by the process of elimination. That is to say, by learning what religion *is not*, rather than by affirmative reasoning and declaring what it *is*.

(1) Even a cursory study of religion will show us that it is connected with some kind of an institution—the family, the

clan, the tribe, the nation; or the ceremonies of the initiation at the age of puberty; the "medicine men," or shamans of primitive people; the temples of early civilization—and for the last two thousand years, especially, the extraordinary organization and machinery of the Christian church. But is religion an institution? Yes, and no. We can conceive of the time in the very early life of man when religion had no relation to an institution. Indeed, we have what I consider a classic instance of this in historical times of no very remote period. I now refer to the fact of the movements from Ur of the Chaldees, of Abraham, who, leaning heavily and in great faith on the Power with which his heart was not only in communion, but in the veriest harmony and unity of purpose, obeyed willingly and cheerfully the mysterious leading into the land of possession, and saw by the same faith and confidence the great family of whom he should be called the father and founder. Because Abraham was so genuinely a religious character, so human withal, it was necessary that that experience should ultimately formulate itself into an institution fitted to meet the needs of his descendants, even according to the very laws of their being—a united people,—a community of wonderful oneness, and the development of those social and moral laws, obedient to which secures the highest human efficiency and standard of life. The institution succeeded the religion, and religion was truly the foundation of the institution.

Another instance illustrating the truth that religion is not an institution is that afforded by the life and work of Jesus Christ. Having reached maturity of both body and soul, he comes out from the quietness of his mountain home permeated and passionated with the fact of God's presence in his own soul; he is deeply conscious, too, that all men everywhere are the children of God by the right of birth, but that they have alienated themselves from Him by their own lusts, passions and selfishness. And, to realize his own life work, it was necessary for him to break away from the ecclesiasticism and clericalism of his own day, yes, he saw that indeed he must come out from among them in that unique separation which finally caused his death—namely this, that he was the son of God and that God worked in him His own divine purposes for the world. This close relationship between Abraham and God was called friendship, love; and the relation between Jesus and God was pie-

tured as that of Father and Son united in the ties of closest paternal and filial love, by the loyal obedience of Jesus to every divine impulse. It was not until late in his brief three years' ministry that he began to organize his followers and disciples, and that organization was no human accident, *but a human as well as a divine necessity.* We could not possibly picture the organization without the fact of Religion: (1) in the heart of the founder and leader to whom it was his very life, (2) then through the communication of that life to kindred spirits.

In what may be called immediate historic times we have another great instance of the same fact in religion, namely, the movement originating with Luther in the sixteenth century. It seems tremendously like a rebirth of Christianity in the light of history. For do we not find Jesus a Jew among his people—but whose heart was afire with the passion of God—and the religious institutions of his day had shown their inability to meet the needs of humanity because they had shut out the *life* of men and bound themselves with forms and ceremonies, thus destroying *life?* In the case of the German peasant-boy who became priest, we have practically the same thing recurring. Organized religion was, yes, had killed itself, and all that remained of it was the merest casket and shell. Religion had been crushed under the weight of creed and ceremony and the blight of passion and sin in those who should have been its conservators. The young unsullied heart of the peasant priest, in its deep yearnings for the true life of God, was touched by the hand of the Great Spirit of All and filled with new light and life. And with and for him, henceforth, religion was to be a *life*, “*a living bright reality, more near, more intimately nigh, than e'en the sweetest earthly tie.*” Henceforth his glorious enthusiasm was the mainstay of a new burden for his own people—Justification by Faith alone. Now there was no necessity for church, priest, or pope. The human heart was to have free access to the throne of God, and nothing but Man's sinfulness was to interfere with such a relationship. And to make this more possible of realization, next to preaching according to the free message of his Scripture, was to make it possible to have that Scripture made over into the vernacular of his day and scattered broadcast over the land. Without this awakening in the heart of Luther, we can hardly see how

that great movement, of which he was the center, would have come about. It was first essentially a movement for the people—not as organized in some new institution, but as a *new life* which would realize itself within the compass of its own life-giving activities. It was a necessity, common to all movements in the race, that to reach their greatest efficiency men must be bound together for service; and so the Lutheran church became an institution for the diffusion of the new life (Vide Köstlin's *Martin Luther*; and Arthur P. McGiffert's *Life of Luther*, New York, 1911). Perhaps Tolstoi was justified in the belligerent attitude regarding the church, that he sustained in some of his correspondence with that brilliant French scholar and critic, Paul Sabatier, when he said: "Religion is truth and goodness; . . . I tell you frankly, I cannot agree with those who believe the church is an organization indispensable to religion." At any rate, his own experience with the Russian national church (the Greek church), and the type of mind and viewpoint of history resulting from that experience,—namely the apperception always of rioting, bigotry, and tyranny, which undeniably defile the pages of the history of the church—made such an impression as to be to him eminently justifiable.

By the enumeration of these three classic instances I think it becomes abundantly clear to us that *religion is not an institution*—but that it has in the largest sense always ultimately been identified with an institution. And even to-day the smallest religious sect, Protestant and non-conformist, gathers itself into an organization and an institution. Human beings can no more live apart and alone and know their true selves than they can become the sons of God while perpetrating outrages against the divine and human laws governing life and thought. The danger always is, that religion, when once organized, is perilously liable to allow the cold hand of reason and the blight of ceremony to come upon it—almost unaware—with their deadly effect. Or again, to become vitiated by a creeping paralysis of complacency and self-esteem, either of which is enough to sow the seeds of disintegration in the life of religion.

(2) Because religion has so long been conceived of as inseparable from a supernatural revelation given to persons and preserved in so-called sacred literature, we have been apt to think that religion is a book or a collection of books. The consequence has been, that, because they have been so conceived

of as divine, their contents are held not to have been liable to error or inaccuracy—in other words, they have been infallible in their contents and meaning for man. For the great fact is that almost every religion under the sun, ancient or modern—yes, even to the newest religion less than half a century old!—has its own sacred literature. Oftentimes this literature is so diverse within itself as to be seriously incompatible; and from the fact that one set of such literature is unintelligible to another part of the race, we may reasonably be sure that religion is not a book or books nor yet any amount of literature! The acceptance of literature as religion, or taking upon itself the right to determine whether one is religious, has wrought much harm and havoc in human lives, and men have been led into tragic extravagances. How true is this of the Jewish people in the years immediately preceding the Christ, and in fact contemporaneously with him: for did not the religionists of his day ask among themselves concerning him: “How speaks this man these things, seeing that he *knoweth not his letters?*” Mohammedanism with the *Koran* is on the same level as this low experience of the Jews. To come nearer home, it is not so long since that a man was regarded as being a religious man or an atheist or an infidel, accordingly as he held or refused to hold to certain things in the sacred books of the Jews and the Christians: for instance, the scientific or absolute accuracy of the creation story in Genesis and the fact of the involvement of all the race in the sin of Adam—or the literal inspiration of the Bible, in which it is held that every word even was dictated by the Divine Mind, in some such mechanical fashion as a lawyer would dictate a brief to a stenographer. Such literatures are valuable only as possessing in cold letter that form of life and type of religious experience in the growth of the race—and no word in them, *ipso facto*, must be accepted that is contrary to either historical or scientific fact. But they are full of vital meaning for the religious man as bringing him into closer contact with the working of the divine spirit in the hearts of men as they reached out to the light and life, and as they are actuated to better lives. *But religion is not literature, nor is literature religion.* We may say that, even if the Bible were taken away, Christianity would not cease to be—for it is that development of life that far transcends any set of books—it is a continuous, yes, the highest continuous motive

force in the lives of men whom it has touched and has its fairest fruitage in life, light, love, and service for humanity.

(3) Arising from the fact of the close relationship between an institution as expressive of religion in the life of men, and of a book professing to be its source, history is replete with instances where leaders in religious movements have tried to formulate their conceptions of both the institution and the book as things verily to be believed without question and as axiomatic, self-evident truths. In this manner we have the Credo of the institution or the church. As intellectualism and formalism laid hold on the institution, this creed, instead of being merely an instrument to help men into a better understanding of religion, was transformed into the fact of religion itself! And the pages of the history of many religious movements are blotted by this substitution of a means to an end—and that end a larger life—into the end perfect in itself! And one has only to read such books as the Hon. A. D. White's work on the *Warfare of Science and Theology* or Dr. Draper's *History of the Conflict between Religion and Science*.

(4) In man's efforts to formulate his ideas and knowledge of God and Man, he developed a theology—a science of God. And in very much the same way that the creeds were made an end in themselves, so theology found itself in the same danger—and that the acceptance of some specified theology too—e.g., that of Aquinas or Augustine in Christianity, or of Mohammed in Islamism. The resulting injury to the cause of true religion has caused much sorrow and suffering to genuinely religious souls. Theology is but an attempt of the reason to comprehend the fact of God and his exact relations to Man and the Universe, and must ever be subject to the changes which may be necessitated in the face of new experiences and new facts. *Theology only becomes vital when it is the offspring of genuine religious experience, but it can never become that Religion itself!* Man was religious ages before he ever thought about theology; so religion is not theology. What then is it?

VII. It has been characterized once in these words: "Pure religion and undefiled before God and the Father is this: to visit the widow and the fatherless, and to keep himself unspotted from the world"—so, then, we may say that religion is the true life of man in filial relation to God, showing itself in love and service.

We need religion because it affords the human character the proper opportunity to realize itself in its true sphere of activity. At heart, and divested of the shams and artificiality of our civilization, man is essentially an unselfish creature, lacking not one whit in the highest intelligent human and moral attributes and qualities which, in the animal world are but blind instinct. In every effort of service and exhibition of love, we show our inherent religious nature. Shall we then truthfully acknowledge this great fact of our nature and put ourselves in that attitude of heart and mind which shall best secure such a life as the only genuine expression of ourselves? or shall we continue to deceive ourselves with less than the real thing? For weal or woe, religion is and eternally will be. We are made in God's image and God's likeness; we are his children. What kind of children are we—loving? obedient? loyal? *Do we really know that we are the offspring of God?* There are only two kinds of people in the world, religious and irreligious, and the religious people are those who are living genuine human lives, happy, joyous and glad, souls full of music; while the irreligious people are those who are deluding themselves in seeking the shadow for the substance, the unreal for the real. They pride themselves on being the sons of God, when in truth they are bastards.

The one supreme thing that enters into the daily experiences of the race—experiences of joy or sorrow—is the divine interpretation that the religious man puts into them. Instead of being accidents of blind force or fate, they are but the keys into the heart of God's love. In the separation of loved ones by the exigencies of life, there is found the bond of unity kept unbroken at that

“place where spirits blend,
Where friend holds fellowship with friend,
Though sundered far by faith they meet
Around one common Mercy-seat.”

When that other great fact for all the race faces us, death, the religious man's sorrow is turned into deep and abiding peace, because he knows that the loved ones are

“Safe home in port, the harbor reached”

and enjoying greater happiness—for are they not at home? And those left behind have the confidence in their hearts that the

separation is but temporary. For when they too shall be called, by the same unrespecting power, they shall be forever with them.

Religion is at once that one companion which goes by our side throughout life in the eternal growth of the soul and a continuous revelation of the real beauties of life.

"Let each man think himself an act of God,
His mind a breath, his life a thought of God;
And let each try by great thoughts and great deeds,
To show the most of God and heaven he hath in him."

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De la glossolalie chez les premiers chrétiens, et des phénomènes similaires—

Etude d'exégèse et de psychologie. EMILE LOMBARD. *Préface de Th. Flournoy.* Lausanne, Bridel; Paris, Fischbaeher, 1910. xii, 254 p.

The "Académie" of Neuchâtel, Switzerland, was transformed two years ago into a "Université," and we have here the first doctor's dissertation in the "Faculté de Théologie;" it is a splendid start. Our discussion comes somewhat late perhaps; but it is never too late to call attention to a good book, and *De la glossolalie* will surely remain a standard work on the special question it treats, and a most valuable contribution to the psychology of religion in general. Flournoy—who is a *connoisseur*—does not hesitate to call it "une oeuvre capitale et définitive sur la glossolalie religieuse." To apply data of modern psychology to the interpretation of the Scriptures is not exactly new, but to apply them so well could probably be called new.

Lombard begins by giving a definition of glossolalia in the Apostolic Church, as accurate as possible, from the few texts on hand (especially the First Epistle to the Corinthians, and the Second Chapter of the Acts of the Apostles). Glossolalia is one of the "charisms" of the early Christian Church, like prophesying, or performing miracles. It is a product of divine inspiration, the person speaking in tongues not by *nous* but by *pneuma*, according to the Neoplatonic and Gnostic terminology. It requires usually interpretation; at times the effect on the listeners is intensified by the singing of the inspired phrases. An important difference between the two groups of passages mentioned, is that according to I Cor., XII-XIV, it seems that the "tongues" were of a purely spiritual character and spoken by no nation on earth; while according to Acts II (account of the Pentecost) they are tongues spoken in foreign countries, although unknown before by those now using them under the influence of the *pneuma* (*xenoglossia*.) Modern Bible scholars seem to agree that the notion of *xenoglossia*, as found in Acts, was introduced later into the question and thus may be left aside. Lombard adopts this interpretation (let us, however, remark here that it is adopted on purely exegetical grounds, and is based chiefly on the fact that Acts was written after Corinthians; this is interesting, but is not quite convincing that the idea of glossolalia was not originally connected with that of *xenoglossia* by reliable although oral tradition), and then has no difficulty in finding that the phenomenon is not confined to the time of the Apostolic Church. He finds glossolalia proper, or similar manifestations, in Israel, with the Pagans (in religious ceremonies, like mysteries, oracles); and in the Christian Church up to the second century (Montanists); and again in more recent manifestations, which have been minutely described either by the inspired persons themselves, or by psychologists who have found there a fruitful field of study. Lombard draws illustrations chiefly from the Irving revivals. The "prophets cœvenants," the Welsh revivals, from individual cases like Le baron and Helen

Smith. Chapter V, (§I and II) which gives the psychological description and explanation of glossolalia, is a remarkably keen piece of analysis and shows a most sagacious use of the material collected. Of course the way had been prepared by the studies of Flounoy and Henry, but the original application of results already attained to the history of the early church is all Lombard's. His reconstruction, by analogy with modern glossolals, of those Christian meetings is absolutely convincing: namely the atmosphere of religious exaltation suggesting the idea of talking in tongues; and the contagion either directly by hearing a glossolal act, or indirectly by hearing of the enthusiasm created in assemblies by the rising of the glossolals; then, glossolalia growing more frequent all the time until it became an almost everyday expression of religious emotion, and a natural way of confessing one's faith like praying in a Salvation Army meeting. We also follow the various phases of the act itself of glossolaling: people are trying to express things for which they find no words, and thus use, at first, vague exclamations; now one of those exclamations more frequently occurring than others finally calls for some meaning, and such ideas like *Jesus*, or *God*, or *Sin* is associated with it; then a second, a third, a fourth meaningless sound is treated in the same fashion; a few such new words, joined by vague, senseless syllables, suggest some sort of a regular language. The longer one person keeps on the talking in tongues, the richer the vocabulary gets; an embryo of syntax (borrowed from the person's native tongue) is added to it and by and by, if sufficient time is allowed, a complete language is formed, like the "Martian" of Helen Smith.

The appreciation of the value of the glossolalia lies outside the pale of Lombard's work; but as a matter of fact the results of his psychological demonstration leave little doubt as to his attitude: glossolalia although the expression of a sincere and deep faith, of feelings of really superior nature, remains a childish expression; the idea of talking in tongues is legitimate, and by no means the sign of an inferior mind: St. Paul himself despairing to find human words to express his religious emotion, would occasionally "talk in tongues" and try coining a new, a supernatural language; but, of course, such an attempt even if carried some way, can contribute but little to the edification of the other members of the assembly,—since they cannot understand,—, and therefore need not be encouraged. Lombard adopts entirely Paul's attitude, which is the "pragmatic" attitude: if people like to talk in tongues, let them do it privatim, it will still do them good, and not create disorder in assemblies.

A few critical observations: Lombard has a long passage on Psychology of Religion (IV, iii) which is not entirely satisfactory. One does not see exactly at first what the author is driving at, because he brings in elements that belong rather elsewhere in the book. Evidently what he wanted, and what he had to say was this: In No. I (of Chapter IV) we have seen the conditions under which glossolalia took place; in No. II how the phenomenon took place; therefore in No. III we ought to be able to infer why it took place, i.e., why people talked in tongues. And the answer is given, too, namely: man tries to express the inexpressible, and only a supernatural language will answer the purpose. But besides this answer, there are found in the same chapter all sorts of discussions which are either of an exegetic

character or of a theological character (various views on glossolalia by scholars); thus discussions which are out of place here. In other words, in No. I and II Lombard was a demonstrator, a psychologist, he discusses facts; in No. III he keeps on demonstrating but, besides discussing facts, he discusses theories,—he is still a psychologist, but, at the same time, he becomes a philosopher or a theologian: thus we miss the clear-cut psychological demonstration that we had enjoyed so much before. This can be altered in another edition.

Lombard simply states the difference between Corinthians (glossolalia=talking in supernatural tongues) and Acts (glossolalia=talking in foreign tongues, or xenoglossia); the notion of xenoglossia was introduced in later texts only, and thus he drops it altogether, ignores it in his book. But some reason there must be why xenoglossia is associated with glossolalia, and why glossolalia is a special feature of the Christian religion. Now it seems to me that one ought to remember that, if the account of the Pentecost is posterior to the writing of I Corinthians, on the other hand, the event of the Pentecost is anterior to the events discussed in I Corinthians; and nothing proves that the idea of xenoglossia was not already associated with the oral accounts of the Pentecost. Therefore I venture the following hypothesis: The apostles, at the Pentecost, were exalted over the idea of evangelizing the world; which led them *naturally* to the other idea, that in order to do this, they need acquaintance with foreign tongues. It occurred to them just as naturally as, e.g., it occurred to Helen Smith, that, if she gave herself as coming from Mars, she must possess some special language spoken in that planet. In that exaltation they begin to utter foreign sounds, which are taken by those present, and possibly by themselves, for the foreign languages needed for missionary work,—while it was only “Lallspiel,” expressing their faith that they could go to various countries and be understood. Then, the account of the events at Pentecost spread, together with the report of glossolalia = xenoglossia, and in various cities disciples of the Lord, seized with a great enthusiasm for the service of God, felt in themselves the same inspiration for talking in unknown languages. By and by, however, it had been found out that those who spoke in tongues were not able, for that, to evangelize foreign countries, in other words that glossolalia was not xenoglossia; but by this time glossolalia had already become one of the “charisms,” and was not given up. If my suggestion is correct, then glossolalia would be really an outgrowth of xenoglossia, and the considerable part which glossolalia plays in the Christian Church is well enough explained. All the information and interpretation of Lombard not only remain as solid as before, but gain in probability; moreover, the rather small practical value of the “charism” is confirmed overmore.

Lombard is thoroughly equipped as far as literature on his special topic is concerned. I am inclined to think that he might have found valuable suggestions in the domain of general linguistics, if he had consulted others than Leroy and Wundt. Wundt after all is not a linguist by profession, and, if his work on that subject is suggestive at times, however, the lack of deep grasping is apparent all through. While writing this, I have not the library facilities that would enable me to give special references; but I remember at least one long study on artificial languages (schoolboy

languages, argots of all classes and all trades, even Volapük and Esperanto) by Richard M. Meyer in *Indogermanische Forschungen* (October, 1901). And this calls to my mind a curious relation between glossolalia as described by Lombard, and the esthetic theory of the modern poets called Symbolists. Glossolalia means an attempt to express inexpressible things by vague words or sounds; it means acting by mere suggestion, because the ordinary language is too coarse a book to express high and subtle emotions. Symbolists started from the same principle in the domain of poetry; their way of writing was to use the vaguest possible word, so as to keep as far removed as possible from current coarse ideation and leave things as ethereal as possible. The theory of glossolalia, as used by poets, would be expressed as adequately as possible in these words from Morice:

Ta pensée garde toi de la jamais nettement dire. Qu'en des jeux de lumière et d'ombre elle semble se livrer toujours et s'échapper sans cesse—agrandissant de tels écarts l'esprit émerveillé d'un lecteur comme il doit être, attentif et soumis—jusqu'au point final où elle éclatera magnifiquement en se réservant encore et toutefois, le nimbe d'une équivoque féconde afin que les esprits qui t'ont suivi soient récompensés de leurs peines par la joie tremblante d'une découverte qu'ils croiraient faire avec l'illusoire espérance d'une certitude qui ne sera jamais et la réalité d'un doute délicieux. Ainsi sauvegardé par celle initiale prudence d'éviter la précision tu iras, Poète, par tes propres intuitions restées indépendantes, plus loin dans les voies même purement rationnelles que les plus méthodiques philosophes et la plume te deviendra talisman d'invention, de vérité * * *. (Ch. Morice. *La littérature de tout à l'heure.* 1886.)

And should you want to press a little more the comparison and see the transition between the unconscious process of extatic glossolalia (Helen Smith, e.g.) and the conscious process of symbolists, examples will be found in Richard Dohmel, the famous modern German poet who simply outdid the symbolists, for he deliberately suggested thoughts by sounds instead of suggesting them by vague words. Here, for instance, is the refrain invented by this author, for the poem, called *Der Glühende* (note the title in connection with the refrain):

*Singt mir das Lied vom Tode und vom Leben
Dagloni, gleia, glühlala.*

ALBERT SCHINZ.

Jamaica Negro Proverbs and Sayings, Collected and Classified according to Subjects, by IZETT ANDERSON, M. D., and FRANK CUNDALL, F. S. A. Kingston, Jamaica: The Institute of Jamaica, 1910. 48 p.

This collection of 737 Jamaica Negro proverbs and sayings is of interest here by reason of such items as relate to folk-religion and its linguistic expression. The following sayings of a more or less religious character may be cited:

- 48. When cow' tail cut off, God-a-mighty brush fly.
- 140. Cunny better dan obeah (i.e., Cunning is better than witchcraft).
- 162. If you get your han' in a debil mout' tek time tek it out.

163. If you yearry (i.e., hear) debil a come, clear de way.
164. I eat wid de debil, but I cautious a him.
165. It hard fe keep out de debil, but it wus fe drike him out.
166. Accidental shot may kill Satan.
187. Ebery dog hab him day, but puss hab Sunday.
244. Duppy know who be frighten.
329. Chicken 'member God when him druk.
353. Godamighty never shut him yeye.
354. Godamighty no lub ugly.
355. Godamighty mek man 'traight, a rum mek him can't 'tan' up.
356. Big Massa (i.e., God) gib ebery man him oun mout'-water fe swaller him oun duckanoo (cornmeal cake).
357. When poor slave look through smoke glass, a no Godamighty fault dat Him wull look dingy.
358. Godamighty only mek you see 'tar, no matter which way wind blow.
557. Parson christen him our pickney, fus'.
587. Pr'yer in de mout' only, is no pr'yer.
680. Ebery day debil help tief, one day God help watchman.

Of these proverbs No. 48 is the equivalent of our "God tempers the wind to the shorn lamb;" No. 162 warns one to "act cautiously in getting out of a difficulty;" No. 164 is our "who would sup with the Devil need have a long spoon;" No. 164 corresponds to the Scotch "Better keep the deil oot than hae to turn him oot;" No. 187, which signifies "every one has his chance in turn," is based on the fact that "the dog is petted when he goes out with his master, while the cat has his chance when the master is at home on Sunday." No. 244 corresponds to the Scotch "Freits follow those who look to them." For No. 329 there is a variant, "When fowl drink water him say 'tank God,' when man drink water, him say nuttin,'" the reference being to the action of fowls in lifting their heads after drinking. No. 357 is certainly noteworthy. The interpretation of No. 680 seems to be "Murder will out," or "Crime will be discovered sooner or later." As the authors note, "comparatively few of these proverbs can be traced to their African origin." Quite a number of sayings are "more or less Biblical in character." The tendency of the Negroes to improvise proverbs, just as they improvise verses to their songs, gives rise to "two or three renderings of the same saying;" and very often one meets "the same idea clothed in different words." Many Jamaican Negro proverbs are nothing more than "European proverbs turned into meanings more readily understood of the people."

A. F. C.

Die Dichtung der Afrikaner. Hamburgische Vorträge von CARL MEINHOF.
Berlin: Buchhandlung der Berliner ev. Missionsgesellschaft, 1911.
179 p.

The eight sections of this book treat of the *märchen*, the myth, the sage, the epic, cult-compositions, the beginnings of dramatic art, proverb and riddle, minor poems and songs. The author is well known through

his African linguistic researches. The material is compiled from various reputable sources. As the author points out (p. 10), when, in 1889, E. Meinhof published his *Märchen aus Kamerun*, many would scarcely believe that an African could tell such beautiful and charming stories, so like our *märchen*. Moreover, protests came even from Africa, made by people who had had daily intercourse with the Negroes, and thought they ought to know about such matters. Since then the literature of African folk-lore has assumed such proportions as to silence effectually such arguments. Dr. Meinhof seems to follow Wundt in his ideas of the succession of *märchen*-subjects in the development of the child and of the race, viz., human beings, animals, plants or flowers, moon and other heavenly bodies. In the African *märchen* animals play a great rôle, but plants are little represented; nor are the heavenly bodies of very great importance,—the moon is often much more prominent than the sun. The tale of the wager is known over the whole continent; so also the story of the stupid and the wise animal,—as wise the hare or the jackal often figures, as stupid the lion, the panther or the hyena. That the hare should be given such a superior rôle is thought by some to indicate influence from India, as the author suggests (p. 17), but this view is not at all necessary. The appearance and rôle of the snake, as intermediary between this and the spiritworld, Meinhof explains, again with Wundt, as due to the belief that "the cold animals, that creep forth out of the ground, or live in the water, have a special relation to the realm of the dead, and are looked upon as the 'souls' of ancestors, who have come out of their graves again."

In Africa, according to Dr. Meinhof, cosmogonic and anthropogonic myths "have little or nothing to do with cults, but move about among the religious exercises like simple *märchen*-material." They are probably considered as purely poetical products. In African mythology, as here considered, sky and earth, the origin of man, demons, ghosts, wood-spirits, the origin of death, the interpretation of natural phenomena, and many other subjects all figure. For the half-animal and half-human, long-tailed demons or hobgoblins appearing in certain stories of the Masai the author again sees the influence of India (p. 36). The sacrifice-myth given on pages 38-39 expresses the real folk-spirit and, whether borrowed or genuinely African, is characterized by beauty and poetic truth. The sage "is the mother of history," and here Africa is represented both by hero-tales and totemic legends. Interesting are the stories of the Ziba in which the Supreme Being is represented as blond. This, Dr. Meinhof thinks, has some historical basis. But in other parts of Africa, and elsewhere also in the world, uncivilized peoples have made their heroes or their gods of another color or another race than their own,—and no mass-contact, or very marked foreign influence is needed to explain these facts." One of the first approaches to epic poetry in Africa, according to Dr. Meinhof, is to be found in the laudatory songs so common among many peoples. These run all the way from a song of a few lines in praise of some chief to such a self-song of many verses as the chant of the Basuto Chief Kukutle, given on pages 65-66. The way the Kafirs tell history "is strongly suggestive of the epic" (an interesting specimen is given, pp.

68-70). Dr. Meinhof remarks (p. 70) that "Verse is found in Africa, only where Asiatic influence is present, Christian, e.g., in Abyssinia, Mohammedan elsewhere,"—thus the songs of the Somali have fixed rhythms. Concerning the Somali and their great love for poetry, the author observes with respect to two incidents on record (one tribe promised not to avenge the theft of 100 camels if the chief who had stolen them would sing a great song about his deed; a threatening feud was once settled by the song of a blind poet), "are we not in the days of Homer?" The general impression made by Africa is that of antiquity,—Asia Minor gives merely the impression of the Middle Ages, when one is transported thither immediately from Europe. The epic stories of the Mohammedan Suaheli (pp. 77-90) are of interest in the matter of the mingling of races and religions.

The section on cult-songs, etc. (pp. 93-112) treats of the Bushmen, Masai and Nandi, Jagga, Zulus, Basuto, etc. According to Dr. Meinhof, the magic formula "is perhaps the origin of all poetry." The poetic form of cult-songs is, to begin with, "simple, like that of the simplest prayer." Besides simple repetition by the monologist, there is repetition of the same thing by a chorus, after the soloist has chanted it,—later come the soloist and the choir as singers of different parts, as in the Masai production on page 97. Among cult-compositions are to be reckoned "magic songs," songs of medicine-men, certain prayers (especially among the Nandi, Masai and Galla, who have a sort of monotheism), etc. It is remarked also (p. 101) that "the songs of children are partly old magic-songs,"—this statement often holds of uncivilized peoples as well as of civilized Europeans, etc. The puberty festivals (e.g., of the Basuto boys and girls) are sometimes the most important religious acts in the life of the individual, but it does not appear that the songs are necessarily cult-songs (p. 103). But the language of many of these songs is unintelligible, so their import might be almost anything. On pages 109-112 the use of the cult-song in the mother-tongue by the Christian missions is considered. In several religions, among Zulus, Basuto, some peoples of Togo-land, gifted natives have been encouraged to sing Christian ideas in the forms of their national poetry (e.g., Untsikana, a famous Xesa-Kafir). This has produced, for the purposes needed, much more effective literature than is furnished by the hymns, etc., of ardent missionaries, even when they have had some real knowledge of the native tongues. The beginnings of dramatic art are seen in the imitation of animals and in real pantomime as met with among the Hottentots (who are so passionately fond of dancing), representations of historical events, battles, etc. As preparation for the drama proper serve the plays of children (often imitative of the acts of adults, the doings of animals, etc.), dances and their paraphernalia, hero-songs (practically often the monology of a heroic drama), *marchen* (where occur often genuine dialogues,—examples are given on pages 127-131), etc. On page 124 the opinion is expressed that the secular dance has grown up out of the cult-dance. Dr. Meinhof notes the horrible and fearsome character of some of these African dances and pantomimes with their masks and *outré* dresses, ornaments, etc., and brings this aspect of them into connection with the

fear-theory of the origin of tragedy advocated by European authorities. In modern Africa as in ancient Greece, "the fearful and the burlesque, tragedy and comedy, lie close to one another."

The fact that African proverbs are the expression of African everyday life makes the understanding of some of them (cf. the interpretation on page 137 of the Suaheli proverb about shaving one's self) difficult for a European. A knowledge of the *vie intime* of African animals is also needed. There are, of course, many African proverbs that correspond aptly enough to familiar European ones (e.g., to the German *Man soll das Kind nicht mit dem Bade ausschütten* corresponds the Togo *One doesn't burn up a dirty dress*). Some of the African proverbs reveal unexpected depths of feeling and sentiment. As examples of this the author cites such as the following:

- A beautiful town is not so beautiful as home (Togo).
 For the disease of love there is no physician (Herero).
 Peace comes only at the point of the sword (Suaheli).

As an expression of love of liberty the Herero proverb, "the guineahen does not breed in captivity," might have come from some member of a civilized race, like the saying about peace and the sword. Some of the satiric proverbs are equally impressive (e.g., the Jagga "there is no woman who tells another woman to wash her face"). Proverbs relating to religion are said to be rare (p. 146); they are most often found among the Mohammedan Suaheli (a proverb of the Ziba of German East Africa runs, "You see the temple, and yet ask where God lives"). The Suaheli have many proverbs in poetical form. Among many African peoples there is a fixed fashion of asking riddles, and some of the riddle-questions are very complicated. The minor literary products of African peoples considered on pages 153-155, include work-songs, travel-songs, songs in *märchen*, herdsmen's songs, satirical songs, wedding-songs, hunting-songs, war-songs, mourning-songs, dance-songs, love-songs (some of the Suaheli love-songs, according to Dr. Meinhof, suggest Arabic models), etc. A really good dance and love song of the Suaheli, given on pages 177-178, treats of true conjugal love. The author has probably underestimated the element of nature-observation in African primitive poetry and folk-literature,—to the few examples cited on pages 170-171 others could certainly be added, particularly from the Masai, etc.

As a résumé of the chief facts concerning literary composition among the uncivilized peoples of Africa Dr. Meinhof's book will be very useful. But too close adhesion to the Wundtian theory of the evolution of the various forms of the literary products of mankind is hardly to be recommended.

A. F. C.

Folk Stories from Southern Nigeria, West Africa. By ELPHINSTONE DAYRELL, F. R. G. S., F. R. A. I. With an Introduction by ANDREW LANG. With Frontispiece. London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1911. xvi, 159 p.

This book gives the English texts only of forty tales on all sorts of topics from "the tortoise with a pretty daughter" to "the woman with

two skins;" and from "why worms live underground" to "the King and the ju-ju tree." They were collected among the Negroes of Southern Nigeria by Major Dayrell, District Commissioner for that part of the British Empire. In an interesting Introduction (pp. vii-xvi), Andrew Lang discusses each tale briefly and points out its analogues in folk-tale and folk-lore the world over. "The woman with two skins," e.g., is "a peculiar version of the story of the courteous Sir Gawain with his bride, hideous by day, and a pearl of loveliness by night;" "the pretty stranger" is "a native variant of Judith and Holofernes." A dozen or more are simply "just so stories," plain, or elaborate. Several of these tales have to do with religion, some others are really cosmogonic myths. The story of the retreat of the sun and moon into the sky (pp. 64-65) is *sui generis*; and Mr. Lang styles the story of the lightning and the thunder (pp. 70-71), "quite an original myth," but "much below the divine dignity of such myths elsewhere." The tale of the King and the ju-ju tree is "a fine example of ju-ju beliefs." Concerning these tales in general Mr. Lang makes the following remarks (p. xvi):

"The most striking point in the tales is the combination of good humor and good feeling with horrible cruelties, and the reign of terror of the Egbos and lesser societies. European influences can scarcely do much harm, apart from whiskey, in Nigeria. As to religion, we do not learn that the Creator receives any sacrifice: in savage and barbaric countries. He usually gets none. Only Ju Jus, whether ghosts or fiends in general, are propitiated. The Other is 'too high and too far.' " This is a handy and useful little book.

A. F. C.

The Numeration, Calendar Systems and Astronomical Knowledge of the Mayas. By CHARLES P. BOWDITCH. Privately printed. Cambridge: The University Press, 1910. xviii, 346 p. Plates I-XIX, figs. 1-64.

This well-printed volume contains the results of a serious study of the Maya hieroglyphs by a competent American investigator, familiar with both the Codices and the glyphs on the stone monuments of Yucatan, Guatemala, etc. The hieroglyphs of the Mayas are the *crux* of American archeology, and the inscriptions left by these more or less civilized Indians of Central America appear to be mostly, if not entirely of a calendrical, or semi-religious character, having to do, like certain figures in the Codices and others on the stelae and the great stone monoliths and elsewhere in the temple ruins, etc., probably with anniversaries, festivals, memorial and ceremonial occasions and the like. So far, no complete and satisfactory interpretation of the "Maya hieroglyphs" has been found,—no Rosetta stone, or bilingual inscription such as solved similar problems in Egypt and Asia Minor, has turned up, or is ever likely to. All efforts to obtain illuminating knowledge from the Mayas of the present day (possibly they really have none) have failed. But at points, here and there, workers like Mr. Bowditch are plodding away in the hope that something important may soon be discovered that will go far toward settling the matter.

The present volume, besides treating of the mathematical and limitedly calendrical aspects of the subject (use of lines and dots in numeration,

higher numbers, methods of fixing dates, intercalary days, methods of marking the passage of time, methods of calculating time), discusses, in more or less detail, the meanings of the day and month signs with their variations, the glyphs marking counts, calendaric rounds, periods, cycles, grand cycles, "wheels," etc. The knowledge of the Mayas concerning the heavenly bodies and their motions, and the important part in their life and customs played by the *tonalamatl* (the Mexican name of the period of 260 days,—the name is also applied to a divination calendar or ritual of feasts, etc.) are likewise briefly considered. Dr. Förstemann, a distinguished German investigator of Maya antiquities, was of opinion that these Indian chroniclers recorded the lunar revolutions, also those of Mercury and Jupiter, as well as those of Mars and Venus. But Mr. Bowditch (p. 236) considers it doubtful whether the Mayas observed the synodical revolutions of Mars, though they evidently did those of Venus, and probably Jupiter, but not Saturn (they hardly "discovered the Copernican theory"). The so-called "planet signs" need very careful study. Venus counts for much in this part of the world. The Maya periods of time seem to have been: *Kin* (day), *uinal* (20 days), *tun* (360 days), *katun* (7,200 days),—also cycle of 144,000 days and *grand cycle* of 13 or 20 *cycles*, for which last two periods no Maya names are known. Concerning the knowledge of the Mayas Mr. Bowditch remarks (p. 199):

"But with a nation which had remained in the same general area long enough to have enabled them to keep records which have as a basis a date more than 3,000 years in the past, and to fix the length of the year as accurately as 365 days, and which, as is probably shown by the Dresden codex, had worked out the length of the revolutions of the moon and of the synodical revolutions of Venus, the observations made by them must have been very accurate." As compared with the Mayas, so far as is known, "the Mexicans used no method of recording time like the long count, built up of *kins*, *uinals*, *tuns*, *katuns* and *cycles*," and "therefore, they had no such plan of recording time as is found in the thirteen-*katun* count" (p. 334).

Mr. Bowditch has his own method of finding the day reached by the Maya system of time notation, differing from those of Förstemann and Goodman. He also holds that *ahau* was not a synonym of *katun*. As to the general character of the Maya hieroglyphs themselves the author expresses the opinion that we have here no real phonetic alphabet,—"the phonetic use of syllables,—the rebus form,—called by Dr. Brinton the 'ikonomatique' system, is probably the solution of the question" (p. 254). The disappointing "alphabet" of Bishop Landa "was probably merely a collection of the signs which would be used by the Mayas to recall the sounds of the words of the church service; thus, if the priest asked them what sign would be used to recall the first syllable of the word 'Ave,' they would draw the head of the turtle or *Ae*." The writing of the Mayas, however, was on a different plane from that of the Aztecs, for, as Mr. Bowditch points out (p. 255): "As far as I am aware, the use of this kind of writing was confined, among the Aztecs to the name of persons and

places, while the Mayas, if they used the rebus form at all, used it also for expressing common nouns and possibly abstract ideas. The Mayas surely used picture-writing and the ideographic system, but I feel confident that a large part of their hieroglyphs will be found to be made up of rebus forms, and that the true line of research will be found to lie in this direction." It is thus "very important, indispensable indeed, that the student of the Maya hieroglyphs should become a thorough Maya linguist." The author also thinks that the consonantal sound of a syllable was of far greater importance than the vowel sound, so that a form could be used to represent a syllable, even if the vowel and consonant sounds were reversed." The list of the Maya day-names (pp. 263-265), with their meanings as suggested by various investigators past and present, shows how much has yet to be done to change guesses into certainties.

A. F. C.

Unsere ältesten Vorfahren, ihre Abstammung und Kultur von DR. HEINRICH MICHELIS. Mit 14 Textfiguren. Leipzig and Berlin: Druck und Verlag von B. G. Teubner, 1910. 35 p.

This pamphlet treats in readable fashion, with references to the literature of the subject in footnotes, of the descent of man, the culture of our oldest ancestors and the primitive history of mankind in the light of the theory of evolution and modern civilized man. Naturally there are few items here relating to religion. The origin of cremation is placed in the metal period (p. 27). Grave-gifts were common then also; likewise stone burial-places for several or many individuals. The beginnings of agriculture belong to the later stone age and domestic animals counted for much in neolithic times. The author seems to adopt (p. 24) the "magic" theory of the art of cave-man. Dr. Michelis gives expression (p. 20) to the following rather *outré* opinion: "The Hindu twirling-stick for fire-making, the hooked cross, the *swastika*, indicates the primitive cult of mankind. In it we have also the origin of the Christian symbolism of the cross and the Christian cult itself. A direct line of evolution leads from the simple stone block of primitive times to the high altar of the modern church, from the heathen sacrificial fire of long vanished ages, past the Agni cult of the ancient Hindus, the Vesta worship of the old Romans, and the sacred hearth-fire of the Teutons, down to our own times,—with the ever burning lamp of the Catholic Church." After saying this much about the "fire-cross" and its significance today and yesterday, the author considers the effects of the glacial age upon early European man. The Edda is right, he thinks, in making Ymir, the giant and first of the gods, arise from melting blocks of ice. Old Teutonic mythology bears many marks of the age of ice: "The earth arose from the contact of two worlds,—cold Nifelheim and hot Muspelheim. Primitive man, living on the edge of the slowly melting glacial world, left behind him in tradition, in his original myth of the origin of earth, a clear picture of his earliest and simplest beliefs" (p. 25).

A. F. C.

History of Anthropology. By ALFRED C. HADDON with the help of A. HINGSTON QUIGGIN. [Issued for the Rationalist Press Association Limited.] London: Watts & Co., 1910. x, 158 p. Illd.

This welcome sketch of the development of anthropological science in its various aspects divides the subject into Physical and Cultural Anthropology. Under the first head are considered: The pioneers of physical anthropology, the systematizers of physical anthropology, anthropological controversies, the unfolding of the antiquity of man, comparative psychology, and the classification and distribution of man. Under the second: Ethnology: its scope and sources, the history of archeological discovery, technology, sociology and religion, linguistics, cultural classification and the influence of environment. There is a bibliography (pp. 155-156), supplementing the references in the text; also an index of authors, but none of subjects. A few more names ought to be added to the list of the pioneers of anthropology as given here; certainly on page 148, in connection with Gallatin ought to be mentioned Thomas Jefferson, whose ethnological opinions and activities the writer of this review has made the topic of a brief study (*Amer. Anthropol.*, Vol. 9, N. S., 1907, pp. 499-509). The sections which particularly interest us for this Journal are those on "Comparative Psychology" (pp. 78-87) and "Sociology and Religion" (pp. 128-143). Under comparative psychology, phrenology, psychical research, ethnic psychology, folk-psychology, experimental psychology and eugenics are touched upon. As representing notably in America the anthropological-psychological field, the name of Dr. F. Boas should find place here beside those of Bastian and Wundt,—he is mentioned only on p. 69, in connection with the Negro question; his book on *The Mind of Primitive Man* appeared since Dr. Haddon's volume was published, but the material included in it, was already largely available in essays contributed to scientific periodicals, etc. In the consideration of sociology and religion Brinton should have received at least mention; and in a new edition Dr. P. Ehrenreich's *Die allgemeine Mythologie und ihre ethnologischen Grundlagen* (Leipzig, 1910) and Dr. A. A. Goldenweiser's *Totemism: An Analytical Study* (N. Y., 1910), originally published in the *Journal of American Folk-Lore* (Vol. 23, 1910) are important enough for special consideration, the last as embodying the new conceptions of the "American school" of anthropologists. With the reference to *orenda* (p. 136) might have gone mention of J. N. B. Hewitt and Miss A. C. Fletcher. As Prof. Haddon points out (p. 137), anthropology has studied but little the belief aspect of religion, having hitherto "practically confined its attention to ritual and myth, and but too frequently extensively to the last." On page 140, with reference to the theories of the origin of religion set forth at various times, such as star-worship, euhemerism, fetishism, nature-worship, ancestor-worship, totemism, the remark is made that "these hypotheses were based on the erroneous assumption that savage religions represented the primitive mode of thought, out of which civilized religions had evolved." And the author cites, with approval, the statement of G. F. Moore, that "we can learn a great deal from the lowest existing religions, but they cannot tell

us what the beginning of religion was, any more than the history of language can tell us what was the first human speech." Prof. Hadjion sees some danger in the *renaissance* of the nature-mythology theories of the school of Frobenius, Ehrenreich, etc.

A. F. C.

The Mind of Primitive Man. By FRANZ BOAS. A Course of Lectures delivered before the Lowell Institute, Boston, Mass., and the National University of Mexico, 1910-1911. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1911. xi, 294 p.

This book, wherein are embodied the results of years of personal investigation and study of primitive peoples at first hand, together with the author's mature thoughts concerning the many problems involved from the point of view of psychological anthropology, will be welcomed by all interested in the history of man individually and racially considered. Expert in somatology, in ethnology, in mythology and folk-lore, and in linguistics, an investigator in the field, as well as in the laboratory, Professor Boas' authority to speak on certain matters relating to the nature and significance of racial differences and resemblances, the origin and the connection of the forms of human culture found among savage and barbarous peoples and their interpretation for the history of the evolution of human civilization, etc., is of the very highest order, and, in many cases uniquely satisfying. Besides a summary (pp. 243-250) the volume contains nine chapters devoted to the following topics: Racial prejudices, the influence of environment upon human types, influence of heredity upon human types, the mental traits of primitive man and of civilized man, race and language, the universality of cultural traits, the evolutionary view point, some traits of primitive culture, race-problems in the United States. Several of these chapters are the revised and enlarged forms of papers published during the period 1894-1910 in various scientific periodicals, monographs, etc. Pages 279-294 are occupied by notes of a bibliographic nature,—an alphabetically arranged bibliography might have been better; and an index would have been useful.

The most important conclusions reached by the author are these: On the whole, hereditary traits, more particularly hereditary higher gifts, are at best a possible, but not a necessary, element determining the degree of advancement of a race (p. 245). Historical events appear to have been much more potent in leading races to civilization than their faculty, and it follows that achievements of races do not warrant us in assuming that one race is more highly gifted than the other (p. 17). Hardly any evidence can be adduced to show that the anatomical characteristics of the races possessing the highest civilization were phylogenetically more advanced than those on lower grades of culture; the various races differ in this respect, the specifically human characteristics being most highly developed, some in one race, some in another (p. 245). A direct relation between physical habitus and mental endowment does not exist (p. 245). One of the most potent causes of modifications of the anatomical structure and physiological functions of man, leading to dif-

ferences of type and action between primitive and civilized groups of the same race, must be looked for in the progressive domestication of man incident to the progress of civilization (p. 75). The differences between different types of man, are, on the whole, small as compared with the range of variation in each type (p. 94). The average faculty of the white race is found to the same degree in a large proportion of individuals of all other races; and, although it is probable that some of these races may not produce as large a proportion of great men as our own race, there is no reason to suppose that they are unable to reach the level of civilization represented by the bulk of our own people (p. 123). The hereditary mental faculty does not seem to have been improved by civilization (p. 247). Language does not furnish the much-looked-for means of discovering differences in the mental status of different races (p. 154). Linguistic relationships and racial relationships are not interchangeable terms (p. 124). Types, languages, and culture are not so intimately connected that each human race is characterized by a certain combination of physical type, language and culture (p. 125). All attempts to correlate racial types and cultural stages have failed; cultural stage is essentially a phenomenon dependent upon historical causes, regardless of race (p. 249). The change from primitive to civilized society includes a lessening of the number of the emotional associations, and an improvement of the traditional material that enters into our habitual mental operations (p. 250). But, while in the logical processes of the mind we have a decided tendency, with the development of civilization, to eliminate traditional elements, no such marked decrease in the force of traditional elements can be found in our activities; these are controlled by custom almost as much among ourselves as they are among primitive man (p. 242). The existence of a large mulatto population in the United States is, of itself, enough to prove that the alleged "race-instinct" of the whites is not a physiological dislike but rather a repetition of the old instinct and fear of the connubium of patricians and plebeians, of the European nobility and the common people, or of the castes of India (p. 273). As all races have contributed in the past to cultural progress in one way or another, so they will be capable of advancing the interests of mankind, if we are only willing to give them a fair opportunity (p. 278).

Dr. Boas' volume should be read by all interested in the problem of human civilization, and particularly that aspect of it concerned with the relations of so-called "higher" and "lower" races. If they are not, as is so often the case, beyond the reach of argument and blind to the connection of facts, the Southern Negrophobe and the Northern Teutonophile will both be able to profit by it. Special attention might be called to the treatment by Dr. Boas of certain topics within the general discussion. Such, e.g., are: the difference between the civilization of the Old World and that of the New (p. 8),—essentially a difference in time, and the "preeocity" of Mediterranean culture; the importance of the effect of rate of development upon the final form of body and of mind (p. 49); the effects of the "domestication" of man (pp. 65-75); the phenomena of race-mixture (pp. 78-81); the small ancestral group and

the origin of "local races" (p. 88); the rôle of the individual in primitive culture (pp. 112-114); the question of relapses of educated "savages" and civilized Robinson Crusoes (pp. 120-12); the "Aryan problem" (pp. 133-136); the achievements of the earliest ancestors of man (pp. 165-166) and the dissemination of cultural elements from tribe to tribe; the phenomena of convergent evolution (p. 186); the nature of "totemism" (p. 190)—not a single psychological problem, but embracing the most diverse psychological elements.

For religious psychology and sociology Dr. Boas has much of value, particularly in those sections of the book dealing with the mental traits of primitive man and the distribution of culture-phenomena among the various races of man, past and present. On pages 105-114, Dr. Boas effectually disposes of the argument that primitive peoples as such lack the power to inhibit impulses, have no power of attention or concentration of mind, are without the power of original thought, etc. Here, "the difference in attitude of civilized man and of primitive man disappears if we give due weight to the social conditions in which the individual lives" (p. 108). The alleged "improvidence" of primitive man had often better be deemed "optimism," as we call it when found among civilized Europeans or Americans. In the religious ideas and institutions of primitive peoples may be found abundant evidence of the influence of the independent thought of individuals,—this is particularly true of certain American Indian tribes (p. 112), and "may be observed in the increasing complexity of esoteric doctrines intrusted to the care of a priesthood." An interesting example of the adoption of new and modification of old ideas is to be found in the "Ghost Danee" religion of the Plains Indians, and other North American tribes. And Dr. Boas informs us that "the notion of a future life of an Indian tribe of Vancouver Island has undergone a change in this manner, in so far as the idea of the return of the dead in children of their own family has arisen" (p. 113). On this point, the author expresses the opinion that "the mental attitude of individuals who thus develop the beliefs of a tribe is exactly that of the civilized philosopher." In the section on race, language and culture, a place might have been found, perhaps, for a more extended discussion of the connection of language with religion, or rather of the phenomena of a linguistic nature accompanying the development of religious ideas and beliefs, a topic which the author has touched upon in the Introduction to the *Handbook of Indian Languages* (vol. 1, Washington, 1911), published by the Bureau of American Ethnology. The possibility of the rapid spread of cultural achievements is exemplified in the history of cultivated plants, domestic animals, etc., but "perhaps the best proof of transmission is contained in the folk-lore of the tribes of the world." Here, the following remark of the author is much to the point (p. 169): "The culture of any given tribe, no matter how primitive it may be, can be fully explained only when we take into consideration its inner growth as well as its relation to the culture of its near and distant neighbors, and the effect that they may have exerted." The complete generalization involved in the viewpoint of so many evolutionists that there has been "a correlation between industrial

development and social development, and therefore a definite sequence of inventions as well as of forms of organization and of belief," lacks proof—cf. the facts in the distribution of the arts of pottery and metallurgy. This is especially true in the field of primitive religion, mythology and folk-lore, where it has been "inferred that because many conceptions of the future life have evidently developed from dreams and hallucinations, all notions of this character have had the same origin." The improbability of the use of masks all over the world having had a single origin is another case in point. Totemism, again, is, doubtless, of multiform derivation, as Goldenweiser has demonstrated in his recent monograph on that much-discussed subject. Only in a limited sense can it be true that there exists "a uniform development of culture among all the different races of man and among all tribal units" (p. 195). We must take into consideration here "a peculiar tendency of diverse customs and beliefs to converge toward similar forms," and remember that "anthropological phenomena, which are in outward appearance alike, are psychologically speaking, entirely distinct, and that, consequently, psychological laws covering all of them cannot be deduced from them." Herein consists one of the distinctions between the general European school of anthropologists and the "new" American, as Dr. Lowie well brings out in his discussion of "A New Conception of Totemism" in the *American Anthropologist* (N. S. vol. 13, 1911, pp. 189-207). The study of *tabu*, which looms so large sometimes in the religious and related ideas of savage and barbarous peoples offers many problems of a similar nature. Dr. Boas, e.g., thinks (p. 222) that "it is very likely that the Eskimo taboo forbidding the use of caribou and of seal on the same day may be due to the alternating inland and coast life of the people." Thus we would have an unconscious origin for a peculiar custom, as may be the case also with the fish-*tabu* of some of the Southwestern tribes, i.e., the impossibility of obtaining fish in a certain habitat developed into the custom of not eating fish. The continuation solely through force of habit of actions considered proper or improper is exemplified numerously in the customary actions of civilized peoples to-day, as well as among primitive peoples. The hold of ritual is very important here, for, as Dr. Boas says (p. 229) "in our day, the domain of ritual is restricted, but in primitive culture it pervades the whole life; not a single action of any importance can be performed that is not accompanied by prescribed rites of more or less elaborate form." In many cases, "rites are more stable than their explanations," and "they symbolize different ideas among different peoples and at different times." The characteristic trait of "nature-myths," according to Dr. Boas, is "the association between the observed cosmic events and what might be called a novelistic plot based on the form of life with which people are familiar" (p. 230),—one distinction between folk-tale and nature-myth "lies solely in the association of the latter with cosmic phenomena," an association that "does not naturally develop in modern society," and, "if it is still found every now and then, is based on the survival of the traditional nature-myth." With regard to mythology, it is well said (p. 234) that "the same kind of tales are current over enormous areas, but the mythological use to which they are

put is locally quite different." To sum up in a word, "the difference in the mode of thought of primitive man and that of civilized man seems to consist largely in the difference of character of the traditional material with which the new perception associates itself" (p. 203). Or, again, "'mythology,' 'theology' and 'philosophy' are different terms for the same influences which shape the current of human thought, and which determine the character of the attempts of man to explain the phenomena of nature." A marked trait of primitive life is "the occurrence of close associations between mental activities that appear to us as entirely disparate" (p. 209). As contrasted with the general run of civilized life: "In primitive life, religion and science; music, poetry and dance; myth and history; fashion and ethics,—appear inextricably interwoven."

A. F. C.

Geburt, Hochzeit und Tod. Beiträge zur vergleichenden Volkskunde. Von ERNST SAMTER. Mit 7 Abbildungen im Text und auf 3 Tafeln. Leipzig und Berlin: Druck und Verlag von B. G. Teubner, 1911. 222 p.

This book, provided with numerous bibliographical references in footnotes and an index, treats of all sorts of beliefs and practices concerning birth, marriage and death from the point of view of comparative folk-lore. Beginning with the discussion of the Roman custom of placing the new-born infant on the ground, from which its father lifted it up and recognized it, the author ends with a brief section on the traces of spirit-cult in birth and wedding rites and ceremonies. The other chapters deal with the dangers to the woman at child-birth from demons, spirits, etc.: defensive rites at birth, wedding, death; driving away the spirits by noises, etc.; torches and candles; fire and water as obstacles for demons and spirits; change of clothes; "the false bride;" change of name; nakedness as a defense against demons and spirits; untying knots and hair; taboo of sleep; covering up or avoidance of mirrors; taboo of touching the threshold; taboo of looking back; salt as defence against evil things, etc.; stopping the wedding-procession en route; offerings at birth and at marriage; sacrifices of blood, hair, etc.; red color in connection with birth, marriage, death; throwing a shoe after the bridal couple, and related practices. Hr. Samter, who has already published a monograph on *Familienfeste der Griechen und Römer* (Berlin, 1911), and a number of articles in the *Neue Jahrbücher für das klassische Altertum* on classical folk-lore, ceremonials, etc., considers some of these items with special reference to Teutonic and ancient Greek and Roman data. The custom of having the woman about to give birth to her child kneel on the ground, and many other practices akin to this, receive from the author the following explanation (p. 19):

"After all that has been said, it is no rash supposition, if we assume that kneeling and clasping the earth on the part of the Greek woman at child-birth are to be explained in the same way as the same practices in the chthonic cult, and also the custom among other peoples of placing on the ground the parturient and the dying, we can assume that it was the belief among the Greeks also that the woman-with-

child should be brought into contact with the earth and with the realm of the subterranean, so that birth might take place successfully and auspiciously, i.e., that the soul of the child might thus arise out of the earth, an idea that naturally goes with what Albrecht Dieterich has taught us concerning the Greek conception of Mother Earth." Many rites and ceremonies seem to belong in part, at least, to the celebrations connected with birth, marriage and death, all three. The Roman *candclae* at child-birth, the wedding-torch, and the funeral lights, illustrate this point. Even to-day it is sometimes difficult to distinguish certain parts of a wedding from some belonging with a funeral. Painting children, candidates for matrimony, the dying and the dead, is also an ancient and widespread custom; as is likewise the practice, often akin to this, of disguising such human beings in various ways so as to cheat or avoid demons, evil spirits, etc. The "false" or "substitute" bride is another device to "cheat the Devil"—or his imps. A like end is served by change of name, etc. The rôle of human nakedness in connection with certain of these rites and ceremonies of a protective or a defensive sort has been variously interpreted (pp. 112-120,—indeed no single explanation will do for all cases, for ritual nakedness may have divers *motifs*. Samter considers that there is not a little in Heim and Crooke's theory of the origin of ritual nakedness in the idea of the magie effectivity of the obscene; but nakedness, of course, has not always been considered indecent. The taboo of sleep to the bridal couple the night before the wedding, or the night after, to mothers for the night after the birth of the child, to boys after circumcision, to watchers at the grave of the dead, etc., is a curious, but rather widespread practice. The taboos of the threshold have a large kinship in ancient and modern folk-belief and folk-custom. Hr. Samter emphasizes (p. 210) the customs and practices which, seemingly, have to do with ancestors, souls, spirits, etc., but is careful not to seek to derive all such rites, etc., from the primitive soul-cult, for "while belief in the soul is to be regarded as one of the chief roots of religion, it is assuredly only one, not *the* root of all religion" (p. 217). With Samter's book should be read Dr. Arnold van Gennep's volume covering much the same ground, *Les Rites de Passage* (Paris, 1909. 288 p.). By "rites de passage" are meant those ceremonies, customs, practices, etc., connected with the passage of the individual from one age to another, from one condition to another, from one occupation to another,—also with physical passage, i.e., over the threshold, through openings of all sorts, etc.; and with beginnings, entrances into new occupations, new situations, new lands, submission to new chiefs, new masters, etc. Van Gennep discourses particularly rites concerning pregnancy and *accouchement*, birth and infancy, initiatory-rites, betrothal and marriage, death and burial. He emphasizes the fact that often these "rites de passage" form a fixed whole, from birth to death,—a whole than can only arbitrarily be sectioned off into ceremonies preliminary to puberty, for puberty, for marriage, for pregnancy, for birth, for infancy, etc. Such a cycle of ceremonies from the adolescence of the parents to the birth of the first child exists, e.g., among the Todas (p. 277). Here, again, as Samter pointed out in certain cases, the resemblances are sometimes very great between rites of initiation and wedding-cere-

monies, between puberty-rites and funeral-practices, between baptismal rites, ceremonies of adoption and fraternization and marriage rites and customs. For van Gennep the *sequence* of such rites and ceremonies is of much importance. Of great interest is the displacement or transference of certain of these ceremonies, etc. Often, when the woman during pregnancy is not regarded as unclean, or when any one can assist in the *accouchement* (an ordinary, normal, though painful event), the scheme of rites and practices will be found connected with infancy, with betrothal, or with marriage (p. 277).

A. F. C.

Increasing Human Efficiency in Business. A Contribution to the Psychology of Business. By WALTER DILL SCOTT. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1911. p. 339. Price \$1.25 net.

The index to this book, which discusses as means of increasing human efficiency, imitation, competition, loyalty, concentration, wages, pleasure, the love of the game, relaxation, etc., does not contain the word "Religion," although it is not to be imagined that Professor Scott intends to overlook it or to exclude it altogether as a factor in the perfection of the modern business man. This, too, in the light of the first sentence of Chapter I., "The modern business man is the true heir of the old magicians." There are occasional references to religion throughout the book, and the author does mention religion (p. 220) along with philanthropy, literature, art, club-life, athletics, etc., as among the things from which upon entering business every young man should select "some form of endeavor or activity apart from business to which he shall devote a part of his attention"—this interest "should be so absorbing that, when he is thus engaged, business is banished from mind" (p. 220). Religion as a recreation is one thing, religion as a human instinct is another. If "by the proper application of psychology the efficiency of men is to be increased beyond the idle dream of the optimist of the past," care must be taken, that here, as elsewhere in human history a particular institution does not kill a generic instinct or an omni-human ideal. There is almost a fetish of "efficiency" to-day and men as human-beings, and women and children also, run much danger of being metamorphosed into highly-efficient machines, whose actual years of life will soon be as readily and as accurately predicted as is the life-time of a loom or a locomotive. Professor Scott's book, like that of Taylor is interesting and suggestive, but both emphasize a tendency already too apparent in American life, to demand the efficiency of one individual under the supervision of another as the *sine qua non* of commercial and industrial method and the creator of business genius. The generically human ought not to be altogether swamped by the particularly American.

A. F. C.

The Natural History of Religious Feeling. A Question of Miracles in the Soul. An Inductive Study by ISAAC A. CORNELISON, D. D. New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1911. xvii, 273 p. Price \$1.50 net.

The author of this book died at the age of eighty-three and in the best of health, while it was in press. This study grew out of "the diffi-

culty he has encountered in his efforts to bring certain generally accepted notions regarding experimental religion into harmony with the great body of truth," and was undertaken "to lay specters of doubt which were beginning to appear in his own mind." He is of opinion that "the time has come for an advance to be made in the religious world, like that which began in the scientific world, with the appearance of Charles Darwin's *Origin of Species*; an advance, from an incorrect, to a more nearly correct, view of the divine order in the development of the spiritual life in man" (p. ix). The argument of the book is directed against the assumption of the evangelical church that "conversion is necessary to make a man a Christian and conversion is a supernatural, divine work, a miracle in the soul, which is always manifested in the consciousness by unmistakable emotional experiences,"—against this view and the deductions made from it. Part I of the book treats of the natural causes of religious feeling (tropism, regeneration, the one miracle in the human soul); Part II of the religious ecstasy (ecstasy in the heathen and the Christian world); Part III of conversion (what is conversion? the divine agency in conversion, the variety of means employed and the difference in result, natural causes of conversion, the psychology of emotion, changes in character and life from natural causes, prophecy and Pentecost, the test of experiment, etc.); Part IV of the practical consequences of the doctrine of conversion (evils attending conversion, what is the church? evangelism, repentance and forgiveness, the evangelism needed). In an appendix (pp. 233-268) are gathered "examples of conversions from a wide range of space and time:" St. Augustine, Martin Luther, John Bunyan, Jonathan Edwards, David Brainerd, Asahel Nettleton, C. G. Finney, H. W. Beecher, S. H. Hadley. Dr. Cornelison is unsparing in his description (pp. 169-187; 200-219) of the "evils of conversion" and the "evils of evangelism" and its business of "soul-winning,"—this he terms an "uncouth and unscriptural phrase" (p. 210). The conclusion at which the author arrives is that "conversion is an effect produced by natural causes, and is not, either in whole or in part, the product of direct supernatural agency, is not a miracle in the soul" (p. 162). The hypothesis of conversion does not pass the test of experiment (e.g., the listing by a heathen of the converted and unconverted in a Christian community, "determined in the classification solely by what he observes in their character and conduct"). If modern evangelism wants to undertake a fit task, the author suggests for it (p. 227), "the elevation of the tone of the religious feeling in Christian people, the quickening of their spiritual life, a work which the Roman Catholic church is doing by its 'missions,'" or, again, "to endeavor to produce in all men, if possible, an experience like that of the raptures of conversion or the ecstasies of mysticism,"—feelings that give us one of our purest and most exalted pleasures. The religious rapture may be employed for such purposes, just as dramatic art, fiction, music and all the fine arts are and have been, and not as a test of discipleship or membership in the fold of Christianity (p. 229). In the words of Dr. Cornelison, "the religious rapture will be of short duration, as nature has not energy enough to make it perpetual, and, once experienced, it may not return again; but the memory of it

will be a precious possession.' On the question of the origin of religion, the author believes (p. 12) that "superstition, as well as religion, springs from the inherent tendency to turn to God." There is in man a *Theotropism*, as fully justified as any of the tropisms of the animal world below him. And Theotropism is saner than Satanophobia or Gehennaphobia as a rule of life and conduct. This book might be read to advantage by the "soul-winners" of the "Men and Religion Forward Movement," now running like wild-fire all over the country. The author makes use of Coe, Starbuck and James, but his bibliographic data are not extensive. In the paragraph on "the medicine of the American Indian" (pp. 42-43), e.g., he contents himself with a quotation from Parkman's *The Jesuit in North America*.

A. F. C.

The Religious Life of Ancient Rome. A Study in the Development of Religious Consciousness from the Foundation of the City until the Death of Gregory the Great. By JESSE BENEDICT CARTER. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1911. ix, 270 p.

The eight chapters (originally eight lectures delivered before the Lowell Institute in Boston, during January, 1911), of this book treat the following topics: Rome and the Etruscans (the religion of agriculture and the religion of patriotism); Rome and Greece (the religion of superstition and the decline of faith); the religion of the early empire (salvation by reason and salvation by faith); Constantine and Christianity; Julian called the Apostate (the twilight of the gods); Augustine and the City of God (the struggle of Pagan and Christian thought); Benedict and the Ostrogoths (the problem of the salvation of ancient culture); Gregory and the Lombards (the preparation for the Holy Roman Empire). For the first three chapters the author makes some use of his earlier book on *The Religion of Numa* (London, 1906). The volume lacks a bibliography and the only foreign (non-English) authors referred to in the preface are Duebcne and Gregorovius,—although his book on the religion of Numa indicates his acquaintance with the works of Wissowa, etc. The first part of the present volume could have been improved by consideration and absorption or incorporation of some of the material of foreign authors published during the last quinquennium with which Professor Carter is no doubt well acquainted (see on this point R. Wünsch's review of the literature of 1906-1910 relating to Greek and Roman religion in *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft*, vol. 14, 1911, pp. 517-602).

The author emphasizes the changes of religion that the Eternal City has witnessed, from the era of the Etruscan to the death of Gregory in 604 A. D.,—"the world's history offers no other such variety of religious experience" (p. 7). Upon the earliest known primitive people of Rome, with a religion born of pastoral and agricultural life ("at best only an advanced form of animism"), was imposed, according to Professor Carter, the Jupiter cult of the Etruscans, who "changed a religion of physical increase to a religion of patriotism." The Etruscans, moreover, educated the Romans to comprehend, in part, at least, the Greeks, who gave Rome new gods, but destroyed also many which she already possessed. Then came the Oriental influences, culminating in the cult of Mithras and its

alliance with the cult of the Magna Mater,—“never in the history of the world has there been a more effective organization of missionary endeavor than in the ranks of the worshipers of Mithras” (p. 90). After this or rather with it, in part, we have Christianity, “whose early history is if anything more interesting and more picturesque than that of Mithras” (p. 97). In the third and fourth centuries there were “three great contending forces: Neoplatonism, Mithraism and Christianity,” and “each of these forces came in succession to the front and gained at least a temporary control of the Empire: Mithras in the person of Diocletian; Christianity in Constantine; and Neoplatonism in Julian” (p. 120). In the possession of a definite body of doctrine and of organization Mithraism and Christianity had the advantage over Neoplatonism. The victory of Christianity, the author holds, was due to the fact that it possessed something which Neoplatonism and Mithraism knew nothing of, viz., “what we, who have the privilege of living in these post-Darwinian days, may call its opposition, the resistance, which it offers to the working of the doctrines of biological evolution, its war against the practice of the survival of the fittest” (p. 123).

In his discussion of the Etruscans Professor Carter sees too much Greek and Babylonian influence, believing that the *haruspicina*, the art of divination as known among them “is a purely Babylonian method” (p. 19), and overmagnifying “the Oriental element in the Etruscans.” Even after Thulin’s and Körtes’ arguments for the Chaldean and Babylonian origin of liver-augury, it may be possible that the bronze liver of Piacenza represents something that grew up independently upon Italian soil. He holds that the “foreign element” in the Etruscans (a mixed race) entered Italy about 800 B. C., much later than was generally believed. He also thinks that “in coming out of the Orient they tarried for a while under Greek influence in Asia Minor,” and also that “their original home, or at least a very long abiding-place, was Babylon” (p. 19). One cannot, however, accept this view, which neither the language nor the culture of the Etruscans justifies, for much more of their civilization than the author is prepared to admit was evolved *in situ* and is really “Italian” and not “Oriental” in the sense intended by him. One wishes he had included in this volume at least a brief account of the Lupercalia and their vicissitudes, from the rites of a simple pastoral folk, to their later development and metamorphosis. And there are also a few other points that might have been enlarged upon somewhat. The statement, on page 5, that “all religion is by nature conservative” needs a little reservation. A. F. C.

PERIODICAL LITERATURE.

BY ALEXANDER F. CHAMBERLAIN.

25. *Babylonian prodigy-books.* In a brief article in the *Mitteilungen d. Schlesischen Ges. f. Volkskunde* (vol. 13-14, 1911-1912, pp. 256-263), Dr. Bruno Meissner, of Breslau, treats of "Babylonische Prodigienbücher." Besides the records of liver-auguries, etc., ancient Babylonia has furnished "books of prodigies," cataloging the strange and wonderful events (in one case, almost in Livian fashion), which have preceded the fall of kings and the great cities. On pages 257-259 is a list of 47 such prodigies (first published by Boissier and recently again, in a new edition by King)—stated to have preceeded the fall of Akkad, or northern Babylonia. Among the prodigies mentioned are the following: A woman with a beard and a split lower lip; a male date-palm bearing dates; a man having carnal relations with his mother; a white falcon and a white raven seen in the city; falling stars; in Chaldea a male dog bearing young; a child born with a trunk like an elephant. In other lists of prodigies occur such as these: Day changed into night; coming of strange, wild animals into the city; appearance of a demon in the bedroom of the God Nebo, etc. These prodigies form an interesting element in the mythological and religious lore of the ancient Mesopotamians. The lists also resemble some of the productions of later ages in Christian Europe, etc.
26. *Buddhistic contributions to Christianity.* Richard Garbe's article in the *Deutsche Rundschau* (Oktoberheft, 1911, pp. 55-73) on "Buddhistisches in der christlichen Legende," appears also in English as "Contributions of Buddhism to Christianity," in the *Monist* (vol. 21, 1911, pp. 509-563). The author points out that there is "an essential difference between the *alleged* Buddhist elements in the canonical Gospels and the *actual* Buddhist elements in the Apocryphal Gospels." According to Garbe (p. 513) "in reality no influence of Buddhist tales or of Buddhist doctrine upon the New Testament Scriptures has been proved,"—although "the similarities between the stories of Buddhism and those of the New Testament have formed an arena where dilettantism has long had a flourishing existence." Garbe discusses some of these alleged borrowings: The story in John IX 1-3 of the man blind from birth, the supernatural birth of Jesus, the temptation story of Christ, a number of minor items. He also raises the question "whether the evidences of intercommunication at all permit the assumption that, as early as the first century after Christ, or earlier, Buddhist legends and ideas had found their way into Palestine?" In the second century A. D. conditions were more favorable and in that period "belongs the loan of the fish-symbol from northern Buddhism" (pp. 525-527). Buddhist influence really "first

entered into Christianity in the Apocrypha,'—the parallels with Buddhist tales in the Apocrypha are of an entirely fabulous character, and are entirely different from those claimed to exist in the canonical Gospels.' According to Garbe, "here we have to do with genuine Indian miracle tales,—not miracles of situation for purposes of edification, but quite unheard-of miracles the invention of which had for its sole purpose to arouse the astonishment of the hearer or reader." After pointing out borrowings from Buddhistic literature in the stories of St. Thomas, the tale of Barlaam and Joasaph, etc., the author discusses with some detail the legend of St. Eustachius Placidus (pp. 538-530) and the legend of St. Christopher (pp. 550-558). Concerning the first, he observes that the points of agreement between the Jataka story of Brahmadatta and the legend of Placidus "are so manifold that they cannot rest on chance,"—indeed "the most important features are absolutely identical." In like manner the Jataka story of Prince Sutasoma and the Christian legend of St. Christopher are so alike as to convince him that "the man-eating giant of the Indian fairy-tale has become one of the best known saints of Christendom! He is as real as St. Josaphat (Joasaph, Bodhisattva) to whom a church was erected in Palermo! And if edificatory tales have influenced Christian literature, "the externalities of the religious life of Buddhism may have served the Christians as a model." The author sees no historic evidence contradicting the assumption that cloister and monachism, celibacy and tonsure of the clergy, confession, veneration of relics, the rosary, the shepherd's crook, the church spires, and the use of incense and bells may have been borrowed from Buddhism by Christianity. According to the author, "the common utilization of the halo in both Christianity and Buddhism comes from classical antiquity." The transference (possibly direct through Hellenism) from the Occident to Buddhism must have occurred rather early, since "the figure of Buddha appears with a nimbus on coins of King Kanishka (about 100 A. D.)."

27. *Christianity in China.* Some interesting items concerning both the good and the bad side of Christianity in contact with the yellow race are to be found in "The Journal of S. Wells Williams, LL. D.," which, edited by his son, Professor F. W. Williams, of Yale University, has just been published in the *Journal of the North-China Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* (vol. 42, 1911, pp. 1-233). Dr. Wells was secretary and interpreter of the American Embassy to China during the expedition to Tientsin and Peking in 1858 and 1859. The "Journal" also contains many comments on Chinese matters, notes of a philological character, etc. The discussion (pp. 176-178) on the status of the President of the United States, as compared with the Emperor, the Pope, etc., and the nature of the *kotow*, are worth noting. Says Dr. Williams (p. 178): "There is really not the least difference between the reverence paid the Pope and the Emperor, and both demand it on the same grounds,—that they are the vice-regents of Heaven, and sitting in the seat of God, claim

to be gods. After what these Chinese functionaries said to-day, no Christian man should ever discuss the question whether he can perform the *Kotau*,—it would be an idolatrous act.'' Interesting, too, are the discussions of some of the phrases used in diplomatic communications.

28. *Circumambulation.* According to Dr. A. Hillebrandt's article on "Circumambulatio," in the *Mitteilungen d. Schlesischen Ges. f. Volkskunde* (vol. 13-14, 1911-1912, pp. 3-8), this old and widespread custom "can best be studied in the usages of ancient and modern India,"—It is mentioned in both Brahmanic and Buddhistic books. At their wedding bride and bridegroom walk round the fire; the pious student had to pass around images of deities, Brahmans, cows; the ancient *pradaksina* is represented to-day by the *Pañc-Kōśi-Yātra*, which the pilgrim executes around the sacred city of Benares. The Hindu ritualistic text-books distinguish two forms of circumambulation, from left to right, and from right to left. The first method holds for ceremonies in honor of the gods (then all movements are directed thus), the second is practiced when it is a question of magic, or when spirits or demons are concerned. Not infrequently the movement in the one direction is followed by a movement in the opposite direction. The Hindu *pradaksina* and *prasalavi* find analogues in the circumambulation of persons for good-luck and for ill-luck, among the Celtic Highlanders of Scotland,—the sun-wise going round is *dazil*, the opposite procedure *withershins*. In Gaelic the imitation of the apparent motion of the sun is termed "the right or lucky way;" the opposite is "the false or unlucky way." Circumambulation is known to other Aryan peoples, "but the distinction between sun-wise and 'against the sun' is much less emphasized." Here ought to be mentioned also the old English custom of "beating the bounds" and related ceremonies, etc.
29. *Contrast of hunter and cultivator.* In his article on "The Irulans of the Gingee Hills," in *Anthropos* (vol. 6, 1911, pp. 808-813), C. H. Rao gives some interesting information concerning the Irulans of the Gingee Hills in the Tindivanam Taluk of the South Arcot district of Madras, who numbered some 20,000 according to the census of 1901. They stand in marked contrast to the Hindu agriculturalists about them. The Irulans of the Gingee Hills are more primitive than those on the eastern slopes of the Nilgiris. These Irulans are a forest folk, hunters, living an essentially wild life. Their "codes of laws," forbid, among other things, the following (characteristic of the agriculturalists): 1. Living inside a village. 2. Using sandals. 3. Using an umbrella. 4. Use (by women) of bodice (or petticoat). In matters of religion every Irulan should be his own priest, and he keeps the drum, his insignia of priestly office, going most of the night. Another point in religion is that he should "worship only the seven *Kannimar* (or the seven virgin goddesses) and not bow down before the gods of the Hindu agriculturists." While

Irulans are prohibited from becoming *ryots* or cultivators, like the Hindus around them, there seems to be no bar against a *ryot* entering the Irulan fold, but such a convert is held strictly to the tribal "laws." The *Kannimar*, or goddesses, "are represented by wooden symbols which have female clothes tied around them, and have ornaments bestowed on them."

30. *Culture-idea.* In *Logos* (vol. 2, 1911-1912, pp. 200-207), Gustav Radbruch writes "Ueber den Begriff der Kultur." He distinguishes three different culture-ideas, the historical, the historico-philosophical and the ethical, and discusses briefly each of these. According to R., "the culture of a people, or an age, . . . includes not only its virtues, insights, taste, etc., but also its vices, errors, tastelessness; its powers for hindering and antagonizing culture, as well as those for promoting it." And besides all this, "over-culture and unculture, even the culturelessness of a primitive people, are culture-facts."
31. *Double proletariat of antiquity.* In an article on "Le double prolétariat antique," in the *Mercure de France* (vol. 90, 1911, pp. 673-686), P. Louis treats of the free *plebs* and the slave *plebs* as they existed particularly in ancient Rome. With a people whose national industry was war, slavery was natural and became the characteristic system of organization of work, first in the country, afterwards in the city. At the close of the Republic Italy counted 4½ million slaves, distributed among the various agricultural, industrial and commercial activities, or employed in the public service. The free proletariat, vegetating above these, suffered greatly from their competition, and from the loss of useful employments. Rome itself lived in constant fear of sedition among the free *plebs* or revolt among the slaves. But the very antagonism between the free *plebs* and the senile *plebs* saved the State. They could not make common cause, and the directing class ruled in virtue of this fact,—the aristocracy continued to dominate, while these two lower classes lived on, almost as separate as two distinct peoples.
32. *Egypt and the Bible.* In the *Nineteenth Century* (No. 418, December, 1911, pp. 1135-1146) Rev. E. McClure writes of the "Latest light from Egypt on the Holy Scriptures," with special reference to the papyri, ostraca, and inscribed pottery, discovered in 1906-1908 on the island of Elephantine. Details concerning these finds are contained in two quarto volumes, published under the editorship of Dr. E. Sachau, of Berlin, the well-known Semitic scholar. The period covered by these papyri is 494-404 B. C., and their language Aramaic. On pages 1138-1140 is given *in extenso* a translation (from Dr. Sachau's German) of a letter to the Governor of Jerusalem from the priests of Elephantine. The Jewish people of Elephantine were a military settlement, planted there long enough to have lost their ancestral speech (i.e., Hebrew), while "continuing to preserve their sacrificial cult, which required a temple for its observance, and the recognition of

Yahveh, the God of the Hebrews.' The personal names in this document "find an echo in the history handed down to us by Ezra and Nehemiah." Other papyri throw light also on Bible names and statements. One fragmentary papyrus is of considerable interest since it contains the story of *Achikar*, to which, under the name *Achiacharus* (in the English version), reference is made in the book of Tobit in the Apoerypha.

33. *Freemasons in folk-lore.* In certain regions of Europe there is current a considerable amount of folk-lore concerning the Freemasons, who, according to the ideas of the people have had much to do with polities and also with the Devil and his imps. In an article on "Die Freimaurer im Deutschen Volksglauben," published in the *Mitteilungen d. Schlesischen Ges. f. Volkskunde* (vol. 13-14, 1911-1912, pp. 232-241), Dr. K. Olbrich gives numerous folk-lore items, including some tales and legends, from various parts of Germany and Austria concerning Freemasons, their life, actions, etc. The initiation-ceremonies, oaths, etc., are looked upon as a pact with Satan; by the help of Satan, every Freemason, by uttering a few words, can become rich; they are capable of doing many weird things because of their supposed connections with the spirit-world,—among things thus attributed to them is the elixir of life; they have control over the demons of hell in animal form, or visible or invisible; in return for the favors of the Evil One and his subordinates, favors are demanded from them, and all sorts of "deviltry" is attributed to the Freemasons; at death the Devil gets the Freemason, body and soul. In Catholic countries, naturally, the Freemason has fallen under the ban of folk-thought and much of the wealth of devil-lore and "magie" of the black sort has been thought to be his. The term "Freemason" serves in places to denote an uneanny or suspicious person. In Thuringia, in the middle of the 18th century, a stranger (speaking a foreign tongue and wearing his own hair, in contrast with the wigs of that period), who restored to productivity and placed on a money-making basis the property of a certain decayed nobleman of the country, soon came to be looked upon as "a Freemason." In another region the schoolchildren are said to have believed that men who wore gray top-hats were "Freemasons." A tale concerning the origin of the name "Freemason" is cited on page 237.
34. *Imprisoned spirits.* In an article on "Gefangene Geister" in the *Mitteilungen d. Schlesischen Ges. f. Volkskunde* (vol. 13-14, 1911-1912, pp. 98-120) Dr. Richard Kühnau treats of German folk-lore concerning "imprisoned spirits;" such tales, legends, etc., as relate to "a little bottle, box or casket, a bag, wallet, etc., in which is shut up a small invisible creature, such as a worm, a spider a fly, a beetle, or perhaps a bird or some other creature moving to and fro,"—the belief being that the possessor of such an imprisoned creature (the thing is often found by accident, given or sold by a stranger, etc.) has in it a servant capable of fulfilling all his wishes, especially in

the matter of money. The receptacle must never be opened, as only the greatest luck will enable the possessor to return the imprisoned creature into its "home," and, if it is once let out it becomes a source of misfortune and destruction for the former owner. Dr. Kühnau cites 53 such legends, from all parts of Germany; many of those imprisoned are simply goblins, house-spirits and the like,—the Devil often uses them as tools in his designs upon the bodies and the souls of men. Sometimes it is Satan himself, who, for purposes of his own, gets into, or permits himself, in reduced form, to be put into such small receptacles. Besides the famous trick of St. Patrick, there is a mass of interesting folk-lore concerning "the Devil deceived." Many of these imprisoned creatures are thought to be souls of the dead, mostly of those who have done ill in their life-time, and who wander about as evil spirits, until by exorcism, tricks of black art, etc., they are induced (or forced by some hokus-pokus), to enter a sack, a wallet, a purse, a satchel, a casket, a pot, a jug, a glass, a bottle, etc., in which they are safely impounded or corked up, and rendered harmless as long they remain there. Accidentally, they often get released. These receptacles are sometimes transparent, sometimes not; they are often hidden in out-of-the-way spots far from human dwellings, etc.

35. *Judeo-Christian psalter of the first century.* In the *Mercure de France* (vol. 89, 1911, pp. 774-787), Henri Schoen writes of "Un psautier judéo-chrétien du premier siècle." The Ms. in Syriac (the original was probably in Hebrew or Aramaic) was discovered in Mesopotamia by Rendel Harris. It has been edited by Harris and dealt with also by A. Harnack, *Ein Jüdisch-christliches Psalmbuch aus dem ersten Jahrhundert* (Leipzig, 1910). It is a collection of lyric songs, attributed to Solomon,—the title *Odes of Solomon* was known to the early Christian historians (Laetantius, e.g., cites it), but this is the first appearance of the text itself,—but evidently the work of a Jewish poet (somewhere between 50 B. C. and 67 A. D.,—certainly before the destruction of Jerusalem, 70 A. D.). Toward the end of the first century, this collection was slightly revised and added to by some Palestinian Christian in order to fit it for use in the Judeo-Christian churches. We have here "one of the oldest witnesses to the ardent faith and naïve piety of the primitive church." The mystic *élan* of these poems recalls the accents of the Song of Songs, and although anonymous they "have a very marked personal character,"—throughout "it is the I, and not the Judeo-Christian community that sings and sighs, is exalted and triumphs." At the center of the poet's religious conceptions is the idea of love. In a general way one feels that he has let go the purely external ceremonials of Israel,—he has achieved "an enlightened piety." Perhaps Harnack is right in perceiving here "the quarry where the block of Johannine theology has been cut." The elevation of moral and social ideas corresponds to the religious order of the sentiments. Moral personality is regarded as a sacred thing and morality alone is significant. The last word of

this poet is a declaration of the reality of human liberty in the service of the good and the true. In this new document, important for the history of early Christianity, is revealed "a relatively recent form of Judaism,—a religious individualism already detached from every mythic element and from the rites prescribed by the Mosaic law." It shows how "Christianity was prepared in the bosom of Judaism,"—it is not easy, however, to determine with exactness, what belongs properly to the Jewish poet and what to the Christian author. The *Odes of Solomon* were considered by some churchmen to belong to the canonical scriptures; it is hard to see why they were left out altogether.

36. *Magna Mater cult in ancient Crete.* In an article on "Ein Mützenidol aus Kreta," in the *Mitteilungen d. Schlesischen Ges. f. Volkskunde* (vol. 13-14, 1911-1912, pp. 377-385, 6 figs.), Dr. Hugo Prinz discusses the significance of certain conic clay figures, from various localities in ancient Crete, sometimes in connection with terra cotta idols of the chief goddess of the Minoan religion, the Great Mother. Two of these, discovered in the palace of H. Triada, represent a human head, wearing a conical cap; in others the cap is represented independently without being attached to a human head. After this separation of head and cap occurred, the latter could be modified and metamorphosed in various ways,—it took on, e.g., the form of a vase of some sort, with "handles" (sometimes snakes, horns, etc.). According to Dr. P., the conic clay figures in question are "nothing else than representations of the cap of the Minoan Magna Mater," and not phallic idols as Wide maintained,—here we have a very good example of the ease with which phallic objects can be seen and recognized by modern investigators in the art-products of antiquity; and the same thing is not uncommon among certain students of the art and the religion of primitive people of to-day. The cap here represents, *paris pro toto*, the deity herself, as the double-ax does her consort. The cap-cult was widespread in ancient Crete, going back perhaps beyond 1600 B. C. And, as the discoveries in Prinia indicate, this cult survived even in historic times.
37. *Medieval notions of hell.* In *The Romanic Review* (vol. 2, 1911, pp. 54-60) Prof. S. L. Galpin treats of the "Influence of the Medieval Christian Visions on Jean de Meun's Notions of Hell." The most flourishing period of the production of these Christian visions, "the time at which they were longest and most detailed, lies between the middle of the 12th century and the first decade of the 13th century." This, as the author points out, "immediately precedes, in point of time, the flourishing period of French allegory," and "the most cursory examination of the two phenomena discloses similarities of structure and content which may hardly be considered fortuitous." Such, e.g., are, "the dream form, common to both, and the correspondence of the typical features of the Paradise of the Christian visions with those of the Garden of Love in the lay allegories." But "demonstrable proof of interrelationship between the Christian visions

and French allegory is more readily found in the references to Hell and Purgatory than in the comparison of paradeses divine and erotic,"—and Love's Paradise is as old as Tibullus. The author discusses the notions of hell in the second part of the *Roman de la Rose*, by Jean de Meun, and concludes that he "laid under contribution his reminiscences of the medieval Christian visions. Among the Christian visions are the vision of Tundal (of which 54 Latin MSS. are known), the apocryphal Vision of St. Paul, the Vision of Charles the Fat, the Vision of Thurcill, the Vision of Drihtehlm, St. Patrick's Purgatory, etc. Of course not all of the items in de Meun are to be found in any one of these Visions, not even in the Vision of Tundal, the most detailed.

38. *Mount Sinai*. In an article on "Die Sinaifrage," in *Mitt. d. k.-k. Geogr. Ges. in Wien* (vol. 54, pp. 628-641, 3 maps), Prof. E. Oberhummer résumés the various theories as to the location of the Biblical Mt. Sinai, the place where the law was delivered to Moses. Of late years the opinion has gained in strength that the scene of the events described in the book of Exodus was not on the Sinai peninsula, but farther to the East, beyond the Gulf of Akaba. The theory also (first, apparently, suggested by Beke, the English geographer, in his pamphlet, *Mt. Sinai a Volcano*, published in 1873,—he afterwards gave up this view) that Mt. Sinai was a volcano has gained ground. Quite independently of Beke, the Old Testament scholar, Professor H. Gunkel of Giessen, in various of his writings, 1903-1905, has arrived at the conclusion that Mt. Sinai was a volcano; and that it was to a volcano that Moses led his people and their experiences with Jahveh are to be explained in connection with a volcanic outbreak, etc. E. Meyer (1906) went further still, and maintained that "Jahve was originally a volcanic fire-god, native to Midian." Prof. Haupt, of Johns Hopkins University, is another who holds the volcano-theory, as expressed in his essay on "The Burning Bush and the Origin of Judaism" (*Proc. Amer. Philos. Soc.*, 1909). The identification of the particular volcano has, according to Dr. Oberhummer, been made possible by the recent investigations of Professor A. Musik and his companion L. Kober, the geologist. The true Biblical Mt. Sinai would appear to have been the volcano Hala-l-Bedr, in N. lat. $27^{\circ} 12'$ and E. long. $37^{\circ} 7'$, much further south than even the supporters of the Midian theory had hitherto placed it. If this theory ultimately prevails, as it is likely to do, it means quite a rearrangement of the map of the wanderings of the Children of Israel, and the "crossing of the Red Sea" is now the traversing not of the Gulf of Suez, but of the Gulf of Akaba. Much interesting discussion will doubtless develop in the effort to identify in the Land of Midian, the stopping-places of the Israelites, which had formerly been located in the Sinai Peninsula.
39. *Mysticism*. In *Logos* (vol. 2, 1911- 1912, pp. 242-256) G. Mehlis discusses "Formen der Mystik,"—it seems rather paradoxical to speak of forms of that which is claimed to be essentially formless. Still,

we may distinguish speculative, esthetic and practical mysticism; the individualistic mysticism of Eckhart, the cosmic mysticism of Plotinus; the intellectual mysticism of Eckhart, the voluntary mysticism of Jacob Böhme, the mysticism of activity, the mysticism of passivity. In the mysticism of Eckhart lives still the spirit of the antique, in the mysticism of Böhme beats already the heart of a modern age. The greatness of Eckhart lay in his being able to "unite the demands of the magical consciousness with those of the mystic." For Eckhart the soul is creator, and not merely creature, and God must ultimately unite with it, whether he will or no. By the power of religious genius this great work grows up out of the opposing demands of magic and mysticism. The high evaluation of the soul satisfies the demands of magic; mysticism is satisfied with the emphasis of the universal in the thought of burial in waste and empty deity. Eckhart attempted the synthesis of magic and mysticism.

40. *Mysticism and Rabbinical literature.* In *The Hibbert Journal* (vol. 10, 1911-1912, pp. 426-443), Rev. J. Abelson treats of "Mysticism and Rabbinical Literature," discussing "the mysticism of the Shechinah" and "the mysticism of the 'Ruach Ha-Kodesh,' or Holy Spirit." According to Dr. A., the "hosts of references to the Shechinah and Holy Spirit" show that "Rabbinism does possess a strong mystical element." It is, indeed, "a compound consisting of the harmonious co-existence of the two factors, viz., mysticism and formalism." With the Jews, fortunately, "Rabbinical mysticism was judiciously balanced." The "safest anchorage of the religious Jew" was "the very fact of the interweaving of these two elements,—the mystical and the authoritative."
41. *Neptanabus, the magician, and Alexander the Great.* In his article, "Der Zauberer Neptanabus nach einem bisher unbekannten Erfurter Text," in *Mitteilungen d. Schlesischen Ges. f. Volkskunde* (vol. 13-14, 1911-1912, pp. 185-198), Dr. Alfons Hilka, of Breslau, discusses, with reproduction (pp. 195-198) of the Latin text, an account of the magician Neptanabus, teacher of Alexander the Great, *nominatissimus astrovomorum*, the wonders at his birth, etc., from a Ms. of the 15th century, part of the *Codex Amplonianus* in the city library of Erfurt. This is a rather free working-over of a mythic Alexander-story, "a sort of *Enfances Alexandre*." It adds something to the folk-lore of the great Greek. In style and feeling it rises far above the vapid contents of the Medieval Latin texts. It is neither borrowed from Walter of Châtillon's *Alexandriæ* nor from Valerius.
42. *Prehistoric art, magic and awe.* In the *Hibbert Journal* (vol. 10, 1911-1912, pp. 380-392, under the title "In a Prehistoric Sanctuary," R. R. Marett, the author of *The Threshold of Religion* (1909), and other interesting minor works on the origin and development of religion, writes of a visit to the prehistoric cave of Niaux with the

archeologist Cartailhae. Here the ancient artist in simple black-and-white has drawn "the living image of Prjewalski's wild horse of the Mongolian deserts," and many other frescoes of various animals known to his age. A visit was also made to the cave of Gargas, near Aventiron, in the valley of the Nest. At Gargas, "we are among the pioneers of pleistocene art, the so-called Aurignacians"—here we get a hint of "the magical, striving with purely decorative, and artistic purposes." At Niaux, "we are amongst the later Magdalenian artists, who could, and did draw true to life." Marett points out the fact that at Niaux, as at Font-de-Gaume, Les Combarelles, etc., the access to these caves is very difficult (crawling or on one's knees), and argues that these recesses must have been "sanctuaries," for "no artist ever graved animals, or men with the heads of animals, masked dancers, it may be, for simple fun in such a place." An explanation may partly be found in the customs of existing savages for "these ceremonies, best known to ethnologists in their Australian form, whereby savages, by magico-religious means, including the use of sacred designs, endeavor to secure for themselves good hunting and a plentiful supply of game animals, take us by analogy straight back to the times of prehistoric artistry." The man who left his footmark at Niaux "drew near in awe, whether it was spell or prayer that accompanied his painting." In Marett's opinion "all genuine rites involve one and the same fundamental mood and attitude, a drawing near in awe." But this is quite too dogmatic.

43. *Primitive conception of death.* In *The Hibbert Journal* (vol. 10, 1911-1912, pp. 393-407), W. H. R. Rivers writes of "The Primitive Conception of Death," with special reference to the arguments advanced by Lévy-Bruhl, in his recent volume, *Les Fonctions mentales dans les Sociétés inférieures* (Paris, 1910), and the author's own experiences of the primitive mind as exemplified in the natives of the Solomon Islands, etc. According to M. R., M. Lévy-Bruhl is in error in maintaining that primitive thought is not subject to the law of contradiction (see the example cited from the island of Eddystone by Mr. Rivers, p. 395). The Melanesian uses of the terms *mate* (dead man; person serious ill and likely to die; often also, person healthy but so old that, if he is not dead, he ought to be) and *toa* (living, but excluding all who are *mate*) and the burial of all who are considered *mate* are discussed (pp. 397-400). Such practices Lévy-Bruhl cites as evidencing "pre-logical mentality," but, as Rivers says, "they are merely cases in which the facts of the Universe have been classified and arranged in categories different from those of ourselves;" they are really "cases in which there is no real contradiction at all, in which there is no failure of logic in our sense." And moreover, "the behavior which follows, behavior which often seems to us unnatural and inhuman, is merely the realization of these principles in a thoroughly logical manner." The apparently contradictory ideas about the dead entertained by the natives of Eddystone Island may be "the resultant of the mixture of two cults, one possessing the belief that

the dead dwell in a cave of the island, and the other being the cult of an immigrant people, whose dead returned to the home whence they came." This would be a case of "religious syncretism." The life of primitive man "is far more definitely divided into periods than that of ourselves," and "the rites connected with death would seem to have the same character as those accompanying various transitional periods of life." By primitive man, "the passage from life to death is looked on in much the same light and treated in much the same way as the passage from one condition of life to another;" and to primitive man, "death is not the unique and catastrophic event it seems to us, but merely a condition of passing from one existence to another, forming but one of a number of transitions, which began perhaps before his birth, and stand out as the chief memories of his life." Another valuable article on primitive ideas of death, etc., is that of Dr. H. Klaatsch on "Die Todes-Psychologie der Uraustralier in ihrer volks-und religionsgeschichtlichen Bedeutung," in the *Mitteilungen d. Schlesischen Ges. f. Volkskunde* (vol. 13-14, 1911-1912, pp. 401-439). The author, well-known for his studies of fossil European man and of the evolution of man from the lower animals, spent three years (1904-1907) in scientific investigation in Australia, psychological as well as somatic, archeological and ethnological. For scientific purposes the native Australians are "the most important race on earth," and "their naïve and childlike ideas give us clear indications how and in what direction among primitive men of the Tertiary period the beginnings of religious ideas developed out of very coarse and earthly concepts and apprehensions" (p. 405). General among the Australians is the conviction that "almost all accidents, diseases, etc., that befall the individual are caused by the deliberate action, at a distance, of enemies alive or dead." The most peculiar culmination of such belief, as Dr. Klaatsch notes, is what Roth has termed *thanatomania*, i.e., "the idea of being so bewitched by a distant enemy that nothing at all can save one from death, so all there is to do is to lie down and die without any recognizable direct cause of death, merely as a result of the psychic affection." An important rôle in Australian primitive religion is played by the "medicine-men," particularly in connection with "magic at a distance," and the employment of souls of the dead, etc. All over Australia is found the belief in the continued existence of the soul after death. This belief, according to Dr. Klaatsch (p. 411) "is not the result of profound philosophic considerations or religious feelings, but simply the consequence of inability to conceive of a cessation." Then the parallel between death and sleep comes to give the naïve primitive man, the idea of a soul that can at times leave the body. Existence after death is like that during life, and, "if we find the Australian natives everywhere in fear of evil spirits, we must not deduce therefrom a theoretical structure of hostile elemental forces, what we have here is a very real fear of men, of dead men" (p. 411). Nor are we authorized to see in the efforts to appease the dead or make them innocuous, "ancestor-worship." Of prime importance is what is done with the body,—here even cannibalism is a mode

of burial assuring the control of the spirit of the dead man by him who has devoured, e.g., his significant part, the kidney-fat, regarded by the natives as the seat of the psychic qualities. The treatment of mummies is also significant, the idea being "the retention of the dead body in as unchanged form as possible, but so arranged as to prevent any motion looking toward the return of the soul and subsequent harm to the survivors" (p. 421). The Australian practice of mummification, "Hocker" position, and tying up of the corpse, belongs with their "soul-lore." The idea of preventing the return of the dead, Dr. Klaatsch thinks, is hardly the essential point,—"rather the Australians do not think the dead man is dead, or do not trust him" (p. 426). Interesting is Dr. Klaatsch's views on the development of religion (p. 433):

"The usual, dominant idea is that man personified the elements, and that belief in a personal God was the last step in a long series of evolution with gradual clarification of conceptions.

"My comprehension of the matter is just the reverse: first was the personal and that was deified. The elements were not personified, but persons were elementarized.

"When a whirl-wind arose, some Australian had blown, when it rained, that, too, was the work of some one man, the thunder was the roar of some man who was feared, etc.

"Originally, there was a portion of God in different gradations, the individual being able in different degrees to exert magic at a distance. If we, in our definition of religion, take as point of departure the literal translation, then, in the light of the views here discussed, this relation was originally a purely personal one, partly one of love, partly, and to a much greater degree, of fear. The fear of the influence of a powerful dead man, especially a shaman, is the embryonal stage of the fear of God present in the highest religious systems."

The most important fact in primitive religion is, therefore, the *personal*. Indeed the becoming of man was through the awakening of the personal. All else is later, according to Klaatsch, "with the exception of a few pre-anthropic, pre-human sources of religious phenomena," e.g., the peculiar rôle of the serpent, intelligible only as a relic of preceding animal stages. The serpent is not a god,—man's attention to him is a reflex of the great pre-human struggle between mammals and reptiles, in which the ancestors of our human race won their lasting victory.

44. *Race and culture mixture in Asia Minor.* In his article on "Les Karamanlis" in the *Mercure de France* (vol. 94, 1911, pp. 74-80), H. de Ziegler gives some interesting information concerning the conditions in Caramania (ancient Cappadocia and Galatia) in southeastern Asia Minor. It is a Turkized part of the Hellenic world. Here the Turkish tongue is written with the Greek alphabet. In some places (e.g. at the port of Adalia) half the population is Greek and speaks Turkish; the other half is Turkish but speaks Greek. The most ancient towns are the least Turkized. Certain villages have not ceased to

be Greek in manners, language and appearance. Others have been completely metamorphosed and Turkized altogether. And all sorts of intermediary stages are to be found between these two extremes. Where Greek is spoken, the inroad of Turkoman, Persian and Arabic words is on the increase. The modern Karamanlis "are Turkish by language, habits, manner of life, dress, etc., by Greeks by alphabet,"—in contrast with the Mohammedans of Crete, who are Greek by race and language, but use the same system of writing as their co-religionists. In the two Christian churches of Nigdē the mass and all the liturgy are conducted in Greek, not a word of which the people understand. The sermon, whenever there is one, is delivered in Turkish. The gospel-book in use has, opposite the original text, a Turkish translation in Greek letters. The personal names of the Karamanlis, e.g., *Pappazoglou* (= Greek *Papadopoulos*, "son of the priest,") simply translate Greek antecedents.

45. "*Resurrection*" of still-born infants. In his article, "Les résurrections d'enfants morts-nés et les sanctuaires à 'répit,'" in the *Revue d'Ethnographie et de Sociologie* (vol. 2, 1911, pp. 65-74), P. Saintyves treats of a very curious practice, viz., the "*resurrecting*" of still-born infants by saints and priests at certain churches and shrines from the 14th century down. Theological doctrine held that still-born infants, not having received baptism, are prevented from entering heaven and seeing God; while not burning in hell or in purgatory, they are in the limbos and are essentially damned. Parental love demanded the "*resurrection*" for a few instants of these unfortunate beings, so that the rite of baptism might be administered to them during such moments of life, and they might thus be admitted into the realm of the blessed. The parish-registers of certain regions of France, we are told, bear record of hundreds and thousands of these "*resurrections*," effected by the power of the Virgin, the Saints, etc. Among the Saints to whom this miracle has been attributed are: St. Stephen, Saint Cunegonda, St. Leontius, St. Rosalia, St. Thomas of Villanueva, St. Thomas Aquinas, St. Viventius, St. Claudius, etc. But, naturally enough, it was to the Virgin Mary that the miracle of "*resurrection*" was most commonly ascribed. The east of France seems to be the favorite region for this practice in the past,—*Franche-Comté*, Savoy and Burgundy,—although Lorraine, Picardy, Flanders, Belgium, Switzerland, furnish many examples (*Notre-Dame d'Alsemberg* in Brabant, *Notre Dame des Halles*, *Notre Dame de Foy* at Gravelines are all said to have effected such "*resurrections*"; in one case the infant had been buried a fortnight). Among the churches and shrines of the Virgin in France, famous for miracles of this sort are: *Notre-Dame Caester*, near Hazebrouck (9 cases 1494-1496); *Notre-Dame de Grâce*, at the Abbey of *Saint-Sauve*, Montreuil; *Notre-Dame de Boulogne*; *Notre-Dame de Bonne Nouvelle*, Naney); *Notre-Dame de Benoîte-Vaux*, Verdun (13 cases 1644, 1659); *Notre-Dame de Pitié*, Moutiers; *Notre-Dame de Mont-Provent* at Châtillon sur Cluses, upper Savoy (cases in 1820 and 1863); *Notre-Dame de Faisees* at Pillier; *Notre-Dame de la Vie*, at Vénasque,

Provence; Notre-Dame de Bletterans in Orgelet (here was a cemetery for these infants); Notre-Dame La Blanche at Faverney, Doubs (here, in the 16th century, in less than 20 years, 489 cases are recorded). The custom was quite widespread, and from time to time seems to have met with local or somewhat general opposition on the part of the ecclesiastical authorities having been condemned several times by bishops and synods (the condemnation in 1452 is given textually on p. 70). In Langres and Besançon several synodical condemnations occurred between 1452 and 1656. Semi-defences of these practices appeared from time to time and they had often the quiet, if not the open, approval of many priests of the church. Nor are they altogether extinct even to-day. At Notre-Dame de Romay, near Paray-le-Monial, the euré records the custom and states that it is "impossible to doubt the miracle," in 1865,—and in 1908 the practice was still in vogue. Very remarkable is the history of Notre-Dame de Noyer, at Cuiseaux. Here the custom had full sway toward the middle of the 16th century; and from 1702 down more than 60 cases are recorded,—some as late as 1822, 1825, 1850, and even 1867. The shrines and chapels consecrated to these miracles are known in Picardy, etc., as *rêpits* i.e. "respites." One infant so "resurrected" is said to have lived two days. Of an infant, buried for a whole fortnight, "resurrected," at Notre-Dame des Halles, in 1428, it is stated that "having lived five hours after receiving baptism, it gradually melted away like a snow-ball,"—all this in the presence of 70 people." Movements of hands or feet, regaining the color of living flesh, motion of the tongue, bleeding, shaking the head, moisture at the mouth, are some of the "signs of life" mentioned in the records. Often the infant "died" the very second the baptism was ended. In these practices we have an interesting example of the power of parental love in subordinating to its uses the sacraments of a great church. Human piety lies near to human pity. Pity recreates the lost opportunity, which piety hesitates long to refuse. In a brief article, "Die Taufe totgeborener Kinder ist noch heute üblich," in the *Zeitschrift d. Ver. f. Volkskunde* (vol. 21, 1911, p. 333), Richard Andree, after *résuméing* some of the facts in Saintyves' essay, points out that the practice in question is known also to-day in the Tirol. To the shrine of the Mother of God at Trens near Steizing the peasants still bring their still-born infants, to have them waked to life again so they may receive baptism. Something on this point is to be found in H. Noé's *Winter und Sommer in Tirol* (Wien 1878, see p. 48).

46. *Sacred books of the Yezidis.* In an article, "La découverte récente des deux livres sacrés des Yézidis," published in *Anthropos* (vol. 6, 1911, pp. 1-39), Father Anastase Marie, a Carmelite of Bagdad, gives an account of two sacred books of the Yezidis, or "Devil-worshipers," one of the numerous religious sects of Asia Minor. These two documents were discovered in the shrine of Sheik Adi on Mt. Sinjar, near Mosul. These codices are reproduced, in the original Kurdish (Arabic versions are also in existence) are reproduced on pages 12-19

and 22-35, with a translation into French (pp. 20-21, 36-39) of them both. In a later issue of *Anthropos* (pp. 628-638), under the title "Die beiden heiligen Bücher der Jeziden im Lichte der Textkritik," Prof. Maximilian Bittner, furnishes critical notes and scholarly comments on the language, etc., of these curious religious documents,—The Kiteb-i jälwî ("Book of Revelation") and the Mashaf-(i) ras ("the Black Book"). Father M. thinks that the former, which is more sacred and venerated, and less known to the Yezidis in general, is the older work. Its ideas are higher, its doctrine also more original. These Ms. on gazelleskin parchment, were discovered in 1904. They are written in a Kurdish dialect approximating the classical Mukri, and are of great philological as well as religious interest. Arabic versions of these sacred books of the Yezidis had already been made use of (unknown to Father Marie) by Parry in the Appendix to his *Six Months in a Syrian Monastery* (1895) and Dr. I. Joseph in his "Jezidi Texts," in *The American Journal of Semitic Languages and Literatures* (1909). Prof. Bittner emphasizes the genuineness of the Kurdish texts and their value for the study of Yezidi beliefs. The recent literature of the subject includes also a monograph by Djelal Noury, a highly educated Turk: *Le Diable promu "Dieu." Essai sur le yézidisme* (Constantinople, 1910), based on a book on "The Devil-Worshippers," written by his father, and published in Mosul. According to Prof. Bittner, this last is probably identical with the Turkish text brought home from Asia Minor by H. Grothe and described by G. Jacob in the *Beiträge zur Kenntnis des Orients* (vol. 7, 1909, pp. 30-35). The "Black Book" is particularly concerned with the ideas of the Yezidis about the creation. It contains also the Yezidi taboos. The name of God is given as Shaitân (Satan). Gabriel is the assistant of God in the creation, and makes Eve to console Adam. This Yezidi *Genesis* makes curious parallel reading for the account in our Bible.

47. *Socialism in Japan.* In an article in the *Mercure de France* (vol. 79, 1911, pp. 480-494) on "Socialistes et révolutionnaires Japonais," A. Maybon sketches, with special reference to the data in M. Ludovic Naudéau's *Japon Moderne* and Count Okuma's recent work on Japanese history during the past fifty years, the origin and development of socialism, etc., in Japan. Okuma's book has a chapter on the history of socialism by Professor Abe Isoo, of the University of Waseda. The socialists of Japan split up into a loyalist and a revolutionary party, from the latter of which came the regicidal plotters,—one of the individuals executed was Kôtoku, "popularizer of Marxism, a founder of the socialistic party, disciple and translator of Tolstoi and Kropotkin." The nomenclature of socialism and anarchy in Japan is of some interest. The term for "socialism" is *shakwai*; "anarchy," *museifu*; "revolution," *kakumei*. The word *shakwai* is derived from *sha* (society) and *k(w)ai* (union, society); *museifu* from *seifu* (government) and the negative or privative prefix *mu*; *sei* is the radical for "government," "polities," etc.

48. *South Teutonic and North Teutonic Sagadom.* Under the title, "Ragnacharius von Cambrai," in the *Mitteilungen d. Schlesischen Ges. f. Volkskunde* (vol. 13-14, 1911-1912, pp. 121-154), Dr. G. Neckel compares the data in Gregory of Tours' *Historia Francorum* with North Teutonic and Scandinavian *saga*-material. In a way, Gregory "supplies the missing South Teutonic *saga*." There is much interesting *rapprochement* between the Merovingian sovereigns and the vikings. The tale related by Gregory in most detail is that of Ragnacharius of Cambray, whose character and "doings," Dr. Neckel compares particularly with the Scandinavian Hroerekr, Hugleikr, and the viking Eysteinn, son of Haraldr gilli (1142-1157).
49. *Symbolism in Petrarch.* In an article, "The Symbolism of Petrarch's Canzone to the Virgin: A Comparative Study," in *The Romanic Review* (vol. 2, 1911, pp. 32-53), Francis W. Snow finds that "the whole symbolism, studied in the present article, fused what is in essence a religious *alba* with an elegiac expression of his purely worldly grief arising from his love for Laura." And, "in the formation of this synthetically remarkable *canzone*, Bible, Apocalypse, the homilies and comments of the Fathers of the Latin church; the early Latin hymnal; the Provençal religious *albas*, have all, in ratios not certainly determined, had their share." The author is of opinion that the last two of these, five sources "have never, either by the *canzone*'s commentators, from the oldest to the most modern, or by special investigators of the religious symbolism *per se*, received the recognition which is their due." For the author "Petrarch's *canzone* to the Virgin . . . seems to represent, from the aspect at least of genius, the culminating point in the long and complex development of the religious symbol." The symbolism forming the nucleus of religious hymns and *albas* (morning hymns) is in brief:
1. *God*: the great Universal Light.
 2. *Mary*: light in general; specifically Dawn; sometimes, (a) Lucifer, (b) Stella Maris.
 3. *Christ*: the Day; by confusion, (a) Lucifer, (b) Dawn, (c) the Sun itself.
 4. *Satan*: Sin; Night; Sleep.

The author seems to be the first to have pointed out that "Petrarch's magnificent invocation to the Virgin, in the high and solemn beauty of which the mystic and essentially medieval side of the poets' complex nature finds eloquent expression, contains the same symbolism as that on which the early Christian hymnists based their morning hymns; which forms the nucleus of the 10th century bilingual *alba* discovered by Johann Schmidt in the Vatican Library in 1881; and which was utilized by Folquet de Marselha (if the attribution be reliable) and his successors in this field, as a nucleus for the production of the psychologically interesting, and, to certain temperaments, esthetically pleasing religious *albas* of the 12th and 13th centuries in Provence."

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THE ELEMENT OF FEAR IN RELIGION.

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In how far may religion be considered a mere manifestation of social phenomena and in how far is it rooted in individual psychology? Is there any common trait which cannot be explained by a reference beyond the social *milieu*? Is it true that, "*Unter der Hülle aller Religionen liegt die Religion selbst?*" And what is this *Religion selbst*, if there be such? While not attempting to define *Religion selbst*, an effort will be made here to point out one element believed to be common to every religion, simple and crude, or complex and advanced. If this be established, then it follows that religion is necessarily rooted in individual as well as in social psychology, since no social complex presents any one common feature—unless it be such fundamental underlying features as find their ultimate support in the individual psychic needs. Chance could not explain an element so general and invariable.

It will be well to keep in mind a distinction not observed in the treatment of this topic by a large class of writers, viz., the distinction between religion and religious emotion itself and the manifestation of religion and religious emotions themselves. The former may appear in manifold garb and guise, without losing its distinctive character. To confuse or to identify the two is like identifying the meal-hour with hunger. There is a certain chain of connection and of influence between the two, the meal-hour determining the time and place and diet, and, to some extent, regulating the appetite itself. The meal-hour is social, but no one would contend that it was hunger itself, or that the latter was not the more fundamental, and the one thing responsible for the meal-hour, rather than *vice versa*.

And this remains true, although, in some socially well regulated lives, we may find, through a period of many years, a thorough correspondence between the individual need and the social arrangement. If we take mankind over a larger range and in its less advanced, as well as in its more advanced standings, we shall the more easily see the fundamental difference between the social arrangement and the individual needs.

A confusion no less fundamental than this suggested confusion between the meal-hour and hunger seems to have been made by a certain class of the social psychologists, of whom Durkheim may be taken as one of the most brilliant, though, the writer is convinced, sometimes an erring representative. While agreeing with him as to the method by which these facts must be approached, namely, through a study of the whole social complex in which they find manifestation, we are forced to differ from him as regards the interpretation of those phenomena; as, for example, when he says,¹ after pointing out the obligatory character of religion, "*La religion obligatoire ne saurait avoir des origines individuelles.*" Granted the compulsory character of religious manifestations, does he not make the same fundamental error of inference in forthwith denying its origin in the individual, that one would make in concluding from the fact that every undergraduate at Oxford had to dine in hall at seven, that, therefore, eating being a social compulsion, appetite had no "*origine individuelle?*" The greater fallacy in Durkheim's presentation lies in the regrettable fact—and it is a fallacy as general as it is deplorable—that he confuses under one word two things as distinct, yet as intimately related, as eating and appetite. Social compulsion, as pointed out, does, to some extent, regulate and determine the appetite; but no theory of feasts and dinner-hours would be complete without something of gastronomies; and appetite is recurrent in the individual as such, nor waits necessarily until two or three are gathered together. Just so, if the writer's interpretation is correct, there is a common fundamental element in religion, as distinguished from its various manifestations, that is rooted in individual psychology and manifests itself quite independently of the activity of the group. From the fact that religious forms are presented as compulsory, it is illogical to conclude, with Durkheim, that, on the theory of its varying directly as the collective religion varies, its origin is not in the individual soul,

but in the collective soul. Or, that, to use his own words: "*La religion a pour origine, non des sentiments individuels, mais des états de l'âme collective, et elle varie comme ces états. Si elle était fondée dans la constitution de l'individu, elle ne se présenterait pas à lui sous cet aspect coercitif.*" So far as the interpretation we are about to attempt may be said to imply a theory of historical or evolutionary development, we believe that religious manifestations are, in a sense, specializations from a primitive and relatively undifferentiated consciousness, at once intellectual, emotional, spontaneous and teleological. Almost necessarily, it tends to take on, at a certain stage, more and more the appearance of a social phenomenon. Such tendencies toward religious forms and practices that are social no longer permit individuals to remain in egoistic isolation, but bring them into a unity of purpose, and thereby strengthen the group and tribal bonds. Perhaps religious values and "all that goes to make up the distinguishing features of the religious consciousness have evolved most fully in the atmosphere of the social group." The same may be said of any form of social activity, of science, or of the higher learning; but the social atmosphere may or may not be responsible for the origin of the interest or activity to which it gives trend and shape. In a word, the sociological school does not distinguish between the forms and practices called religious, and religion itself. They deal, as Schiller would say, with "*die Hülle aller Religionen*" and not with "*Religion selbst*." The food which we prefer may, to a great extent, be determined by that with which we have been provided. But it is quite false to conclude from this, that eating is solely a matter of meals. The same distinction holds with regard to religion and the forms of religious activity exhibited by the group to which one belongs. Conformity to established forms of the group does not so much create as it is created by an individual need common to the many units which go to make up the community. Indeed, arguments of this kind could as easily prove that knowledge is a social phenomenon as that religion is such. Our schools are established by the state, and the courses given are prescribed by it; this circumscribes the individual, determines the trend of his interests, and so knowledge becomes wholly social, some would say, and nothing is really left to individual initiative. The social side of such forms is one that we should emphasize, but not to the extent

of distorting it beyond due proportions. It is a most important, and, until recently, an unemphasized and almost unrecognized aspect, but it is not the only aspect. In the matter of education, for example, knowledge is tremendously dependent upon the personal factor, both in instructor and in instructed. The fact that a thing must take a certain course, that it is to some extent circumscribed, does not strip it of all dependence on the individual. Religious forms may be largely social; religion itself may still remain, fundamentally individual. If we interpret the phenomena correctly, religion is psychological and individual, not social and general, as Durkheim would have us believe. The particular practice and form of it may be social; but the religious consciousness itself is not a hole that can be filled with anything, and the social aspect is as much conditioned by the psychology of the individual as the content of his consciousness is conditioned by the social environment.

In the following discussion we shall take as the common psychic element in every true religious consciousness the emotions of awe and reverence.³ In accordance with this definition it will not be possible to separate magic entirely from religion, and we shall treat of them as the magico-religious,⁴ a term suggestive of an intimate relationship between the two, or a condition which is both magic and religion, and neither of these to the exclusion of the other.

In the following pages, we shall attempt an analysis of a body of phenomena recognized as the magical or the sacred, with a view toward determining any common quality in the mass. We shall adduce representative data fairly complete from Australia and Melanesia, and, by way of illustrating the prevalence of similar attitudes in the presence of similar phenomena, will adduce material from widely separated ethnographic areas. Lastly, we shall point out the existence of the same attitude in ourselves, as well as in the higher animals, and shall attempt an explanation of the same. But the attempt throughout will be to illustrate and interpret, not to exhaust the examples, nor suppose that mere mention of them proves the point the writer is trying to make.

If we examine the phenomena that give rise to this attitude toward the magico-religious, we shall find it to be the unusual, that is, the unfamiliar and the apparently uncaused—all of which belong in the same logical, if not in the same working,

psychological category; the attitude taken is one of awe, of fear or of reverence—all belonging to the same fundamental category. The outer or objective element in the sacro-sanct, then, is the unusual or apparently uneasiness, the inner or psychological element is the emotion of fear or of awe shading off into respect and reverence.⁵

A proper test of the correctness of our view-point will be to take the sum-total of the magico-religious phenomena in one or more definite ethnographic areas, and then find how far these results are applicable to other removed areas. Believing that the best test is one which applies to all this group of phenomena among a given people, we shall first describe, in a purely factual way, and then attempt to analyse, the magico-religious in Melanesia and in Australia.⁶

Codrington gives the following facts with regard to Melanesia:

Whenever the native is deeply impressed by some natural phenomenon, he apprehends the presence of some haunting *mana* and is moved to acts of worship or propitiation. A deep hole in a stream or in a pool among the rocks upon the beach is such a natural object, and into these he scatters money as a sacrificial offering. In Banks Island deep pools in streams are sacred, and there is at Valmoa a deep hole into which no one dares to look. Here we have lurking possibilities whose limits are not determinable. What power, what danger, what mystery may lurk in these hidden depths—places which have always impressed mankind!

A very common source of *mana* are stones which bear a striking likeness to fruit or tubers, such as, for example, the banana or the yam. If practically all stones bore this striking resemblance, it is not possible to believe that they would be looked upon as bearers of *mana*. But this resemblance is not usual; it is noticeable,⁷ therefore, when it occurs and necessarily has some particular significance.

In the New Hebrides, large stones are sacred, and in Banks Island stones of a remarkably long shape are so powerful that, if a man's shadow falls on one, it will draw out his soul from him, so that he will die. The natural ring of stones at Loalav in Saddle Island is, and has been from time immemorial, a sacred place. Those who do not know how to sacrifice to the sacred stones pass them by with awe, and will not tread the sacred ground about them. It is safe to say that both the peculiarity

of this arrangement and the difficulty of accounting for the agency which effected it have forced themselves upon the attention of the native; and to the writer, it seems clear that the unusualness of the phenomenon and the element of the apparently uncaused (that is by any known means) has been directly responsible for the emotional attitude taken by him toward the place. Nor is it surprising, in view of the prevalence of such an attitude in similar situations, that if a native finds a boulder of volcanic or coral rock of peculiar conformation, he is at once struck with a belief that a spirit is connected with it. For a spirit does not select an ordinary place for abode; which is in accordance with the rule that the unusual tends to attract the sacred and soon to surround itself with occult and mystic influence. Accordingly, in Florida Island, the presence of an extraordinary thing or the occurrence of an extraordinary event may cause a place to become *vumba*, that is, *sacred*, this wonderful thing or event being taken as evidence of the presence of a ghost. Again, this interpretation of the unusual as the sacred.⁸

Two trees have an inherent sacredness: the cycas and the casuarina. Dr. W. H. R. Rivers informs the writer that the cycas tree is a very common one in the Banks Island, and is used in every part of the island in all the sacred rites. He could not suggest, however, why it is sacred or why it should play such an important part in all their sacred ceremonies. Codrington tells us that, at Saa, a leaf of the cycas is put on the breast of a deceased great man, and in Lepers' Island it is used for keeping count of the one hundred days during which the death-meal is eaten. But here again there is intimation of nothing that offers a clue to the source of its sacredness.

Is it not possible that the sacredness of the casuarina may be explained by the qualities exhibited in the following description of it by Codrington? He says:

"Nothing can be more weird and ghostly than an aged casuarina standing alone on a wind-beaten beach, or rising on a lofty cliff, with bare grey stem and shadowless foliage, never without a voice, whispering in a calm or shrieking in a breeze. The presence of one of these trees gives a certain sanctity and awfulness to a place."

Lest it be supposed that Codrington has drawn too freely on his imagination, let me quote, to the same effect, from Carl Lumholtz:¹⁰

"After journeying two or three days through this gray wilderness, we

crossed the Comet river. Along its banks my attention was drawn to a number of Casuarinas—those leafless, dark trees, which always make a sad impression on the traveller; even a casual observer will notice the dull, depressing sigh which comes from a grove of these trees when there is the least breeze.”

Perhaps it is, after all, matter of little surprise if the native has attached some sacredness to these trees.¹¹⁻¹³

A white *kandara* or cuscus of unusual size, or an unusually large eel in a stream which is full of eels, is looked upon as representing some *tindalo* and the place around becomes sacred. Ordinarily snakes are killed. Dr. Rivers informs the writer that the natives of Banks Island have an intense fear of them, although they know that the land snakes, unlike the sea-serpents, are quite harmless. Snakes become sacred, however, when they are found in sacred places, or when there is something startlingly unusual about them, as, for example, when they appear to men in unexpected ways and places. Snakes of enormous size are said to live in banyan trees and are invested with considerable sacredness.

Two birds are sacred; the frigate-bird and the king-fisher.

The frigate-bird has great swiftness of flight and a habit of cruising about among birds of other species and of boldly pursuing them. The following description, taken from Newton's *Dictionary of Birds*, is impartial evidence, and may throw some light upon the source of the bird's sacred character. It soars “for a considerable distance in the air with scarcely a perceptible movement of the wings. . . . The buoyancy of this bird is very great,” as it floats overhead against the deep blue sky, “the long tail alternately opening and shutting like a pair of scissors, the head inclined from side to side, and the wings, to all appearance, fixedly extended.” The writer, without intimating the object of his interest, asked an observer if there was anything peculiar about the flight of the frigate-bird, and received the answer: “Oh, it is a most impressive sight!”¹⁴ So, Flinders Petrie, writing of the vulture, as the emblem of protection, figured in Egyptian royal tombs, says:

“There is perhaps no sight in the animal world more imposing than one of these birds stretched out with a span of some nine or ten feet, hanging in the air overhead; it is natural that it should have excited the admiration of man.”¹⁵

Are we right in inferring that these impressive because un-

usual features are, at least in part, responsible for the sacred character of the frigate-bird.¹⁶

The other sacred bird of Melanesia, the king-fisher, is—and this is apropos of our discussion—the subject of a variety of legends and superstitions, both classical and mediaeval. One curious old superstition, to which we are indebted for our modern weathercock, is that if a dead king-fisher be suspended from the roof, it will always turn its breast in the direction from which the wind blows. Sir Thomas Browne was the first to suspect the truth of this alleged characteristic, and experiment convinced him that it must be ranked among other *vulgar errors*.

"It was formerly held that if the dead bodies of these birds were put away in chests they protected garments from the ravages of moths, and it was believed that the feathers of a dead king-fisher were renewed in all their splendor every year. It was an article of faith, too, that the plumage of the king-fisher was injurious to the eyes of those who gazed too long and too intently upon it, while the possession of even a feather was a protection against lightning."¹⁷

The following descriptions are given of this bird:

It has "a very loud, harsh, rattling scream," a "loud piercing cry, resembling a cry of distress * * * its curious loud barking was sometimes mistaken for that of a dog." "Its voice is so extraordinary as to be unlike that of any other living creature." "Its cry, which resembles a chorus of wild spirits, is apt to startle the traveller who may be in jeopardy, as if laughing and mocking at his misfortune."¹⁸

Here, again, the unusual seems allied with the sacred.¹⁹

Sharks, alligators, and bonitos were, according to Codrington, sacred animals in the Solomon Islands. At Ulawa offerings of porpoise teeth are made to dreaded maneaters, and here, as well as at Saa, if a sacred shark attempts to seize a man and he escapes, the people are so much afraid of the shark's anger that they throw the man back into the sea to be drowned. Men, who believe they are about to die, frequently announce that their 'ghost will reside in a shark, and the *tindalo* of this class of men seem to form a class of "powerful supernatural beings."

Professor Goode says that a single sweep of the tail of the bonito doubtless suffices to propel the fish one hundred yards, since the polished surfaces of its body can offer little resistance to the water.²⁰ Although the native must have observed this peculiar power of the bonito, it were useless to speculate whether or not he has been impressed by it. Moreover, since these are dangerous animals, I think we need look no

farther for an adequate explanation of their sacred character. As a matter of fact, they were propitiated, and fear may have been indirectly responsible for all the reverence and respect paid them. Dr. Rivers informs me that practically all of their sacred animals are dangerous.²¹

Here, then, we have other sources for the sacred not related, at least not directly related to the unusual. Of different import, however, seems the following:

"If a flying-fish or gar-fish springs from the waves and strikes a man, they say in San Cristoval, that an *adaro* or ghost sent it; it is no common fish, the man will die."

Thus may unhappy combination of accident and incident be token the dire and the marvellous—the usual reaction upon the unusual.

Turning now to our second ethnographic territory, we find in Australia, as we found in Melanesia, a peopling of deep water-holes with indescribable spirits. The Kabi says that the rainbow which imparts vitality in the form of a rope (*yurru*), and for which they have great respect, lives in unfathomable water-holes on the mountains and when visible is in the act of passing from one haunt to another.²² According to Taplin,²³ the Narrinyeri live in dread of a spirit called *Mulgewauke*.

"The booming sound which is heard frequently in Lake Alexandrina is ascribed to him, and they think it causes rheumatism to those who hear it. He is represented as a curious being, half man, half fish, and has, instead of hair, a matted crop of reeds. I have often wondered myself what the noise is really caused by which they ascribe to *Mulgewauke*. I have heard it dozens of times, and so have other persons. It resembles the boom of a distant cannon, or the explosion of a blast. Sometimes, however, it is more like the sound made by the fall of a huge body into deep water. It cannot be the peculiar sound made by the Murray bittern, as I have often heard that too, and it is not at all like the noise in the Lake. At first I ascribed it to people blasting wood on the opposite side, but since then I have been convinced that this cannot be the case. One peculiarity of the sound ascribed to the *Mulgewauke* is, that although it is sometimes louder than at others, yet it is never near, always distant. I have no doubt but that some time or other the natural cause of it will be discovered, but I have never heard the phenomenon explained. A legend of this tribe states that, once upon a time, a child, who was playing on the shore, was seized and carried to the bottom of the lake by a *Mulgewauke*, one of these spirits of the deep, and it was with great difficulty that the child was rescued from him. The Moorundi, near the great north-west bend of the Murray, live in dread of a water-spirit which has the form of an enormous star-fish, and lives in this river. The Wailwun tribes say

that *wawi* is a snake or a monster, as large as a gum-tree with a small head and neck like a snake.”

It lives in a water-hole thirty miles from the Barwan; and used to eat black fellows.²⁴ Among the Central tribes the only being to whom the natives offered propitiation, and the one of whom they stood most in dread, was *Wullunqua*, a powerful water-spirit which lived in a very deep water-hole. They never approached his abode without giving him due warning of their coming and never failed to apologise for trespassing on his property. When they made the mound representing *Wullunqua* in the Intichiuma ceremonies, he was represented as very long and large.²⁵ No slender weakling of a serpent could be the proprietor of such an awe-inspiring place. Beneath that quiet surface, in the abysmal depth unfathomable, beyond the power of the eye to discern, must lurk some powerful creature whose ability to do one injury could not be doubted. What might one *not* expect from this unknown region? Is it not because hidden and concealed, untraversed and unknown, these water-holes and lakes are invested with danger, peopled with sprites and spirits and monsters not to be approached save humbly and with awe-stricken souls? The phenomena are so almost universal wherever such lakes and water-holes occur that we must suppose some common appeal made by them to men who react thus in their presence.²⁶

In Australia, too, particular respect is paid to rocks, because of unusual resemblances. The Narrinyeri have a sacred rock called *Luive* upon which women and children are not allowed to tread. They say he is a transformed ancestor, and, owing to the conformation of the stone, are able to point out his head, feet, hands, and also his hut and fire.²⁷

Mention is nowhere made,—so far as we are informed,—of sacred trees in Australia. There is, however, some evidence that the wood of the casuarina, of the existence of which in Australia and Melanesia we have already spoken, is instinct with magic powers. A death caused by a combination of sorcery and violence is called *baru* by the Kurnai, while they use the name *Baru* for the species of casuarina known locally as the “He-oak.” Moreover, when they wished to kill a man by evil magic they threw its malign influence at him by means of a piece of “He-oak” (*Casuarina suberosa*). The *Guliwil*, used by the Wotjobaluk for killing by magic, was made of *Casuarina glauca*

("Bull-oak"). The Wudthaurung put the rough cones of *Casuarina quadrivalvis* ("She-oak") into a man's fire, so that the smoke might blow into his eyes and blind him. Here, however, "the idea seems to be that the eidolon of the rough seed cones would magically produce injury, as the object might do;" and Howitt finds in this belief an attempted explanation of ophthalmia.²⁸

Although there are no sacred birds in Australia similar to those of Melanesia, peculiar beliefs are entertained about some of the feathered tribe. The North Central tribes, for example, believe that the spirit of a man killed by an avenging party takes the form of a little bird and waits for an opportunity to kill men by evil magic. They say that this bird when heard sounds like a child crying in the distance.²⁹

Lumholtz gives this account of a bird, which the natives on the Upper Herbert River, Queensland, look upon as an evil spirit:

"It was *Kvigan*, their evil spirit, who chiefly haunted this spot. His voice was often heard in the evening at night from the abyss or from the scrubs. I made the discovery that the strange melancholy voice which they attributed to the spirit belonged to a bird which could be heard at a great distance. But I must admit that it is the most mysterious bird's voice that I have ever heard, and it is not strange that a people so savage as the Australian natives should have formed superstitious notions in regard to it. *Kvigan* is found in the inaccessible mountain regions."

Moreover, the evil spirit is sometimes resident in the cicada and the explanation of its sacredness as given by Lumholtz³⁰ is most suggestive:

"This insect, the cicada, produces in summer a very shrill sound in the tree-top, but it is impossible to discover it by the sound. It is this loud shrill sound which comes from every direction, and which is not to be traced to any particular place, that has evidently given rise to superstitious ideas concerning it."

Indeed, Lumholtz seems to sum up the situation admirably in the observation that the natives have a superstitious fear of these evil spirits, "*and of the unknown generally.*"³¹

A few examples will illustrate the attention given the strange or the unusual and the attitude taken by the native toward such phenomena which are at once feared and respected by him. An incident mentioned by Taplin³² illustrates this admirably.

"The first time some of the women heard our clocks strike, they listened with astonishment, then inquired hurriedly in a whisper, 'What him say?' and rushed out of the house in terror without waiting for an answer."³³

As in Melanesia, an eclipse or a falling star is a wonder and a portent which brings an appalling sense of danger, so, in Australia, women as well as men are much frightened at eclipses of the moon, although it is only by the latter that evil is foreboded. Similarly, the fact that the ghost of the dead is considered quite harmless does not detract from their regarding it with fear.^{33a}

The Kurnai believe that the wild dog sometimes speaks, and that "to hear this is fatal, the listener being turned into stone." The narrator refers to a belief that a camp of Kurnai were literally petrified by hearing one of their dogs say, "You are eating fish, and have given me none." A Kurnai told Fison that, when a boy, he once heard a dog commence to howl something; he caught only one word, "bring" (bone), whereupon he made off as fast as he could run and so saved his life.^{33b}

The natives of Western Victoria believe that if a corpse opens its eyes and stares at any one, the unfortunate person at whom it looks will not live long. When the star-gazer sees the planet Venus set twice in one night, he knows that death awaits him 'ere the dawn. The cause of an echo is not understood and the echo is supposed to be a mysterious something mocking the speaker.

Strange spears and weapons are reluctantly touched, for it is believed they communicate sickness and might cause death; and it was with difficulty that some of the West Victoria natives could be prevailed upon to take hold of spears, arrows, and clubs from the Society Islands. However much the natives may be in want of a fire-stick when travelling through the bush, they will not take a light from a strange fire, unless they observe the footprints of human beings near it, indicating that it has been kindled by man. Fire caused by lightning is shunned, "because there is a belief that the lightning hangs about the spot, and would kill anyone going near it. . . . Neither will they take a fire from a funeral pyre."³⁴

Among the Kabis of Queensland and the tribes of Gippsland, to have miraculously escaped death is a passport to the ranks of the medicine-men.³⁵

Interesting, in this connection, is the attitude taken toward the insane—an attitude that varies among different peoples as much as the attitude toward the aged. Among the Chepara, if a man became insane, or was in the habit of idiotically muttering

to himself, it was thought that *Wulle*, an evil being, was influencing him, and that disaster might happen to the camp. A fear of the insane was doubtless responsible for the custom in Western Victoria of killing them.³⁶ Spencer and Gillen say that among the North Central tribes, twins were usually destroyed at once as something uncanny.³⁷

In an interesting article on "The Bull-Roarer and the Higher Gods,"³⁸ Marett has pointed out the very intimate connection between the bull-roarer and Australian religion and the compelling nature of its weird sound, sufficing not only to awe men but even to effect such unaesthetic creatures as elephants, cattle and gorillas. No other sound in Heaven or on earth may be likened to that of a rapidly twirled bull-roarer, and none so likely to attract and hold the attention of its users and hearers. For the women and the uninitiated, the sound of the bull-roarer is the voice of *Daramulun*, and, as Marett convincingly points out, for the initiated, *Daramulun* is probably the bull-roarer itself. Indeed, Ridley says that, by the tribes living about the Naimoi and the Barwan, the bull-roarer is spoken of as *Dhurumbulum*, and is said to have been given them by Baiame.³⁹ Surely, no better instance could be had of the source of the mystery and awe surrounding the bull-roarer and its ceremonial.

The following incident told the writer by a young Chilkat chief (Alaska) illustrates how savages react in the presence of the unusual.

"John Fox was a very energetic man who rose early every morning and attended to his traps before it was daylight or anyone else was astir. He told me this story to show me that I should always look into a thing carefully before I made anything [supernatural] out of it. 'I was out one afternoon in a piece of woods to get some berries, I had a big basket and a little basket. The big basket I had set down. Later I looked for it and could not find it anywhere. I hunted and hunted and could not find it anywhere. Then the thought suddenly came to me: This is strange, for I have been over this ground time and time again and know every inch of it; and nothing like this ever happened to me in my whole life. There is something very strange about it. I can't understand it.'

"Just then a piece of bark fell down in front of me. I was frightened. Then a second piece came down right past my nose. I was too frightened to move. I felt a funny feeling run all over me—a kind of a chill. A third piece came this time on my hat. I thought: I can't stand this any longer. I must find out what it is. I was nearly fainting—so weak from

fright. I moved a step or two and leaned up against a tree to support myself, and looked up— There was a large wood-pecker up there which had been picking off the bark!"

Here was an unusual experience which, had impressed the Indian and had aroused an intense fear of a I-do-not-know-what. Explanation dissipated the fear.

We have seen that, in Melanesia and Australia, a study of the entire mass of the magico-religious showed a common element, which we called the unusual, or the apparently uncaused. It will not be possible to point this out in detail for any other area, but a few instances will serve to show how general it is. Indeed, to find a tribe or people among whom this would not apply, is a task the present writer cannot perform. The reactions may vary, and a given phenomenon may not always bring the same reaction, but those which do elicit it are of this kind and may be included under our general principle.

At Aneiteum, "smooth stones, apparently picked up out of the bed of the river were regarded as representatives of certain gods, and wherever the stone was, there the god was supposed to be. One resembling a fish would be prayed to as the fisherman's god. Another, resembling a yam, would be the yam god. A third, round like a bread-fruit, the bread-fruit god—and so on."⁴⁰

The principal sacred place at Salengo, on Savaii, was a rock which gave an unusually hollow sound at the change of wind and current. This was a call for offerings; for a time the fish about this rock were untouched as sacred to this "Neptune."⁴¹

As in Melanesia, and Polynesia, so in Indonesia generally, and especially in Borneo, particular virtues are attached to peculiarly shaped stones; Sir A. Lyall's explanation of the primitive worship of stones in India as, "that single awe of the unusual which belongs to no particular religion," is doubtless applicable to nearly the whole of these phenomena.⁴² Such, too, may be the explanation of the respect which the peasants have, generally, for the cromlechs, alignments, dolmens, etc., of Europe, to which frequently offerings are made.⁴³

With respect to the pictographs on the rocks of British Guiana, Brown writes:

"The Indians of Guiana know nothing about the picture writing by traditions. They scout the idea of their having been made by the hand of man, and ascribe them to the handiwork of the *Makunamia*, their great spirit. Nevertheless, they do not regard them with any superstitious feel-

ings, looking upon them merely as curiosities, which is the more extraordinary as there are numbers of large rocks without any markings on some rivers, which they will not even look at in passing, lest some calamity should overtake them. Their Peaimen or sorcerers always squeeze tobacco juice into their eyes on approaching these, but pay no regard to the sculptured rocks.⁴⁴

Sir John Evans remarks that, "stones remarkable for their colour or shape appear at all times to have attracted the attention of mankind, and frequently to have served as personal ornaments or charms;" (*Ancient Stone Implements of G. Br. and Ireland*, p. 470) and this holds particularly of prehistoric implements of a type not used by the people in whose locality they are occasionally found. Ellis (*The Yoruba* pp. 46-51) says that among the Yorubas of West Africa, stone implements which have long ceased to be used, are believed to be the thunderbolts of the god Shango; and whenever a house is struck by lightning his priests rush in a body to pillage it and to find the stone, which, as they take it with them secretly they always succeed in doing. Bowen (*Op. cit.*, p. xvi), says of this same region that the prehistoric stones which are picked up are thought to have been cast down by Sango or Dzakuta and are preserved as sacred reliques. The stone implements which are found scattered broadcast over the Malay Peninsula are believed by the Malays to be thunderbolts,⁴⁵ and thunderbolt, fairy dart, elfstone or thunderstone is a name given them all over Europe by the peasants who generally save and use them as amulets, for person or property.⁴⁶

The unusual is particularly fitted for magic. We have already seen that among certain Australian tribes to have miraculously escaped death is to have prepared oneself for the fold of medicine-men. The Yoruba proverb that, "A rat which has a navel is a witch,"⁴⁷ is one that is applicable in almost any land. So, too, an unusual thing will be especially adapted to the performance of witchcraft; as witness the following example:

In hunting material for a new fetich, a Batanga fetich doctor "searched among the trees until they found two growing near together, but bent in such a way toward each other that their trunks crossed in contact, and were rubbed smooth by abrasion; and when violently rubbing, in a storm, gave out a creaking sound. In that mysterious sound inhered the fetich power. He chose the trees, not for any value in their kind, but because of their singular juxtaposition and their weird sounds."⁴⁸

Likewise an unusual event will herald the approach or signify

the presence of witches. "When a fire is seen on a distant hill, where no fire can be accounted for"—this is an indication that the witches are assembling for their orgies.⁴⁹ In British Guiana, fragments of rock crystal brought from the mountains of the interior are supposed to possess some hidden virtue.⁵⁰

It is essential that magic should involve the use of means which we do not understand. Practically all magical formulae involve this element. See, for example, how the addition of apparently useless and unessential things and the insistence upon them, enhance the sense of mystery surrounding one of these formulae:

We are told to "spin a variegated and a scarlet thread together, and tie seven knots in it; thou shalt mix together oil of cedar, spittle of the man, the leavened dough, earth from an old grave, a tortoise's mouth, a thorn, earth from the roots of the caper, earth of ants; thou shalt sprinkle the knots with this. While thou tiest them, thou shalt repeat this incantation and bind it on the temples of the man. Thus shalt thou tighten it, until the darkening of the white part of the face and the whitening of the dark-colored part of the face takes place."⁵¹

How much more attractive and awe-inspiring is the prescription which tells us to crush dried toads in a mortar, compounding a salve out of mashed worms, and make pills from the dried livers of rats which are mixed with saliva emitted during a blasphemous incantation, than the matter of fact scientific one which prescribes two ounces of quinine and a good night's sleep, or certain nitrates plus certain carbon compounds, at which no man marvels, nor finds in it cause for respect. After all, Naaman was only human when he objected to the simplicity of the cure which was to take away his leprosy.

In the Arab Museum at Cairo is preserved a "cup of terror," which was used in the middle ages for treating persons who were "ill from the effects of violent emotion." For this purpose "the vessel is filled with water in which is soaked a bunch of old rusty keys; the vessel and its contents are then exposed all night to the cool air, and the patient drinks the water in the morning." The cure might or might not be equally sure if it were realised by the patients "that the oxide derived from the keys may in certain cases be of benefit to the patient;" but there can be no doubt that, with this knowledge, the cup that cures would no longer be a "cup of terror."⁵² Explanation of the cure destroys the peculiar respect and reverence once attaching to the medicine.

" Long was making a powerful series of cures of chronic rheumatism and pains and aches of many kinds by means of this wonderful liniment. This remedy was thought to be so efficacious that the British Government finally bought the secret of it from him, paying many thousands of dollars for it, in order that it might be given to the public and enable them to free themselves from most of the chronic ills to which flesh is heir. The mysterious remedy proved to be only a combination of turpentine and white of egg with some other equally familiar substances, and, of course, just as soon as it lost the power that its mystery had commanded for it, it ceased to be effective."⁵³

Moreover, the practicing of a craft or trade or the performing of a feat which others do not understand will often merit one the name of witch or wizard and imbue respect or fear, not infrequently a combination of the two. To tamper with new things was to play with danger, and to invent was to invite disaster. In 1278, '*propter quasdam novitates*,' Roger Bacon, the foremost scientist of his day, was condemned for his innovations and sent to prison for fourteen years.⁵⁴ Silvester II., Pope of Rome, 1002-3, was

" both intelligent and learned, qualities, which, at that age, were regarded as derivable only from the devil. He was spoken of with bated breath as a necromancer. Men crossed themselves when they mentioned his name, being convinced that he had in his possession a magical brazen head, which had foretold his death in Jerusalem. . . . And it seems to be a fact that *he used steam power for blowing the church organ.*"

Little wonder he excited awe and fear! St. Gregory, too, seems to have owed his success in attaching to himself demoniacal attributes to the fact that he was so far in advance of the times as to be for most men beyond comprehension, the natural inference being that he, his papedom notwithstanding, must have obtained these faculties from his Satanic Majesty. Whether such powers be looked upon as providential or as coming from the devil, seems often to hang in the balance, but in the Middle Ages the devil seems to have been the more popular and preferred.⁵⁵ Perhaps this use of means not generally comprehended by the masses may account for the peculiar fear or respect commonly attaching to blacksmiths among savage or semi-civilized peoples. In Abyssinia all artisans are *Budah*, i.e., sorcerers, and especially is this true of the blacksmith. Here, as among the Somali, he is a social outcast, though throughout El-Islam, the blacksmith is respected as one treading in the path of David, whom they look upon as the father of the craft.

But whatever his social position, few people will venture to molest or offend a blacksmith, since they fear the effects of his resentment.

"The power of possessing persons with the devil is attributed mostly to Jewish blacksmiths; and women and children are terrified when they meet, in a solitary place, a blacksmith who is a Jew. These sorcerers are also said to be endowed with the power of changing the shape of the object of their incantations."⁵⁶

Other attempts have been made to explain the low status of the blacksmith, as, for example, that he was retained by the invading conquerors who had no knowledge of iron-working but appreciated its value.

Marett⁵⁷ speaks of the horror of a human corpse as a something instilled in man's heart by his instinct of self-preservation; and this, he says, is at the back of his horror of a ghost. In similar manner Shaler⁵⁸ refers to "the primitive fear of death," and "the instinctive fear of death," holding that, "its source is to be looked for in our animal ancestry, where this fear, blind and unconscious of its object, was absolutely demanded for the fit preservation of the individual."⁵⁹ The theory is good, but unfortunately the facts will not conform to it. As a reviewer of Marett has pointed out, the explanation will not suffice. "A dog has a strong instinct of self-preservation, but he sniffs with the mildest curiosity at the corpse of a brother. There must be something else behind the human awe of death. What is it?" we are asked.⁶⁰ It is difficult to answer Darwin's question, "Who can say what cows feel, when they surround and stare intently on a dying or dead companion?"⁶¹ and yet, to ask the question is to deny instinctive fear of a dead body. The author can vouch for the correctness of the assertions made by the writer in *The Church Times* as to the lack of this instinctive fear among the lower animals. Dogs are not frightened by the sight of the body of a dead dog, nor are cattle or horses frightened by the body of one of their dead companions. A duck will peck at the head of one of its mates still gory from recent decapitation; while chickens look upon the spasmodically gyrating headless body of one of their tribe without displaying more than the mildest curiosity.

There is, of course, abundant evidence of the fear of a corpse. Swan speaks of the great superstitious dread some of the Indians of Washington have for a dead person; "their horror of touching

a corpse oftentimes gives rise to a difficulty as to who shall perform the funeral ceremonies. In cases of small-pox, I have known them leave the corpse in the lodge, and all remove elsewhere."⁶² The Clallam and Twanas are especially afraid of having children go near the corpse, being much more fearful of the effect of the evil spirit on them than on older persons.⁶³ But this is scarcely 'instinctive fear.' Of a different sort, perhaps, is the attitude of the Eskimo, who are said to "feel the greatest awe in touching a dead body,"⁶⁴ or that of the Yerkla-mining of Australia, who are said to be much afraid of a dead body. Indeed, "they never bury their dead or dispose of them in any way. When death approaches, the person is left alone, as comfortably as possible, near a fire, and the tribe leave the neighbourhood, not to return for a considerable time." Mrs. Peggs reports that the natives at Roebuck Bay, W. Australia, have a fear of the bodies of people killed by some disaster, such as drowning or burning, though formerly they ate their dead.⁶⁵ The Stlatlumh (of British Columbia) believe that evil influences attend corpses so potent that only the funerary shaman with mystic powers could come into contact with them and remain immune to the bad medicine. And even he took precautions to wash the body, comb and tie the hair, paint the face and sprinkle the head of the corpse with the down of bulrushes, which is effective in checking the evil influences attending corpses.⁶⁶ These instances give a measure of support to Thompson's view that, "the tabu on a dead body is due to the dread of attracting the departed soul, which can return to afflict all that meddle with the corpse," but they cannot be taken to imply a "primitive" or instinctive fear of death. Moreover this fear of a corpse is by no means universal.⁶⁷ The Indians in the Ungava District, near Hudson Bay, have not that dread of a corpse which is shown so plainly among the Eskimo;⁶⁸ and Dawson says the tribes of Western Victoria never manifested any fear of their dead until after contact with the whites. Mr. R. S. Rattray, who has enjoyed a long and intimate acquaintance at first hand with Africans, tells me that, among the tribes of British Central Africa with which he is acquainted, there is no fear of the bodies of their dead; the same assurance was given me with regard to Dahomey by a native from that country. Similar testimony was given me by a Chilkat Indian of Northwest Alaska; and Dr. Rivers assured me, with regard to Melan-

esia, that the present natives of the Banks Islands have no fear of their dead.

If Lyman Abbott had been sojourning in Australia, with an eye solely to the customs and attitudes of its aborigines, he would scarcely have spoken of that "feeling of awe in the presence of the great mystery of life and death, which, at times, sober and solemnizes the most careless of us."⁶⁹ If we are to believe Spence and Gillen, it does neither of these for the natives of the Central tribes of Australia. Nor is it true, as Karsten would have us believe,⁷⁰ that "death always has something of mystery about it, that lies like a veil over one who has departed this life." Some kinds of death are mysterious, others are mere matter-of-fact occurrences. As Fison has expressed it, "Death by accident they can imagine—death by violence they can imagine—but I question if they can . . . imagine death by mere disease. . . . Thus the belief arises that death occurs only from accident, open violence, or secret magic."⁷¹ This is true of most tribes of Australia, and practically the same condition was said by a native informant to exist in Dahomey.⁷²

We believe, then, that Steindorff expressed quite the reverse of the truth when he said: "to the unsophisticated man there is always something incomprehensible in the sudden cessation of life."⁷³ It is only to the sophisticated man that there is anything incomprehensible in the cessation of life. For the unsophisticated, life ceases; for the sophisticated, life ceases without fully ascertainable cause. For the ordinary man, the sun rises—a sun-rise it is to him and nothing more; and it is only an intelligence more advanced that wonders at a phenomenon so common, and finds in the very rising and setting of the sun one of the great mysteries of nature. Why then should animals exhibit fear in the presence of their dead? They do not realize that the mysterious vital force called life has gone out; and there is nothing involved in the mere presence of a dead body which calls for any great fear by way of self-preservation.⁷⁴ Quite different is it when the animal sees or smells blood, an immediate reaction becoming a means of self-preservation since blood often means or meant foes and danger. Thus, perhaps, may we account for the rage of bulls—and often of cows—which smell or see the blood of a slaughtered fellow-tribesman.⁷⁴ With human beings the sight of blood seems to have quite a contrary effect. William James spoke of having fainted, while he watched

the bleeding of a horse, and the writer knows a university professor who had to give up work in the dissecting room because of dizziness and nausea brought on by the sight of blood. The operating surgeon in a Baltimore hospital told the writer some years ago that a large number of men (not practitioners) who see an operation for the first time actually faint. If this has any relation to the survival of the species *Homo* it would seem to be of the opossum type of mere passivity.

Although we have advanced somewhat beyond the "primitive" conceptions of death we have not passed altogether beyond the "primitive" attitudes toward it. In the case of many of us, we do not feel the same sense of mystery about one who has died of some disease with the course and consequences of which we are familiar, as we feel when one has died of some sudden attack where the cause of death is beyond determination.

It is easy to believe anything of a land or people remote and unknown, and anything is possible in the land of shadows and mystery. The Greenlanders' idea of the Ameriean Indian is that of a fabulous inlander with a faee like a dog's, martial spirits and inhuman foes to mankind.⁷⁵

The Point Barrow Eskimo tell confused stories of the people in the far-off country unknown to them, who are without posteriors (commonly met with in Eskimo legends) and who have sledges that run of themselves, not requiring any dogs to draw them.⁷⁶ The Central Eskimo believe that living in the extreme northwest is a tribe called the Ardnainig, the men of which are no larger than children and entirely covered with hair. The women, however, are of normal size, do all the work, go out hunting in *kayaks*, and in every way provide for the men whom they carry about in their hoods, "just like children."⁷⁷

The Tornit, who are believed by the Eskimo to have shared their country in the long ago, were much taller than the Eskimo, had very long legs and arms, were almost all of them blear-eyed, and were extremely strong, being able to life large boulders which were far too heavy for the Eskimo.

"But even the Innuit (i.e. Eskimo) of that time were much stronger than those of to-day, and some large stones are shown on the plain of Miliaqduin, in Cumberland Sound, with which the ancient Innuit used to play, throwing them great distances. Even the strongest men of the present generations are scarcely able to lift them, much less to swing them or throw them any distance."⁷⁸

Nearly all the animals which are known to the natives only by report through foreign tribes are highly exaggerated fabulous creatures, e. g., the musk ox is believed to be a fierce animal with black and red streaks and larger than a bear, while the black bear lives inland, is of enormous size, and devours everything that comes near it.⁷⁹

The Montagnais think that the Wendigoes are giant cannibals, 20 and 30 feet high; that they live on human flesh, and that many Indians who have gone hunting, and have never afterwards been heard of, have been devoured by Wendigoes.⁸⁰

The Tenan-kut-chin is a remote Alaskan tribe that came out once a year, for the purpose of trading, and then retired to their fastnesses and were seen no more for another year.

"No white man or Indian of other tribe had penetrated the wilds in which they pursued the deer and trapped the fox and sable. Their reserve, fierce demeanor, and the mystery which surrounded their manner of life had its effect on the imagination of the adjacent tribes, who seemed to fear the strangers, and had many tales, smacking of the marvelous, to tell of them."⁸¹

This attitude is essentially different from that taken by a weaker tribe toward an adjacent stronger one from which they had much to fear as regards physical and warlike prowess.

When the little Yoruba girl had wandered a long, long way she came to the country where the "people stand on their heads in mortars and pound yams with their heads."⁸² "An intelligent Bornuese" (Yoruba) assured Bowen that somewhere eastward of Nufe and Yakoba there was a tribe of men, called Alabiwu who had inflexible tails about six inches long.

"Beyond this tribe was another called Alabiwo, distinguished by a small goat-like horn projecting from the top of the head just above the margin of the hair. Somewhere in the same region was a tribe called Alakere, the tallest of whom were scarcely three feet high. Being a weak people, the Alakere surrounded their towns with walls of iron."

The Negroes beyond the Niger tell of a people who have four eyes, and point out the exact position of the different eyes.⁸³

Bowen thinks many of these stories have been told the credulous Negroes by Arab traders. But the fact that they are readily believed shows an innate willingness to give credence to the marvellous when the marvellous is located in a distant and for them impenetrable territory. The stories that were rife in

Europe about the wonders of the new land shortly after the discovery of America are instances.

The Bushongo, who found the Batwa a forest-dwelling people, in possession when they arrived, hold them in superstitious awe, regarding them as spirits born from trees. In some cases, bands of these pygmies have been induced to leave the forest, to settle in villages and to practice agriculture; and in such cases they are regarded by the Bushongo as becoming more human.⁸⁴

"In the time of Augustus, the island (of Pravaos) was literally at the end of the world, and if it was not classed among fabulous lands, it was placed at the extreme borders of the actual world, at the point where incredible marvels began. Any number of stories were told of the height of the cataract (etc.). . . . Beyond were the deserts of Africa, whence some new monster appeared, regions haunted by sphinxes and onoeentauras, overrun by tribes of Oreillards and Sciapodes."⁸⁵

It is not surprising, then, that

"The unknown stranger, like everything unknown and everything strange, arouses a feeling of mysterious awe in superstitious minds. . . . He is commonly believed to be versed in magie, and the evil curses of a stranger are greatly feared, owing partly to his quasi-supernatural character partly to the close contact in which he comes with the host and his belongings."

He is regarded, not only as a potential benefactor, but as a potential source of evil, and may bring disease or ill-luck.⁸⁶ You may be entertaining angels—or devils—unawares. So, too, the extraordinary power attaching to the blessings and curses of parents, may be due, at least in part, to the mystery of old age and the nearness of death.⁸⁷

But, as Westermarck has pointed out,

"Increasing intercourse between different communities or different countries . . . habituates the people to the sight of strangers, and, in consequence, deprives the stranger of that mystery which surrounds the lonely wanderer in an isolated district whose inhabitants have little communication with the outside world."⁸⁸

In the saying that "familiarity breeds contempt" there seems, then, to be much truth. If we look about us, I believe we shall find that those who possess a given quality or ability in an eminent degree do not have any great respect for one possessing similar eminent qualities though they may feel unbounded respect for those eminent in lines not their own. In the one case they themselves can wield the given power or influence

and thoroughly understand the means by which this has been attained and is maintained. Perhaps, as Ross would say, the father who seems to the child to be limitless in powers and wisdom will, for that reason, be readily obeyed and respected. Perhaps, too,

"The born leader is one whose superiority seems boundless. If it is only relative, if we can measure it, if we can fathom the secret of it, and can see how we can finally attain to it ourselves, he is no longer our hero." "A sense of power in others seems to involve a sense of their inscrutability; and on the other hand, so soon as a person becomes plain, he ceases to stimulate the imagination; we have seen all around him." "The power of mere inscrutability arises from the fact that it gives a vague stimulus to thought and then leaves it to work out the details to suit itself" [which details it is wont to work out most fantastically]. "Another instance of the prestige of the inscrutable is the fascination of silence, when power is imagined to lie behind it. The very name of William the Silent gives one a sort of thrill, whether he knows anything of that distinguished character or not; one seems to see a man darkly potent, mysteriously dispensing with the ordinary channel of self-assertion, and attaining his ends without evident means. . . . One who always appears to be his own master and does not too readily reveal his deeper feelings is so much the more likely to create an impression of power. He is formidable because incalculable."⁹⁹

With men, with events, with natural phenomena, it is the same—a complete understanding is not consonant with awe and reverence. To all of us alike, savage or civilized, the mysterious is impressive, and both custom and religion lose half their emotional toning when their origin and historical development are laid bare.⁹⁰

We have already mentioned the reaction upon the unusual manifested by different people. The instance of the Narrinyeri woman, who fled in terror from the cloek that talked, is a case in point; so too is that of the Tasmanian woman, who screamed when she saw an officer of a French ship pull off his gloves, thinking that he was removing his skin.⁹¹ Such events are often taken as magically potent—instances of which have been given. Almost as frequently however they become sacred and a religious significance attaches to them. Just as an object about which there is some unusual quality is often selected for the performance of magic, so an animal about which there is something unusual may be given a sacred character. As an instance of this, we have the respect shown to white elephants in Siam, where they are much revered and may not be killed.⁹² So,

too, the white monkey is an object of great veneration among the Siamese and is kept in the stables of the sacred white elephants to prevent the presence of evil spirits. The Eskimo believes that the albinos of seals and of deer—which are said to be very quick,—spring from an egg of about half a foot in length. This egg takes form in the earth, so the seals when hatched dig an underground passage to the sea, while the deer dig one to a distant part of the country.⁹³

When it was announced that a mule had conceived near Biskra, the Arabs, thinking the end of the world was at hand, gave themselves up to long fasts by way of conciliating the wrath of heaven. Fortunately the mule miscarried; but long afterwards the Arabs still spoke with terror of this event.⁹⁴ Not essentially different from this, if our interpretation is correct, is the case of the Chinyanja who have many superstitions with respect to men who cannot beget children—this being very unusual and therefore mysteriously strange.⁹⁵

We shall give a few only of the numberless examples that might be cited to show the efficacy of the unusual in generating religious awe and respect.

"A Kafir broke a piece off the anchor of a stranded vessel and soon after died. Ever after the Kaffirs regarded the anchor as something mysterious, divine, and did it honour by saluting it as they passed by, with a view to propitiate its wrath."⁹⁶

The Lacus Palicorum near Favarotta, Sicily, emits carbonic acid gas in such quantities that "small birds are suffocated in attempting to fly too near the surface across the lake and horses and oxen experience difficulty in breathing as soon as they enter the water. The ancients regarded the spot as sacred and the peculiar resort of the gods."⁹⁷ By the Nenesot everything not understood is attributed to the working of one of the numerous spirits;⁹⁸ in Egyptian religion the gods were held responsible for such deaths as cannot be assigned to obvious physical causes.⁹⁹ This is a higher conception than that so prevalent among savages, who attribute deaths of this kind almost invariably to the working of magic; but the two explanations are not essentially different both involving a universal explanation of all that is unusual and mysterious beyond comprehension.¹⁰⁰

This is a view not altogether above or beneath us when we come face to face with "those events at which marble statues might well be believed to perspire, phantasmal fiery warriors

to fight in the air, and quadrupeds to bring forth monstrous births—that it did not belong to the usual order of Providence, but was in a peculiar sense the work of God." For, as Spinoza wrote nearly three centuries ago,

" As men have been wont to call that science which surpasses human apprehension divine, so have they been wont to call the works whereof the cause is generally unknown, divine, or the work of God. For people in general think that the power or providence of God, then, is most clearly manifested when they perceive something to happen in nature which is most uncommon and contrary to the opinion which they have formed from custom concerning nature." ¹⁰¹

Indeed, the part played by the unusual and the prominence given it in at least two of the great world religions is considerable and worthy of notice. Both the Koran and the Bible, as well as the history of attempts to prove the authenticity and divine nature of the creeds, bear ample testimony to this. One example from the Koran will suffice: Moses and Aaron were competing with the Egyptian magicians before Pharaoh in order to show that the God of the Hebrews was the more powerful God. "And lo! by their enchantment, their cords and rods seemed to him as if they ran. And Moses conceived a secret fear within him. And, when Moses' rod swallowed up their cheating wonders, then the magicians threw themselves down in worship:

" They said, ' We believe on the Lord of the Worlds! '

" 'Throw down thy staff.' And when he saw that it moved itself as though it were a serpent, he retreated backward and returned not. 'O Moses, fear not.' ¹⁰²

The practice of magic or of sorcery as such has, however, by the Christian church generally been looked upon with disfavor as an enemy of the true religion. The Roman Church has, in the main, looked upon magical arts as the work of the devil, and as late as 1791 required penance from one Giuseppe Balsamo who was alleged to have engaged in these practices.¹⁰³

As already stated, the distinction between the divine and the profane is not always easy to draw, and the Roman Church has not always been consistent. Sometimes, a magical act is invested with sanctity, is looked upon as a proof of the presence of the Divine, and is, accordingly, respected, as a miracle. In many cases, so far as the nature of the event is concerned there is no way to distinguish between magic and miracle.

Witness the following examples: To test the sacredness of the girdle, alleged by the sacristan of the Church of S. Lorenzo to have belonged to that saint, Pope Alexander II

"laid it on the bier, and at once the dead arose and walked. Then all men knew that the sacristan had told what was true, and the Pope celebrated mass as he had been bidden, and promised an indulgence of forty years to all who should visit, on a Wednesday, any church dedicated to St. Lawrence."¹⁰⁴

"One chain [of St. Peter] had been sent to Rome by Eudoxia the elder, and the other remained at Constantinople, but the Romans could not rest satisfied with the possession of half the relic; and within the walls of this very basilica (S. Pietro in Vincoli) Leo I. beheld in a vision the miraculous and mystic uniting of the two chains, since which they have both been exhibited here, and the day of their being soldered together by invisible power, August 1st, has been kept sacred in the Latin Church."¹⁰⁵

Divine authority and saintliness are proved by the ability to perform some feat not possible for the ordinary layman. The principal miraels ascribed to the Beato Vicolo Albergati, and represented in an altar piece of the chapel dedicated to him in the church of *S. Maria degli Angeli* at Rome, is that he converted bread into coal in order to convince the Emperor of Germany of his divine authority—and great must have been his success, as the records bear witness.¹⁰⁶ St. Agnese,

"when she saw herself thus exposed, . . . bent down her head, . . . and prayed; and immediately her hair, which was always long and abundant, became like a veil, covering her whole person from head to foot; and those who looked upon her were filled with awe and fear, as if something sacred, and dared not lift their eyes."¹⁰⁷

Among the wonderful actions of St. Catherine of Siena which stood as a proof of her great saintliness was the following: while she was leaning in ecstacy against a pilaster in the chapel of San Domenico, "a candle that was there alight in honour of some saints, fell upon the veils of her head and entirely burnt itself out upon them, without doing any harm or making any mark."¹⁰⁸

According to the official provision of the Roman Church, three miracles are the minimum number that qualify one for sainthood. Nor are miraels wholly without value in the eyes of the modern church, Protestant, Greek, or Latin. The immaculate conception proves the divinity of Christ and the miracle of turning water into wine testifies to his oneness with God.¹⁰⁹ "I

should not be a Christian were it not for the miracles," said Saint Augustine,¹¹⁰ and many devout believers could echo his words. To quote Pascal:

"Miracles are more important than you think; they have served for the foundation; and will serve for the continuance of the Church till the coming of Antichrist."¹¹¹

"Miracles . . . a support of religion . . . have been the test of Jews, of Christians, of saints, of innocents, and of true believers."¹¹²

It was a daring venture when Fichte, in his *Kritik der Offenbarung*, announced that "no proof of the divinity of a revelation can be derived from an appeal to miracles occurring in connection with it; but that the question of its authenticity can be decided only by an examination of its contents;" and his book was not allowed publication by the Dean of the Theological Faculty of Halle, because of this heresy.¹¹³ Dear to the heart of the believer are these miracles and loudly do they proclaim the divinity of him who manipulates them—albeit a miracle is only an unusual phenomenon, impressive in inverse proportion to its usualness.

Something of this element of unusualness or of impenetrability is essential to religious emotion. To understand too well is to lose emotion; too much light dissipates awe and reverence. For, as Durkheim has said, the mystery is not inherent in the event itself, but in the paucity of our understanding of the same and is due entirely to our ignorance. Thus, as the illustrations adduced abundantly show, what is mysterious to one is mere matter of fact to another and what was once a mystery becomes explained fact and with this additional information the original awe is gone. For every mystery—save in so far as everything is a mystery—is, in fact, merely a provisional mystery which science as it progresses explains away step by step. Now, religion and magic pertain only to the sphere in which our science has not succeeded in giving us systematic knowledge and clear concepts, and which remains for our intellect a *terra incognita*. For him who possessed an integral science which translated the whole world of fact and fancy into clear and definite concepts—a creature no one would envy—the mysterious would no longer exist since for it explanation is suicidal. Veness expresses a fact of the imaginative faculty that is common to all of us when he speaks of the awe which we feel as a sense

of the vastness and incomprehensibility of Nature, when it floods in upon us:

"The dark night, only sufficiently lighted up to enable you to see the dark shadow of the bush thrown on the water, the overpowering sense of solitude; the still silence broken only by the sound of paddles, or of the insects in the forest, or perhaps the horrible roar of the red howling monkey . . . combine to fill the mind with awe and to carry the thoughts beyond the world to its great Artificer."¹¹¹

Moreover, the cosmic emotion which we feel when conscious of ourselves as limited finites peering into the great boundless infinite we could not experience if our knowledge furnished us with organised logical, indisputable information as to the details of the parts and the scheme of the whole, if it explained the means used, the ends attained and the reasons for all. Perhaps no better expression of this emotional change can be given than the following words from an anonymous author who tells us:

"A great scientist has said that the more a man of science investigates the secrets of nature, the more does he marvel at them and the less is he astonished. . . . The more he ponders over her mysteries the more inexplicable does he feel to be the solution to him, with his practiced intellect and stored-up knowledge; the drop of water or the simplest moss is as wonderful in its essence and perplexes him as greatly as do the most startling phenomena, such as tempests, eclipses, etc. With the uncultured man the familiarity of sameness fills him with indifference. . . . That an apple falls to the ground or that a man is capable of standing upright causes no perplexity to the savage or the child; they evoke as little astonishment in them as in the elephant or the horse."¹¹²

To clarify religious concepts and the content of religious beliefs is to devitalize them and to rob religion of its real essence, the emotions of awe and reverence.

Etymology gives interesting corroboration of the historical relation between the unusual and awe and reverence, between miracles and religious emotion. For example, we find that:

In its earliest use "marvel" meant a "miracle," then "a wonderful or astonishing thing; a cause of surprise, admiration or wonder; a wonder;" the *marvellous* meant "that which is prodigious or extravagantly improbable," or "of poetic material; concerned with the supernatural;" while the verb *marvel* means, "to be filled with wonder or astonishment; to be struck with surprise."¹¹³

So *miracle* comes from Latin *mirari*, to wonder at,¹¹⁴ the same stem from which *marvel* is derived; thus showing a historical connection or unity of

these concepts. Moreover we find the same connection recorded in the history of the word "wonder:"

"*Wonder*, a strange thing, a prodigy, a portent, admiration. . . . The original sense is 'awe,' lit. that from which one *turns aside*, or 'that which is turned from,' from Teut. base *Wand*, to wind, turn."¹¹⁸

Mystery is in general a fact, matter, or phenomenon, of which the meaning, explanation or cause is not known and which awakens curiosity or inspires awe.¹¹⁹

Canny, comes from *can* in the sense of "to know how, be able, or the derived Sc. sb. *Can*, knowledge, skill." Hence it meant, "knowing, sagacious, judicious, prudent."¹²⁰ In our use of the word *uncanny* we have grown accustomed to emphasize the emotional state and mental attitude with which we view the uncanny, *i.e.*, the unknown. Hence its present meaning—due to this emphasis or interest: "Eery, weird, mysterious; apparently not of this world; hence, noting one supposed to possess preternatural powers."¹²¹

So, *σεβέσθαι*, which "expresses primarily, the notion of fright,"¹²² meaning, "to be afraid of anything" is cognate with "*σεβιθω*, to worship, honour."¹²³ *σεβας* meaning, "reverential awe, a feeling of awe and shame; generally reverence, worship, honour, esteem; the awe one feels at any astonishing sight; astonishment, wonder; after Homer, the object of reverential awe, majesty, holiness, etc."¹²⁴

In another Greek word we meet with a record of this connection of the element of surprise and reverence with the unusual—that is the thing to be marvelled at: "*θαυμάσω*, to wonder, be astonished; to look on with wonder and amazement, to wonder, marvel at a thing: later, like Latin, *mirari*, to regard with wonder and reverence, to esteem, honour, admire, praise; to wonder, marvel at; " while *θαυμα* meant "whatever one regards with wonder or astonishment, a wonder, marvel, wondrous thing, work of wonder; wonder, surprise, astonishment. ("The money paid to see conjuror's tricks," was called *θαυμακτροι*.) A similar story is recorded in Arabic words: "the Arabic terms *ittaga*, to be pious, *tagwa* or *taga*, piety, *taqi*, pious, properly denote the idea of 'being on one's guard against something.'¹²⁵

Herbert Spencer's statement that "anything which transcends the ordinary, a savage thinks of as supernatural and divine"¹²⁶ would seem to have a wider application than he imagined.

A similar attitude toward unusual and apparently uncaused phenomena is probably to be found in every one of us. The most civilized, the most sceptical and scientific and incredulous of us are not free from these uncanny feelings in the presence of phenomena which we cannot understand. "Who of us has not been told the common tale of death by fright from imaginary ghosts?" or of "the man who dies from fright because his clothes got entangled in the coffin of a dead man?" Indeed,

if any would test this in himself, let him, as Lane suggests, take the road by night, if only to regain something of that awe of nature, that fear of the elemental, which the resources of civilization have well-nigh driven out of the townsman's life.¹²⁷ And yet it is not physical injury that one apprehends in these situations—no one fears physical injury from a ghost, however great his horror of making its acquaintance. Indeed, the ultimate explanation seems to be an innate fear and spontaneous reaction upon these unusual or apparently uncaused phenomena. So universal is this that the present writer, for one, is convinced that, apart from any fear of bodily harm—it is not physical injury that one fears before he runs away—the most imperturbable scientist or philosopher, sitting quiet and alone in his study at the ominous hour of midnight, would be moved by emotions other than those of mere curiosity or of annoyance, should his books persist in quietly rearranging themselves on the shelves, or the pens rise and dance merrily on his table. Who would not then exhibit that “fear of the unknown” which is said to be “one of the strongest characteristics of primitive man?” Like him: “He may not fear his fellowmen, nor the beasts of the forest; but he lives in perpetual awe of those unseen powers which, from time to time, seem bent on his destruction.”¹²⁸

This attitude toward the unusual and the apparently uncaused is not peculiar to man but seems to be shared by many of the higher animals. The classical instance is that of the dog of Romanes, which was terrified by a bone moved across the floor by means of an invisible thread. Here is individual psychology with a vengeance: it has nothing of the social tinge about it.¹²⁹ Nor is there anything soeial in the action of the terrier, which was frightened terribly by notes from a piano when no player was to be seen—said terrier showing ordinarily a manifest liking for music from this instrument.¹³⁰ Horses pay no attention to a horse and carriage that they meet on a road, but will often shy at a carriage minus the horse.¹³¹ Thus Sully's observation that children are often terrified by the strange and irregular behavior of a feather as it glides along the floor or lifts itself into the air¹³² can be paralleled abundantly in the animal world.¹³³

Waterhouse¹³⁴ says he has failed to find these alleged reactions in the case of animals upon whieh he has made experiments; but

no one will deny that, with all of the higher animals, as with man, *the unusual and unfamiliar is interesting and claims attention.* As Poincaré says, the isolated fact strikes all eyes, those of the vulgar as well as those of the learned.¹³⁵ Moreover, this interest must have had a very vital relation to the life of the individual and the survival of the species in the struggle for existence. The inference is supported by the fact that this interest is not manifested by the lowest orders of animal life and that it is nowhere so generally observable as in those animals which have reached the highest state of development. Trust your ancestral cousin, the monkey, to notice a new fad as quickly as any member of *Homo sapiens* observes it. All know how to deal with the things of everyday experience but every new appearance is a new problem, a new possibility that may either offer material advantage or present an unsuspected danger. The unusual event is frequent with a potentiality that may take the direction of benefit or of disaster with unforeseen probability, and must be closely observed in order to snatch the benefit or flee the danger. Where existence is precarious, with deadly enemies lurking everywhere and liable to appear anywhere and anywhen, the noises and movements which are not familiar, which have not been found by experience to be consonant with safety, must receive immediate close attention. The animal which does not invariably and attentively observe such strange and unfamiliar happenings is at a great disadvantage as compared to one which is keenly alert to all such. To be keenly alive to advantage or to danger is a distinct asset and one that must, in the long run, tend to secure the survival of the individual and so of the species, which was so fortunate as to possess this quality. Thus, to pay attention to the unfamiliar is a distinct gain; inasmuch as the enemy, if lurking there, will the more easily be discovered and escape will be more probable where flight is timely. Another considerable advantage is gained when the animal not merely attends to the unusual phenomenon, but reacts spontaneously and takes to flight or to shelter before the enemy has gained even the advantage of staying its flight while holding its attention. The tendency to react spontaneously becomes another considerable asset in the struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest. It would indeed be matter of surprise if a tendency so universal, both geographically and culturally, in human psychology and physi-

ology, did not have its roots in the higher animals and a pre-human ancestry. If, now, this is the crude basis of religion and of magic alike, it follows that these are rooted in individual as well as in social psychology. If President Hall's generalization be true that,

"It is a commonplace of religious psychology that in every individual and race are found the elements of about every religion that ever was in the world, from fetishism up, and that the best Christian is so only by a more or less safe working majority of his faculties,"¹³⁶

it can be so only on the supposition that religion is, at basis, a matter of individual psychology.

As we have pointed out, the crust of custom or of the usual has to be broken before a sense of wonder and mystery are aroused within us; the unknown is, literally and actually, the *uncanny*, or *unkenned*; devices that seem most impressive till known, become disgustingly simple and even vulgar when they are completely understood. As W. I. Thomas has said:¹³⁷

"It is psychologically true that only the unfamiliar and not—completely—controlled is interesting. This is the secret of the interest of modern scientific pursuit and of games. States of high emotional tension are due to the presentation of the unfamiliar—that is, the unanalysed, the uncontrolled—to the attention. And although the intimate association and daily familiarity of family life produce affection, they are not favorable to the genesis of romantic love. Cognition is so complete that no place is left for emotional appreciation."

A word may be said as to our interpretation of certain things as caused or uncaused, usual or unusual. Those interested in the unusual and unfamiliar will read with pleasure the first few chapters of Poincaré's *Science et Méthode*. In this work, M. Poincaré endeavors to give us the psychology of scientific effort and advance, the basis of which he finds to be the desire to schematize every fact of the universe, and assign to each its proper relative position and value—in a word, an endeavor to bring order and harmony out of chaos and confusion. The isolated and apparently uncaused fact must be assigned its proper place in the sequence or correspondence of things, and thus be shown not to be really uncaused. Until this place in the scheme is found we feel about the isolated, unexplained fact much as we feel about a vibrating string that is neither in temporal nor in tone unison with other vibrating chords. In a word, a love for the harmony and orderliness of things is responsible

for all of our scientific interest and progress. Certainly this "harmony" is an immense gain. It brings economy of thought, as expressed in every generalization and "class" or connotative word; the categories of cause and effect assign things their proper relative positions in the order and sequence of events, enable us to grasp and make use of our knowledge with minimum effort, and must be considered one of the essentials of advance. But this is only one way of saying that the progress of knowledge has been due to continued attempts to transform the unusual and the uncaused into the usual and the caused.

Perhaps a certain amount of support is given to Poincaré's interpretation by the fundamental part rhythm and the love of rhythm plays in our whole physiological and psychological life.¹³⁸ Every people known to us have some form of music, and always *rhythm* is a predominant characteristic—sometimes, to our ears, almost the only quality it possesses. Indeed, in the case of uncivilized people, it is perhaps, an all-inclusive generalization that music is limited to airs possessing an obvious rhythm.¹³⁹ Perhaps the systematization of all experience is part of this desire for harmony in all things.

We are not contending that savages make the distinction of unusual and uncaused after the manner that we have attempted to classify these magico-religious phenomena, any more than the man who fears ghosts and monsters makes such a distinction. But, in the words of Goblet d'Alviella,¹⁴⁰

"The most benighted savages, even when they have no idea of the distinction between natural and supernatural, perceive quite clearly that certain events are due to causes whose connection is self-evident. They did not need to wait till a Newton came to reveal the law of gravitation, in order to convince themselves that, if an apple detached from a tree falls to the ground, there is nothing in this phenomenon but what is natural and capable of being foreseen. But everything that strikes them as unusual and unexpected—and this category includes the great majority of phenomena—seems to them due to the action of invisible powers acting through mysterious processes."¹⁴¹

These powers, says d'Alviella, bear amongst all non-civilized peoples, a generic name which corresponds in their respective languages to our term "spirits."

But, needless to say, we can suppose no such conscious categorizing on the part of the higher animals. Nor do the facts, admitting the correctness of our interpretation of

them, prove or tend to prove that animals are religious because they respond to the unusual and apparently uncaused in much the same way that we humans respond to these self-same phenomena. But the emotional and spontaneous reaction may be present and of such a nature as not to be essentially different from that of men. Indeed it would be matter of surprise if phenomena so universal as these attitudes toward the unusual were not rooted in our pre-human ancestors; while their existence among practically all of the higher animals over the entire globe makes it fairly certain that these spontaneous reactions have been of utility to the species and have had an intimate relation to its survival and perpetuation.¹⁴²

From this point of view there is perhaps no better statement of the implications of the question than that given us by Waterhouse, with whose view I find myself in entire accord. He says:

"The old postulate of a religious faculty existing apart from anything the brutes possess, and supposed to be divinely bestowed, is hardly capable of defence to-day; but it would be sheer perversity to treat religion as if it were not a human *differentia* on the ground that the emotions that exist as religious in man are also found in brutes. That would be to identify religion with certain emotions instead of referring it to a distinctive object of these emotions. The difference in the conception of the object distinguishes clearly the emotions as religious. A savage's awe of the supernatural is *toto coelo* different from the same emotion in a dog with regard to his master.

"If a sharp dividing-line could be drawn between man and the brute, it might be possible to point to the origin of religion. Since that is impossible, the origin of religion is buried behind the blurred haze that lies over the pathway which joins the two points, which to us are none the less distinct, between the lowest man and the highest brute. It may be assumed that there is no break, that continuity is complete, but that must not prevent the facts being handled as we have them, and they are these: that, whilst the emotions that are religious in man exist in brutes, they do not exist as religious in brutes; but their religious quality is something added to them in their passage to man, a something that belongs to man as man."¹⁴³

Our attempt has been to point out a common objective element in these magico-religious phenomena, and not to attempt an interpretation of the various ways in which this may develop into various religious forms and practices with all their complications of tabus and sanctions.¹⁴⁴ Here is one of the ways in which the probability of that development has been outlined:

"The saying *Primus in orbe deos fecit timor* is, with some qualification,

to be accepted as true. At all events we cannot fail to notice that, even in the later times, the dread inspired by the more mysterious phenomena of nature leads man to personify the powers that produce them, and such powers he timidly endeavors to conciliate. The *fear* of God afterwards assumes a nobler character, but nevertheless retains traces of its origin.⁷¹⁴⁵

But records of historical development are few, and did we have them, we should scarcely expect to find the same story told by each and all of them alike. There is no well-defined groove along which every religious system must move in its historical unfoldment.

How we shall feel toward an event or its explanation depends largely upon the centering of our interest. The Australians speak of the remotest time in the dim mythical past when the features of the country had not yet been formed and half-men half-animal creatures walked about, as the *Alcheringa* times. The question what happened before the *Alcheringa* times is cause for merriment from its very absurdity, and does not tend to set them thinking. Now, their interest might center upon portions of the *Alcheringa* times without ever going prior to it; but if they really centered their attention upon the *Alcheringa* as a period of time then the question what was *before* the *Alcheringa* must arise and would, we are forced to believe, receive some answer, more or less satisfactory to the propounder. For it seems essential that there should be a before and an after to that on which our interest is centered, even if that before be nothing more definite than a pre-*Alcheringa* period. In that case the break may be abrupt, but no explanation on which our interest is centered will be without its own explanation. Perhaps to this shifting of interest, as much as to our Poincaréan love of harmony and order, is due the pursuit of wisdom and the advancement of science. For each explanation becomes in itself a thing to be explained when once we center our interest on the explanation; and no first or no ultimate remains such when once we have centered our interest on these aspects.

In conclusion, let it be said that this is merely an attempt to explain an essential and invariable element in all magic and all religions. Possibly in its inadequate way, it may add a chapter to the threshold of religion. Possibly we have shown the foundation of the magico-religious to rest in individual as well as in social psychology, and have demonstrated a fundamental error in viewing religion as simply a social phenomenon.

Social, in the sense that intellect itself, according to some thinkers, is social, it may be. Even so its roots reach back into the remote past when began that struggle with the unknown which baffles yet the keenest intellect. Just how this fear has become socialized giving us the various forms of religion that we have to-day is a problem that awaits the worker in social psychology and in historic-anthropology.

To sum up: From the very heterogeneous material which we have presented, a common trait of spontaneous reaction upon unusual phenomena seems to emerge. The unrelated, unclassified events are wont to be placed without the pale of the natural and well within the region of the saero-sanct. As Dr. Lowie has admirably expressed it, "Observations contrary to the past experience disturb our mental equilibrium, which can be readjusted only by bringing both the ordinary observation and the deviations from it under a common law."¹⁴⁶ We have found that the attitude taken toward these phenomena is almost invariably one of fear—an emotion whose intellectual correlate is, as we have seen, so frequently *mystery*.

Moreover, we the super-civilized and the supereilious, have yet a great deal of the savage in us. "So superstitious is he," writes Fewkes of the Zuñi, "that he fears any trifling event of an unusual nature. . . . Any unusual occurrence in life is so mysterious as to cause fear."¹⁴⁷ And yet, it may be doubted whether civilized man is any less susceptible to these reactions than is the savage, the difference being not one of emotional toning in the presence of the unusual, but rather the greater bounds of knowledge mediate or immediate into which so much of the realm still unconquered by savage man has been placed by civilized man in a way that meets his own intellectual demands. Both alike are in fear and well on the way to the awe and sense of mystery in which religion must ever enshrine itself, when in the presence of what is for both an unusual and unknown occurrence, each interpreting it according to his bent.

In closing, let the following extract from Biard's account, written 1611-16,¹⁴⁸ of the trip of the French up the St. John river, remind us that all mankind is kin in the presence of the unusual, and each in his own way is wont to surround it with a dim halo of mystic significance.

"Now, as we were sailing up the river, being already about a league and a half from the Malouin [Malecite] settlement, towards nightfall a phe-

nomenon appeared to us, which filled us with terror. For the heavens became wonderfully red over the Malouin habitation, and then the glow, separating into long rays and flashes of light, moved on and melted away over this settlement. This appeared twice. Our Savages when they saw this wonder, cried out in their language: 'We shall have war, there will be blood.' The French also made some Prophesies thereupon, each according to his own idea."

NOTES

¹⁻² See *L'Année Sociologique*, vol. 2, pp. 4-6, 23-25.

³ This definition of religion was intimated, but not developed by Moneure D. Conway in an early number of the *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*. Its best exponents are William McDougall, *Social Psychology* (1909); and R. R. Marett, *The Threshold of Religion* (1909), *Birth of Humility* (1910). See also an article by Andrew Lang in the *Contemporary Review* for May, 1909; Preuss' review of the literature relating to the religions of primitive peoples in the *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft* for October, 1910; Lévy-Bruhl, *Les fonctions mentales dans les Sociétés inférieures* (1910), Chapter IX.

⁴ See the works referred to in the previous note. Also Hartland's Address before Section H. (Anthropology) of the British Association for the Advancement of Science (York Meeting, 1906); Leuba, *The Psychological Origin and the Nature of Religion* (1909); Haddon, *Magic and Fetishism* (1906); and J. G. Frazer, *The Golden Bough and Early History of the Kingship*, to whose theory of an absolute separation between religion and magic the subsequent discussion referred to above is due.

⁵ As a living biological authority has said, with regard to life and living things, "At the present time the student of living things shows a tendency to regard any phenomenon as explained, when once it falls under known laws of physiological stimulation or metabolism, although the ultimate causes of these things are unknown." (L. Doncaster, "Vitalism," *Science Progress*, Jan., 1912, vol. 6, p. 388.) Or, as Tennant expresses it (*Hastings' Encycl. Rel. and Ethics*, vol. 3, p. 262): "Experience shows us one thing coming after another, but not *out of* it; observation reveals succession, and regularity of succession, but nothing more." The entire article on "Cause and Causality" may be consulted with profit. For clear statements of the concept of "cause" and "causality," see especially Hume, *Treatise of Human Nature*, Paulsen, *Introduction to Philosophy*, and Francis Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*.

⁶ Practically all of the Melanesian material is from Codrington. For Australia, a number of authorities have been consulted, more especially Spence and Gillen and Howitt.

⁷ The following psychology of resemblance is interesting in this connection as showing the spontaneous interest taken in resemblances for their own sake: "Up to a certain, or rather an uncertain, point, the perception of identity or likeness between two things is in itself, a source of pleasure to man." It is with keen delight that children recognize in a picture, "a thing which they have actually seen. . . . And so with ignorant people when they look at a picture, the great, if not the only, source

of pleasure seems to be the detecting of the likeness to something they know. They pass by the pictures which might communicate new ideas, and rejoice to find some face or some place which they know." (Fry, in *Contemp. Rev.*, vol. 75 (1889), p. 665.)

⁸⁻⁹ In the west end of Savaii were two circular openings among the rocks near the beach, where the souls of the departed were supposed to find an entrance to the world of spirits, away under the ocean. The chiefs went down the larger of the two and the common people had the smaller one. They were conveyed thither by a band of spirits. (Turner, p. 257.) Spirits of the dead were supposed to descend down a hollow pit, to Pulotu, the dominions of Saveasiuleo. "May you go rumbling down the hollow pit" was the common language of cursing. (p. 258.)

¹⁰ C. Lumholtz, *Among Cannibals* (1889).

¹¹⁻¹² "A singular clump of Casuarina was close to the westward of the cliffs, and its dark naked aspect contrasted with the stunted gum-trees and scattered palms, sparingly sprinkled over this sterile tract of country." (Stokes, vol. I, p. 428.) Compare with Codrington's description, the following: "Its [the wind's] melancholy sighing through the branches of the she-oak tree caused an unceasing and almost fearful sound, that one might imagine to be the distant wail of spirits." (Angas, vol. I, p. 125.)

¹³ Quoting Henry Balfour, Esq.

¹⁵ W. F. Flinders Petrie, *Egyptian Decorative Art* (1895).

¹⁶ "At Bugoto, in Ysabel, ghosts cross the pool of *Kolap a pauro* by the narrow tree-trunks which lie over it. But, before they are admitted into the presence of the *Bolafagina*, the tindalo lord of the place, they must have upon their hands the conventional outline of the frigate-bird, the passport to the Eleusinian fields. The oath by *Daula*, the name of the frigate-bird, is in Florida, where Daula is a tindalo, solemn and binding. At Ulawa, the sacred character of such an oath is denoted by the word *kaula*. Many ghosts reside in these birds which are powerful to aid at sea; hence an image of the frigate-bird frequently finds a place upon the prow or the stern of a canoe. Dr. Rivers believes that the sacredness of the frigate-bird is not native to the island, but has been imported. I was not informed and forgot to ask on what grounds he bases this view. When Dr. Rivers publishes the results of his field-work in Melanesia, many of these points will doubtless be illuminated.

¹⁷ F. E. Hulme, *Natural History Lore and Legend* (1895), pp. 255-259.

¹⁸ See Gould, *Birds of New Guinea* (1875-1888), vol. 4, *Birds of Australia* (7 vols. 1840-1848, 1851-1870), vol. 2, *Birds of Asia* (7 vols., 1850-1887), vol 1; Newton, *Dictionary of Birds* (1893-1896), p. 486; *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 10th ed., vol. 24, p. 80.

¹⁹ There are the following confirmatory descriptions from Australia: "Then there is the Laughing Jackass, or Gigantic Kingfisher, a most comical bird. . . . They seem to be generally convulsed with laughter when an unlucky traveller meets with an accident, when drays get stuck, or when one is vainly looking for water." "Suddenly I heard a strange sound; it was the *luahing jackass*, or *mocking-bird*, whose laugh is exactly like a man's. The bird was nowhere to be seen; like the nightingale, he hides

in the recesses of the forest." In similar strain Lumholtz speaks of "the tittering ha! ha! ha! ha! ha! of the laughing jackass." (E. B. Kennedy, *Four Years in Queensland* (1870), p. 108; G. Verschuur, *At the Antipodes* (1891), p. 49; Lumholtz, *Op. cit.*, p. 207; W. E. Roth, *Ethnological Studies among the North-West-Central Queensland Aborigines* (1897), p. 126.

"The laughing jackass, a senseless term, is a butcher bird, and its note bears a slight resemblance to the coarse and boisterous laugh of a man, but is much louder and more dissonant." (W. H. Breton, *Excursions in New South Wales, etc.*, (1833), vol. I., p. 273.)

Bennett writes of the laughing jackass: "Its peculiar gurgling laugh, commencing from a low, and gradually rising to a high and loud tone, is often heard by the traveller in all parts of the colony, sending forth its deafening noises whilst perched upon the lofty branch of a tree."

An Australian lady referred to it as the unparalleled "feathered donkey." (Bennett, vol. I., pp. 222-3.)

²⁰ Cf. D. S. Jordan, *A Guide to Study of Fishes* (1905), p. 264.

²¹ The bonito, which is one of the principal articles of food in the New Hebrides, is not, he says, a sacred animal in that island. Codrington's information about the Solomon Islands was second-hand, and Dr. Rivers thinks it probable he was misinformed with regard to the sacredness of the bonito there. (This information was given me in 1910. I have had no opportunity to get the more recent views of Dr. Rivers on these matters.) See also, with respect to the significance of this sacredness, J. G. Frazer, *Totemism and Exogamy*, vol. II.

²² J. Mathew, *Eaglehawk and Crow* (1899), p. 146.

²³ Taplin, *The Narrinyeri* (1879), p. 48, p. 91.

²⁴ Ridley, *Kamilaroi, etc.* (1875), p. 138.

²⁵ Spencer and Gillen, *Native Tribes of Central Australia* (1899); Strehlow, *Die Aranda und Loritjastämme* (1908); vol. I., pp. 28-29; Angas, *Savage Life and Scenes in Australia and New Zealand* (1850), vol. I., pp. 97-98.

²⁶ Roth (*Ethnological Studies*, p. 153, p. 160) speaks of a dreaded water-spirit by the name of *Kammare*; and Angas (vol. I., pp. 97-8) tells us that the Moorundi, near the great north-west bend of the Murray, live in dread of a water-spirit inhabiting the Murray, and having the form of an enormous star-fish.

²⁷ Woods, *The Native Tribes of South Australia* (1879), p. 202.

²⁸ Howitt, *Native Tribes of South-East Australia* (1904), pp. 453, 376-377, 363, 366,—also *Journal of Anthropological Institute*, vol. 16, p. 27; Fison and Howitt, *Kamilaroi and Kurnai* (1880), p. 252; *Anthropos*, vol. 4, p. 210, p. 230. See also Lane-Fox, *Catalogue of Anthropological Collections, etc.*, p. 31, 32. For the nature of the Casuarina, cf. *Annales des Sciences Naturelles Botaniques*, 2 sér., t. 18, pp. 5-10. *Linnaea*, 1841, pp. 747-756 contains an article, "Bemerkungen über den anatomischen Bau der Casuarina," by H. R. Goffert; see *Ree's Cyclopaedia*, vol. 7., art. *Casuarina*."

It would be fanciful to identify *Tharamulun* or *Daramulun* with *Baru*, since the "God" of initiation for the Kurnai is *Bunjul*. So too, of doubt-

ful value is such evidence as the fact that in the Mukjarawaint tribe, the dead when not put into a hollow tree, were placed on the pollarded branches of a Casuarina.

²⁰ Spencer and Gillen, *Northern Tribes of Central Australia* (1904), pp. 566-568. This suggests a bird of the kingfisher type.

²¹ Lumholtz, *Among Cannibals* (1889), pp. 201-205.

²¹ The Italics are my own.

²² Taplin, *The Narrinyeri* (1879), p. 53.

²³ Fraser, in his *Aborigines of New South Wales* (p. 43), gives a similar incident from New South Wales: "Our Australian is a great coward when brought into contact with the unknown, especially if he can regard the thing as having some relation to the domain of spirits. One day when a blackfellow was present, one of my boys was blowing soap-bubbles; the man was frightened when he saw them and ran round the corner to hide from them."

^{24a} Cf. J. Dawson, *Australian Aborigines* (1881), p. 50; A. J. Peggs, in *Folk-Lore*, vol. 14, 1903, pp. 340-341; Codrington, p. 348; Strehlow, vol. I., p. 17.

^{24b} Fison and Howitt, *Op. cit.*, p. 218.

²⁴ Dawson, p. 534, p. 64.

²⁵ Mauss, *L'Origine des pouvoirs magiques dans quelques sociétés Australiennes* (1904), p. 40. See also Hubert and Mauss, *Mélanges d'histoire des religions* (1909), p. 171.

²⁶ Howitt, *Native Tribes of South-East Australia*, p. 354.

²⁷ This attitude is, however, not general in Australia. A similar variation in attitude towards twins and triplets meets us in Africa, some tribes welcoming their arrival others always destroying them. Any unusual occurrence in the birth, however, frequently will merit death to the infant; as, for example, the custom of the Baganda prescribing that infants born feet foremost be killed and buried at cross-roads. Cf. Frazer, *Totemism and Exogamy*, vol. II., p. 507.—A native informant tells me that though twins are common in Dahomey and triplets not infrequent, they are always allowed to live and no stigma or suspicion rests either on them or on the mother.

²⁸ *The Hibbert Journal*, January, 1910.

²⁹ *Journal of the Anthropological Institute*, vol. 2, p. 270.

^{40, 41} G. Turner, *Samoa* (1884), p. 327, 264.

⁴² A. Lyall, *Asiatic Studies* (First Series, 1882), p. 12; L. T. Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution* (2 vols., 1906), vol. 2, p. 4; E. B. Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, vol. 2, p. 160.

⁴³ Cf. Lockyer, *Stonehenge* (1906); W. Y. E. Wentz, *The Fairy-Faith in Celtic Countries* (1911).

⁴⁴ *Journal of the Anthropological Institute*, vol. 2, p. 156.

Not far from the quaint pueblo of Laguna in New Mexico rise seven black, ragged, peculiar looking rocks and these according to a Laguna tradition are the prison houses of seven spirits. (*The Southern Workman*, Nov., 1910, p. 618.) Leonard's explanation of the sacredness attaching to a particular stone described by him among the tribes of the Lower Niger is probably applicable to a large proportion of similar sacred stones.

He writes: "The natives are ignorant altogether of its history. How it, the only stone in the vicinity, got there, or where it came from, is a blank and a mystery, which renders it all the more sacred;" it "excited in him the same feeling of awe and mystery that any object did, which to him was incomprehensible." (A Leonard, *The Lower Niger and its Tribes* (1906), p. 306, p. 312.)

⁴⁵ Hugh Clifford in *Dublin Review*, January, 1911, p. 152.

⁴⁶ See particularly Sir John Evans, *Ancient Stone Implements of Great Britain and Ireland*; *The British Museum Guide to the Stone Age*; Boyd-Dawkins, *Early Man in Britain*; Wilson, *Prehistoric Man*; Wentz, *The Fairy-Faith in Celtic Countries*. A Teleut tradition states that the reality of the shamanistic powers of a shamanka ancestress was tested by shooting an arrow at her, not unlike the experiment tried upon Captain Cook, though with different success. The Buryats of the Altai, upon finding that Makhunai was incombustible, having tested this alleged property by covering him with seventy cart-loads of straw, which were then set on fire, agreed that he possessed magical powers; and since that day the authorities of Irkutsk have allowed the shamans to carry on their profession. (*Journal of the Anthropological Institute*, p. 24, 134; but see p. 137, where it is stated that, "In the Kolymsk district an old shamanka who could do no tricks was much esteemed, while a clever young wizard who could perform the most complicated shamanist miracles was of no repute.) In some African tribes, to be born feet-foremost was ominous. In Scotland, according to Gregor, "those who were born with their feet first possessed great power to heal all kinds of sprains, lumbago, and rheumatism, either by rubbing the affected part or by trampling on it. The great virtue lay in the feet." (*Journal of the Anthropological Institute*, vol. III., p. 271.)

⁴⁷ A. B. Ellis, *The Yoruba-Speaking Peoples* (1894), p. 238.

⁴⁸ R. H. Nassau, *Fetichism* (1904), p. 179. To the same effect is the brief entertained by the Apaches that if the bull-roarer is made from a tree obtained from the mountain heights, which has previously been struck by lightning, "it possesses special qualities in controlling the elements." (Antonio Apache, in Article on "Apaches," in *Hastings' Encycl. Rel. and Ethics*, vol. I.) "The word 'rune' seems properly to mean 'secrecy,' as it was long considered a wonderful secret how one man could by such simple strokes communicate his thoughts to another. From this it was a natural step to attribute to runes a secret magic power; and so we have pretty frequent accounts of their use as charms." (Montelius, *The Civilization of Sweden in Heathen Times* (1888), p. 209.) "Le nombre des fétiches" writes François, "est considérable au Dahomey. Toute manifestation d'une force que l'indigène ne peut définir, tout phénomène qui dépasse son imagination ou son intelligence est fétiche. Tous les maux qui accablent le noir dénotent l'existence d'un fétiche." (G. François, *Le Dahomey* (1909), p. 96.)

⁴⁹ A. Werner, *The Natives of British Central Africa* (1906), p. 88.

⁵⁰ Veness, *Ten Years of Mission Life in British Guiana* (1875), p. 29.

⁵¹ R. C. Thompson, *Semitic Magic* (1908), pp. 33-34.

⁵² Hertz Bey, *Guide to the Arab Museum at Cairo*.

³³ S. L. Krebs, *The Law of Suggestion*, p. 64.

³⁴ Cf. the article on "Alchemy" (European) in *Hastings' Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, vol. I, p. 294.

³⁵ "Ipse Gerbertus (Silvester II) fecit arte mechanico horologium et organa hydraulica, ubi mirum in modum, per aquae calefactae violentiam, implet ventus emergens concavitatem barbati et per multos foratiles tractus aereae fistulae modulatos clamores emittunt." Cf. Hare, A. J. C., *Walks in Rome* (1871), p. 406; Young, *Story of Rome* (1901), p. 179. Similarly, among the Arabs, "any man noted for his intelligence is supposed to have a *tabi* who reveals all manner of things to him." *Hastings' Encycl. of Rel. and Ethics*, vol. I, p. 670. "Even heathen Arabian poets speak of Palmyra as having been built for King Solomon by the Jinn;" and, Nöldeke believes, "the demons were brought into the story because the edifices of the city seemed too marvellous to be the work of men." *Ibid.*

³⁶ Dufton, *Narrative of a Journey through Abyssinia* (1867), p. 167; M. Parkyns, *Life in Abyssinia* (2 vols., 1853).

³⁷ See *The Threshold of Religion*.

³⁸ See *The Individual* (1900), pp. 200-203.

³⁹ E. S. Hartland, in a recent article in *Hastings' Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics* (vol. IV., "Death and Disposal of the Dead,—Introductory"), again refers to a universal fear of a corpse.

⁴⁰ Cf. *The Church Times* (English Weekly), April 16, 1909.

⁴¹ See *Descent of Man*, vol. I, p. 76.

⁴² *Northwest Coast*, 1857, p. 212. Quoted in *Rep. Bur. Ethnol.*, vol. I, p. 201.

⁴³ Eells, quoted by Yarrow, in *Rep. Bur. Ethnol.*, vol. I, p. 176.

⁴⁴ *Rep. Bur. Ethnol.*, vol. 6, p. 612.

⁴⁵ Fison and Howitt, *Kamilaroi and Kurnai*, p. 18; J. Mathew, *Eagle-hawk and Crow*, p. 91; Peggs, in *Folk-Lore*, vol. 14 (1903), p. 341, p. 356.

⁴⁶ C. Hill-Tout, in *Journal of the Anthropological Institute*, vol. 35, p. 137.

⁴⁷ *Semitic Magic*, pp. 19, 109, 120, 132. Cf. Frazer, in *Journal of the Anthropological Institute*, vol. 15; Yarrow in *Rep. Bur. Ethnol.*, vol. I.

⁴⁸ Turner, "Hudson Bay Eskimo," *Rep. Bur. Ethnol.*, vol. 11, p. 272.

⁴⁹ *Impressions of a Careless Traveller*, p. 125.

⁵⁰ *Origin of Worship*, p. 40, pp. 106-107.

⁵¹ Fison and Howitt, *Kamilaroi and Kurnai*, p. 18.

⁵² The Nagas of India make sacrifices and propitiations to those who have died a natural death, but not to those who have been killed by some calamity, such as an attack by a tiger, being run through with a spear, etc.

⁵³ *Religion of the Ancient Egyptians* (1905), p. 115.

⁵⁴ Horses have been known to run away when an attempt was made to drive them past the place where animals have been butchered.

⁵⁵⁻⁵⁶ Murdoch, "Point Barrow Eskimo," in *Rep. Bur. Ethnol.*, vol. 9, p. 51; p. 45.

⁵⁷⁻⁵⁸ Boas, "Central Eskimo," *Rep. Bur. Ethnol.*, vol. 6, p. 240; pp. 634-636, p. 640, pp. 640-641.

⁸⁰ H. Y. Hind, *Explorations in Labrador* (1867), vol. 1, p. 59.

⁸¹ Dall, *Contrib. to N. Amer. Ethnol.*, vol. 1 (1877), p. 29.

⁸² A. B. Ellis, *Yoruba*, p. 244.

⁸³ Bowen, *Yoruba Language*, p. XX.

⁸⁴ Ridgeway, "Presid. Address," in *Journal of the Anthropological Institute*, vol. 40, p. 18, citing Torday and Joyce.

⁸⁵ Maspero, *New Light on Ancient Egypt*, p. 89. "The peoples frequented by the traders of Elephantiné, through hearing of Egypt, its industry, its wealth, its armies, ended by conceiving for her an admiration somewhat mingled with fear; they learned to consider her a superior power, and the Pharaoh a god, whom no one dared to resist" (*Ibid.*, p. 21).

⁸⁶ E. Westermarek, "The Influence of Magic on Social Relationships," in *Sociological Papers* (London, 1905).

^{87,88} Westermarek, *The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas*, (2 vols., 1906), vol. 1, p. 626; p. 596.

⁸⁹ Ross, *Social Psychology* (1908), pp. 32-33.

⁹⁰ I agree with Ross (*Social Psychology*, pp. 202-203, p. 215) that a rapid and wide departure from the customary and familiar produces in many—I should be inclined to say, in nearly all of us—a distressing sense of self-alienation; but I differ with him when he says that much of man's fear of the unknown and untried was due to his animistic fears. I should be inclined to state it the other way and attribute his animistic fears to his innate fear of the unusual and the unknown.

A similar mistake seems to me to be attributable to L. T. Hobhouse, when he says (*Morals in Evolution*, vol. I., p. 20): "From this state of fear, custom is his great deliverer. What has been done once in safety, may possibly be done again. What has been done many times, is fairly sure to be safe. A new departure is full of dangers; not only to the man who takes it, but to those with whom he lives. . . . Custom is the one sure guide to law; custom is that part of law which has been discovered. Hence the reverence of primitive society for custom; hence their terror of the innovator." But, for the savage custom is a *sanctum per se* and not for him a conservation of those rules and laws which are found socially useful. Hobhouse seems to be reading our attitude into the native.

⁹¹ Cf. *British Museum Handbook to Ethnographical Collection*, p. 31. The following must be included in the same psychological category: "They will not whistle under a rock, having a tradition that some of the natives did, while feasting under one, and it fell from a great height and crushed them to death" (Barrington, *A Voyage to New South Wales* (N. Y., 1796), vol. 2, p. 34).

⁹² A man must accept and feed a white elephant when given him by a superior, even though the keep involves his ruin, as frequently happens. In Siam, wherefore, the phrase 'to have a white elephant on your hands' is too huge a joke for enjoyment.' An old Chinese drawing represents a white elephant as worshipping the sun and moon. Cf. T. W. King, *Siam and Java*, pp. 237-241.

⁹³ Boas, "Central Eskimo," *Rep. Bur. Ethnol.*, vol. 6, p. 640.

²⁴ De Quatrefages, *The Human Species* (Int. Scientif. Ser.), 1879, p. 74.

²⁵ Rattray, *Some Folk-Lore, etc.*, in *Chinyanja*, p. 194. Numerous things may cause this impotence: Should the umbilical cord fall on the pubes, should a child eat eggs, should a person get wounded with a porcupine-quill, should a rabbit run against a man's leg, he becomes a eunuch.

²⁶ See Alberti, L., *De Kaffers* (Amsterdam, 1810).

²⁷ K. Baedeker, *Southern Italy*, p. 402. For similar instances see J. A. McClymont, *Greece* (1906), p. 22; J. G. Frazer, *Adonis, Attis, Osiris* (1907), pp. 75 ff., 113 ff.; Vergil, *Aeneid*, VI, 237-242, VII, 84, 563-571.

²⁸ Turner, "Hudson Bay Eskimo," in *Rep. Bur. Ethnol.*, vol. 11, p. 272.

²⁹ Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution*, vol. 2, p. 40.

³⁰ "When Harb, the grandfather of the Khalif Un 'awiya, together with another man, was engaged in clearing a marsh for purposes of cultivation, white serpents were seen to fly out of the burning weeds; and when both persons died forthwith everyone perceived that the Jinn had slain them." (Article on "Arabs, Ancient" in *Hastings' Encycl. Rel. and Ethics*, vol. 1, p. 670.)

Frazer writes: "Primitive man believes that what is sacred is dangerous,—it is pervaded by a sort of electrical sanctity which communicates a shock to, even if it does not kill, whatever comes into contact with it. Hence the savage is unwilling to touch or even to see that which he deems peculiarly holy. Thus Bechuanas of the Crocodile clan, think it 'hateful and unlucky' to meet or see a crocodile; the sight is thought to cause inflammation of the eyes. Yet the crocodile is their most sacred object; they call it their father, swear by it, and celebrate it in their festivals." He "thinks that often in the primitive sentiment of religious awe and fear . . . the feelings of reverence and abhorrence are almost equally blended. . . . In course of time one of the contradictory feelings is likely to prevail over the other, and according as the feeling which finally predominates is that of reverence or abhorrence, the being who is the object of it will rise into a god or sink into a devil." (*Golden Bough*, vol. I., pp. 55-57. First edition.)

³¹ See Spinoza, *Tract. Theol. Polit.*

³² See Koran, *Sura* 20, 26-27.

³³-³⁴ Hare, *Walks in Rome*, p. 480, p. 430. Compare the crime of Saul in consulting the witch of Endor, I. Samuel XXVIII; see also Acts XIX, 19, where the hold of Christianity upon the people was shown by the fact that, "Not a few of them that practised curious arts brought their books together and burned them in the sight of all." See also, Thompson, *Op. cit.*, pp. 36, 46, 48, 58 of Introd.

³⁵-³⁶ Hare, *Op. cit.*, p. 371 (Leo I. was Pope from 440 to 416 A. D.); p. 356; p. 469 (quoting from Mrs. Jameson's *Sacred Art*).

³⁷ E. G. Gardner, *The Story of Siena, etc.*, 1903, p. 208. See also Ch. 2 and 7.

³⁸ Cf., for example, Torrey, *Difficulties and Alleged Contradictions in the Bible* (1907).

³⁹ B. Pascal, *Thoughts*, p. 71. See on "Miracles."

^{111,112} B. Pascal, *Thoughts on Jesuits and Jansenists* (Trans. C. K. Paul), p. 285; p. 286.

¹¹³ *History of Pantheism* (London, 1879), vol. 2, p. 149.

¹¹⁴ Veness, *Ten Years of Mission Life in British Guiana* (1875), p. 27.

¹¹⁵ *History of Pantheism*, vol. 2, p. 271. p. 318.

[Compare also the following expression of this fact by Iverach: "Take surprise, and we find that while we call by the same name the similar phenomena of an animal and a man, yet surprise is relative to the experience of the individual. We are not surprised at railways, telegraphs, telephones, motor cars, these have become the commonplaces of civilization." (James Iverach in article on "Altruism" in *Hastings' Ency. of Rel. and Ethics*, vol. 1, p. 356.) Jules Verne, in *Ten Thousand Leagues Under the Sea*, has expressed a truth with regard to our tendency to believe the marvellous in the remark: "That the vulgar should believe in extraordinary comets traversing space, and in the existence of antediluvian monsters in the heart of the globe, may well be; but neither astronomer nor geologist believes in such chimeras." The man trained in that field is on familiar ground; but to the uninitiated all things are possible and a mere statement that they exist makes their existence plausible.

Moreover, it usually follows that an attempt to subject the marvellous or the miraculous to too close scrutiny destroys faith in it. Hence, a wise provision of the church which invites little questioning of the truth of its alleged facts. George Eliot seems to have this in mind when Savonarola looking forward to his burning in the square at Florene, takes it for granted that a miracle will save him from the flames: "While it was easy for him to believe in a miracle, which, being distant and undefined, was screened behind the strong reasons he saw for its occurrence, . . . It was at the same time insurmountably difficult to him to believe in the probability of a miracle, which, like this of being carried unhurt through fire, pressed in all its details on his imagination and involved a demand, not only for belief, but for exceptional action." "The miracle—But no! when Savonarola brought his mind close to the threatened scene in the Piazza, and imagined a human body entering the fire, his belief recoiled again." (*Romola*, Ch. LXIV.)]

¹¹⁶ J. A. H. Murray, *New English Dictionary*, vol. 6.

^{117,118} Skeat, *Etymol. Dict. of the English Language*, under "Miracle," "Wonder."

¹¹⁹ *The Century Dictionary*, vol. 4.

¹²⁰ Murray, *New Engl. Dict.*, vol. 2, p. 73.

¹²¹ *Century Dict.*, vol. 6, p. 6585.

¹²² Hastings' *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, vol. 1, p. 660.

^{123,124} Liddell and Scott, *Greek-English Lexicon*, p. 1336; p. 626.

¹²⁵ Hastings, *Op. cit.*, vol. 1, p. 660. Nöldeke, from whom this quotation is taken, concludes that "thus they presuppose that man must take pains to protect himself against the injury which would be inflicted upon him by the higher powers, if he did not continually strive to pacify them."

¹²⁶ H. Spener, *Principles of Sociology*, vol. 2, p. 411.

¹²⁷ See Thompson, *Semitic Magic*, pp. 91.92; P. Topinard, *Science and*

Faith (1899), pp. 227-228; W. James, *Principles of Psychology*, vol. 2, Chapter on Instincts; Jenks, *Law and Politics in the Middle Ages* (1897), pp. 56-57; Ross, *Social Psychology*, pp. 202-203, p. 215.

¹²⁸ A very interesting article entitled "Our Superstitions" appeared in the *Outlook* for August 26, 1911, from the pen of H. Addington Bruce. In a canvass of Harvard professors Mr. Bruce found that eight out of ten believed in some superstition to the extent of being influenced in their actions by this belief. One partial explanation for the persistence of superstition, he suggests, "is the innate tendency of the human mind to lend credence to the uncanny and the marvellous."

¹²⁹ Romanes, *Animal Intelligence* (1881). See also Darwin, *Descent of Man*.

¹³⁰ On the authority of a friend. He observed that terror was manifested by his dog when he, hidden from the dog, played the piano through a window against which it was temporarily placed. He repeated the experiment at another time, and with like results.

¹³¹ In the experience of the writer, a stirring of the leaves by a small stick, which the animal had not seen thrown, frightened a quiet horse so that it broke from its hitching-post. He could cite many similar instances.

¹³² *Studies of Childhood* (1895).

¹³³ Karsten, in his *Origin of Worship* (1905), considers this action of animals in the presence of unusual phenomena animistic, i.e., as an attributing of spirits to such objects by the shy dumb beasts.(!)

¹³⁴ *Modern Theories of Religion* (1910).

¹³⁵ *Science et Méthode* (1908).

¹³⁶ G. Stanley Hall, *Educational Problems* (1911), vol. 2, p. 67.

¹³⁷ W. I. Thomas, *Sex and Society* (1907), p. 196. See also G. Stanley Hall, in *American Journal of Psychology*, vol. 7, p. 39; S. Lane-Poole, *Story of Cairo* (1902), p. 26; A. Seth (Pringle-Patterson), *Man's Place in the Cosmos* (1892; 1902).

¹³⁸ James' postulate that interests in unusual sounds "for ought we can see are without any utility whatever" is simply preposterous. (See his *Principles of Psychology*, vol. 1, p. 325.) The writer is not prepared to hold that the rocking of the cradle quiets the infant because it furnishes the conditions under which our ancestors, "probably arboreal" slept. Still it seems possible to hold that the rocking of trees and the swaying of limbs may have had some effect upon the nervous structure of animals that lived mostly in this movement. These "probably arboreans" whose organism was properly attuned, whose nervous structure was lulled and not irritated by these rhythms of the forest world, might in the long run possess some valuable advantages over those not similarly accommodated and not so favorably adjusted to their environment. See G. S. Hall, "A study of Anger," in *Amer. Jour. of Psych.*, vol. X, p. 590-1, and his *Educational Problems*, vol. I, Ch. II-III; Bolton, "Rhythm," in *Amer. Jour. of Psych.*, vol. VI, pp. 146-66; R. McDougall, in *Psychological Review* (1902), pp. 465-80; Bliss Carman, *The Making of Personality* (1908), p. 121. Moreover, James disregards the social advantage derived from music of securing concerted action—its compelling and unifying power.

¹³⁹ See an interesting discussion in G. Stanley Hall's *Adolescence* (1904), vol. 1, pp. 211-215, p. 465.

¹⁴⁰⁻¹⁴¹ In *Hastings' Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, vol. 1, p. 537, Article on "Animism."

¹⁴² "When children see a strange and somewhat alarming object or occurrence, they immediately assume what may be called a 'take-care' attitude, as if they should say, 'Look out; that object may hurt us; take care'; but there is not the slightest thought of its being animated by a spirit. Now, it seems to me that this 'take-care' attitude is perfectly natural and primitive. Why should it not have been the attitude assumed by our ancestors when they were in the presence of what they did not understand?" (Irving King, in the *Harvard Theol. Rev.*, 1911, p. 115.) See also this author's *The Development of Religion* (1910) and the present writer's review of that book in *Man* for August, 1911, where King's use of the usual and the unusual is criticized.

¹⁴³ E. S. Waterhouse, *Modern Theories of Religion*, p. 353. See an interesting discussion in William McDougall's *Social Psychology*, Chapter on "The Principal Instincts of Man."

¹⁴⁴⁻¹⁴⁵ Nöldeke, article on "Arabs" in *Hastings' Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, vol. 1, p. 660.

¹⁴⁶ An excellent discussion of the concept of *cause* will be found in Dr. Lowie's review of Cornelius (*Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, Apr. 25, 1912).

¹⁴⁷ *Journal of American Ethnology and Archeology*, I, 5.

¹⁴⁸ From Thwaites' *Jesuit Relations*, III, 211.

DYNAMISM, THE PRIMITIVE NATURE PHILOSOPHY, AND ITS RELATION TO RELIGION AND MAGIC.¹

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It was generally agreed until very recently that the original philosophy of nature was animism. This view was first set forth in an epoch-making book, *Primitive Culture*, by Edward B. Tylor. A brief statement of his theory will serve as a convenient starting-point for our discussion.

Tylor seeks to demonstrate that out of naïve thinking about the visions of dreams and trances and from comparisons of life with death, and of health with sickness, arose a belief in the existence of spirits as the powers animating nature. "What men's eyes behold is but the instrument to be used, or the material to be shaped, while behind it there stands some prodigious but half human creature, who grasps it with his hands or blows it with his breath." This belief, which according to him represents the first philosophy of nature, he calls animism. The phenomena mentioned generated initially the idea of the "double," also called "ghost" or "soul." Each man was believed to have a ghost, which could temporarily leave the body and appear at a distance from it. By a process of extension souls were ascribed to animals and even to plants. The separation which takes place at death between the double and the body is responsible, according to this view, for the production of spirits; so that, at their simplest, spirits are the souls of men, animals, or plants, liberated from a body. Spirits may enter and inhabit any organism, but they do not belong to it as a soul belongs to its body. A soul, it is true, can also leave its body, but only for a short time, under conditions such as sleep; otherwise death follows. Thus, in the mind of the savage, the world is animated by untold numbers of souls and spirits or free souls.

"Animism," writes Tylor, "is, in fact, the groundwork of the philosophy of religion, from that of savages up to that of civilised men. . . . It is habitually found that the theory of

¹ A chapter from *A Psychological Study of Religion; its Origin, Function and Future*; to be published by Macmillan in the late summer of 1912.

animism divides into two great dogmas forming parts of one consistent doctrine; first, concerning souls of individual creatures, capable of continued existence after the death or destruction of the body; second, concerning other spirits, upward to the rank of powerful deities. . . . Animism, in its full development, includes the belief in controlling deities and subordinate spirits, in souls, and in a future state, these doctrines practically resulting in some kind of active worship.²² This is his definition of a "minimum of religion."

"The doctrine of souls, founded on the natural perceptions of primitive man, gave rise to the doctrine of spirits."²³ "The conception of a human soul served as a type or a model on which he framed not only his idea of other souls of lower grade, but also his idea of spiritual beings in general, from the tiniest elf that sports in the long grass up to the heavenly Creator."²⁴

Credit must be given to Hobbes for having clearly anticipated the Tylorian animism. In the *Leviathan* we read: "And for the matter, or substance, of the Invisible Agents, so fancyed, they could not, by naturall cogitation, fall upon any other conceit, but that it was the same with that of the Soule of man; and that the Soule of man was of the same substance with that which appeareth in a dream to one that sleepeth or in a looking-glasse, to one that is awake; which, men not knowing that such apparitions are nothing else but creatures of the Fancy, think to be reall and externall Substances; and therefore call them Ghosts, as the Latines called them *Imagines* and *Umbrae*; and thought them Spirits, that is, thin aereall bodies; and those Invisible Agents, which they feared, to bee like them; save that they appear, and vanish when they please."²⁵

This doctrine of souls and spirits, in so far as it purposes to express the first philosophy of nature, is rapidly giving way under the combined weight of anthropological and of psychological data. An increasingly large number of competent writers would now place earlier than the Tylorian animism, or at least side by side with it, another fundamental and universal belief, arising from commoner and simpler experiences than visions;

²² E. B. Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, vol. I, chap. XI, pp. 385, 386.

²³ Vol. II, chap. XIV, pp. 99-100.

²⁴ *Leviathan*, ed. A. R. Waller, 1904, chap. XII, p. 71.

namely, a belief in the existence of an omnipresent, non-personal power or powers.

The names best deserving mention in this connection are probably those of Daniel G. Brinton, in the United States, and of R. R. Marett, in England. In his *Lectures*, published in 1897, Brinton⁵ advanced the theory that "the hidden and mysterious power of the universe" is at first expressed in terms denoting "infinite will." He quotes from Miss Fletcher that *Wakan*, a word of the Dakota Indians, "is the deification of that peculiar quality or power of which man is conscious within himself as directing his own acts, or willing a course to bring about certain results," and he continues: "The universal postulate, the psychic origin of all religious thought, is the recognition, or, if you please, the assumption, that conscious volition is the ultimate source of all Force. It is the belief that, behind the sensuous, phenomenal world, distinct from it, giving it form, existence, and activity, lies the ultimate, invisible, immeasurable power of Mind, of conscious Will, of Intelligence, analogous in some way to our own; and—mark the essential corollary—that man is in communication with it." And again: "The idea of a World-Soul, manifesting itself individually in every form of matter from the star to the elod, is as truly the belief of the Sioux or the Fijian cannibal as it was of Spinoza or Giordano Bruno." He holds further that this Will-Power, this World-Soul, is first posited in moments of ecstasy or trance, in periods of rapture, intoxication, or frenzy. "This influence is at first vague, impersonal, undefined, but is gradually differentiated and personified."

The striking features of this theory are, (1) that the idea of personal beings was not man's first explanation of movement and action in the world; (2) that man began with a quasi-impersonal notion, which Brinton defines in terms of "will." "All Gods and holy objects were merely vehicles through which Life and Power poured into the world from the inexhaustible and impersonal source of both;" (3) that this notion was first revealed in ecstasies and trances. A psychologist might call it a psychic automatism.

It is unfortunate that into this most interesting conception of man's earliest philosophy and its derivation from the sense

⁵ Brinton, Daniel G., *Religions of Primitive Peoples*, 1897, pp. 60, 47, 164.

of our own will Brinton has introduced notions unnecessarily complex and of much later origin. At certain points he seems ready to attribute to primitive man some of Emerson's ideas about the Over-Soul.

R. R. Marett, in an important essay entitled *Pre-Animistic Religion*,⁶ urges "that primitive or rudimentary religion, as we actually find it amongst savage peoples, is at once a wider and, in certain respects, a vaguer thing than 'the belief in spiritual beings' of Tylor's famous 'minimum definition.' " "The animistic idea represents but one among a number of ideas, for the most part far more vague than it is, and hence more liable to escape notice; all of which ideas, however, are active in savage religion as we have it, struggling one with the other for supremacy in accordance with the normal tendency of religious thought towards uniformity of doctrinal expression." Marett, like Brinton, is disposed to see in man's sense of will-power the archetype of the original conception of the Mysterious Power; but he avoids the latter's error of including too much in the primitive conception. His conclusion may be stated in his own words thus: "The attitude of Supernaturalism towards what we should call inanimate nature may be independent of animistic interpretations."⁷

In another chapter of the same book (p. 137), where he endeavors to push the origin of religion a step farther back than animism, he concludes that "Mana, or rather the tabu-mana formula, has solid advantages over Animism, when the avowed object is to found what Dr. Tylor calls a minimum definition of religion. Mana is coextensive with the supernatural; Animism is far too wide. Mana is always Mana, supernatural power, differing in intensity—in voltage, so to speak—but never in essence; Animism splits up into more or less irreducible kinds, notably 'souls,' 'spirits,' and 'ghosts.' Finally, Mana whilst fully adapted to express the immaterial—the unseen force behind the scene—yet conformably with the incoherent state of rudimentary reflection, leaves in solution the distinction between personal and impersonal, and, in particular, does not allow any notion of a high individuality to be precipitated." I maintain that in seeking to replace personal agents (animism) by *Mana*,

⁶ First published in *Folk-Lore* in 1900, and reprinted in 1909 in *The Threshold of Religion*, Methuen and Co., London.

⁷ Marett, R. R., *The Threshold of Religion*, pp. 30, 17.

"which leaves in solution the distinction between personal and impersonal," Marett disregards the only definite line of cleavage which can be used to differentiate religious from non-religious life, that is, the line separating the attitudes and actions that involve the idea of personal power from those that do not. In my view of the matter, when the distinction between personal and impersonal is in solution, religion itself is likewise in solution.

In the *Monist* for 1906, Arthur O. Lovejoy offers a criticism of Marett which deserves attention.⁸ The latter, as we have seen, finds the essence of the preanimistic belief to be the apprehension "of the supernatural or supernormal as distinguished from the natural and the normal," and so he proposes the term "Supernaturalism," or preferably "Teratism" as a name for this primitive attitude. "But," says Lovejoy, "Mr. Marett appears to me to place the emphasis on the wrong side. . . . The pre-animistic belief—the belief which is, at all events, independent of animism—is not best described as "supernaturalism," or "teratism," for the fundamental notion in it is not that of the unpredictable, abnormal, and portentious, but that of a force which is conceived as working according to quite regular and intelligible laws—a force which can be studied and controlled. A better name, then, for this group of beliefs would be Primitive Energeties."

I question the appropriateness of the expression "quite regular and intelligible laws." There is without doubt, I should say, much that is unpredictable in the behavior of *Wakanda*, or *Manitou*, or *Mana*. And, in any case, the means used to bring into play the mysterious Power does not indicate the apprehension of a definite and stable quantitative relation between this means and the effects produced. The power invoked, therefore, is not a mechanical power, but a magical force.

Irving King,⁹ in a chapter entitled *The Mysterious Power*, brings together the philological and other data bearing upon this subject. The terms *Manitou* (Algonquin), *Wakanda*

⁸ Lovejoy, Arthur O., "The Fundamental Concept of the Primitive Philosophy," *Monist*, 1906, vol. XVI, pp. 357-382.

⁹ King, Irving, *The Development of Religion*, Macmillan and Co., 1910. Anyone interested in this point will find a good summary of the evidence in Chapter VI of Irving King's book, or in Lovejoy's shorter article quoted above.

(Sioux), *Orenda* (Iroquois), *Mana* (Melanesian), designate a non-personal Power or Potency considered to be at the basis of all natural phenomena. The same notion is found among the Australians. It appears in particular in their use of the *Chir-inga* or bull-roarer.

I shall not attempt to put before the reader the linguistic and historical evidence that can be adduced to show that the belief in non-personal forces is prior to animism. It is now generally admitted that, among nearly all primitive peoples of whom we have accurate knowledge, the generic and widely used words previously thought to mean a personal divinity and often a "High God," really designate a far less definite conception,—that of power or force. Originally these words no more designated personal gods than does *Mana*, which Codrington defines thus: "That invisible power which is believed by the natives to cause all such effects as transcend their conception of the regular course of nature, and to reside in spiritual beings, whether in the spiritual part of living men or in the ghosts of the dead, being imparted to them, to their names and to various things that belong to them, such as stones, snakes, and indeed objects of all sorts, is that generally known as *Mana*. . . . No man, however, has this power of his own; all that he does is done by the aid of personal beings, ghosts or spirits; he cannot be said, as a spirit can, to be *mana* himself . . . he can be said to have *mana*."¹⁰

With regard to the historical evidence, it is now generally conceded that as one approaches the original conditions of the race, religious practices dwindle away, while magical behavior is everywhere in evidence. Howitt declares that "if religion is defined as being the formulated worship of a divinity," the Austrian savage has no religion.¹¹ Frazer reflects the views of Spencer and Gillen, of Howitt, and probably of every recent first-hand student of Australia, when he writes: "Among the aborigines of Australia, the rudest savages as to whom we possess accurate information, Magic is universally practised, whereas Religion, in the sense of a propitiation or conciliation

¹⁰ Codrington, Dr. R. H., *The Melanesians* (Clarendon Press, 1891), p. 191.

¹¹ Howitt, A. W., "Australian Ceremonies of Initiation," *Journ. of the Anthropol. Institute* (British), 1884, XIII, p. 432.

of the higher powers, seems to be nearly unknown. Roughly speaking, all men in Australia are magicians, but not one is a priest; everybody fancies he can influence his fellows or the course of nature by sympathetic magic, but nobody dreams of propitiating gods by prayer and sacrifice."¹²

Because of the presence of magic and the absence of religious rites among the most primitive tribes known to us, some argue that the belief in the non-personal powers implied in magical behavior antedated the belief in the unseen personal being involved in our conception of religion. This deduction is unwarranted; for the Australians, although they are without religious customs and ceremonies, believe in the existence of some sort of Great Being. It is not my chief intention, however, to prove the priority of the belief in non-personal powers to the belief in unseen personal agents; but to maintain the *independent origin* of these beliefs. The question of precedence loses much of its importance when these two concepts are not supposed to stand to each other in a genetic relation. It seems to me probable, however, that the non-personal view preceded animism.

The theses which I maintain in this chapter, then, are, first, that the belief in non-personal powers is neither a derivative of animism nor a first step leading up to it, but that the two beliefs have had independent origins; and, secondly, that animism appeared second in order of time.

I have begun by giving the opinions of certain writers and referring to some historical facts upon which these opinions are based. The psychologist in search of knowledge concerning origins turns naturally to the child to supplement anthropological data. What are the first explanatory concepts of the child? In response to what experiences, and in what order, were they evolved? Unfortunately the available data here are also meagre and often indefinite.¹³

¹² Frazer, J. G., "The Beginnings of Religion," *Fortn. Rev.*, vol. LXXVIII, (1905), p. 162. Comp. *The Golden Bough*, 2d ed., vol. I, pp. 71-73.

¹³ Sully, J., *Studies in Childhood*, chap. III, IV, pp. 91-108; Tracy, *Psychology of Childhood*, chap. II, pp. 4, 5, III, p. 3; Alexander F. Chamberlain, *The Child*, (The Contemporary Science Series), 1900, pp. 147-148; Perez, *The First Three Years of Childhood*.

Long before a child speaks, he uses things. His interest early extends to causes, and when language appears, with the questions, "What for?" and "Why?" he is already in possession of the abstract ideas of cause and effect.¹⁴ At the end of the third year begins that period of incessant questioning so wearisome to parents. Children wish not only to complete their information about the appearance and the other sensible qualities of objects, but, first of all, to know for what purpose things exist, and how they came to be. Before the end of his third year, Preyer's boy asked, referring to the creaking of a carriage wheel, "*Was macht nur so?*" and not very much later children will ask, "What makes the wind?" "What makes the train move?" "How do we move our eyes?" (girl four years and seven months). "When there is no egg, where does the hen come from? When there was no egg, I mean, where did the hen come from?" (five years old). If I had gone upstairs, could God have made it that I had not?" (boy four years old). From this age on for many years the interrogation point is always wriggling in the mind of the child.

Now, inquiries concerning the causes of things imply an idea of power, for power means at its simplest merely that which produces something. I believe that this primary idea of power, which a child possesses before the end of his third year, is not the idea of a *personal* power, and is not derived from the idea of persons. It would seem to me preposterous to suppose that the first "What does that?" of the infant implies the idea of a personal cause. Is it not much simpler, as well as quite sufficient, to conceive that for him the cause of an event is that which appears to his senses as preceding it? (I waive for a moment the question as to whether or not the crudest idea of causation includes more than the idea of necessary sequence.)

That very young children do conceive of non-personal causes seems indicated in the following instance. A child one year and eleven months old wanted her mother to lift her up that she might see the wind. Is there any sufficient reason for

¹⁴The following instance shows how early concepts appear in the child. A boy eight months old had enjoyed stuffing things into a tin box. Afterwards he looked for holes in all his toys. (*Perez, Ibid*, p. 199.)

It is to be hoped that soon someone will, by systematic observations of the child, complete the present meagre and scattered data, and so aid in the elucidation of the present problems.

thinking that this child expected to see a human being or an animal? To my mind, she simply expected to see something passing by. "Something" is a much simpler notion than that of an animal or human being. This expected thing was, for her, what plucked her dress, moved the tree, etc. Why should she have gone to the length of imagining an object, known only in this way, to have the definite characteristics of men or animals? Her actual experience with the wind was with something which had not these characteristics; it was known to her only as that which pushed or pressed against her. Why not conclude, then, that she simply expected to see some familiar natural object, such as smoke, vapor, cloud?

It may be argued that because the child speaks of these things as alive he identifies them with men and animals. That he is usually ready to attribute life to these inanimate causes is not to be doubted. Some little children when asked what things in the room were alive replied, "Smoke," "Fire." C. said his cushion was alive, because it slipped from under him. The same child, on being told that a certain stick was too short for him, answered, "Me use it for walking stick when stick be bigger."¹⁵ The wind, the smoke, the clouds, anything having the appearance of self-movement, falls in the category of "living" things. But, although for the child a man and the wind may both be alive, it does not follow that he conceives of the wind under the likeness of man. The concept "life" is for him wider than that designated by the same word in the mind of the civilised adult. "Life," it seems, means to the child merely the capacity of self-movement; while the concepts "man" and "animal," involve in addition certain ideas of structure,—head, mouth, limbs,—and modes of behavior.

This idea of forces capable of self-movement or of producing movement and change is simpler than the concept "person," and may, therefore, be expected to appear earlier. The relevant facts of child psychology all confirm this view. It is evident, however, that the much more complex notion of personality does not lag far behind. It includes for the child men and animals and is readily extended so as to include certain physical objects, the moving, puffing, and smoking locomotive, for instance. Having reached this stage, does he

¹⁵ Sully, J., *Diary*, in Appendix to *Studies in Childhood*.

gradually come to conceive of all causes as personal? If so, he would pass through a second stage in his philosophical development, a stage which it would be proper to call animism. I prefer to think that non-personal causes continue to do duty side by side with personal agents throughout childhood. There are indeed many facts, some of which are cited in this and in another chapter, which justify the opinion that the original idea of non-personal causes remains in the mind, and that at no time, either in the history of the child or of the race, does the term animism represent adequately the philosophy of primitive man.

I have represented the original notion of causal Power as independent of the sense of personal effort. But there can be no doubt that the moment soon comes when one's intimate experience of striving is projected into the world of external causes.

A passage from G. F. Stout¹⁶ will set clearly before us the point in question. "Causation for the 'plain man' involves more than mere priority and subsequence; it carries with it a vague, and, for science, a futile representation of what Professor Pearson calls 'enforcement.' The traces of this bias are often found even in scientific exposition. Thus it is plainly in evidence whenever 'force' is referred to as a cause of motion or as a reason why a body moves. . . . In common language such words as pressure, strain, stress, energy, resistance, impact, imply something more than can be included in a mere description of the space relations of the parts of matter. This something more is certainly rather indistinctly conceived. There is, however, no room for doubting that it consists in an assumed inner state of material bodies,—a state imperceptible to the external observer and uninterpretable in terms of the data yielded by external observation. Hence it follows of necessity that the only source from which the material for these ideas of force, enforcement, etc., springs is our own mental life."

The projection of the feeling of effort into natural forces I would place midway between the earliest idea of non-personal causal power and the fully developed idea of personal power. It is only after the child has begun to observe the *sequence* of events outside himself that he acquires a sense of his own person sufficiently clear to project into causes the feelings which he experiences when acting.

The little girl who says to her brother, "If you eat so much goose, you will be quite silly"; the man who holds that his luck changed because he married a shrew, or because so-and-so

¹⁶ Stout, G. F., *Analytic Psychology*, vol. I, pp. 178-179.

died; or the man who thinks his fortune returned because he wore a "lucky" suit,¹⁷ can hardly be supposed to invest the causes of these effects with the will-effort feeling. He has simply remained at the lower conceptual level, or has reverted to it. I affirm, then, that there exists a class of causes into which no will-effort feeling is projected, and that this class not only arises first but persists after more complex notions of power have been added.

It is to be noted further that a cause conceived under the analogy of a will-effort is not necessarily a personal cause. Even civilized man, as Stout reminds us, commonly endows physical causes with something of the sense of effort which he himself experiences, but nevertheless he does not conceive of these causes as truly personal. Facts show that in most communities, at certain periods, the idea of will-power has been seized upon and used as an explanatory category. There is, for instance, a variety of magic called will-magic, because the magical deed is supposed to be due, in part at least, to the will-effort of the magician. Such a notion is common among the North American Indians. According to Miss Fleteher, "The Sioux Indian has deified the power of which he is conscious within himself, the power by which he directs his own acts or wills a course by which to bring about certain results." They have a word *Wa-zhin-dhe-dhe*, for which there is no word in English unless it be "telepathy." "*Dhe-dhe* is 'to send' and *Wa-zhin-dhe-dhe* signifies to send forth one's thoughts and will power towards another in order to supplement his strength.

. . . For instance, when a race is taking place, a man may bend his thought and his will upon one of the contestants . . . in the belief that this act of his, this sending of his mind, will help his friend to win." Similarly, when a man is on the war path, a group of people, usually women, will gather about his tent and sing certain songs called *We-ton-wa-an*. "These songs are the medium by which strength is conveyed to the man facing danger; the act is *Wa-zhin-dhe-dhe*."¹⁸ But we must remember that we are not dealing here

¹⁷ Jastrow, Joseph, *Fact and Fable in Psychology*, p. 252. On the use of analogy, see pp. 236-274.

¹⁸ Fletcher, Alice C., "Notes on Certain Beliefs Concerning Will Power among the Siouan Tribes," *Science* (New York), N. S., vol. V, 1897, pp. 331, 334.

with a primitive people. One need not revert to the American Indian to find illustrations of this belief. The idea of action exerted at a distance by a person's will is very common even among us.

Miss Fletcher, like Brinton and others, fails to mark the important distinction between a power conceived under the analogy of our will-effort, and a complete personification. The will power sent off by a person may be spoken of as having "life," in the sense in which the child first uses this word. But that it is not identical with a person is shown by the fact that the power is detachable in various amounts from a person, and is owned and controlled by a person.

The original idea of non-personal power possesses but one necessary characteristic: it is dynamic, it does things. Man's attitude towards it shows plainly that neither intelligence nor feeling is a necessary element in its composition. As the workings of this power are to a great extent unforeseen and uncontrollable, it evokes frequently dread and awe; but in so far as man thinks himself able to control and use it, it loses its mysteriousness and awfulness and becomes a familiar power. As it is not definitely conceived as intelligent will, the attitudes and the behavior it can elicit on the part of man are fundamentally different from those produced by the belief in personal, unseen powers. The former gives rise to magic; the latter, to religion.

For that conception of nature which most probably preceded the Tylorian Animism, or at least existed side by side with it, I would suggest the name *Dynamism*. This term seems to me preferable to Supernaturalism, because it does not thrust forward a distinction between nature and something above it; and preferable also to Teratism, proposed by Marett, because Dynamism does not direct the attention exclusively to the mysterious and wonderful as if these characteristics were fundamental to the conception. It is the idea of *active power* which is dominant in the conception of Impersonal Force, and this idea is well expressed by Dynamism. I prefer this term also to Manitouism, proposed by Lovejoy, because Dynamism suggests to most people the idea of power, while Manitouism either is without significance, or conveys a meaning not intended.

PREJUDICE, EDUCATION AND RELIGION.

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It is somewhat strange, seeing that a very large part of the world's pleasure and pain is due to prejudice of one sort or another, that the subject has received almost no study from those who have taken human nature as their province. The reason for this omission cannot be that prejudice is too rare an experience, or one too subtle for analysis. On the contrary, it is more than likely that its very universality and ubiquity have caused it to be ignored. Familiarity breeds contempt in the realm of psychology as well as in society,—which is itself, perhaps, a species of prejudice. In our daily thoughts and actions we are no more aware of its insidious presence than we are of our heart-beat, or our kinaesthetic sensations. Then again, we are thoroughly familiar with the *word*, and therefore it does not readily occur to us that our knowledge of the *thing* may not be exhaustive. Nietzsche has a fine passage on this point:

"Wherever primitive man put up a word, he believed that he had made a discovery. How utterly mistaken he really was! He had touched a problem, and while supposing that he had solved it, he had created an obstacle to its solution. Now, with every new knowledge we stumble over flint-like and petrified words, and, in so doing, break a leg sooner than a word."

Our streams of consciousness, at their very sources, are colored with prejudices, and new ones are being constantly added as these streams slowly wend their ways through the course of life. 'Tis true the filters of education, travel, research and invention have been employed with gratifying results, but the waters of thought and feeling, will and desire are still far from being pure. Nor is a distilled, colorless consciousness either possible, or even desirable, for earth creatures like ourselves. A certain amount of natural prejudice is absolutely necessary for preservation and survival. For, imagine what would happen if the joys and sorrows, the successes and failures,

the honors and riches of others interested us as much as our own; or if we loved our friends' children as much as those which are bone of our bone and flesh of our flesh; or if the lion and the lamb, the cat and the dog, should lie down together, and the hawk and the hen go to roost on the same perch. Nature herself has planted the seeds of prejudice in the primordial bits of protoplasmic stuff which are transmitted from one generation to another, and which serve to keep the genera and species of plants and animals separate and distinct. That Nature herself is prejudiced, we unconsciously proclaim, when we personify her and speak of her likes and dislikes, as her abhorrence of a vacuum, her favorite ways of accomplishing results, her ultimate purpose with regard to that particular species of animal called Man, etc. And who can explain why the loadstone will attract iron filings and behave so indifferently towards filings of brass; who can explain the mysterious chemical affinities and antipathies, or the tropisms of plants and lower animals? When the late Professor James spoke of "the order of Nature" as mere *weather*, "doing and undoing without end," his friend Davidson took him to task, contending that "even the weather reveals an harmonious spiritual intent, in that it contributes to the development of spiritual beings by supplying their bodies with food." And so, even the weather is prejudiced, as every farmer and fisherman will aver and prove by a thousand incidents, and a wealth of weather-lore as old as the race itself.

But, be that as it may, certainly the statement that *men and women* are prejudiced will need no proof. Rather would it require proof to substantiate the statement that a certain individual is entirely free from the taint, so convinced are we that to be prejudiced is the natural state of man, whereas the unprejudiced is the unnatural or overcultured condition.

If we seek for the source of prejudice, we shall find it, I believe, in the fact that we are organisms, possessing individuality and personality, bounded and limited, and therefore necessarily biased. For whatever is limited, is separated, and, in a measure, alienated from all that is external to it. The skin of the worm of dust, as Lotze somewhere says, splits the entire universe into two disparate parts,—the inner and the outer—and, to the worm, the former is by far the more important part. In the outer world, mighty empires may rise or fall, and he is

unconcerned; in the inner the slightest disturbance may make him feel that the whole scheme of things is all awry and on the road to destruction. The worm is evidently biased, but are not also those who tread him under foot? Our skins separate us from all the rest of the universe; completely insulate and isolate us, as it were, so that we can know and feel only what takes place within us, and must content ourselves with merely imagining the pains and joys of those nearest and dearest to us. Mothers are thus removed from the babes at their breasts by barriers that are forever impenetrable. Furthermore, our imperfect sense-organs shut out the rich universe from us, except those few bits of it which are neither too coarse nor too fine to be received by them. To its remaining fulness we are as insensible as stones. What the universe would mean to creatures possessing fifty or a hundred sense-organs, instead of a paltry half dozen, we cannot even imagine. We know how surprised we are when with the aid of an instrument we increase the power of one of our senses and find that things are altogether different from what they seem. So upset do we become that we immediately begin to philosophize and write ponderous volumes on Appearance and Reality, on The Thing-in-itself and the Thing-outside-itself, and other such illuminating treatises. Our organisms, our nervous systems, are so moulded and set that we are given but little choice in determining what impressions shall be received and what rejected, or in what manner they shall be received and what reactions, mental and physical, they shall call forth. Consequently we go through life re-creating the universe, each one in his own partial, imperfect way, and no two are ever exactly alike. Only an omniscient and omnipotent God—an Absolute—can be without prejudice, but strangely enough, the most prejudiced among us are the very ones who think they possess these divine attributes.

What is true of our bodies and sense-organs, in this respect, is perhaps even more true of our consciousness. Attention, we know, is eclectic: focusing upon some things and ignoring others for the time being. The same is true of interest, memory, imagination, association and the other mental processes. Our intellects, as Bacon pointed out, are "not of the nature of a dry light, but receive a tincture from the will and affections, which generate accordingly knowledge *ad quot vult*, for what a man would rather was true, that he more readily believes."

. . . . "In innumerable ways," he goes on to say, "and those sometimes imperceptible, the affection tinges and affects the intellect." It is proverbial, for example, that love renders us blind, and the same applies to hate and anger, and fear and hope, and every strong emotion which constricts the mind and perverts or paralyzes the judgment.

Consider too, the sense of self, which magnifies out of all proportion the things that pertain to our own ego, and makes us feel, to use Emerson's aphorism, that "difference from me is the measure of absurdity." Again, consider the instincts and habits, habits of thought as well as of action, which enslave us and reduce us almost to the level of automata, unable to think or act for the most part in any but habitual ways. Our personalities—what we refer to when we use the first person singular—are simply the sublimates of our numberless inherited and acquired impulses and tendencies, our temperaments, early associations, attachments, affections, our unreasoned and half-baked ideas, the beliefs that were inculcated, the tastes—aesthetic and otherwise—that have become ingrained, and all the varied experiences of our daily lives, now forgotten for the most part, but by no means lost or ineffectual in determining our present thoughts and conduct. Our souls may be likened to the ocean deep—the surface waves and ripples we call consciousness; the vast depths with their currents and life abounding we call the subconscious, or subliminal, or instinctive, etc. This latter is the stuff characters are made of, as well as dreams, and this is the medium—the subconscious—in which, as will be seen, our prejudices germinate and grow. So much for sources.

What now is prejudice *per se*? Professor Patrick, who was the first psychologist to study the subject (in his article on "The Psychology of Prejudice," *Pop. Sci. Mo.*, vol. 36, pp. 633-643), defined prejudice as "an individual deviation from the normal beliefs of mankind, taking as the standard, the universal, the general, or the mean." This definition limits prejudice to the intellectual functions, and leaves out of consideration the many more prejudices growing out of instinct, feeling, taste, habit, volition, the finer emotions, etc. But, even within the above-narrow limits, the definition will not hold, for it is equivalent to the now obsolete expression *Vox populi, vox dei*, and the fallacious inference that those who do not subscribe to public-

opinion are prejudiced heretics. By this token we should have to regard Socrates, Galileo, Bruno, Luther, Darwin and a host of other reformers and innovators, as men of prejudice, which would manifestly do violence to our conception of the men and the meaning of the term.

Moreover, prejudice does not consist in deviating from a popular standard of any sort—the popular standard may itself be a gross prejudice—but rather in an *undue* prepossession in favor of, or against, anything, be that what it may,—a man's personality, or his doctrine, the color of his hair, or the shape of his nose. By undue prepossession is meant a kind of mental cramp or tension which renders the individual unable to see or consider anything, but from a single point of view, when several points of view are equally possible. Undue prepossession and deviating from the standard of the people or the average man are as unlike as night and day. There are times and conditions, when not to deviate is to be prejudiced. The people have seldom been the criterion of truth, nor is the testimony of ten millions who are blind to be weighed against that of one man who sees. Indeed, the criterion of truth, the Pragmatists tell us, is not mathematical but psychologic, not quantitative but qualitative, not universal but particular. It is to be found within the individual, in the effects which his ideas and beliefs produce upon his life and his general development, as shown by his works and his daily conduct. If his prepossessions militate against his normal development, mentally, morally, socially, or physically; if they lower his general efficiency and make him a worse husband, father or citizen than he otherwise would have been, they cannot but be considered prejudices of the harmful sort, the kind that are to be eliminated; but if on the other hand they are conducive to further development, to a richer life, a better *Aufklärung*, or to the elaboration of a viewpoint or hypothesis, which later generations will accept, they are productive of positive good, and must be considered normal and beneficial, regardless of the views of the people. As a rule, only time, "the final judge of appeal from the verdicts of successive ages," can determine the worth and truth of these, which explains why so often later generations erect memorials in honor of those whom earlier ones burned or stoned or otherwise persecuted and dishonored.

Professor Patriek concludes that prejudice is but the popular

term for that which is technically known as "appereception." A college student, riding by a plot of level ground in the suburbs of a city, apperceives it as a possible ball ground; a young girl, as a tennis court; a speculator, as an addition for town lots; an undertaker, perhaps, as a possible site for a cemetery. Each apperceives the same plot of ground in the light of his or her previous experiences and interests, and that is prejudice. To this interpretation we must take decided exception. Prejudice, so far from being synonymous with appereception, is the exact opposite of it. Prejudice is the refusal or inability to apperceive, rather than appereception itself. A child apperceives a long watermelon as a large pickle. It is acquainted with pickles, but has never seen a watermelon before. This new object resembles old familiar pickles, therefore we will call it such for the time being, says the child, and that is a pure act of appereception. But, if the child, on being told that the object is not a large pickle, but a watermelon, should insist on maintaining that it is a pickle, and refuse to think of it in any other way, it would be prejudiced. Likewise the college student, the young girl, the speculator, and undertaker. It is but natural that each should see in the plot of ground a different thing, according to their different experiences and interests, but they would be prejudiced if each insisted that it was suitable *only* for the purpose he or she had in mind, for, as a matter of fact, it is suitable for all four purposes. Appereception causes each to consider the ground from a particular point of view; prejudice disables them from considering it from any other point of view, even after it has been clearly pointed out. The appereception of the unduly prepossessed is loaded, as it were, with strong volitional and emotional ingredients; they apperceive only as suits their purpose, to other points of view they are blind, to other arguments they are deaf.

In other words, appereception is the natural process of learning; prejudice is the determination not to learn, or the inability to learn, owing to mental blindness. Again, appereception is a conscious or unconscious judgment of resemblance between a given object and similar objects previously experienced, and this judgment is a valid induction to the extent of the experience upon which it is based. In calling the watermelon a large pickle, the child did what every productive scientist has done—it reasoned inductively and noted similarities. Prejudice, on

the other hand, has an eye only for differences, which it delights to magnify and multiply. Apperception is constantly correcting its errors, accommodating itself to new conditions, appropriating new facts, thereby causing the mind to grow and develop. Prejudice has an aversion for growth, is perfectly content with its existing condition, has no errors to correct, no new truths to learn. If there is to be any change or development or adaptation, it must take place in the other fellow who manifestly needs to be changed,—to be brought to see the true light, which is, of course, its own dim light, sufficient only to reveal the Cimmerian darkness that envelops it. Apperception waits upon time and makes trial; prejudice needs no additional time, and forbids trial. Apperception broadens and liberates; prejudice arrests, narrows and encrusts.

The late Professor James told of a biologist who once said to him, "that if such a' thing as telepathy were true, scientists ought to band together to keep it suppressed and concealed. It would undo the uniformity of nature, and all sorts of other things without which scientists cannot carry on their pursuits." His deep interest in science prejudiced him against anything which threatened to overthrow its conclusions, even though that something might be truer than his science. No one, perhaps, is entirely unfamiliar with this warm, kindly feeling towards something that is dear,—a cherished belief, a fond illusion, a pet theory—which we feel ourselves outgrowing and compelled to abandon. Says Emerson: "The creeds into which we were initiated in childhood and youth no longer hold their place in the minds of thoughtful men, but they are not nothing to us, and we hate to have them treated with contempt."

Such instances as these show clearly the emotional and volitional roots of prejudice,—roots which penetrate and ramify the whole soil of subconsciousness, as it were, vitiating our thinking and determining our attitude and reaction to all the various life situations and experiences, as they occur. Were we passionless, without instinct and love and hate and anger and desire and interest and ambition, we might coldly apperceive all things properly and without prejudice. But the Reason in Nature has not seen fit to evolve us thus; these emotions, desires, interests and will-acts have proved themselves necessary and valuable not only for our development from the lower forms of life, but for

our continued development as human beings; for our commercial, industrial, political,—even our scientific progress.

However, it should be remembered that what is normal and beneficial in a certain measure, becomes abnormal and injurious, when that measure is either increased or diminished out of bounds. Error and evil, we know, are located in deficiency or excess, and "right and justice are found in moderation in the golden mean, in the true balance—between overdoing and under-doing, going too fast and too slow." *Harmful prejudice is located in deficiency or excess, in lack of mental and moral balance*—that is the main thesis of this paper. The scales of reason and justice are tilted by old and hardened ideas, fixed associations, habits, interest, passion or what not, so that an impartial reaction to a given situation is almost impossible and but little desired by the prejudiced individual.

Time does not permit the giving of many examples which would elucidate and support the above statements. I shall merely enumerate the more important types of prejudice, following with an illustration or two under each head. There are first, the deep-seated generic and racial prejudices, which have the important biologic function of keeping the races separate and distinct, in order perhaps, that they might develop to the fullest their own peculiarities and native genius. Next are the national, tribal, and familial prejudices; geographical, political and economical ones, which when kept within reasonable bounds, have not a little sociological value, but when carried to excess have led to wars, feuds, cruelties and injustices of every description. Then there are the personal prejudices—esthetic, religious, moral, philosophical, academic, professional, etc., which in moderation have their undoubted psychological value, but which again in excess have caused all the inhumanities that have made countless thousands suffer and mourn.

Illustrations: Our physiological and aesthetic prejudices against the black and yellow races,—which, we are told, they heartily reciprocate,—are natural and need but little to be said in their defence. To the anthropological arguments in proof of the essential unity of the races of mankind, the remark of a carpenter to Professor James is an apt reply: "There is little difference between one man and another," he said, "but that little counts." Or, as Nietzsche expressed it, "One drop

of blood too many or too few in the brain can make our life unspeakably miserable and hard, so that we may have to suffer more from this one drop than Prometheus did from his *vulture*." And the poet-philosopher Browning:

"Oh the little more and how much it is!
And the little less, and what worlds away!"

But, when this prejudice engenders wild passion and paralyzes reason; when it denies common justice, forgets the "square deal," and curdles the milk of human kindness in the breasts of men, it serves no useful biologic purpose, but inflicts instead incalculable injury upon the subjects of it, as well as upon its objects. Whole tribes and races have either been exterminated or scattered to the four ends of the earth, and there is hardly a crime in the catalogue of foul deeds that has not been instigated by it.

"Frenchmen," said Coleridge, "are like grains of gunpowder; each by itself smutty and contemptible, but mass them together and they are terrible indeed!" Johnson referred to Americans as "a race of convicts who ought to be thankful for anything we allow them short of hanging." He was willing to love all mankind, he said, "except an American."

This and the succeeding types may be denominated "secondary" or acquired prejudices to distinguish them from the preceding ones, which are "primary" and fundamental. Secondary prejudices spring from an exaggeration of value attached to superficial and accidental differences, such as language, customs, traditions, minor peculiarities, etc., but not from the fundamental biological difference of protoplasm. They may lead to wars in which each will fight for his own country, right or wrong; to high tariffs, boycotts, etc., but they can never become so deeply ingrained as to beget a profound feeling-complex almost equivalent to a psycho-physical aversion to miscegenation. The sexes can still find each other attractive, notwithstanding the many secondary prejudices which might struggle to keep them apart. This is a basic distinction worthy of emphasis.

To be somewhat prejudiced in favor of one's kith and kin and close friends is rightly esteemed a virtue, but to insist that they are the earth's paragons, to be blind to their more serious

faults, to condone or defend their crimes, is, to say the least, not a virtue. The same applies to matters pertaining to one's self. One can hardly be expected to literally love others as himself, or to take the same interest in them and their affairs and possessions as in his own; but if he regards himself as the centre of the social system and is unable to recognize the claims and merits of others, he is suffering from a mental malady for which the term 'prejudice' is a euphemism. One naturally prefers to associate with individuals belonging to his own social class, but to withhold the hand of fellowship from those who are in a lower level, to speak or think contemptuously of them, or regard them as "unclean" or "outcaste," as is done in India and parts of Europe and America, is a species of snobbery or prejudice which is harmful to all concerned.

According to some four hundred proverbs, woman is mentally inferior to man, deceptive, cunning, vain, conceited, quarrelsome, mischievous, dishonest, untruthful, garrulous, fickle, and, lately, it has been added that she is "more deadly than the male." This sex-prejudice manifests itself in its more acute forms in the opposition to higher education for women, to their entrance into the professional, commercial, industrial and political worlds; to the granting of equal pay for equal work, and worse still, in the various statutes, now happily decreasing, which deprive married women of their human and property rights.

Aesthetic appreciation is proverbially a matter of individual psychology. The Chinaman does not admire our white teeth, which remind him of a dog's, nor our rosy color which is like that of a potato-plant. We, on the other hand, fail to find attractive certain features which he regards beautiful. Both would be prejudiced if they denied to each other the possession of any aesthetic sense at all. So too in matters of dress. The cowboy or miner, who condemns a man because of his starched collar and kid gloves, is as prejudiced as he who looks with contempt upon them because of their flannel shirts and coarse boots. It is proverbial that "good clothes open all doors," and that a thief in gentleman's clothing is proof against suspicion, whereas the honest man in rags is often treated as a thief.

It is but natural that one should have a higher regard for

his own religion than for others, if for no other reason than that it meets his needs better than others could; but to maintain that all other religions are false, or mere superstitions and idolatries is a pernicious prejudice, the bitter fruits of which need no describing.

Concerning many moral questions there is legitimate difference of opinion. Prejudice enters in when the right to the existence of this difference is denied.

The case of Ingres, a classicist artist of the first half of the nineteenth century, who excluded Shakespeare and Goethe from the gathering of great men around the Father of Poetry, because he suspected them of Romanticism, is paralleled in literature by the intense prejudice of Carlyle against Scott, because of his florid and descriptive style.

But it is in the realm of philosophy that we find prejudice's paradise. The fierce logomachies prejudice has here instigated, have filled our libraries with mind-destroying books, the only antidote for which is the modern pragmatism, which hold that all the various philosophical systems are but the autobiographies of their respective founders and disciples. The late Professor James disposed of the whole matter with the two words, "tough-minded" and "tender-minded." Every philosopher in the history of speculative thought belongs to the one or the other of these two types, and therefore, if you know his type, you know the essence of his philosophy, and *vice-versa*.

Science is in but a slightly better plight, notwithstanding the almost worshipful attitude of the layman towards it. Agassiz, to his dying day fought with all the strength of his learning against the Darwinian theory of evolution; and now M. Poincaré informs us that all theoretical science is but a mass of pious prejudices, and that we should not speak of theories, or mathematical axioms even, as true or false, but rather as more or less convenient, or useful, or beautiful. The race has been chiseling and rechiseling the universe to suit its changing needs and fancies, and according to its ability and the excellence of the tools with which it worked at the time. And each generation, when it saw the work it had wrought, labeled it "good" and "true" and "final." But who knows what good is, what truth is,—and can finality be ere the crack of Doom?

The field of education or pedagogy must be passed over entirely

for the same reason that a wise man avoideth a hornet's nest. But it may not be so imprudent to refer to the prejudice which makes the possession of the Ph. D. degree the *sine qua non* for obtaining a position in college or university. This prejudice has both padded the graduate enrolment in our leading universities and filled our institutions with snobs and incompetents.

Party politics is but another name for prejudice, and its evils are notorious, but, when a Westerner recently declined a nomination to an office, because he could not, as he said, be a politician and a Christian at the same time, and he preferred to be the latter, he gave voice to a prejudice which is seriously injurious to a republican form of government, and to its progress among the slower nations.

We are told that there was not a little sectional prejudice in this country during the latter part of the last century, and that it came near disrupting the nation. All peoples have known it, and Nathanael gave expression to it twenty centuries ago when he asked, "Can there any good come out of Nazareth?"

The struggles between capital and labor, between the independent merchants and the trusts and monopolies, between producers and consumers, furnish their full quota of the ugly state of consciousness we are describing.

Few would agree with the apostle of Futurism that "to admire an old picture is to pour our sentiment into a funeral urn, . . . to consume our best strength in the useless admiration of the past," but to admire a picture or anything else simply because it is old is a species of prejudice which works hardship upon the new and young, and is harmful to progress. The familiar story of Michel Angelo, who was practically compelled to bury his statue of Cupid and later to dispose of it as a Roman antique, is a case in point.

Finally, there are various professional and occupational prejudices. Theoretically, honest labor of whatever sort, is no disgrace, but practically it often makes a deal of difference whether one is a hod carrier, a ditch digger, a cobbler, bootblack, bar-keeper, pawnbroker, merchant, lawyer, doctor, banker and so on through the whole list. There are prejudice-breathing proverbs for almost every vocation. Thus we are told

"A lawyer and a cart-wheel must be greased;" that "a lawyer is a learned gentleman who rescues your estate and keeps it to himself;" that

"until hell is full no lawyer will be saved," etc. "A doctor is one who kills you to-day to prevent you from dying to-morrow." "A new doctor, a new grave digger," "If you have a friend who is a physician send him to the house of your enemy." "Hussars pray for war and doctors for fever." "A politician is one that would circumvent God." "Critics are men who have failed in literature and art." "A usurer, a miller, a banker, and a publican are the four evangelists of Lucifer." "Highways and streets have not all thieves: shops have ten to one." "Nine tailors make a man." "Six awls make a shoemaker." "A servant is a paid enemy." "Who has many servants has many thieves," etc.

In a democracy, these prejudices are easily overcome, but in India and those other parts of the world, where every trade and occupation "has its exact place arbitrarily fixed in the scale of degradation," this type of prejudice has raised insurmountable barriers and robbed untold millions of all hope and ambition and desire for improvement.

This list, representative perhaps, but by no means exhaustive, will suffice to show the enormous rôle which prejudice has played and still plays in the lives of nations and individuals. Each type, if traced back to its origin, will be found to have served some important function either in preserving life in the struggle for existence, or making it more comfortable and thus assuring progress and development; in establishing social forms and institutions and making them stable, or in bringing out and intensifying certain traits and characteristics which have been useful to the race. What other explanation, for example, can be given for the prejudice in favor of the old and tried, and against the new, the unknown, the strange and alien?

But, in admitting its value as an evolutionary factor in the past history of the race, it should not be forgotten that like the many organs which were once necessary and useful but have now become rudimentary and harmful, so, many of our prejudices have outlived their usefulness and are now serious hindrances to our further development. For the conditions of existence are no longer so harsh and brutal as in the days of the jungle. Civilization has greatly ameliorated the life-struggle and made it so very different that the conditions for survival and supremacy are no longer hate and strife and brute strength, but rather love and sympathy and understanding and mutual aid. Violent elimination of the different is being supplanted by peaceful and sympathetic assimilation, which means a richer

life from every point of view. Culture is controlling instinct and impulse, and culture is the product of education.

This brings us to the second thesis, which is, that it is the function of education and religion, using these words in their widest connotation, both to rid us of our secondary prejudices, and to so control the primary and more fundamental ones that no evil consequences will come of them. For, if education is to realize its end, which is the drawing out to the fullest extent and the harmonious development of all the powers and capacities of the individual, or in other words, if its aim is character-building and the increase of efficiency, it must sedulously weed out the secondary prejudices as soon as they make their appearance in the consciousness of the child. For, prejudice, as has been seen, prevents growth and expansion; it narrows and poisons and slays. It is half sister to hate and cousin to the whole brood of vices. The function of education, on the other hand, is one with the function of religion, namely, to expand the soul and increase the spiritual efficiency of human beings. Especially is this true of the Gospel of Love and Brotherhood and Unity which has not only wrought miracles of conversion and regeneration, but has more genuinely educated the minds and hearts of men than all the secular learning of scientists and philosophers. Love, which is the essence of religion, reveals and illuminates the truth, which also is the aim of education, but prejudice and hate conceal it and oppose it. Love attracts and unites; hate and prejudice repel and separate.

Perhaps we cannot go so far as Vivekananda, the Hindu mystic, who says:

"This separation between man and man; man and woman, man and child, nation and nation, earth from moon, moon from sun, this separation between atom and atom is the cause really of all the misery, and the Vedānta says this separation does not exist, it is not real. It is merely apparent, on the surface. In the heart of things there is unity still. If you go inside, you find that unity between man and man, women and children, races and races, high and low, rich and poor, the gods and men; all are One, and animals too, if you go deep enough, and he who has attained to that has no more delusion. . . . When man had seen himself as One with the infinite Being of the Universe, when all separateness has ceased, when all men, all woman, all angels, all gods, all animals, all plants, the whole universe has been melted into that oneness, then all fear disappears. . . . Then will all sorrow disappear. . . . Then all jealousies will disappear. . . . Then all bad feelings disappear." Unto such an one

"belongs eternal peace, unto none else, unto none else." (Cited by William James, *Pragmatism*, pp. 152-154.)

A little of such mystic music is good to hear. It elevates the soul and titillates the dim sense we all have of oneness with the universe. And 'tis true that to know all is to forgive much, if not entirely all; and true also is the saying of Arnold Bennett that "when one has thoroughly got imbued into one's head the leading truth that nothing happens without a cause, one grows not only large-minded but large-hearted." But it is not necessary to throw ourselves into the cosmic melting-pot and lose all sense of identity and individuality to be worthy citizens of the twentieth century. We can retain and cultivate our personalities, and peculiarities even, much to our own advantage and humanity's, if only we are broad-minded enough to recognize with the poet that,

"There are nine and sixty ways
Of composing tribal lays
And every single one of them is right."

and are willing to let each one "take for God's truth that which harmonizes with all the best he knows, and helps and strengthens, him in nobility of life."

The Japanese are fond of employing their beautiful sacred mountain, Fujiyama, as a symbol of truth. The pilgrims who gather around her gaze upon snow-capped Fujiyama, but of all their number, not two gaze upon the same Fujiyama. And though their artists have painted many thousand different views of her, and all are true, yet is Fujiyama truer, richer and more beautiful than them all. He who has seen only one view of Fujiyama is to be pitied as a spiritual pauper who knows nothing of her exhaustless and everchanging splendors; he to whom it has never occurred that there could be more than one view is an unreflective child, and he who would destroy or suppress all views, except the one that appeals to him, is a fanatic and a fool.

To keep the mind plastic, active, and alert so that it may readily turn and catch a glimpse, at least, of every passing phase of truth; to expand the soul by larger doses of love and sympathy; to increase its efficiency for the beautiful-good by weeding out the poisonous prejudices that generate fanaticism, and bigotry and intolerance; and finally to teach each one both to play his own part well in the universe's orchestra, and in

tune with his fellow players, that is the endless task which education has to perform. Not to eliminate every vestige of prejudice from the soul, for that would be to efface all individuality and enthusiasm, but rather to control it and so direct it that it will be a help instead of a hindrance—if that could be accomplished, many of the problems that now vex us sorely would disappear. Then would the Gospel of the God-man be comprehended; then would his will be done.

THE REESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGIOUS CONVICTION IN THE EDUCATIONAL WORLD.

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The following paper was read before the Worcester Central Association of Congregational Ministers, in Worcester, recently, and is here given as it was then read. It is analyzed thus:

- I. The Question Stated and Its Content Determined.
- II. Reasons for the Loss of Religious Conviction in the Educational World.
- III. The Educational World Accepts the Fundamental Data of the Religious Experience of the Race.
- IV. The Trend of Modern Thought Demands the Interpretation of Religious Phenomena and Their Significance in the Terms of Life Rather than in the Terms of Reason.
- V. God and Man, and the Relationship Between Them: What Is It?

I. THE QUESTION STATED AND ITS CONTENT DETERMINED.

What do we mean by the *Educational World*? For one can conceive of not only the *Scientific World*, being an integral part of the *Educational World*, but also the *Popular World*. But in a very real sense, the *Scientific World* is a part of the *Educational World*, and came into existence only by reason of the advances of the *Educational World* which made necessary many of the branches into which that sphere of intellectual activity is to-day divided. So then, if I overlap and occasionally touch upon that part of our discussion designated as the *Scientific World*, it will be because of the necessity of such overlapping. Here it may be stated that this paper formed a part of a discussion of the reestablishment of religious conviction in (1) The Educational World, (2) The Scientific World, (3) The Popular World.

Two vague terms meet us at the outset of this discussion—namely, “*Religious Conviction*” and “*Educational World*.”

In my own mind I am not at all sure as to what was intended

that these terms should denote, neither am I sure just what will be the content given them by this audience. So that, at the outset of this discussion, it will be necessary, both for myself and for my auditors, to determine first just what we shall mean and understand the title of this discussion to mean.

By "*Religious Conviction*" do we mean the assent to some set *formula of doctrine*, the acceptance of the church with its ordinances as the only means of salvation, the infallibility of the Bible, the acceptance of the ecclesiastical dogma of miracles, and the story of a six-days creation? If so, then I say that no amount of preaching and teaching will reestablish religious conviction in the *Educational World*, and I certainly should not be regarded as a religious man. If by religious conviction we mean that expression of God in human life in such a way as to show, unmistakably, the divine working in human frailty—with the profoundest sense that, apart from this kind of life, human life is only serving its lowest ideals—then I unhesitatingly say that we can hope for the reestablishment of religious conviction in the *Educational World*.

To me, then, as Harnack has said, religion is "eternal life in the midst of time, by the strength and under the eyes of God"; or as President Henry Churchill King has described it:

"We shall therefore look for religion not as something apart from life, but in the very midst of it, knit up with cell and sex, with all human relations and employments and tendencies and strivings—inextricably involved in all. And we shall look for its glory not in a majestic isolation, but rather in its ability to permeate and dominate all life."

Another expression is given to this fact in the following lines:

"Let each man think himself an act of God,
His mind a thought, his life a breath of God;
And let each try by great thoughts and great deeds,
To show the most of God and heaven he hath in him."

Religion, therefore, I conceive as that expression of God in human life, where man is found living in the highest possible relation to his fellow-men, for their well-being and the growth of his own spiritual experience; and religious conviction as that dominating passion of life and intellectual attitude bringing with it the deepest conviction that the true life is lived only in this relation.

If by the "*Educational World*" we are to understand that

part of our church congregations whose privilege it has been to have received a college or university training in contradistinction to the purely professional educators, I think we shall give to this term a content and meaning more in accordance with the opportunity that is offered and held out to the average minister of religion to reëstablish religious conviction in the *Educational World*. For we must recognize, at the outset, that the Christian ministry stands small opportunity in reëstablishing or even establishing religious conviction in the *Educational World*, if by such a term we mean professional educators and the faculties of colleges and universities. Giving then to the term "*Religious Conviction*" the meaning already expressed; and to the "*Educational World*" that where the preacher has the opportunity of influencing the college or university trained minds of his congregation we may proceed with our discussion of "*The Reëstablishment of Religious Conviction in the Educational World.*"

II. REASONS FOR THE LOSS OF RELIGIOUS CONVICTION IN THE EDUCATIONAL WORLD.

1. Does the *Educational World* accept the data of the religious experience of the race? Such, of course, is tacitly affirmed by the title of our discussion, or there could certainly be no reëstablishing of the conviction which the religious experience of the race is capable of producing. The rapid advances, made by psychology and sociology, as divisions of the great field of anthropology, undeniably justify one in affirming that the *Educational World* does accept the data of the religious experience of the race. If religious conviction needs reëstablishing, what are the reasons for religion having lost its hold upon the educational world? I think we must say that it is because of a radical misunderstanding, rather than by reason of any rationally justifiable grounds of incompatibility. In the large and youthful enthusiasm that came in with the new attitude of science, in the middle of the nineteenth century—which did not leave untouched either philosophy or religion, and gave to the physical phenomena a new interpretation—the ideas of physical science transcended their own field and considered religion as a thing altogether unnecessary, because there was now no place to be found for it within the meaning of the laws of organic development. And, whatever might previously

have been said about religion being a device of priest-craft to hold people in subjection, now seemed to substantiate such an explanation of religion,—an explanation that was sooner destined to be destroyed by the very progress and advances of science, than it was cherished to live. This misunderstanding of religion came about through a fundamental misunderstanding of the essential grounds of both science and religion.

If there is one fact above all others which the new science and newer education have revealed, it is the fact of man as essentially a religious being—not to go into the discussion of the late President W. R. Harper as to the relation of religion to arts, science, and other branches of human intellectual acquisitions, as published in his *Religion and the Higher Life*,—nor yet to consider the theory, which Andrew Lang recurs to in his *The Making of Religion*, namely, that man had degenerated from a higher life. As Prof. George Galloway, in his *The Principles of Religious Development* (p. 72) says “The fact that men everywhere, and always have developed religion . . . points to the truth that religion must have its roots in human nature.” The late Auguste Sabatier has amply, if oftentimes erroneously and with a sometimes grotesque intellectualism, shown that religion is and always has been, the one great factor that has secured for man the opportunity and power of advancement. And though there are not lacking, even to-day Christian men of learning and leading in learned circles, who still hold that there are peoples without religion—such as for instance, when Sir John Lubbock, in his *Marriage, Totemism and Religion*, gathers up the work of a singularly happy learned long life, and reaffirms his opinions of fifty years ago concerning what he calls particularism and individualism in religion in contrast to that theory which holds to its universality. While, in the writings of the late Dr. Daniel G. Brinton, a man of little or no religious sympathy with the Church as religious, we have a champion of that position which affirms that the first people possessing no religion has yet to be found; and “religion is ‘that reference of a man’s life to a world governing Power which seeks to grow into a living union with it’” (Pfleiderer, quoted by Galloway, *Op. cit.* p. 58).

The Christian Church, of course, has always held, in theory, at least, if not in practice, this essential relation of human beings in the bond of religion, and always works on the assumption

tion of the innate knowledge of God in man. But, like many other facts which are constituent in the church's vital faith, it has been only half believed and lived. Its finest fruition has had to be revealed by the labors of learned Christian men and men of science like Sir Oliver Lodge, Sir W. Crookes, President G. Stanley Hall, Dr. Franz Boas, and Professor Alexander F. Chamberlain.

2. Granting then, as we firmly believe, that man is an incurably religious being, and that his truest life is realized in profound religious experience—there is another factor which has been not a little potent in destroying religious conviction in the *Educational World*, though in a totally different way from that which was conceived under the influence of the new organic development theory. I refer now to the so-called higher critical movement in the field of Biblical literature, archeology, history and doctrine. And it has been just here that there has arisen that second cause of the loss of religious conviction for the educated man. For here, the danger was, not in denying any such thing as religion or the fact of the religious experience of the race, but to him the practical denial of religion on the part of those who were supposed to be the conservators of religious truth, by reason of the attitudes they sustained to every other investigator in the same field—and their denial and destruction rather than the reconstruction, of those things in the Bible which were regarded as being the highest and most perfect expressions of religious truth,—and, therefore, the most authoritative. Here the difficulty was greater, because more genuinely personal. It was the engendering of disbelief and indifference because of "war within the camp," as it were. There was still an acceptance of the fact of religion, and religious experience, as well as the will to believe—but, if the professors and teachers of theological learning and divinity were at war with themselves regarding these heretofore fundamental truths of the Christian Church, where were they to look for that positive expression of religion that would help them? When faith has been assailed, thereby causing indifference, it is not a great step to a species of open immorality. In other words, it came to be thought that religion had no relation to life itself and the fact of conduct and character.

3. And, perhaps, greatest of all the causes of the loss of religious conviction in the educational world was this separation

of conduct and religion, character and belief. It is in this fact, too, that we must find the reason for the success of that pseudo-scientific intellectualism of Haeckel with his specious and Godless monism. This fact, too, has had that peculiar effect upon both the demands of the intellect and also of moral perception, of making the spiritual life seem very unreal for them.

III. THE EDUCATIONAL WORLD ACCEPTS THE FUNDAMENTAL DATA OF THE RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE OF THE RACE.

With the naming of only these few causes of the loss of religious conviction in the educational world, let us now turn to see whether the educational world accepts the data of religious experience. And I shall here name only those data of the most fundamental importance, namely (1) the existence of a supreme power or force—or God; (2) the existence of man as a being distinct from the rest of the creatures of the world; (3) the fact of evil; (4) the necessity of redemption, and regeneration.

1. No history of education can be written without reckoning with the Christian Church. And, while the teachers of the Church have always insisted upon the existence of a personal Supreme Power as responsible for the world and the life that now is, not all the world of Christian civilization has vitally accepted the dogma of the schoolmen. Their reasonable doubt arose solely through their manner of teaching this great fact—and if doubt expressed itself in atheism, it was because the teacher persistently refused to get the learner's point of view. And yet, no great scientific discovery has ever been made by the man who did not accept this dogma in some form. If it was not a personal God, it was a great law, or the activity of mere blind forces, set in motion in some far off and remote time of the world's history.

The Church, in her best days, has never been anything but a sympathetic sponsor for the progress and growth of education and enlightenment. But she has changed her methods now. In her best teachers and educators, she has become as progressive as the most progressive movement. She has taught the world to look upon the unerring law operating in nature as the great and gracious God—in whose image man himself is made. Though there may be many valid arguments against the design

theory, perhaps next to the theory of moral government, it is and is likely to be one of the most powerful for influencing the minds of the educational as well as the popular world. Our modern education is built up on the great theory of the unity and personality of the world ground (cf. Bowne, *Theism*, *passim*; Diman, *The Theistic Argument*, *passim*; Knight, *Aspects of Theism*, chapters VIII-XV).

This unity and personality of the world-ground is the Christian's God and Father "who in holy love created and sustains all." Before the world of nature could be understood as perfectly as it is understood to-day, men had to work in the holiest obedience to all the laws that permeate it. Here then, we may undoubtedly affirm a truth acceptable, in one of its many forms, to the members of the educational world.

2. Man is one with the rest of the creation as regards his physical being and well-being. The doctrine of man with his essential physical relation to all the world, plus those additional qualities and attributes which make him also a member of another kingdom, is one of the most fundamental truths in the educational world—for the anthropologist, the psychologist, and for the sociologist.

"Whatever view may be taken of him, he is a part of nature, the summit and crown of it, to be sure, but still embraced and held in it. He is born, and grows, and is dependent on the same chemical and physical laws as the animal world about him. He is subject to the common laws of organic life. Even his mental life is at present conditioned in the healthy action of a complex of natural forces. Thus, however clearly his possession of reason may suggest to faith a connection with a higher sphere, the roots of his being undoubtedly connect him with the great aggregate of nature. And it is specially to be noted, . . . that those who deny . . . the existence of God are emphatic in the complete identification of man with nature" (Valentine, *Natural Theology*, p. 90).

Those arguments and experiments of the ultra-Darwinian and Haeckelian biologists (both by the study of embryology and the relative truth that certain animals can be shown to be prone to the diseases and weaknesses of the flesh which are also common to man, and that such ailments in these certain animals can be treated in just the same and in as successful a manner as they are treated in man), which would prove man to be merely a creature of the creative cosmic forces, and be nothing more, are open to many modes of disproof and discredit. The educa-

tional world accepts the fact of man—as witness not only the results of the work of anthropologists, but also the multitudinous productions of psychologists and sociologists. They recognize too that man is open to two modes of influence, each producing a life of character the result of the dominating influence. In other words, that a man can become, in a truer sense than the Nietzschean sense, a super-man; or he can become a sub-human creature. The material evolutionist and some evolutionary sociologists attempt to produce this super-man merely in special and beautiful physical environments. Other interpreters of life see that there must be something other than mere non-human and non-moral environment, and strive first to clean out man's impure motivations and teach him that unmistakable truth—that right living and character are begotten only in right thinking and the expression of his better-self in some form of service. And this is where the datum of man that forms part of the data of religious experience also forms a part of the philosophy of science in the educational world. In him, that is his flesh, the religious world sees a war being waged, the combatants being evil and righteousness. On this double truth concerning man two other data of the religious experience are founded, namely 3) the problem of evil, and 4) the necessity of redemption and regeneration, both of which will now engage our consideration.

3. From the far-off distance, the fact of evil has been bewailed in man's efforts to live to the extent of his greatest aspirations. We cannot even here stop to indicate the theories of the origin of evil, nor yet to say much in regard to its nature: for both lines have been very diversely conceived. In spite of that kind of reasoning which says 'God is all, God is mind, therefore there is no matter'; or 'God is all, God is good, therefore there is no evil,' the man in the street as well as the member of the educational world feels that such reasoning explains too much and not enough. The struggle and war of the lower nature with the higher nature of man, and the failure of the higher over the lower, is the fact of evil here spoken of and meant. In a sense it may be said that this fact of evil is one of the chief things recognized by the Christian Church—because the Church was built, constructed, and conceived to destroy the work and havoc of evil. Even a rank evolutionary ethics recognizes this fact of evil, too, and tries to meet it with its own

specific, even as the Comtean doctrine of the God-Humanity tries to meet it by making the race itself God. One system of thought, and not a little influential either, interprets this commonly recognized fact thus

"God (good) could never make man capable of sin. It is the opposite of good—that is evil—which seems to make men capable of wrong. Hence evil is but an illusion, and error has no real basis. . . . The superstitious parent of evil is a lie ("Science and Health," 267 thousandth, Boston 1903, p. 481)."

With this thing that has proven itself the enemy of man's highest *well-being* what must follow but his defeat or victory? And so we come to the fact of Redemption.

4. We are thus brought to the fact of redemption as a necessity in the world. Redemption in more ways than one is reognized by the educational world. But the greatest redemption which it coneeives of is absolutely identical with that view of the religious world, namely the redemption from evil to righteousness, from Satan to God.

The *Educational World* aeepts these data of the *Religious World* or experience, and thus sustains to religious experience a common though not a perfect relation. And it is because of the imperfect relation existing between these two worlds that we are come together at this discussion, if perchance we may solve the problem so clearly to our own satisfaction as to go back to our spheres of labor and begin immediately reëstablishing religious conviction in each of these indicated realms: 1) of science, 2) of edneation, and 3) of the popular mind.

Personally, this problem has always had more or less fascination for me in my work as a minister of Christ's truth and the most glorious life. If there is so much in common of the absolute facts of life among men of diverse intellectual temperaments, as our discussion includes, just how shall we set about reëstablishing the perfect relation, which, in this instance, we call the reëstablishment of religious conviction?

IV. THE TREND OF MODERN THOUGHT DEMANDS THE INTERPRETATION OF RELIGIOUS PHENOMENA IN THE TERMS OF LIFE RATHER THAN REASON.

There is a sense in which it is perfectly justifiable to say that truth is not an absolute quantity or quality, but rather relative; especially when we mean that truth is never stationary

in the sense that it brings one to a certain place or position and leaves him there an unmovable object. We should rather liken it to a secret and silent dynamic and vital power, most fully expressed only in human lives, which brings one up from a lower plane to a higher and truer—the real place where one should rest and be, but from which place he is ever going out into new paths, and bringing in new treasures, and growing richer with each new excursus from the house of truth into the highways and byways of life. And the minister of the things of Jesus Christ should certainly be an occupant of this house of truth that he may bring to those well versed in the knowledge of things and time, the real vitality of all thinking and life. In other words, as a prime requisite, he must learn to adjust himself to the best of the earth's knowledge and its interpretations; for these will be for him the byways and highways into which he must make his excursions.

Tremendous have been the damage and destruction caused by this servant of truth by the reason of intellectual blindness, or the arrogance of faith as being able to subsist without the companionship of knowledge. I have in mind especially the case of a brilliant student of geology, an earnest Christian and worker in the church, until after an interview with his pastor, whose intellectual life was so narrow that his God was equally small. He insisted that, if this young science-student accepted the modern views of the origin of things, with their involved incompatibility with the belief of the Church, he would be worthy of dismissal from her privileges. The day came when this minister of truth had but a handful of hearers.

If it is true that there are but few in the educational world, who do not accept the great fact of some fundamental or supreme power, who is the essential center of all that is, and which great fact is not only the pivot on which all truly religious experience depends, but also all progressive and positive knowledge rests, and on which the whole educational world a mathematical demonstration? Or shall we not rather interpret this fact of religious experience to these people to make it an absolute necessity in their lives? Shall we try to demonstrate God's existence as a great personal being—after the order of a mathematical demonstration? or shall we not rather interpret God in the terms of life than intellect? The trend of thought

in educational and religious circles demands that this fact be demonstrated in the terms of life; and here is where we shall ever see that truth for which all evangelical religious scholars stand, namely that faith in God produces salvation from the lower self to the embodiment of the divine character in human lives, rather than character being the causative factor in salvation, or of the true religious conviction. As already suggested, when the fact of God is interpreted in the terms of life and action—the world begins to have a new appearance. In the plain, dull nasturtium leaf, the new eyes of the new heart see God and his wondrousness. The blades of grass now speak of the goodness of God; and earth becomes filled with heaven, and every common bush aflame with the holy life of God—and a new life courses through the veins, and the person wonders why he shut out the light of God's countenance, and the joy of the divine life, so long. In the multitude of new experiences and existences he now sees signs of God's purposes in creating man and the world. Instead of by the imperfect philosophical argument of Descartes, the world will be more readily saved by the appeal to life and purpose. The Cartesian doctrine will always be an imperfect argument and incapable of leading one to true general conclusions about God. It will be more useful, perhaps to the man already religious. But we must go farther and recognize that when a man applies his faculties of inquiry and observation to the world outside him, he finds himself confronted with facts which have greater meaning and strengthen the beliefs which he derives from his own qualities and his own experiences. He sees that the world is full of marks of active design, which are in daily operation throughout all nature. He conceives a designer. Why does he conclude that every effect must have had a cause? Because it is the final answer of his own consciousness. Upon this all science and knowledge rests. You must always, in the last analysis, come to something which is known, but in fact unprovable.

This I mention merely by the way, that, before we can attempt intellectual work regarding the Being and existence of God, we must carry human beings along that road where we may lead them to discover God in life and action, revealing himself in the language of the soul's need. On this aspect of the truth I have treated at greater length in my recently published article on "The Authority of Jesus and its Meaning for the Modern

Mind," in the *American Journal of Religious Psychology and Education* (vol. 4, No. 3, July, 1911). In President Churchill King's *Taylor Lectures* at Yale University, on *The Seeming Unreality of the Spiritual Life*, we find an admirable discussion of the difficulties which beset this great spiritual and religious fact. I can only mention the book with a brief quotation:

"The religious life can never be one of mere passive appreciation, or aesthetic admiration; it requires through and through the active ethical will. . . . The very existence of harmonious personal relation to God requires such an ethical will, The character of God, then, can never be a mere subject of passive aesthetic admiration; it demands a moral surrender to the will of God, and strenuous endeavor to embody that will in life."

V. GOD AND MAN, AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THEM: WHAT IS IT?

All other essential facts in experience regarding life and God can only be rightly conceived as this fact is adjusted to the life of man. The Apostolic word will remain true as long as man's highest relations are expressed in this oneness and unity with God and service for men: "For ye are laborers together with God; ye are God's husbandry; ye are God's building."

The fact that man is not man by mere animal instincts in contrast to intellect and character is not always recognized by the world in general. Though comparative psychology, and the science of genetics are fast growing branches of human knowledge, and are adding not a little to our knowledge of both man and the lower animal kingdom, their effort to bridge the great gulf between man, even the lowest, and the highest of the lower forms of animal life is a task for which it is even too soon to venture to utter any kind of prophecy. We have the fact of man and his essential difference from other animals. This fact is generally accepted both by anthropologists and biologists. Religious experience rests itself upon the assurance that though man is a child of this world, according to the flesh, yet he is more truly a child of the heavenly country, that is a spiritual, because he is unmistakably the offspring of God. It is a fact worthy of note that it is not the person notable because of great physical or bodily endowment that survives in the memory, or whose life is recorded for and his character re-counted among the rising generations—but it is rather the man who has shown

to the world how much of God and heaven there is in him: a man like our Lord himself, one like Robertson of Brighton, one like Drummond of Sterling—men who have shown God to the world! There are many things regarding both God and man that will forever cause mental uncertainty and sometimes even doubt because it is impossible for the intellect to grasp them and master them. But to demonstrate that life can be lived with God, is the way to bring the surest poise and sanity to life.

Man has experiences, which, at once attest his relation to dual kingdoms. The lustings of the flesh assure him that he is an animal, and sometimes no better; the promptings of the Spirit link him with the Infinite and Eternal, and he stands in awe before the Ineffable.

“Eternal Light, Eternal Light
How pure the soul must be,
When placed within thy searching sight,
It shrinks not, but, with calm delight,
Can live and look on thee!

The Spirits that surround thy Throne
May bear the burning bliss,
But surely this is theirs alone,
Since they have never, never known,
A fallen world like this.

There is a way for man to rise
To that sublime abode;
An offering and a sacrifice,
A Holy Spirit’s energies,
An advocate with God.”

And in this realm of experience the true key is the person of our Lord Jesus Christ. In him we have the acme of God’s revelation of love and light. In Jesus we have learned that the Jehovah of the Jews is more than the Absolute of the Christian philosopher: *He is our Father*. In this pivotal point of God’s Fatherhood through Jesus Christ, every minister of religion has the source of inspiration and enthusiasm with which he may go to work to make God real to men. “In all religions we have a subject and an object, and a bond of relationship between them,” which is that “the faith that the deepening spiritual life reaches beyond the present time-order, is a legitimate faith, that the values which give meaning to this life are not subject

to decay and destruction because they are of God." (Galloway *Op. cit.*)

Not in the Church as constituted to-day are we as ministers of the word of truth to place that absolute assurance that it is the sole heir of God's instruments of salvation. True it is one, and that one sanctioned by our Lord. The Church is rather the home and ought to be the place of nourishment, fellowship, and the school of training. When we have taught the Church's necessity in human life in this aspect, we may rest assured that to those whose faith has been destroyed because of the glaring inconsistencies of Christian lives, we shall present to them an aspect of the religious life which places the Church as God's visible tabernacle in which men shall find food for their souls, strength for their lives, and directions for their services—and from the Church they may go out and work out their own salvation through those channels of service which offer the greatest means for the service of God in the service for men.

"We know no deeper law in the building of character, than that righteous character comes through that association with the best in which there is mutual self-giving"

says Churchill King. We have tentatively defined Religion as the realization of those true relations in which men mutually give themselves for help.

"And," continues Churchill King, "the problem of character implies not only a bare recognition of man's moral freedom, but a sacred respect at every point for his personality. If a man is ever to have a character at all, it must be absolutely his own; he must be won freely into it. In this free winning to character, no association counts for its most that is not mutual. I become in character most certainly and rapidly like that man with whom I constantly am, to whose influence I most fully surrender, and who gives himself most completely to me" (*Theology and the Social Consciousness*).

"Religious Conviction" is that intellectual attitude and dominating passion of life which realizes that Jesus has given himself fully to men to transform them into his own character and likeness. Our part in reestablishing this conviction in the educational world is to interpret this great social and religious truth in the terms of life of a like kind.

For a technical consideration of this theme, as far as it is treated in literature, and the sources from which I have derived most help I am indebted to the following authors.

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MODERN JUDAISM (QUESTIONNAIRE).

BY DR. J. H. KAPLAN,
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The following *questionnaire* has been prepared for the purpose of obtaining reliable information concerning the present condition and the probable future of modern Judaism. Certain questions, in particular, are of paramount interest. Such, e. g., are the retention or abandonment of the Sabbath, the relations of Judaism and Unitarianism, the rôle of the stage and its possible substitution for the pulpit, the preservation of Jewish separatism, or the acceptance of assimilation with the non-Jewish world, etc.

QUESTIONNAIRE.

1. Do you believe a day of rest, that is, a Sabbath, is essential to a religious life?
2. Do you believe Judaism can live without a Sabbath?
3. Do you think one can be a good Jew without keeping the Sabbath?
4. Do you believe that by any effort, however great, the Jews could and would observe the Sabbath?
5. Do you believe that Reform Judaism means a higher appreciation of Judaism, or a gradual loss of all things Jewish?
6. Do you believe Judaism would gain or lose by a Sunday-Sabbath?
7. Do you think that Reform Judaism leads to an ultimate assimilation of Jew with non-Jew?
8. Do you believe that Unitarianism and Reform Judaism could permanently unite in one congregation?
9. Do you believe a complete assimilation of Jew with non-Jew would be a loss or a gain to the spiritual forces of civilization?
10. Do you believe the stage, purified and reorganized, can take the place of the pulpit, and if so, would you consider that a gain or loss to religion in general?

11. Supposing the Jew has no distinct religious message for the world any more than Germany or Russia has a distinct political message for the world, do you believe the Jew's privilege, right, or duty, would still be to preserve his individuality and separate religious existence?

Those interested and willing to answer these questions, are requested to send their replies (with name and age) to Dr. J. H. Kaplan, Selma, Alabama.

LITERAURE: BOOKS, ETC.

La parole catholique. Discours choisis de nombreux orateurs. Par Le Chanoine JEAN VAUDON, Missionnaire, Ancien Supérieur de Séminaire. Première Série. *La Paroisse. Tome I. L'Installation dans la Paroisse. La Prise de Possession de la Paroisse. Pour les Prêtres de la Paroisse.* Paris: Bloud et Cie., 1911. xiii, 354p.

Bibliothèque de l'Enseignement scriptuaire. La Loi et la Foi. Étude sur Saint Paul et les Judéisants par A. DE BOYSSON, Directeur au Séminaire de Saint-Sulpice. Paris: Bloud et Cie., 1912. viii, 339p.

These are two characteristic productions of French Catholicism. The first is a selection of sermons and essays by various members of the clergy on all aspects of the parish and the priest, the duties, opportunities, dangers, etc., of the ministry; the opening essay (pp. 8-33) is by a Bishop (anonymous) who treats of the parish in figurative fashion,—the parish has a soul and a body, the priest is the head and the church the heart, the faithful are the limbs, etc. Other contributors are the late Archbishop of Cambrai, the Bishops of Constance, Limoges, etc. Several sermons and essays (pp. 261-339) are the work of Father Delaporte, Superior General of the Prêtres de la Miséricorde. Canon Vaudon cites the saying, aimed at the Church, "What destroys religion in France is the 40,000 sermons preached there every Sunday," but observes on this point (p. xii): "No! what destroys religion in France is not the priestly word, but the contempt of some, the indifference of others, or the cowardice of a very large number in face of duty." Good sermons and good books there are; it is good hearers and good readers that are wanting. The deaf and the blind are so of their own volition. The closing section of the book (pp. 340-351), by Father Rauzan, Superior General of the Missionaries of France, bears the title "The priest, principal cause, and only efficacious remedy of the evils of the church." This manual will doubtless be of service to the priests for whom it is intended. Rev. A. de Boysson's *The Faith and the Law* is intended for clergymen and students in the higher seminaries. After an introductory chapter dealing with the question of the date of the New Testament documents concerned, especially the Epistle to the Galatians, the author has a historical section (pp. 29-191), which treats of the first controversies, the Council of Jerusalem, the Judaizing opposition after the Council, and the beginnings of the Judaizing gnosis; and a theological study (pp. 191-334) concerned with the doctrine of St. Paul as opposed to the Judaizing view, justification by faith, the progress of the supernatural life, and the relations between the doctrine of St. Paul and that of Our Lord. On pages 335-336 is a brief bibliography, in which the names of Ramsay, Round, Sanday and Headlam, among others, appear. The author concludes that "the Church has kept the first Gospel which it received, without experiencing the need of accepting a new one." Clementine doctrine and Judaeo-philosophy failed to influence the development of dogma or of ecclesiastical institutions. Nor is the doctrine of St. Paul to

be regarded as the result of his personal religious experience; that only made him feel more keenly and express with more conviction and energy the truths he had otherwhere learned.

A. F. C.

La philosophie de William James. Par TH. FLOURNOY. Sainte-Blaise; Foyer Solidariste, 1911. 221 p. With portrait.

This little book grew out of the address delivered by the author, Professor in the Scientific Faculty of the University of Geneva, at the anniversary meeting of the Association chrétienne suisse des Etudiants, held at Stc.-Croix, October 8, 1910, an occasion at which it had been hoped Professor James himself would be present to renew "my old acquaintance with the *jeunesse studieuse* of Vaud and Geneva," and it is under their auspices that it is now published. In 1860, William James, "stud. phil.," was received as *hospes perpetuus* (April 4 to July 27) of the Genevese section of the Society of Zofingen, and, on leaving, was made an honorary member. *The Catalogue of Members of the Society*, published in 1861, gives his occupation as "merchant, New York," which curious fact gives rise to some reflections by Prof. Flournoy on the seeming contrast with his after-career. In a most sympathetic way the author treats of James and his philosophy under the following headings: Artistic nature, first influences, rejection of monism, pragmatism, radical empiricism, pluralism, tychism (or fortuitism), meliorism and moralism, theism, the will to believe, etc. An appendix (pp. 197-219) reproduces a *compte-rendu* of James' *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, contributed by Prof. Flournoy to the *Revue Philosophique* in 1902; and pages 9-12 contain a list of French translations of his works, a very brief sketch of his life, and a list of the principal notices of his life and death which have appeared in the French language, 1910-1911. The start of James on his way to lasting fame as a philosopher is thus described (p. 36):

"In so far as it is possible to explain the personality of a man of genius by environmental influences, it may be said that William James, when about to commence his proper career, had drawn from his family milieu that moral and religious conviction, which was to remain the permanent inspirer of his philosophy, and from the school of the natural sciences that concrete mode of thought, which fitted so well his innate artistic temperament, and later expanded in his two doctrines, so closely related, of pragmatism and radical empiricism." James will not live in the history of human thought as the founder of a school of philosophy (his philosophy was "rather an attitude communicating itself by contagion of feeling than a doctrine that could be taught by didactic exposition"), but as "one of the great prophets of intellectual and moral liberty; an apostle of the strenuous life and personal faith; a figure of deliverance standing against all systems tending to fetter, to narrow and to stifle the spontaneity of human beings and their spiritual development; one of those rare and lofty individualities, who have succeeded in uniting the two poles of our nature, the sense of the Real and the sense of the Ideal, in a truly living synthesis, inspiring with enthusiasm and energy all who approach them" (p. 191).

A. F. C.

L'origine de l'idée de Dieu. Etude historico-critique et positive. Ière partie: historico-critique. Par le P. GUILLAUME SCHMIDT, S. V. D. Vienne, Autriche: Imprimerie des Méchitharistes, 1910. Pp. xiii, 316.

This book, well-provided with indexes (subjects; tribes, peoples, countries; native words and expressions; authors), is reprinted from the journal *Anthropos* of which the author is the editor. The six chapters treat of the following topics: The philological period in the study of the religions of historical peoples (the school of Lepsius, Schwarz, Kühn, Müller, Baudry, Bourouuf, Bréal, Meyer, Ploin, etc.); the ethnological period of the study of the religions of uncivilized peoples (theories of Lubbock, Spencer, Tylor, etc.; progress of the animistic theory with the philologists and others; pan-Babylonianism); the position of the theologians; later views more favorable toward animism; the monotheistic pre-animism of Andrew Lang (pp. 72-124); criticism of Lang's theory (pp. 125-244; Howitt, Tylor, Foy, Maret, Hartland, van Gennep; the Australian supreme beings, etc.); the preanimistic theories of magic (pp. 245-297; Guyau, King, Maret, Hubert and Mauss, Preuss, Lehmann, Vierkandt, Hartland, etc.). For Father Schmidt religion is to be defined as "the recognition of one or several personal beings, who rise above terrestrial and temporal conditions, and the feeling of dependence with regard to them." The term *personal*, and not *spiritual*, is used, because, in his opinion, religion "includes forms and periods in which the idea of spirituality had not yet developed" (p. 4). It also serves, he thinks, to emphasize the incorrectness of the theory of "magic," discussed at length in chapter vii, which would see the very beginnings of religion in the idea of "a universal and impersonal magic force." With such a definition the strictest Buddhists and the European atheists are both ruled out of consideration. The author observes further: "The mere recognition of the existence of a supernatural being and the feeling of dependence with regard to him would constitute only a theoretical religion, with which man, considered abstractly might content himself. But it is precisely in those first times of human evolution, with which we are dealing, when thinking, feeling and acting are all one, that such a purely theoretical religion seems *a priori* impossible, and the intellectual and affective recognition will at once express itself in external actions. Then we have a complete and veritable religion, because it is living." The exact manner in which, in the most primitive period, this external recognition manifested itself first and most commonly is difficult to say. Father Schmidt rejects the opinion of certain recent ethnologists who refuse to admit the existence of religion, where no well-characterized prayer is to be found. He holds that, while religion, in its perfect form, may require the presence of moral or social prescriptions, prayer, sacrifice and the observation of certain ceremonies, "there is a real religion, wherever the existence of any single one of these manifestations can be demonstrated." moreover, in primitive times these manifestations, generally, have not yet assumed the character of fixed forms or ceremonies,—"they are rather spontaneous and in correlation with external events and states of mind, being for this reason in a large measure still subject to change." It is with this view of the nature of religion that Father Schmidt, whose knowledge of the literature of the subject is very large, résumés critically

the history of the idea of God in modern scientific literature from the school of Max Müller and its antecedents down to the polemics of Lang and the increasing out-put of the opponents and supporters of the theories of "magic," "pre-animism," etc. The thesis, which he himself seeks to maintain, in this work, is that "a primitive monotheism" has existed, of such a nature that it is not at all necessary to assume that it has been preceded by a long series of lower forms, or "developed with the primitive forms of mythological evolution." This "primitive monotheism," Father Schmidt maintains, "is a real monotheism, but so simple in structure, that it could be born, without difficulty, at the beginning of a really human (*i. e.*, intellectual) evolution" (p. 31). In the opinion of Father Schmidt (p. 38) "the empire of the animistic theory appears still to be almost universal." The theologians have paid too little attention to it and their attacks upon it have often suffered from their lack of ethnological equipment, etc., but this is now being more or less overcome. Naturally, much space is given to Andrew Lang and the "anthropological school." The author points out the great lack of harmony among the critics of Lang and his theories, especially concerning the bearing of the new facts adduced from the religious life, ideas and institutions of the Australians and other primitive races and peoples. But the general result is, on the whole, rather favorable to Lang (p. 243), in so far, at least, as the existence of the idea of a supreme being among certain uncivilized peoples is concerned. In attempting to explain the origin of this idea, however, there is great difference of opinion. In opposition to current theories of the magical origin of religion, etc., Father Schmidt (p. 294) claims to demonstrate that "only the absolute priority of 'normal (=profane)' causality, and not magical causality, can explain psychological, ethnographic and prehistoric facts." Again, "at the beginnings of human development we must place power and not impotence, the positive and not the negative, the effort and the capacity to know causes, and not 'primitive stupidity'." The author expresses surprise at the aversion of scientists to "personality," which Lang's theory places at the beginnings of religious evolution, and their tendency to explain religion through unconscious forces. We await with interest the appearance of the second part of this valuable and scholarly work.

A. F. C.

Harper's Library of Living Thought. The Revolutions of Civilization.
By W. M. FLINDERS PETRIE, D. C. L., LL. D., F. R. S., F. B. A. London and New York: Harper and Brothers, 1911. Pp. xi, 135. Figs. 1-57.

In this little book, the seven chapters of which treat of the nature of civilization, the periods of civilization in Egypt, the periods in Europe, the fluctuations, relations of different activities, the national view of civilization, conditions of civilization, the well-known British Egyptologist sustains the thesis that "civilization is an intermittent phenomenon" (p. 5), and also "a recurrent phenomenon." To study its recurrences, to determine the principles underlying its variations, and to discover the character of its "summer" and its "winter," its growth and its fall, etc., "we should examine the longest series of its revolutions and see what they have in common." In Egypt, according to Dr. Petrie, "we

can trace the past of man in continuous history for over 7,000 years, and can put in order a prehistoric age which may well extend our view to about 10,000 years;" and, over the whole of that time we know what were the products of every century; in the long range of vision we can discern eight successive periods of civilization, each separated by an age of barbarism or decline before and after it" (p.11). Two of these periods are prehistoric and lie beyond 6000 B. C., and for these pottery and other more primitive arts must be used for comparison. But for the other six periods Dr. Petrie employs sculpture as the standard test of advance and retrogression. The art-data in question are used to "trace through eight successive periods the repeated growth, glory and decay of art in Egypt, indicating the evolutions of civilization through some 10,000 years." Taking as guide, "the best-defined position in the development of art, the close of the archaic age in sculpture, when a perfect harmonizing of the several parts is first reached" (p. 84), the author fixes this date for the various periods as follows: Eighth, 1240 A. D.; seventh, 450 B. C.; sixth, 1550 B. C.; fifth, 3450 B. C.; fourth, 4750 B. C.; third, 5400 B. C. Dr. Petrie believes that "the Mediterranean and Egypt, as a whole, form therefore a single group in the history of civilization," and "the phase of the wave of civilization was identical in Egypt and Europe to within a century, where it can be observed in three periods; and in three earlier periods it was generally connected and may have been identical." According to the author, "the remains parallel to the first three periods in Egypt still lie in the 21 feet of neolithic ruins in Knossos,—this depth is a greater amount of accumulation than that which contained the ruins of the subsequent three periods of the Early, Middle and Late Cretan Ages" (p. 48). The parallelism of the other periods is as follows:

Period	In Egypt	In Europe
IV.....	3d-6th Dynasties.....	Early Cretan
V.....	7th-14th Dynasties.....	Middle Cretan
VI.....	15-20th Dynasties.....	Late Cretan
VII.....	21st-33d Dynasties.....	Classical
VIII.....	The Arab.....	Medieval

While the data for Asia are not so convincing or so apropos, the recurrences of civilization are noticeable there also, and what little we know of ancient American culture suggests a similar course of events. But "the Eastern phase, on the whole, keeps about 3 1-2 centuries in advance of the Mediterranean," and this difference of phases causes "the constant struggle between East and West." In the words of the author (p. 108): "The impression that civilization always comes from the East is due to the East being a few centuries ahead of the West in its phase. Thus, on the rise of a wave the East is more civilized; while on the fall of a wave—which does not attract attention—it is less civilized." While, "with Mesopotamia always leading, it is bound, politically, to overrun the West a few centuries before the rise of the West in each period," nevertheless, "on the whole, the West more usually controls the East, because from the time of its maximum, during the gradual decline of each period, it is always on a higher plane than the East." The phase belongs to folk

and not to land, in the opinion of Dr. Petrie, as the history of the Etruscans (if an Asiatic people) in Italy, the Greeks in Bactria, and the Arabs in Spain seems to indicate,—i. e., “the phase of an intrusive people is that of their source and not that of their new region; the phase of civilization is inherent in the people, and is not due to the circumstances of their position” (p. 113). Of the breaks between periods, etc., we are told that “every civilization of a settled population tends to incessant decay from its *maximum* condition; and this decay continues until it is too weak to initiate anything, when a fresh race comes in, and utilizes the old stock to graft on, both in blood and culture; as soon as the mixture is well started, it rapidly grows on the new soil, and produces a new wave of civilization.” There can be “no new generation without a mixture of blood,” and “parthenogenesis is unknown in the birth of nations.” With the successive periods ‘there are lesser intervals of barbarism between the civilizations, and the civilization-phase in each period is longer at each recurrence.’’ This, as the author points out, “is in accord with the common idea that the world is getting more civilized as the ages go on, in spite of the crushing fact that in many kinds of civilization the successive recurrences show no improvement” (p. 119). A gain has been made in quantity, not in quality,—“the total amount of civilization is greater because it is longer.” Another result of this “widening-out of the phases,” has been to “separate the best period of each form of culture” (e. g., in the early days the arts of sculpture and painting, mechanics and wealth, were all nearly contemporaneous), and thus “art is decadent before the mechanical ability is free, and before the wealth has grown.” As to forms of government,—every invasion by a new people—the necessary foundation of a new period of civilization means the following succession: Autoocracy (four to six centuries), oligarchy (four to five centuries), gradual transformation to democracy (four centuries), their steady decay after democracy has attained full power, and autoocracy upon its ruins. The facts of marriage and the succession of human generations ensure “a period of greatest ability, beginning about eight centuries after the mixture, and lasting for four or five centuries in different subjects.” This, rather than periodical changes of climate, determines the regular recurrence of civilization. As to the future, Prof. Petrie holds that conditions are such that “the production of a new European art, and its subsequent activities cannot be expected for many centuries” (p. 130). Moreover, “the future progress of man may depend as much on isolation to establish a type, as on fusion of types when established” (p. 131). Hence the important rôle of eugenics in the future. A. F. C.

The Cambridge Manuals of Science and Literature. Vol. 21. *Early Religious Poetry of Persia*. By JAMES HOPE MOULTON. Cambridge: at the University Press, 1911. xi., 170p.

Ibid. vol. 26. *The Moral Life and Moral Worth*. By W. R. SORLEY. Cambridge: at the University Press, 1911. vii. 147 p.

Ibid. vol. 14. *An Introduction to Experimental Psychology*. By C. S. MYERS. Cambridge: at the University Press, 1911. vii, 156 p.

The nine chapters of the *Early Religious Poetry of Persia*, whose author is Greenwood Professor in the University of Manchester, discuss the fol-

lowing subjects: The Aryans and their language, general description of the Avesta, Avestan verse-forms, early history of the religion, Zarathustra, After Zarathustra, The Gāthās: literary features, Contents of the Gāthās, The Yashts and the later Avestas. There is a Bibliography ("a few of the most necessary books,"—those named in the text are generally not repeated) and an index. As Professor Moulton observes (p. 1), "the continent of Asia, apart from the tiny country of Palestine, has produced very little poetry that has made any impression upon the West." Even Omar was happy in finding a translator, who could win him the attention of the English literary world. The early Persian religious poetry also interests the thinker more than the man of letters." It was not until 1771 that the Avesta was really brought to the West, although MSS. (the oldest known is dated 1278, A. D.) lay hidden long before then in the Bodleian and certain other European libraries. From the vicissitudes of wars and the fanatical destructiveness of the Moslems, etc., the Avesta has suffered so much that, according to Prof. Jackson, "two-thirds have disappeared since the last Zoroastrian monarch sat on the Persian throne" (p. 14). As the author points out, Darmesteter's sceptical attempt to demonstrate that "the Gāthās are no older than the first century of our era, and the Sassanian editors are to be credited with very much more originality than tradition allows," never won favor,—indeed, "its brilliant author never made a convert among experts." One evidence as to "the remarkable faithfulness with which the Gāthās have been preserved," is the test of meter. The Later Avesta has suffered much more from glosses, etc. The Bible of Zoroastrianism may have been touched in two or three points by Babel, but its influence cannot have been great for the early period. Mithra, Prof. Moulton suggests, "seems to have belonged to the upper air rather than to the sun" (p. 37), and he regards him as probably of alien origin,—cf. Assyrian *metru*, "vain." *Anāhita*, a river-genius, or water-spirit, especially associated in the Later Avesta with Mithra, may also be non-Aryan. As to the historicity of Zarathustra there seems to be no doubt, but when and where he lived is harder to determine; and "legend has added immensely to the scanty record of the Prophet's life." The great importance of the sixth and fifth centuries B. C. in religious history (Buddha, Confucius, Socrates) lends some countenance to the traditional dates for his birth and death, viz. 660 and 583 B. C.; linguistic arguments, on the other hand, suggest a much earlier date. The birth-place of Zarathustra, where he spent his early life, seems to have been in Adarbaijan. He probably preached first in Bactria, making a convert of King Vish-tāspa,—"the Constantine of the new faith," and then "returned later on the full tide of success to press his propaganda in his native land." But he won only a partial victory over the lower forms of faith which he opposed and "a counter-reformation set in before the Gāthic dialect ceased to be spoken" (p. 74). It is in the Gāthās (really verse introductions, résumés and *aperçus* for a lost substratum of prose), "the kernel of the Avesta is to be found,"—the author gives a good résumé on pages 97-118. The Yashts and Later Avesta demonstrate "the degeneration which marks the centuries between Zarathustra and the Sassanians." In the words of Prof. Moulton: "Into the Avesta the Magi brought, to speak

generally, the elements which we find in the Vendīdād. The Gāthās are almost as innocent of ritual as the New Testament: like the prophets elsewhere, Zarathustra seems to have cared little for outward forms of worship. The Magi supplied the omission, and it suffices the record with sincere relief that their book of offices is in prose" (p. 78). Moreover: "They hardened the Prophet's profound adumbrations of truth into a mechanical system of dogma, therein showing the usual skill of priests in preserving the letter and destroying the spirit. Zarathustra's doctrine of Evil was developed into a systematic division of the world between Ahura Mazdāh and Angra Mainyu. Every angel and every creation of the former had its exact counterpart in the infernal order. The fact that the ingenious process was not always completed may be evidence of the limitation of Magian influence during the formative period of Parsism. The Amesha Spentas are only perfunctorily provided with fiends to match." It was through "the Sassanian reform that the Parsi faith was unified and established." The failure of Parsism to become a world-religion in part, at least, "lies in its weakness on that side where literature makes itself, even when its creators like the writers of the New Testament are totally unconscious of any literary mission" (p. 28), and "around the figure of the founder himself there is no halo, nor anything out of which a halo could be produced." Again, in spite of the pure and lofty character of the concept of Zarathustra, "the absence of the attributes of grace and love is by itself sufficient reason for the failure of Parsism to establish itself as a world-religion" (p. 64). In the Yashts and Later Avesta Zarathustra ceases to be a man and becomes "a purely supernatural figure, holding converse with Ahura Mazdāh on theological and ritual subjects, which rarely come near the practical and homely religion inculcated by the singer of the Gāthās. Nor is Ahura himself less changed" (p. 120). The story of Persian religious development is important in the evolution of our own faith, for two by-products of Persian thought loom large in the early history of Christianity—the Parsi heresy of Manichaeism, and the most important and long victorious cult of the Mithra, the latter seemingly a direct descendant of unreformed Iranian religion, scarcely touched by Zarathushtra's ideas, but considerably mixed with indigenous elements from the countries where it took its rise" (p. 79).

A. F. C.

Prof. Sorley's purpose in his monograph (perhaps too theoretical and didactic) on *The Moral Life* is to give "a popular account of the nature of goodness in human beings." It is not addressed specially to the philosophical student, but to the wider public interested in the subject. The topics treated are: The moral life, temperance, courage, wisdom, some other personal virtues (industry, prudence, thrift), justice, benevolence, religion and the moral life. For his ethnological orientation the author seems to have depended on Westermarck, from whom he cites Howitt's anecdote of the young Australian on page 4. The statement (p. 4) that "so far as our evidence goes, morality in some form has always been a factor in human life," seems justified. How far it is true that "in early societies there is no distinction between custom and morality" is less

certain. And the author is right in recognizing the difficulty in estimating "the amount of difference that actually exists, or has existed between the moral codes of different communities." It is not exactly true to say (p. 7), "the progress of moral ideas depends upon their emancipation from custom." From the author's point of view "morality is internal; it belongs to the inner life; and this is the mark which distinguishes it from the law of the land and the conventions of society." As to connection with law it may be said that "it is yet possible that the man of exact performance may remain untouched by the spirit of morality." A man's character "is made both for him and by him." It is based on heredity and developed by "experience" (environment, education, etc.). Prof. Sorley believes that "the term intellectual virtue is not a misnomer, although it does not, as with Aristotle, indicate a class distinct from moral virtue" (p. 21). The two terms, physical virtue and intellectual virtue, as used in Greek ethics, are found by modern writers to be of doubtful application. The personal and the social aspects "are inseparable in the moralization of man," and "if we make this fundamental distinction of personal and social the basis of a classification of the virtues, we must bear in mind the limits of the distinction." Room must also be made, the author thinks, for a third class,—"virtues corresponding to what have been called theological virtues. The cardinal virtues thus consist of: (1) Personal virtues, such as *temperance, courage, wisdom*; (2) social virtues, such as *justice, benevolence*; (3) religious virtues, or excellences in the personal attitude to the ultimate meaning of life. One of the triumphs of modern progress is the discovery of the virtue of courage "in regions intellectual and philanthropic, where its presence was not clearly seen by ancient morality" (p. 61), the widening of our conception of it "by associating it with active devotion to the claims of truth and of benevolence." The thought that "industry directed to a worthy end is an essential part of virtue is, in its clear statement, a modern, a very modern idea" (p. 72). Justice, being "the volitional habit which disposes a man to respect the rights of others," is essentially a social virtue. The discussion of benevolence (pp. 115-125) closes with the following bit of good advice: "In making moral pocket-handkerchiefs for the natives of Borrioboola-Gha, do not forget your station and its duties; in cultivating your own garden, always remember that you are a citizen of the world." Religions have not always been ethical, but "religion is never separated altogether from conduct" (p. 132),—nor can religion and morality be kept apart for long, "unless, as in some creeds, God is confined to heaven, and the world given over to the Devil." In connection with this book one should read certain sections of Dr. Franz Boas' *The Mind of Primitive Man* (N. Y., 1911) and also Dr. A. L. Kroeber's article on "The Morals of Uncivilized Peoples," in the *American Anthropologist* (N. S. vol. XII, 1910, pp. 437-447).

A. F. C.

The portions of Professor Myers' handy *Introduction to Experimental Psychology* (the chapter-subjects are touch, temperature and pain; color-vision; the Müller-Lyer illusion; experimental esthetics; memory; mental

test and their uses) which interest us particularly here are those which record evidence derived by the author and his fellow-investigators from the primitive peoples of Australasia, etc. As to color-vision the author observes (p. 43): "thus neither in animals, nor among children or savages, is there evidence of a development of the color sense along a definite path," and "there is no evidence that man has acquired his color vision say by an early evolution of the red (or blue) sense, later by the appearance of the green, and lastly by the appearance of the blue (or red) sense." Information concerning the color-sense of primitive peoples is given on pages 29-36. Of the Müller-Lyer illusion, we learn (p. 55): "Among very primitive peoples, e. g., those of the Torres Straits, the illusion turns out to be distinctly smaller than in England, while less primitive peoples, e. g., the Todas of Madras, stand midway, in size of the illusion, between the Torres Straits Islanders and Englishmen," but "it is probably because of his unfamiliarity with geometrical figures that the savage experiences the Müller-Lyer illusion in a less degree than the civilized man,—for him such figures have less 'meaning,' and, consequently, he is less influenced by the figure as a whole when estimating the length of one of its parts." As judged by the E test the visual acuity of the uncivilized peoples examined (p. 94) "is not very different from, though perhaps on the whole slightly superior to, the acuity of Europeans living a corresponding out-of-door life." As to sensitiveness to difference of pitch, "whereas the Murray Island (Torres Straits) and the Aberdeenshire adults differ enormously, there is very little difference between the school children of Aberdeenshire and those of Murray Island, who are now being taught by a Scottish teacher" (p. 99). Judged by the "spacial threshold" test of skin-touch, the Papuan Murray Islanders stand first having the lowest "spacial threshold," being able to distinguish a two-point from a one-point touch, when the compass points are separated by a distance of about a third of what is necessary in the case of the university men who stand at the opposite end of the list" (p. 100). Between the Papuans and the Todas come the Dayaks, and after the Todas the Englishmen, Scotchmen, etc. This result is, in some ways, quite surprising, as is also a similar greater capacity among primitive peoples to discriminate between lifted weights. And there seems to be "fair experimental evidence that the sensibility to pain is greater among civilized than among primitive people." There is a brief Bibliography (pp. 151-153), and an Index.

A. F. C.

Die Indogermanen im alten Orient. Mythologisch-historische Funde und Fragen. Von MARTIN GEMOLL. Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung, 1911. viii, 124 p.

This book has an attractive title and a good index. In an earlier volume, *Grundsteinen zur Geschichte Israels* (Leipzig, 1911) the author set forth the thesis that the Israelites took over their religion from the lords of the land of Canaan, who were of Indo-Germanic stock. The father of Israel *Abraham* and the ancient priest *Aaron* he brought into relation with *Ahura* (—Mazda); and *Jahwe* with Indo-Iranian *Yama*. He likewise dis-

covered Celtic myths in the Old Testament, and does many other things of the same sort, as a confirmed Aryanomaniae. The volume under review treats of the following: Tamūrā—Tahmūra—Takhmo urupa; Attis—Adad; Ahura—Arthur—Abram—; Gideon—Gwydion und Gilead—Galaad; zum Gilgamesepos; die Hatti—Mitani und ihre Verwandten. Here the comparative method has run wild, and Indogermanic peoples are picked out all over Asia Minor (the Hatti, Mitani, Chaldi, Cassites, Elamites, etc., are all such), while philological *rapprochements* of the most impossible sort are ventured upon. For Hr. Gemoll the *Hatti*, by their very name, betray relationship to the old Tentonic *Chatti*; Tamūrā—Thahmūrath—Nimrod, Attis—Adad are really Indogermanic deities,—so, too, is the famous Marduk. Not content with identifying *Ahura* and *Abram*, the author maintains that “the legendary old British King” is identical with them both,—moreover Lot and Lear are the same, and “the story of Lot must have been carried to Palestine by some Celtic people.” The Grail story comes in here also; and Gideon is identified with Gwydion, also Gilead with Galahad. From these and many other similar arguments the conclusion is reached that “Palestine was once inhabited by Celts.” The Iwein—Gawein legend, too, is “a European Gilgamesh epic,” indeed in Gawein—Gwalchmai lies hidden Gilgamesh. If this monograph has been composed as a “stunt” to show the dangerous possibilities of the comparative method, with attachments of solar and lunar mythology, its existence might be justified; what useful purpose it otherwise can serve is difficult to imagine.

A. F. C.

Beiträge zur Assyriologie und semitischen Sprachwissenschaft, herausgegeben von FRIEDR. DELITSCH und PAUL HAUPT, VII, 4: *Beiträge zur babylonischen Astronomie*. Von ERNST WEIDNER. Mit einer Sternkarte und 6 Abbildungen im Text. Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press), 1911. 101 p.

This discussion of the astronomy of the ancient Babylonians deals with “The ways of Anu, Enlil and Ea” (text, translation, notes, etc.); the significations of *Agū* (of the moon, the sun, Venus) and *Azkaru*; the observation of the moon by the Babylonians; Babylonian knowledge of the apparent lunar and solar diameters and the origin of the sexagesimal system. It is a very special and technical study based on the original documents themselves,—etymological notes and an extensive word-list (pp. 84-97) are given. The basis of the sexagesimal system, the “six,” lies in a six-fold division of the sky by the ancient Babylonians (p. 100). This stands in relationship with their calculation of the firmament in terms of the apparent diameter of the moon. The Babylonian text on moon-observations, translated on pages 60-68, contains much folk-lore and weather-lore, omens of luck and of evil, etc. One of the weather-prognostics is that “when the new moon appears covered with clouds, there will be rain.” The large number of terms in use applying to the moon, its phases, etc., shows how carefully and persistently it was observed in ancient Babylonia,—according to some, she was the world's first great teacher in the art of observing the heavens.

A. F. C.

Unsere Schrift. Drei Abhandlungen zur Einführung in die Geschichte der Schrift und des Buchdrucks. Von Dr. KARL BRANDI, ord. Prof. an der Univ. Göttingen. Mit 89 Abbildungen im Text und drei Beilagen. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1911. vii, 80 + 12 p.

This well-illustrated little monograph treats in three sections of writing and civilization, history of the forms of the letters of the alphabet, writing and technique, style, etc. Pages 77-80 contain bibliographical data; the three appendices are facsimiles of pages set up in various sorts of Gothic, Roman, Italic, etc. The illustrations in the text cover all periods of German writing, normal and abnormal. The manysidedness of writing is as marked at various periods of history as has been that of other borrowed forms of culture,—in the troublous times of the early Middle Ages, with their political divisions and limitations in the way of communication, etc., varieties of writing grew up which the paleographers of the 17th and 18th centuries mistakenly called “national” (cf. West Gothic, Lombard, Merovingian, Irish, Anglo-Saxon), but which are now recognized as having been in no wise coincident with the vacillating political boundaries of those nations (p. 3). The influence of the Roman Church, of the Renaissance, etc., is to be noted. The struggle between “Gothic” and “Roman” is still going on in Germany, the former having the advantage of a certain “patriotism.” The limit of distortion possible can be seen in the Augsburg H and S dating from 1740, as compared with some of the letters in vogue at the beginning of the art of printing itself. Noteworthy also are the esthetic “fringes” of such writing as that practiced by the humanists of the Roman Curia (see p. 35). Interesting is the story of the development of the writing of the capital letters (pp. 39-49),—the author styles K, “a sort of comet in the sky of letters.” The cursive employed on a Würzburg epitaph in 1687 is particularly adorned without losing its firmness (p. 49). In what direction German writing and printing are moving to-day is not absolutely clear, but Prof. Brandi detects “a strong mutual effect between the fluid forms of the German and the simpler forms of the Latin script.” This, perhaps, suggests the direction of the future. Mixture of form and style now prevail in many manuscripts; and numbers, like that of the Königsberg Professor, cited on page 75, are neither German nor Latin.

Die Stetigkeit im Kulturwandel. Eine soziologische Studie. Von ALFRED VIERKANDT, Privatdozent an der Universität Berlin. Leipzig: Verlag von Duncker & Humblot, 1908. xiv, 209 p.

We review here very tardily this book of Dr. Vierkandt, which, like his other valuable and interesting monograph on *Naturvölker und Kulturvölker* (Leipzig, 1896), seems not to be well-known in America. The present volume consists of a historical section (pp. 6-63), treating of invention and economic life, custom, language and political life, religion and myth; art, science, the physiognomy of modern culture; a psychological section (pp. 64-101) devoted to the historical structure of consciousness (basal idea, the development of mental life in the individual, perceptions and recollections, thought-process and conviction, affective life and formation of values, action, creative activity); and a sociological section (pp. 102-

200) concerned with the mechanism of culture-change (the conservation of culture, different types of culture-change, the process of acculturation, the three requisites for culture-change, necessity, "leading individuals" in culture-change, the realization of the new, the last causes of culture, evolutional tendencies, the irrational character of culture and the nature of the historical). There are also a brief introduction and conclusion. From the point of view of the author, the general characteristic of the human mind, which makes itself evident in the phenomena of society and civilization is the fact of continuity, or lack of spontaneity, according as we observe it with regard on the one hand to content and on the other to form. Everywhere innovations are not mere fiat activities or productions,—they have behind them a long history. Culture proceeds from culture,—these investigations of human peoples and races now existing, or having previously existed abundantly demonstrate. New phenomena of culture do not arise with absolute spontaneity; the rôle of the intellect and the will in their production is comparatively small, and the latter "must be set in motion by strong drastic and severe motives." The historic structure of human consciousness is continuity, which, on its negative side, reveals itself as lack of initiative or spontaneity. According to Dr. Vierkandt (p. 2): "The pressure of tradition, of imitation, of custom dominates both in the practical and in the theoretical realm of human consciousness to a much larger extent than popular opinion is aware of. The capacity to initiate both in thought and in action is much smaller and indolence here much greater than is generally assumed." In the first part the author illustrates the force and validity of the law of continuity from all aspects of human culture,—the origins of agriculture and the domestication of animals; the discovery of the use of fire, of the art of printing, etc.; the origin and development of language, the development of cult out of magic, the long pre-history of certain myths, the pre-history of modern animism; development of drama out of mime, influence of technique on ornamentation, origin of communicative drawing; mythology and dialectics as forerunners of science; the contrast of the high level attained by some parts of our culture and the low level still characterizing other parts. In the consideration of the historical structure of human consciousness, two types are recognized, a lower type, that of persistence, and a higher, that of adaptation. Changes of quality in evolution depend on summations. The birth of a new creation generally follows a longer developmental history, by means of which it first becomes complete and ripe for the contemporary age. The three requisites for culture-change are maturity (*Reife*), need (*Bedürfnis*) and initiative of individuals (or acculturation),—there are, of course, accidental outward impulses, etc. For real success all three factors are necessary, the lack of any one seems fatal or inhibitive. In the case of "leading individuals" ideal motives may be effective; the group, however, needs other interests. Economic interest is often suppressed by religious or social motives etc. There are four last causes which may stand behind the determining requisites as motive forces: (1) contact with other peoples; (2) change of external relations, change of place or of natural endowment, geographical changes,

the discovery of new natural resources (even though the latter be only a sort of stone capable of furnishing a new ornament); (3) a change in the human material and its relations, increase or decrease of population, change in the number of a special group, etc.; (4) a certain change may have as a consequence further variations. Dr. Vierkandt emphasizes "the immense importance of the trivial" and "the composition of the great out of the small" (p. 201). This is true both in the individual and in the racial life. The great in human things, wherever it may be found, consists in "the accumulation of small component parts." The trivial explanation in the mental sciences is the one to be first sought out,—the near-by, simple, drastic and trivial motives serve best for the explanation of cultural facts. In general, it may be said, "the simpler the explanation, the greater probability that it is the right one." This applies especially to the beginnings of culture, but also, with certain exceptions in the case of the higher civilizations and particular individuals, to other forms of culture (p. 155). The author treats in an interesting way of the difficulties attending successful innovations in customs, language, social institutions, etc. The difficulty of developing and getting accepted a new word is particularly emphasized. On this point interesting data are to be found in R. M. Meyer's *Vierhundert Schlagworte*, which the author refers to (p. 139).

A. F. C.

Weltanschauung, Volkssage und Volksbrauch in ihrem Zusammenhang untersucht von HEINRICH BERTSCH. Dortmund: Druck und Verlag von Fr. Wilh. Ruhfus, 1910. xii, 446 p.

The author of this book is, *magno intervallo*, perhaps, a Teutonic Thales, who sees water everywhere, an aqueous mythology as the primitive outlook on the world. The subjects of the thirteen sections of this work are: Earth and water (the ocean-ring, the subterranean ocean, the water-hell, birth from the waters, the subterranean ocean and springs, creation of the world out of the waters, the end of the world through water, the poisonous breath of the water); earth and the water-dragon (the serpent coiled round the earth, the giant serpent beneath the earth, the primitive dragon and the creation of the world, the flood-dragon and the end of the world, the coiled serpent and the ring as omens, the loosing of the flood-dragon and the final battle, the deadly breath of the dragon); dragon, water-course and spring (water-course and serpent, spring and serpent's jaws, the many-headed serpent); the water-tree of the earth's depths (trunk, branches and roots as symbols of the water-course, tree and forest as realm of the dead, as place of births, as primitive and terminal flood, tree-spirits and wood-spirits as water-beings); water-dragon and water-giant (the many-armed giant, giant-head and spring, the inexhaustible present, the many-headed giant, the primal giant and the creation of the world, primal giant, end of the world and the final conflict); water-beings singing and speaking (water-spirit as singer and musician, as seer and prophet); water-beings in fog and cloud (fog and cloud as smoke, vapor and concealer, as hair and beard, as web, rope and bridge, as fabric and clothing, as body and parts of the body, as realm of souls, as wall and rock, as omen and augury); treasure and treasure-keeper (the treasure

in the waters, the forms under which the treasure and the treasure-keeper appear); the water-spirit in tempest and storm (the winged giant, the fire-spitting giant; the giant with eyes of fire, the one-eyed giant, the skittle-playing giant, the treasure-giving giant, the giant as musician, the storm-giant as death-demon, the storm-giant as wanderer and hunter, the path of the storm-giant as omen); storm-symbols (glowing coal, the fiery coach, the bell, hammer and ax, key and staff; animaliform water-beings in myth, belief and custom (ox, cattle, horse, wild-boar, sow, dog and wolf, the goat, the deer, the cat, the hare, the fox, squirrel, mouse, lion, sheep, birds); earth and sky (the dome of heaven, the celestial ocean, the flood-gates of heaven, the pillars of heaven); the structure of the world (the world-tortoise, the cosmic egg). Practically everything is "a symbol of water" from the primal serpent to the one-eyed giant, and from the oak-tree to the stars in the heavens. The stag, *e. g.*, is a symbol of water (p. 367) on account of his antlers (*cf.* the many-branched tree), his habitat in the forest, and his great swiftness,—the author elaborates this argument on pages 367-373. By this method, thus employed, almost anything can be demonstrated,—for this water-theory goes even farther than the sun-myth theory and other philosophies of the time when "imaginative insight" is given free rein. Bertsch's mythology gives us a water-heaven and a water-hades, a water-womb for the birth of all the children of men and a watery grave for them after life is spent; a beginning of the eosmos in water and its end in water; a symbolism of the snake and the ring permeating everything; vegetable and animal life in a thousand forms symbolizing water,—Proteus, himself, the multiform, among them; the idea of the treasure and its keeper widespread in the folk-thought of the world. A wider knowledge of the latest literature of the mythology of savage and barbarous peoples would have helped the author much in the way of material. If a phrase may be borrowed from the field of ideas with which he deals, it may be said quite truthfully that the arguments advanced in this attempt at a comparative mythology "will not hold water."

A. F. C.

Natursagen. Eine Sammlung naturdeutender Sagen, Märchen, Fabeln und Legenden. Mit Beiträgen von V. Armhaus, M. Boehm, J. Bolte, K. Dieterich, H. F. Feilberg, O. Hackman, M. Hiecke, W. Hnatjuk, B. Ilg, K. Krohn, A. von Löwis of Menar, G. Polivka, E. Ronasklarek, St. Zdziarski und anderen herausgegeben von OSKAR DÄHNHARDT. Band I. *Sagen zum Alten Testament.* Leipzig und Berlin: B. G. Teubner, 1907. xiv, 376 p.

Ibid. Band II. *Sagen zum Neuen Testament.* Leipzig und Berlin: B. G. Teubner, 1909. xiv, 316 p.

Ibid. Band III. *Tiersagen. Erster Teil.* Leipzig und Berlin: B. G. Teubner, 1910. xiv, 558 p.

These three volumes, with exact text-references, extensive bibliographies and good indexes, are typical of the German scholarship of the day. They represent the diligent study and research of the author since the appearance in 1898 of his modest little book, *Naturgeschichtliche Volksmädchen*. Out of subsequent investigations, with the assistance of many folklorists, who furnished authoritative material from the Slavonic countries, Scandin-

avia, Rumania, Greece, Finland, Hungary, Lithuania, etc.—the author's own acquaintance with German, Dutch, English, French and Italian folklore literature was large, and he had also here the able assistance of his wife—was formulated the idea of a comprehensive series of volumes dealing with various aspects of nature-myths. Of these, three have been published so far treating, respectively, of *Old Testament Tales*, *New Testament Tales*, *Animal Tales*; other volumes are to deal with *Plant Tales*, *Tales of Sky and Earth*, *Tales of Man*. The series is to be concluded with a critical study of the *Nature, Growth and Migration of Nature-Tales*. By "nature-tales," is meant such tales as furnish "explanations" for the origins or the peculiarities of natural phenomena or facts of nature. The savage and the barbarian like the child, feel the irrepressible need to explain things, nor is this "instinct" absent from the so-called "higher races." And nature is the greatest stimulus to reflection,—the *why*, the *warum*, the *pourquoi* of the innumerable objects with which the world is filled, and the varied and endless activities that go on on earth and in sea and sky, furnish themes for thousands of tales, legends and myths invented for purposes of explanation; and later on many other tales and similar composition, which, in the beginning, served quite different ends, are metamorphosed into nature-studies. We may thus distinguish two fundamentally distinct groups of nature-tales, viz., those due to the necessity for poetic explanations of nature and invented solely for that purpose; and those turned from a purpose originally different to serve as nature-tales. These nature-tales, many of these at least, are important for the history of the human intellect on account of their great antiquity. The nature-tale (the animal-tale) is older than the fable; but many a fable turns, in the mouth of the folk, to a nature-tale, and so a whole, new series of nature-tales arises, which have nothing at all to do with the older stratum. The study of the nature-tale goes deeper into folk-psychology and the history of religion than does that of the *märchen*.

The first volume deals with *Old Testament Tales*, i. e., tales and legends, which, however far they have departed in some respects from the spirit and the word of the Bible, can hardly be given any other name. These tales have developed under the express influence of Iranian, Indian, Gnostic, Moslem, and Jewish tradition, and also under the influence of such apocryphal writings as the *Book of Adam*, etc. Taken altogether, they stand in such relation to the history and the essence of the Bible as to belong with it as mythological glosses or appendices. The seventeen chapters of the book treat of the following subjects: Creation of the world, creation of man, the creation of Eve, dualistic tales of the devil, etc., the Fall, the punishment of the serpent, the repentance of the exiles, bodily changes after the fall, origin of man's beard, Adam at the plough, Adam's size and stature, Cain and Abel, deluge legends, the sinful angels, the properties of wine, from Abraham to David, tales of Solomon, Jonah and Job. First are recorded the tales and legends of Christian, Jewish and Mohammedan peoples of the European—Asiatic regions, then those of other parts of the globe presumably derived from these, then parallel tales from distant countries and primitive peoples, many of which doubtless have had an

origin absolutely independent of Biblical statements or Oriental or European traditions. Thus, under the head of "creation of the world," Dr. Dähnhardt takes up the data from the Iranians, Babylonians, Hindus, Gnostics, Mandaeans, Manichaeans, Yezidis, peoples of the Caucasus, Gipsies, Finnie peoples, peoples of N. E. Asia, American Indians, etc. In the case of the creation-myth, as elsewhere, the author seems to assign too great a rôle to migration in explaining the resemblances of tales and legends found in widely separated regions of the globe, following here, however, the lead of so eminent a folklorist as Dr. Franz Boas. Some of the tales, however, are to be accounted for by separate invention in various parts of the globe. One very interesting legend tells how man was originally covered with a hard shiny substance, of which all that now remains can be seen in the nails of his fingers and toes. In the "Old Testament Tales," this reduction is a result of the Fall. Dr. Boas reports a tale of this type from the Tsimshian Indians (this Dr. Dähnhardt refers to) and the writer of this review obtained another, much closer to the "Bible type," from a Mohawk Indian in 1888,—the latter may have been borrowed, the former is probably indigenous.

The nineteen chapters of the volume on *New Testament Tales* are concerned with the following subjects: Tales relating to the annunciation of Mary and the visitation (*e. g.*, the half-eaten fish restored to life,—now the flounder or sole); the birth of Christ (the date-tree, the ox and ass in the stall, tales of other animals and plants, etc.); the flight into Egypt (the animals and plants that hindered and betrayed, or did homage, helped and protected, pp. 25-70); the childhood of Jesus (the clay birds, punishments, flower legends); later life of Jesus (driving out devils, stories of Jesus and Peter); story of Jesus' crossing the river; punishments for presumption and insolence, disrespect toward Jesus, etc. (men and women changed into animals, etc.); the creative power of the spittle of Jesus (gave rise to the snail, silk-worm, mushrooms, etc.); punishment of laziness; punishment of inhospitality (men and women changed into wood-peckers, plovers, swallows, cuckoos, tortoises, etc.); the "making young again" and the origin of monkeys (unsuccessful imitations of the miraculous power of Jesus, etc.); Peter as a musician; Peter as fisherman; creative pranks, Peter and the goat; tales of Peter, Paul and John; passion and death of Jesus (events during the entry into Jerusalem, the agony in the garden, the trial, the passage to Golgotha, the scourging and crowning; legends of the wood of the cross; the nails of the cross, actions of certain animals, birds, insects; the birds at the cross, legends of the cross-beak, robin redbreast, swallow, plover, stork, sparrow, crow, lark, dove; insects, frog, fishes; the marks on animals, birds, plants, flowers, etc., due to the passion and bleeding of Jesus; the sympathy of trees and plants with Jesus,—the unfeeling character of some; the burial and ascension of Jesus); stories of Judas Iscariot (trees on which he hung himself); legends of Mary (pp. 242-264); tales of Joseph, etc. The two chief groups of myths considered in this second volume have originated partly in the Orient (in apostolic and post-apostolic times) and partly in Europe (heathen antiquity and period of conversion to Christianity). Influences of

Teutonic, Celtic and Slavonic heathenism and folk-religion are seen, besides Jewish and Moslem. The Apocryphal history of the childhood of Jesus and some of the other apocryphal literature of early Christianity have contributed not a little. Analogical neo-formations of old legends and myths also occur. Besides Jesus, Mary and Peter are the principal figures of this nature-lore, and, in certain respects, Peter is the most interesting to the folk-mind.

The third volume is devoted to *Animal Tales*,—a collection rather than an interpretation. In the introduction (pp. viii-xi) Dr. Dähnhardt cites from Cushing's *Zuni Folk-Tales* the version of the Italian folk-tale of "The Cock and the Mouse," as Cushing told it to the Zunis and as they retold it to him,—this as an example of the metamorphosis of tale and legend which has been going on in the world from time immemorial. The subjects of the eighteen chapters (the legends are drawn from civilized and uncivilized peoples in all regions of the globe) are: Form and bodily peculiarities of animals (reduction and diminution, compression, extension; origin and appearance of hide, spines, shell, scales, baldness; origin of parts of animals from implements, etc.; peculiarities of individual parts of the body); marking and coloring of the bodies of animals (effects of pressure, origin of stripes, change from white to black, paling, colored eyes; painting, soiling, burning by sun, etc.); the winning of fire and of the sun and its results upon the animals, etc.; the exchange of property (*e. g.*, voices, horns, etc.) among animals; wagers between animals and their results; the origin of vermin (from the burned up bodies of monsters, snakes, or from their bodies after bursting to pieces; from transformed spirits, etc.); the distribution of gifts and names to the animals (dissatisfaction, etc.); the dwelling-places of animals (the learning of nest-building, etc.); the habitat of animals (tales of animals that live in the forest, in the water; of animals that live alone; of animals that live with man, etc.); customs and peculiarities of animal life (manner of movement, lack of capacity; smell; action in danger, etc.; peculiar likes and dislikes; wildness and tameness; theft; attitudes, etc., in different seasons); animals that shun light; "seeking" animals; food of animals; disobedience of animals when told by God to dig for water, to build roads, etc.; enmity and friendship among the animals; metamorphoses of men and women into animals (cuckoo, nightingale, lark, dove, swallow), often with reference to the voice; soul-birds (pp. 476-486). Animal-tales, more, in some respects than other stories and legends, testify abundantly to the unity of human nature and to the sameness of the psychic endowment of the race. This is equally evident, whether one considers the tales, resembling each other, which are due to independent invention and reinvention all over the globe, or those others, with more complicated or more numerous motifs, which must have spread to the places in which they are now found through migration or transmission in various forms. The fourth volume, as noted above, will treat in detail the question of the migration of animal-tales. On page xii of vol. 3, Dr. Dähnhardt cites von den Steinen and Jones as to the belief of primitive peoples (*e. g.*, American Indians) in their stories. Not a few competent authorities attribute to them "the same confident belief

that the convinced Christian has in the miracles of the Bible.'' Taken altogether, Dr. Dähnhardt's *Natursagen* is a collection of mythological and folk-lore material most valuable to all investigators and exceeding in scope and accuracy anything else yet published on the same topic. The fourth and critical and expository volume will, doubtless, be of equal merit. This book ought to be in every library of importance, both public and private, theological and secular.

A. F. C.

PERIODICAL LITERATURE.

BY ALEXANDER F. CHAMBERLAIN.

50. *Antiquity of Wine, etc.* In his article "Zur Urgeschichte der Rebe und des Weinbaues," in the *Mitteilungen der Anthropologischen Gesellschaft in Wien* (vol. 31, 1911, pp. 283-296), Albert Stummer discusses the grape-vine and its cultivation, etc., in prehistoric times, with special reference to Western Europe. The conclusions reached are: In Southern Europe only can vine-growing be ascribed to really prehistoric times. The Grecian cultivation of the vine begins at the farthest during the bronze age, about the middle of the second millennium (B. C.), that of the Italian peninsula during the iron age, at the beginning of the first millennium (B. C.). The Central European finds of the grape-vine, those of the neolithic period and of the whole bronze age of Italy and Bosnia, as well as those of the earliest bronze age of Greece belong in all probability with the wild-grape, *Vitis silvestris*. The general opinion seems to be that viniculture reached Gaul from Greece, having begun at Massilia,—the colonists either brought with them Greek vines or cultivated the already existing wild vines. There is, however, some evidence that viniculture flourished in Gaul before the advent of Greek settlers. Roman viniculture arose independently of Greek, as is indicated both by historical data and by an examination of the words in both languages relating the vine, wine, etc. At the time of the Roman Empire viniculture and wine-keeping had already reached a rather high stage, furnishing the basis of the modern European viniculture, etc. In the Roman provinces the development of viniculture was hindered by the *Lex Domitiania* (not finally repealed till the third century), which forbade the making of new vineyards and ordered the destruction of half of those already existing in the provinces. The great promoters of viniculture in the provinces were the veterans. From the close of the third century onwards, Christianity began to take up its rôle of a protector of viniculture, which it has kept ever since in a great part of Europe, where monks and wine have often equally contributed to make cities and country-districts world-famous. Very interesting are the pictures preserved on ancient Egyptian monuments, etc., relating to viniculture, in its various aspects,—here viniculture appears at least as early as 3500 B. C., as already firmly established and pointing to a long earlier period of growth and development. Phenician, Assyrian and Semitic viniculture (of which our Bible has a good deal to say) seem younger than the Egyptian. The antiquity of viniculture in Egypt does not seem to harmonize well with the theory of Schrader and Hehn that it originated in Asia Minor. The abundance of the wild vine in the Caucasus and in the region of the Caspian also suggests a possible center of distri-

bution. Much interesting information concerning viniculture will be found in Bassermann-Jordan's *Geschichte des Weinbaues*. 3 Bde. (Frankfurt, a. M., 1907).

51. "*Demopsychology*." Professor Giuseppe Pitré, the famous Italian folklorist, delivered, in January, 1911, his inaugural address, as first occupant of the chair of "*Demopsicologia*" (*i. e.*, Folk-lore) in the Royal University of Palermo. It has been reprinted (Palermo, 1911. 23 p.) from the *Atti d. r. Accad. di Scienze* (ser. 3, vol. 9) under the title *Per la inaugurazione del corso di demopsicologia nella r. Università di Palermo, prelezione*. "*Demopsychology*" has to do with all peoples civilized, uncivilized, and "*savage*," and one of its chief tasks is to emphasize the value for the history of the human mind and its various expressions of plays and games (and related phenomena), proverbs, etc., folk-tales, legends, songs, customs and usages, superstitious ideas and practices.
52. *Dew in folk-lore.* Dew plays a considerable rôle in the folk-lore of religion. In the *Zeitschrift d. Vereins f. Volkskunde* (vol. 22, 1912, pp. 89-95) Otto Knoop discusses "*Der Tau im Glauben und in der Sage der Provinz Posen*," both German and Polish data being recorded. In many places dew is looked upon as tears of the angels and of the souls in purgatory shed on account of the sins of human beings upon earth; and dew is collected to be used to cure certain diseases, especially those of the eyes, etc., freckles, baldness, cramps, open wounds and cuts, rheumatism, skin-diseases, burns, etc. The virtues of dew as a beauty-wash are also well-known. One legend tells how by licking the dew off the plants on a certain morning when all the birds drink it, one can learn their language. Another folk-belief is that "*naked, or with only their shirts on, the witches, at the time of the new moon, collect the dew from the grass with bark sieves; by this means they deprive of their milk the cows that have been pastured on the grass,—and, as soon as their sieves are full of dew, they know that their pots at home are full of milk.* The Polish people of Wongrowitz call the dew on which the birds are supposed to feed *ptasie mleko*, *i. e.*, "*birds' milk*."
53. *Immortality.* In his article on "*Die Entstehung der Unsterblichkeitsvorstellung*," in the *Zeitschrift f. Religionspsychologie* (vol. 5, 1911, pp. 1-24), Anton Tschöcke seeks to give a psychogenetic theory of the origin of the idea of immortality. The very primitive treatment of the dead by the aboriginal Veddas of Ceylon (at first the dead seem to have been left unburied altogether),—bodies are sometimes covered with leaves and branches, a stone laid on the breast, the place of burial fenced about, etc., and the spot, whether death has occurred even though it is an inhabited cave, always abandoned,—represents about the earliest stage known. The next stage may be observed in the death-ceremonies of the South African Bushmen; after this the stage of the Makua and Makonde of German Africa. From

flight from the dead to ancestor-cult has been the course of the human mind in various regions of the globe. It is not from fear of the man's body or soul that the Vedda flees, according to Tschöcke, but from the "dead" man, still living and now stretched stiff and motionless on the ground. Out of this situation the idea of immortality has grown. The author considers the time elapsing before the abandonment or burial of the body to be a factor of importance in the development of the concept. The Veddas flee the corpse immediately after death; with the Bushman 12, and with the Makua-Makonde 24 hours elapse before burial. Both Veddas and Bushmen flee the corpse,—with the latter, after the burial the whole family hasten away at once; and no one will sleep on the spot, nor will even strange Bushmen, who recognize it as a burial-place, sleep nearby. This flight *after some time has elapsed since the death* distinguishes the Bushmen from the Veddas. After this the reaction from the death-situation becomes more and more complex,—the flight is delayed longer (*e. g.*, with the Makua and Makonde) treatment of the corpse occurs,—it is covered, buried, etc.,—the death is announced by cries, shots, or the like, mourning-ceremonies take place, often corresponding to the power, influence, etc., of the deceased, protective and "magic" rites are celebrated, etc. Here also the beginnings of the ancestor-cult are to be found,—food and drink are deposited on the grave, and before wars and other great undertakings the aid of the dead is sought through sacrifices. There is a gradual lightening of the motives from the dark basal tone of painful fear to the lesser nuances of feeling. But more searching and satisfactory investigations of the death and funeral ceremonies of savage and barbarous peoples are necessary before any gradational scheme of the development of the idea of immortality can be made out, if, indeed, such views can ever be substantiated.

54. *Kant and Judaism.* In his article on "Kant und das Judentum," in the *Zeitschrift f. Religionspsychologie* (vol. 5, 1911, pp. 295-299) Dr. Beermann answers the condemnation passed upon the Jewish religion by Kant in his *Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft*. The great German philosopher there declared his opinion that "Judaism is no religion, but a code of laws;" that it is indifferent to the moral sentiment, barren of the love of man, unreceptive of the idea of immortality, conceives of God as a despot, not as a moral power; and that Christianity has nothing in common with Judaism. Kant's Anti-Semitism is, perhaps, merely an example of the onesidedness of men of genius. Dr. Beermann does not think it can be explained (*as, e. g.*, in the case of Voltaire) from his unfavorable experiences with individual Hebrews, for Kant's personal acquaintances with men of this race (Mendelsshon, Dr. Herz, S. Maimon, etc.) were pleasant enough.
55. *Life-values and culture-values.* In *Logos* (vol. 2, 1911-1912, pp. 131-166), H. Rickert discusses "Lebenswerte und Kulturwerte." Biologism and Nietzsche, the biological "mode-philosophy," biolo-

gism and biology as a natural science, culture and life (pp. 151-166), are treated with some detail. According to the author, the misuse of biological ideas for "philosophie" ends has had an unfavorable reaction upon biology itself. Similar vagaries occurred once in physics, when it was sought to found ethical norms upon Newton's law of gravitation. To-day like mistakes are being made in the attempts to use the biological ideas of "natural selection" and "the struggle for existence in the determination of the moral life. Culture-values are sought to be founded on life-values; but vitality is a means, not an end, or the end.

56. *Maize and maguey in ancient Mexican mythology and religion.* In his article, "Le maïs et le maguey chez les anciennes populations du Mexique," in the *Journal de la Société des Américanistes de Paris* (n. s. vol. 7, 1910 [1911], pp. 5-35), L. Duguet has a section (pp. 31-34) on the tutelary deities of these important food-plants. The principal maize and maguey deities among the Aztecs were the following:

(1) *Centeotl* (from *centli*, "maize," and *teotl*, "deity"), the goddess of maize, had a rôle somewhat corresponding to that of the classical Ceres; she presided over harvests, and, in general, over all vegetable production. The agricultural Totonacs venerated her as their chief deity, and as she hated human sacrifices, offered up to her doves, partridges, rabbits, etc.,—such creatures as lived in the cultivated fields. The Aztecs, however, offered human sacrifices to her. *Centeotl* had many other names, e. g., *Chicomecoatl* (Seven serpents), goddess of plant-germination, worshiped in time of drought and famine; *Chalchiuhluatl* (Jade woman), goddess of abundant harvests and personification of good and evil,—also the deity of the stone-cutters. According to the condition of the maize-fields and of the harvests in general, she was invoked by the following names:

Xilonen, deity of the young, tender ear of maize.

Tlatlauhquicenteotl, the goddess of the red maize.

Illacenteotl, goddess of the white maize.

Tonacayohua, she who nourishes us.

Centeotl seems also to have been regarded as the goddess of *maguey*, but pulque had its special deity in *Tezeatzoncatl* (from *tezcatl*, "obsidian mirror," and *tzoma*, "to cover with straw").

(2) *Tezcatzoneatl*, the deity of *pulque*, the intoxicating liquor made from the *maguey*, had as brothers some dozen or other demi-gods or deities of inferior rank. He was the god who caused men to lose their reason and to commit all sorts of strange and extravagant deeds, committing suicide, etc.; and hence he was called also *Tlatlahuani* ("The drowner"), *Tequechmecaniani* ("The hanger"), etc. There were said to be 400 priests consecrated to his cult in Mexico, where his temple was known as *Centzontotchtzinintepan*, or "the temple of 400 rabbits." *Tochli* ("rabbit") was the name applied to drunken people, and the priests of the cult of *Tezeatzoncatl*, were termed *ome-tochtle*, or "two rabbits." Among the Aztecs (according

to Sahagun) drunkenness was regarded rather as a manifestation of the god of *pulque*. When anyone was intoxicated and committed extravagant deeds, he was said "to have his rabbit," and if he committed suicide by throwing himself from a high rock, he was said "to have been rabbited." The festival of the god *Tezeatzoncatl* was held to commemorate the invention of intoxicating liquor. Several legends attribute the invention of *pulque* to a woman. According to one myth the invention of *pulque* took place on Mt. *Chichinauia*, which, by reason of the form produced by *pulque* when fermented, was named *Popoconaltepelt*, "the foamy mountain" (from *popoconatotl*, "foam," and *tepelt*, "mountain"). Another legend makes the settlement of the Huastecs on the Rio Panueo due to the drunkenness of a chief, which obliged them to abandon the plateau of Anahuac. The young woman, who made known the use of *pulque* to the Toltecs was called *Xochitl*.

57. *Mohammedan alms-tithe.* In the *Revue d'Ethnographie et de Sociologie* (vol. 2, 1911, pp. 1-3), J. A. Decourdemanche discusses briefly "La dîme aumônier musulmane." This "tithe" is a curious sort of tax from more than one point of view. In the first place, while an inescapable religious obligation, on a par with prayer, fasting and ablutions it is to be spent by the faithful Mohammedan himself, under the control of his own conscience alone. This "tithe" (called *zakah*) amounts to one-fortieth, or 2 1-2 per cent., levied upon two portions only of the assets of the individual, viz., silver or gold money, net product of labor; fruits of lands possessed,—with the exemption of a minimum known as *nesab* (varying according to the nature of the revenue), which is large in the case of food, relatively small in the case of gold, still smaller in the case of silver, while it is complete in the case of capital invested, e. g., personal effects, salable merchandise, etc. Says the author: "The *zakah*, thus established, evidently stimulates the utilization of capital as well as the establishment of a gold reserve in the country (the amount of gold exempted being double that of silver). We have here the germ of a whole system of political economy, based on religious prescriptions of a very simple nature." The calculation of the *nesab* and of the *wask* (the grain and fruit measure upon which it is based) in the case of crops, etc., varies with the different orthodox Mohammedan sects. The legal valuation of silver as to gold is fourteen to one.
58. *Nature-concept of peasant.* In a brief article, "Hat der Bauer eine eigene Naturauffassung?" in the *Hessische Blätter für Volkskunde* (vol. 10, 1911, pp. 125-127) Dr. A. Vierkandt, author of several sociological-ethnological works (*Die Stetigkeit im Kulturwandel*, 1908; *Naturvölker und Kulturvölker*, 1896) raises the question whether the peasant really has a nature-concept of his own. It is surprising he thinks that, while primitive peoples, even some in the lowest stages of culture (the forest Veddas or the Pygmies of Central Africa may be exceptions), have what might be termed a distinct "nature-sense,"

the peasant appears as almost completely devoid of it. This is seen, *e. g.*, if one compares the peasant's talk about, explanations of, etc., natural phenomena, earthquakes, the moon, comets, and the like, with, say, some savage and barbarous peoples' explanations of the movement of the heavenly bodies, the difference between the moon and the sun, etc. If the savage seems absurd, he is at least imaginative and not stupid like the peasant. Much of the peasant's information badly digested quite often comes from the Bible, the school, popular lectures, newspaper items, etc., mixed in with which are some of his own ideas. Too chief reasons for this lack of a real nature-sense in the peasant are, according to Dr. Vierkandt, first his purely practical orientation, causing him to have little or no interest in theoretic questions; and, secondly, the influence of ecclesiastical teaching, which gives the peasant the Biblical ideas of nature and the things of nature. But neither of these explanations is quite satisfactory, nor are both together sufficient to explain the condition of mind alleged to exist. Dr. Vierkandt will be glad to have those who have any opinion on the subject or any information to offer, address him at Grosslichterfelde, Wilhelmstrasse 22.

59. *Psychology of animal-names.* Miss A. Werner's article on "The Names of Animals in the Bantu Languages," in the *Revue d'Ethnographie et de Sociologie* (vol. 2, 1911, pp. 19-25, 92-99) contains a number of points interesting to the historian of human thought. The presence of names of animals in the "person-class" is one of the noteworthy features of Bantu speech. According to Miss Werner (p. 25), "it seems clear, therefore, on the whole, that names of animals have only been placed in the person-class at a late stage of development, and as a result of personification, probably, in the first instance, through the influence of the animal-story which is so marked a feature in Bantu folk-lore." In the case of certain names "we are dealing with names of animals transferred from their original class to the person-class, as a result of personification,"—such personification being due to the presence and activities of these animals in myths, etc. In *Uncle Remus* we are familiar with "Br'er Fox," "Br'er Rabbit," etc.; in the Bantu languages of South Africa we meet with "Mother Rabbit," "Mother Crane," "Mother Spider," "Mother Chameleon," "Father Centipede," "Father Crane," "Father Antelope," "Father Hawk," etc. Animal-name also often take the "plural of respect" like proper names. Some names of animals are very widely distributed,—"out of seventy Bantu languages we find that fifty have virtually the same name for *elephant*;" the names for *lion*, however, differ widely. The custom of *hlonipa* may have something to do with these differences. The Wanika, when digging for the *badger* do not call it *loma* but *godzo*, "from the superstitious dread that, if they called it by its real name, it would go further from them in its hole, and, if caught, would not prove as fat as it ought to be" (p. 94). In the Kigiryama dialect of Nika the word for *lion* is not the term common to other dialects of that language, *i. e.*, *dzimba*, but *muniambo*. The Ganda

term for lion is *empologoma* ("the roarer"), evidently not the original name. In Zulu, etc., the avoidance of the lion's primitive name might have originated, Miss Werner thinks, either in a superstitious fear of the animal itself (as seems to be the case with the names of the leopard and the wild-cat), or through *hlonipaing* the name of a chief. In Herero the loin has a "surname" or "nickname." *Elibonzu*, the name of the lion in Kinga, "has every appearance of being a *hlonipa* word recently coined." The name for *elephant* in a number of Bantu languages is some form of *tembo*, a word, originally signifying "tusk" and then applied to the whole elephant. No instances of *hlonipa* of elephant-names seems to be on record. In Bantu folklore the lion is not always "the king of beasts,"—the elephant, the hare, the tortoise often exceed and outwit him;—in a Chinamwanga story the shrewmouse bluffs him. The lion is often the "silly" animal tricked by the hare.

60. *Religious psychology.* In an article on "Aufgabe und Methode der Religionspsychologie," in the *Zeitschrift f. Religionspsychologie* (vol. 5, 1911, pp. 97-104), Herman Bauke discusses the problem and method of religious psychology with special reference to the address of D. Wobbermin at the International Religious Congress held in Berlin in 1910. Professor Wobbermin expressed the opinion that "in no other study is the international character of modern theology so clearly marked as in the psychology of religion,—the influences of America on Germany are indeed so great that it is customary to speak of an 'American religious psychology.'" The statistical method of Starbuck and others, as well as the James' method of noted cases are both criticized. The danger of the former is the purely biological-physiological judgment, that of the latter emphasis of the form pathological religiosity. The preference for the study of abnormal and pathological religious phenomena by American psychologists is explainable from the fact that the psychological investigation of these are less difficult. This is the opinion of Professor Wobbermin, and Bauke thinks that he has here placed his finger upon the weak spot in "American" religious psychology. In the same Journal (pp. 245-263) Dr. Roland Schütz discusses the "Grundsätze und Aufgaben der Religionspsychologie." The psychology of religion, laying claim to the position of a scientific *Fach* in theology, has the task of methodically influencing the theological sciences; it is not a special division of apologetics.
61. *Sexualia in Gnostic theory and practice.* In his article on "Das Geschlechtliche in gnostischer Lehre und Uebung," in the *Zeitschrift f. Religionspsychologie* (vol. 5, 1911, pp. 69-87) Wolfgang Schultz treats of the sexual in the theory and practice of the Gnostics, a topic considered in detail in the same author's book, *Dokumente der Gnosis* (Jena, 1910). In the system of the Gnostics, in whose ideas had coalesced many concepts and customs of Assyrio-Babylonian, Egyptian, Hellenic, Iranian, Jewish, and perhaps even Hindu peoples and cultures, are mingled

and united the didactic, the cult-side, the mythic and the sacramental. The hermaphrodite, the male-and-female, the spermatogenic theory of world-origins, the pneuma-woman, the primal virgin-prostitute-mother, the womb-phallus-embryo symbolism, the mouth-phallus union, the sacrament of male semen and female menstrual blood, the philosophie exhaustion of the symbolism of *coitus*, pregnancy, birth, etc., the actual carrying out by men and women of all the figurative and imaginative relations of the sexes, a communism of fleshly participation as well as of imaginative insight,—all this and much more is to be found in this sorry chapter of human history represented by the Gnostics of divers sorts, the Ophites, the Perates, the Valentinians, the Sethites, the Carpoeratians, the Marcusites, the Simonites, and others earlier and later. The love of Pneuma and Sophia, of Eva and the Serpent, and the peculiar doctrines and ideas to be found in such works as *The Gospel of Eve*, *The Book of Noria* (wife of Noah), etc., belong with a remarkable sexomania, for which no complete parallel can be found among savages and barbarians, for the effluvia of civilized philosophies are always more "degenerate" than the doings and sayings of cultureless men and women. There is no evolutional authority for reading back into primitive life much of the muck-philosophy of some of the Gnostic sects.

62. *Skulls of saints as drinking-vessels, etc.* In his article on "Menschen-schädel als Trinkgefässe," in the *Zeitschrift d. Vereins f. Volkskunde* (vol. 22, 1912, pp. 1-33, 6 figs.), besides discussing the use of human skulls as drinking-vessels, etc., in prehistoric Europe, by the peoples of classical antiquity, and among savage and barbarous tribes in all parts of the globe (especially among tribes practieing, more or less, anthropology), Dr. Richard Andree treats of their cult-use. The employment of saints' skulls as drinking-essels in early Christian and Medieval Europe, etc. The town of Ebersberg in Bavaria boasts of having possessed for almost a thousand years the skull of St. Sebastian, and for centuries (including the present day) thousands of pilgrims have sought health and blessing for mental and physical troubles in a drink out of this famous relie. In the seventeenth century water overflowing from the same vessel was thought to stay a plague among the cattle of the country. The great virtues of drinking out of this skull are dwelt upon in the Jesuit A. Widl's *Divus Sebastianus Eberspergae*. (Monachii, 1688). The skull is ornamented and protected with silver, etc. Other skulls of saints now or formerly in use for this or similar purposes are: skull of St. Nantwein (13th cent.), used at Wolfratshausen, Upper Bavaria up to the beginning of the 19th century; skull of St. Quinns at a nunnery at Neuss on the Lower Rhine in the middle of the 15th century; skull of St. Theodulphus at Tréves in 1668; skull of St. Marinus at the Benedictine cloister of Rott am Inn; skull of St. Alto at the cloister of Altomünster, Bavaria (up to 1869, at least, wine was given to drink out of it on the Saint's day, Feb. 9); skull of St. Ernhart at Niedermünster in Regensburg, in the 15th century; skull of St. Gumpertus at Ansbach,

out of which the heathen Wends are said to have drunk. For many others, cited by Prof. J. N. Sepp, according to Dr. Andree, there is some little, but not convincing evidence. The Lama cult of Tibet is also well acquainted with the use of the human skull as a drinking-vessel (the legend concerning the origin of its employment is given on p. 25). Among the Aghori, one of the lowest of a fakir-sects of India, who are Siva-worshippers, the use of human skulls for drinking-vessels prevails. At their weddings such a vessel is handed over to the son-in-law by the father-in-law. On the island of Ceram the priests of certain tribes drink sago-wine out of skulls at the great sacrificial ceremonies. Skulls as drinking-vessels are also known from China, but the so-called "skull of Confucius" in the Museum of the University of Oxford is not his,—it probably came from the Lama temple at Peking. A skull drinking-vessel from the celebrated monastery of Kumbum is now in the U. S. National Museum at Washington. The use of the human skull as a drinking vessel in heathen cults and in Christian religions has been more extensive than is commonly believed or even suspected. Interesting also is the etymological connection of words for *skull* and *pot*, *vessel*, etc., in many European languages. This, and the discovery of portions of the skull (*e. g.*, in the Magdalenian Cave of Placard) used as such by prehistoric man, lead the author to observe (p. 18) that "the skull of his fellowhuman is the oldest drinking-vessel of man."

63. *Sudanese plant and animal folk-lore.* The article of Rudolf Prietze on "Pflanze und Tier im Volksmunde des mittleren Sudan," in the *Zeitschrift für Ethnologie* (vol. 43, 1911, pp. 865-914) contains a collection of *kirari* or names, phrases, epigrams, etc., from the Haussa and Bornu languages of the Central Sudan, applied to plants and animals,—the author has already published *Haussasprichwörter und Haussalieder* (Leipzig, 1907), besides an article on *Tiermärchen der Haussa* in the *Zeitschrift f. Ethnologie* for 1907. On pages 904-914 are given the native texts, interlinear translations and free renderings of several tales and songs, particularly of a Bornu song of the stork, who is styled "the saint of the birds" as the banyan is "the saint of the trees." He is the "rain-bringer,"—the down-pour comes fifteen days after his arrival. The great ape is believed to surprise and kill men; women he seizes, ties with vines or bast and drags them off to his hiding-place, where he outrages from time to time, but never kills them. Monkeys, in general are thought to have been men, metamorphosed for having disobeyed the commands of God and caught fish on holidays. The female donkey in Bornu serves as the symbol of mother-love, the proverb running, "there is no creature in all the world that so loves its child as the she-ass or the slave-woman." The jackal appears as "teacher of the wild animals," "teacher of the wilderness." The cat has "the evil eye." Of the hen it is said "God alone can satisfy her hunger." A characteristic proverb concerning the glow-worm is, "with the fire of the glow-worm no beans are cooked," *i. e.*, "with lying one does not get very far." Another

interesting saying is this: "Tobacco is better than a mother." The fruit of the tamarind is sometimes called "the cow of the poor," because poor people drink (as milk) the water in which it has been softened.

64. *Terms for "holy."* In a brief article on "Heilig" in the *Mitteilungen d. Schlesischen Ges. f. Volkskunde* (vol. 13-14, 1911-1912, pp. 479-483), Dr. Wilhelm Kroll discusses the concept "holy." The author emphasizes the view that in the Old Testament, e.g., the idea of sanctity had originally nothing to do with morality, but grew up out of the cultus, and denotes things, which men might not touch immediately but only after having performed certain precautionary acts, rites, etc. In spite of all sacerdotal efforts to spiritualize religion, these *tabu-ideas* come to the surface again and again, from the depths of the folk-soul, as in the rites and ceremonies of baptism, and other practices of the various branches of the Christian church. The sight of deities (and among many savage and barbarous peoples of spirits, etc.) and contact with them is dangerous,—often too contact with anything that deity has handled or touched. The mysteries of the ancient Greeks and the religions of these and other civilized peoples of antiquity illustrate these points abundantly; as Dr. K. points out. The terms for "holy" reflect the development of the idea in question. Thus, *sanctus*, which finally even assumed the signification of "morally pure," originally designated "the fixed place set apart for a deity;" and *āgios* meant first "tabooed." A special study of *sanctus* has been made by W. Link, in his *De vocis sanctus usu pagano* (Königsberg, 1910). It is a long evolution from the tabu of physical uncleanness to the prescription of moral purity.
66. *Tolstoi and culture.* In *Logos* (vol. 2, 1911-1912, pp. 179-191, W. Iwanow treats of "L. Tolstoj und die Kultur." According to the author "Tolstoi is not a direct expression of our folk-soul; he is rather the offspring of our cosmopolitan education, the product of our social summit, not of our folk-depths." In some respects he is to be compared with Socrates (pp. 186-189), but never was, like him, a theurgist. From the religious-moral standpoint Iwanow recognizes three types of conscious relation to culture: the relative, the ascetic, and the symbolic. Of these the first abandons a religious basis for culture, comprehending it as a system of relative values; the second emphasizes the moral and the religious basis of cultural creation and conceals in itself a renunciation of all culture-value of the secondary, conditional and irrational order,—it leads, of necessity, to the attempt to subordinate to moral utilitarianism, all instinct, all play and all caprices of production, and rests upon a deep mistrust of Nature, even though it is fain to point to the advantages of a life in harmony with Nature, etc.; the third type is the only right and sound view, the standpoint of symbolism is "the heroic and tragic way to freedom of the world-soul," and the principle of creation is theurgic, with a symbolic transformation and transfigura-

tion of all culture. It is to the second of these types that Tolstoi belongs,—he is neither a symbolist, nor a relativist. In the words of the author "Leo Tolstoi is the *Memento mori* to modern culture."—Another discussion of the Russian "prophet" is to be found in Dr. A. von Wenckstein's article on "Tolstoj und Marx, ihre Stellung zu Leben und Volk" in the *Mitteilungen der Schlesischen Ges. f. Volkskunde* (vol. 13-14, 1911-1912, pp. 313-336). According to Dr. W., both Tolstoi and Marx have put their finger upon wounds of our life, but it is an open question whether they have done more healing than hurt,—"Tolstoi is a foe to the earthly existence of man, an enemy to life in this sense, for his final idea is chastity of the present or some near generations of the future to such an extent that ultimately the human race will cease to exist."

67. *Wandering Jew.* In the *Zentralblatt f. Bibliothekswesen* (vol. 28, 1911, pp. 495-509) L. Neubaur has a contribution "Zur Bibliographie der Sage vom Ewigen Juden." His previous contributions to the study of the legend of the Wandering Jew are *Sage vom Ewigen Juden* (1884), *Neue Mitteilungen über die Sage vom Ewigen Juden* (1893), etc. In the *Zeitschrift des Vereins f. Volkskunde* (vol. XXII, 1912, pp. 33-54), Neubaur has also an article "Zur Geschichte der Sage vom Ewigen Juden," treating of the legend in the early Christian centuries and the Middle Ages; also in Germany, Denmark, Sweden, England, France, Belgium, Italy, Portugal, etc. The name of the Jew in question appears as Cartaphilus, then Buttadeus or Malehus, and (in German stories particularly) Ahasverus.
68. *War.* The issue of *International Conciliation* (No. 52, pp. 14) for March, 1912,—the monthly publication of the American Association for International Conciliation (N. Y.), consists of "An Anthropologist's View of War," by Dr. Franz Boas, Professor of Anthropology in Columbia University. The author briefly discusses the development of larger units from the numerous smaller hordes at first existing, by the increasing solidarity of certain groups and 'the extermination of small, isolated hordes that remained in more primitive conditions.' With increasing economic complexity hostility between groups became less. The general result has been that "the group that lives normally at peace has much increased in size, and while the feeling of solidarity may have decreased, its scope has become immensely wider. At the present time, where law rules supreme among many nations," we find the greatest numbers of peoples united in political units that the world has seen." The history of mankind thus shows us "the grand spectacle of the grouping of man in units of ever increasing size that live together in peace, and that are ready to go to war only with other groups outside of their limits," and moreover, "the practical difficulties that seem to stand in the way of the formation of still larger units count for naught before the inexorable laws of history." Dr. Boas expresses the opinion that "it is not any rational cause that forms opposing groups, but solely the emotional value of

an idea that holds together the members of each group and exalts their feeling of solidarity and greatness to such an extent that compromises with other groups become impossible." "Anglo-Saxonism," "Teutonism," "Pan-Germanism," "Pan-Slavism," etc., are not based on any real racial or other relationship, but are merely an "expression of a strong emotion that is connected with a vague idea of supposed relationship." No modern European race can boast a homogeneous descent. There is no true feeling of kinship accompanying, *e. g.*, the interrelationship (alleged) of all blonds or of all brunettes. Even the unity of language is more an ideal than a real bond. Those forces are already strongly at work that "will ultimately abolish warfare as well as legislative conflicts between nations; that will put an end not only to the wholesale slaughter of those representing a distinct ideal, but also prevent the passage of laws that favor the members of one nation at the expense of all other members of mankind." An authoritative account of the war customs of an American aboriginal tribe will be found in Mr. Alanson Skinner's article on "War Customs of the Menomini Indians," in the *American Anthropologist* (vol. 13, n. s., 1911, pp. 299-313), wherein are given so interesting details concerning the native ideas and practices. The "war-bundle" is represented as having been received from the Thunderers. It is said that in the early period of man's existence upon earth "the Powers Above" pitied the children of men on account of their sufferings, and called a council to remedy the sad state of affairs. All the animals promised to help man. And after the council was over:

"When the animals had completed their donations, the Sun and the Morning Star gathered the presents into a bundle, sent for the Thunder-Birds, and gave it to them to transmit to the children of men. As soon as they received the package, the Thunder-Birds called an Indian up to their home in the western sky, and gave it to him, with the promise that, if he followed their directions, he would always be successful in battle. The Thunder-Birds further desired that he should present the bundle with tobacco, and pray to it from time to time. They promised him that whenever he did this they would hear his prayers" (p. 300). Besides this:

"They gave him a rare blue powder with which he was instructed to paint the faces of the injured warriors. He was assured that, if he did this, the blood would run from their wounds and they would recover. Then the Thunderers taught him the sacred songs that go with the medicines to make them efficacious, and permitted him to depart. Since that time worthy men have received the proprietary right to the war-bundle from the Thunderers."

At pages 300-303 the author gives the full story of a bundle which was formerly the property of a man named Watakona. Some of the sacred songs, etc., are recorded on pages 305-307; and a description of the scalp-dance is also given (pp. 310). The annual ceremony is still kept up among the Menomini in the form of a feast, but there is now no attendant scalp-dance. Mr. Skinner likewise gives some notes on the Menomini tactics in warfare, etc. One of the songs in use

"stupefied the enemy and caused them to sleep more soundly." This was in consonance with the idea that "just before daybreak, when sleep is soundest, and man's vitality is said to be at its lowest ebb, was the favorite time for assault." The Menomini are said never to have been in the habit of torturing captives, prisoners being always kindly treated and usually adopted. These Indians "considered capture in war the height of misfortune, and to inflict torments on one so unlucky as to be taken prisoner was thought to be offensive to the 'Overhead Beings'." Among the Menomini then were, roughly speaking "five callings, prophecy, medicine, jugglery, sorcery, and war,"—hunting, fishing and agriculture were too universal occupations, and, "although such gifted persons as prophets, doctors, jugglers and sorcerers were often able to eke out their existence through the fees which they extorted from their patients or clients, men of fame or ability great enough to gain them a living in this way alone were rare." War was thus "the one profession open to everyone," for "all others required not only skill and training, but a certain acquaintance with the supernatural which was not vouchsafed to ordinary mortals" (these miraculous gifts also played their part in warfare, but to a more limited extent). In fact, "every man could be a warrior, but, as a general thing, only those who received divine inspiration could be leaders." Training was begun in early youth. Battles as we understand them nowadays, or how they have long existed between civilized peoples were unknown. As Mr. Skinner says:

"The actual combats were never battles fought in the open between large bodies of soldiers; flying raids by small parties, ambuscades, and, particularly, night attacks, were the rule."

69. *Wedding-gifts.* In his article, "I doni nuziali," in the *Revue d'Ethnographie et de Sociologie* (vol. 2, 1911, pp. 228-254), Dr. R. Corso gives a critico-comparative study of wedding-gifts, a custom concerning which there is still much difference of opinion among folklorists and sociologists. Wedding-gifts are not representative of the *pretia puellarum*; nor are they symbols of marriage itself, being, as it were, the *alter ego* of the person offering them. The view of Crawley (*Mystic Rose*, 1902) to the latter effect is rejected by the author. According to Dr. Corso, the nuptial contract represents the modern history of marriage, while the ceremonies represent its prehistory.
70. *Word of the dead to the living.* In his article, "Der Spruch der Toten an die Lebenden," in the *Zeitschrift d. Vereins f. Volkskunde* (vol. 21, 1911, pp. 53-63, 89-91), W. F. Storck treats of the famous saying:

"What we are, that you shall be,
What you are, that once were we,"

which is met with in all the languages of civilized Europe,—also in Arabic poetry in form similar to that met with in Medieval legends.

He gives in all 147 versions, dating from the third century down—from Arabic, Latin, various periods of French, German and English, Italian, Dutch, Low German, Spanish, Russian, Belgian, Portuguese, Bosnian, etc. The shortest form in which this saying occurs is the *Hodie mihi, eras tibi* of a Carthusian inscription at Dijon,—it is also found in many other places. About the longest is a Latin inscription at Nordhausen, beginning

“Sta Viator, audi, dum te alloquor,
Et disce, sed a mortuo.”

Here belongs also the epitaph (A. D. 1376) of the Black Prince:

“Tiel come tu es ie au tiel fu:
Tu seras tiel come je su.”

The earliest citation seems to be from the third century A. D., and the saying still occurs in our own day. It is not confined to an alleged sepulchral utterance of the dead, but turns up in folk and other poetry, finds place over the entrances to cemeteries and charnel houses, occurs inscribed on works of art with allegorical representations of the transitory, etc. And it is also the origin perhaps of the legend of “The Three Living and the Three Dead,”—incorrectly, too, it has been looked upon as the source of the “dance of death.”

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Religion may be defined, for the purposes of this paper at any rate, as the attitude of individuals or communities toward the power which they conceive as having ultimate control over their interests and destinies. And to describe the workings of the human mind, so far as they are influenced by its attitude toward the Determiner of Destiny, is the task of the psychology of religion. As its name implies, it means to be psychology,—that is, it means to be a science. Human experience is the subject of its investigation. It aims at nothing metaphysical or transcendental. Its task is simply to study the religious consciousness just as any other science studies its object. Nor is there any good reason for setting up any bounds within the religious consciousness which the psychologist shall not be allowed to pass if he can. Certainly, it is very sacred ground that the psychologist is here studying, but, for that very reason, it is all the more worth study. Hence the psychologist will be justified in making use of any material that seems to him promising. He will probe the most sacred depths of the private experience of individuals as thoroughly as he can; he will ransack the public records of social religious practices and common religious ideas; and the results of these various investigations he will describe, compare, and generalize as completely as is possible.

When stated in this abstract fashion, the task of the psychologist may seem relatively simple; but if one seriously undertakes it, he will be met at the outset with certain difficulties peculiar to this field. He must, namely, face the questions, how he is to get at the material for his study, and

how much it will be worth when he has got it. Three methods for obtaining material naturally present themselves, and have in fact been followed by leading psychologists. The first is a study of individual experiences as portrayed in autobiographies, letters, and other spontaneous expressions of religious persons. The second method is the collection of answers to definite questions from a number of persons through the use of a *questionnaire*. The third method investigates the relatively objective expressions of social religion furnished by history, anthropology, and the sacred literatures of various peoples.

The first two of these methods have the advantage of studying religious experience at its source, that is, in the individual soul. They are open to the obvious danger, on the other hand, of emphasizing a type of character that is ready to expose to view its most sacred experiences. The *questionnaire* method is particularly open to suspicion, both because of this unfortunate selective tendency, and also because it almost inevitably puts the respondent into a slightly unnatural attitude, by the very fact of setting him down to answer deliberately someone's questions concerning his religious life. The respondent is often quite incapable of giving an exact or even significant psychological description; and if he is able to do so he is usually unwilling to take the requisite time and trouble, and so writes a short answer too superficial to have any real value. Moreover if the results of such answers are tabulated and an effort made to get statistics and percentages from them, the result is quite likely to be misleading; because, by a process of natural selection, the great majority of the answers will be from those who have something startling to relate and rather enjoy relating it.¹ To avoid difficulties like these, some writers turn to the more objective and impersonal records of social religion, such as rites, ceremonies, and theological concepts or primitive superstitions. And here indeed we get all the advantages of objectivity,—with all its dangers. For, after all, it is psychology, not sociology, nor theology, nor history, that we are studying, and psychology is the science of subjective states and processes which

¹ For an admirable criticism of the *questionnaire* method as ordinarily used see Stählin, "Die Verwendung von Fragebogen in der Religionspsychologie," *Zeitschrift für Religionspsychologie*, V, 394-408 (March, 1912). Cf. also my *Psychology of Religious Belief* (New York, 1907), pp. 232-234.

in the last resort are to be found only in the individual. It is the real "inwardness" of religion that we want to know about; and to throw aside the subjective altogether because of its attendant dangers will be like pouring out the baby with the bath.²

And, after all, the difficulties of the first two methods are not so great but that they may, to a considerable extent, be overcome. Doubtless it is true that many who regard their religious experiences as very sacred will refuse to describe them to the psychologist for coldly scientific purposes. But these same people will often relate them or write them out in detail for the edification of the faithful. And there is no law against the psychologist studying these accounts. Nor is it true that those who thus describe their inner lives are necessarily superficial. The very names Augustine, Teresa, Bunyan, Fox, are enough to disprove any such idea. Even the *questionnaire*, moreover, if carefully used, may bring considerable very reliable information. Thus the "Religionspsychologische Arbeitsgemeinschaft," recently organized in Germany, though very sceptical of the value of the *questionnaire* as ordinarily employed, is making a limited and trustworthy use of it by directing its questions only toward the externals of religion rather than toward inner experiences, and by insisting that the respondent shall never see

² Prof. Billia goes so far in criticism of the historical method as to insist that it has no value. (See his paper "On the Problem and Method of the Psychology of Religion" in the *Monist*, XX, pp. 135-139.) It "gives the illusion of describing and cognizing a mental fact while remaining outside of the fact itself." The outer expression, which the historian and anthropologist see, gives, in Billia's opinion, very little inkling as to the inner fact which alone should interest the psychologist. This question goes hand-in-hand with another that is of interest in this connection,—a question that was raised at the 1909 International Congress of Psychology—namely, whether the non-religious psychologist can effectively study religion. Prof. Billia answered this in the negative, while the majority gave an affirmative answer. It is hard to see why the non-religious psychologist, if there be such a person, cannot throw some light on the religious consciousness by a careful collection and comparison of the ways in which it expresses itself; just as a blind man may be learned in the laws of colors, and just as a psychologist may study the psychical processes of the dancing mouse without being one. None the less, he would be at a distinct disadvantage and could hardly expound the real inwardness of the experience as could a psychologist who could interpret his data by his own introspection.

the *questionnaire* nor be asked for categorical answers, but that all information from him shall be drawn out by the collector through informal conversation.³ These two safeguards certainly avoid practically all of the difficulties which tend to make the *questionnaire* method untrustworthy; and, personally, I am not convinced that the method is altogether useless even without such limitations. The reliability of the method will depend in each case upon the particular subject investigated and upon the care of the editor in interpreting the results. The collector should certainly talk with his respondents whenever possible, and should always interpret their answers in the light of each other and throw out whatever seems in any way suspicious; and if all this is done the material collected can hardly be considered altogether worthless.⁴ Finally, if the biographical and *questionnaire* methods be supplemented by the more objective study based on public and social religious expressions, beliefs, rituals, and the like, the psychologist will have at his disposal a very respectable body of facts as the raw material for his work.

Having collected his facts, the psychologist will proceed as other scientists proceed with their data. That is to say, he will group his facts and note the general relations between them, thus seeking a systematic and general description of the various facts in the religious consciousness. Whenever possible, he will "explain" these facts by subsuming them under the laws of general psychology, that is to say, he will proceed on the assumption that, for the purposes of science, religious facts are not different in kind from other psychic facts. Thus he will seek to build up a scientific view of the religious life, interpreting and explaining it by itself and by the known facts and laws of the human mind, "expounding nature by nature," as Höffding says, "just as a passage in a book is expounded in

³See the article by Stählin cited above, esp. pp. 403-407; and also the same author's account of the founding of the Religionspsychologische Arbeitsgemeinschaft, in the *Zeitschrift f. Religionspsychologie*, IV, p. 222.

⁴A further argument for its use is the fact that the biographical method is in great need of supplementation. Religious material from biographies emanates almost invariably from somewhat extraordinary religious souls, and if one's description of the religious consciousness is based upon this source alone, the picture is likely to be over-colored. This, for example, is the one fundamental weakness in James's great book.

such a manner as to connect it with other passages in the same book.'⁵

The reader may perhaps question whether such a procedure is justifiable. He may insist that it builds upon an assumption that is at least uncertain and seems in some respects very dubious. And he may assert that in the religious consciousness at its best we have something that is very difficult to explain by the laws of general psychology. Certainly no one will appreciate the force of this last statement more fully than the psychologist. When one compares the deeply religious and spiritual person with the best and bravest of those who are not religious, one sees, it must be confessed, that the former possesses something which the others lack. It is not that he is any better morally than his non-religious brother, nor any more appreciative of beauty and love, nor any braver. It is rather, that he has a confidence in the universe and an inner joy which the other lacks. He is, perhaps, no more at home in the world than the other (perhaps he is not so much at home here), but he seems more at home in the universe as a whole. He feels himself in touch, and he acts as if he were in touch, with a larger environment. He either has a more cosmic sense or his attitude toward the cosmos is one of larger hope and greater confidence. Besides this, or as a result of this, he has an inner source of joy and strength which do not seem dependent on outer circumstance, and which in fact seems greatest at times when outer sources of strength and promise fail. He is, therefore, able to shed a kind of peace around him which no argument and no mere animal spirits and no mere courage can produce. Whence comes this difference? On what are these values, which we all recognize, founded? Evidently, the immediate answer can be put in psychological terms. The peace and power in question follow, by regular psychological laws, from a certain form and intensity of belief and a certain emotional experience. Whence come this belief and this experience? Doubtless it will be much more difficult to trace these back to some precedent situation, for the conditions here involved,—social, psychological, physiological—become now very complex. Yet (conceivably) this might be done. But the reader may continue his questioning and ask: Is the belief here involved illusory, and is the experience decep-

⁵ *The Philosophy of Religion*, p. 20.

tive? Can a complete and ultimate explanation of them be given in psychological terms, and if so would not such an explanation, if known, destroy its object?

Certainly the psychologist who started out on the assumption that every religious phenomenon is to be completely and ultimately explained by psychological laws, that we have in our hands—or at least can some day get into our hands—all the data needed for such an ultimate explanation, would be like a physicist who failed to recognize that there might be gaps within his field—that there might be links in the chain of causes which, from the nature of the case, could never be directly experienced by human beings. It is the recognition of such gaps that has led him to the invention of the many atoms and the many ethers. These, strictly speaking, are not scientific objects; they are devices to enable him more easily to put together the parts of his fragmentary experience. The two ends of the cable he sees; he grasps them at the points where they plunge beneath the surface. His imagination depicts what the submerged links may be like. This is all mythology and metaphysics, except so far as it enables him to think together the two parts which he actually holds and to explain them in terms of each other.

Are there such gaps in the field of religious psychology? This is a question of fact. There are for us as many gaps as we find. There is for us a gap wherever we cannot see a connection. These gaps we must seek to fill as best we can;—if possible by discovering actual experience, verifiable objects, that make the desired connections,⁶ where this is not possible, we must recognize the fact, note how the several parts vary in relation to each other, and write down our resulting generalizations. General psychology has numerous gaps of this kind, and usually seeks to fill them by some more or less ingenious hypothesis of brain physiology. The theologian and the religious man frequently insist that similar gaps exist among the phenomena of the religious consciousness—as seen, for example, in conversion, the answer to prayer, the mystical experience. But just as the general psychologist who knows his business will

⁶A good example of this is seen in the explorations of the subconscious by Freud, Prine, and others, by which facts are brought to light which connect and hence "explain" much that before was unconnected.

remember that the physiological hypotheses, no matter how useful, cannot be genuine objects of his science until empirically verified, so the psychologist of religion must remember that explanation through the Supernatural, though quite possibly true, is not psychology, and that he must confine himself to the verifiable facts of human experience.

The question of the Supernatural so frequently confronts one in the study of the psychology of religion that a word more should be added concerning it here. In brief, there are two chief views of it and of its relation to the natural, one of which may be called the phenomenal view, the other the noumenal. According to the first, the Supernatural, or the Will of God, is to be regarded as a cause among other causes, acting in ways that are to the human mind forever incalculable, and interfering at unexpected times with the ordinary and regular course of events. Such a statement makes the view sound crude, possibly, but however that may be, it is the position actually held by the great majority of religious people.⁷ And a good deal may be said for it. It has a pragmatic value which the larger, "noumenal," view retains only with some difficulty; for, according to this "phenomenal" view, it is plain that the Supernatural, in pragmatic terms, "*makes a difference.*" The religious soul usually wants a God who will do something for him. And a Supernatural which made no difference to our experience might be called "divine" or materialistic with indifference.

I do not see that this view of the Supernatural can be proved false. There are too many seeming gaps in our experience, too much that is unexpected and unaccountable in our lives, for us to be able to demonstrate in them an unbroken causal chain. As a fact, to be sure, this view of the Supernatural, so far as it concerns the outer world, has been largely given up;—and it must be added, with no great harm to the cause of religion.⁸ In the inner world, however, it is still defended, and the theologian and philosopher are perfectly free to accept and vindicate it.

⁷ The frank acceptance of the Supernatural as a phenomenon by the popular view is not always recognized by psychologists in arguing this point—e. g., Irving King, *The Development of Religion* (New York, 1910), p. 9.

⁸ One still meets with it occasionally, even in very intelligent circles,—witness, for example, the not uncommon explanation of the Sicilian earthquake in 1909 as due to God's anger over the wickedness of the Sicilians.

But the psychologist is not free to do so. If the Supernatural breaks in upon the natural, psychology as a science is so far forth impossible. The theological explanation is no explanation for the psychologist, because it is not capable of being confirmed by experience. And for psychology, or any science, to admit that there are any facts incapable of being explained, incapable of being regularly connected with the other facts of experience, would be a surrender of its fundamental presuppositions. For its own protection science must *act as if* this view of the Supernatural and its interruptions of the natural were false. It cannot take cognizance of interruptions.

The second view of the Supernatural referred to above regards it as the noumenal side, the inner being, of all Reality,—the “*Natura Naturans*” of Spinoza. It is immanent within the phenomenal world and is expressed by it as really, though probably not so completely, as by any transcendent world. It is a Supernatural, not in that it interferes with nature, but in that it includes and transcends nature. The upholders of this view usually deny miracle, and, at any rate, no miracle is necessary to it. The regularity of the causal law is regarded as being merely *the way God acts*. It sees God in order rather than in disorder, in the dependable working of law rather than in incalculable interferences with law. Thus there is no possible quarrel between it and science. An extension of this view might suggest that some of the gaps in the religious experience may possibly be filled by realities and forces in another spiritual world which acts according to regular laws, so that the results of its action are as certain and (conceivably) as predictable as the performances of the atoms. In this way the pragmatic value of the phenomenal view would be retained, for the Supernatural would thus “make a difference.” Such an hypothesis would, of course, be metaphysical in the extreme, but it would be perfectly consistent with a scientific view of the religious consciousness.

Three different attitudes are possible toward the breaks that we find in experience, both of the outer and of the inner world: (1) We may make the theological hypothesis of supernatural interference. (2) We may invent some other hypothetical intermediary to help us think over the break—*e. g.*, atoms, ether, brain action, the “*Unconscious*.” (3) We may frankly recog-

nize the fact that any such stop-gaps are purely hypothetical and beyond our experience, and content ourselves with simply describing the phenomena as we find them, leaving the guess-work, for the time being, to others.

This third attitude, as it seems to me, is the proper one for the psychology of religion. It is essential to a right understanding of any of the great questions of religion and philosophy, as well as of those of science, to recognize at the beginning the relatively limited aims and pretensions which the psychology of religion justly understood should maintain. I cannot help thinking that it would ultimately lead to great disappointment, if not to positive scepticism, if we should sanguinely expect, as I fear many cultured religious people have been led to expect, that the psychological study of religion can demonstrate any of the truths of theology. And equally misleading does it seem to me to suppose, as some leading "functional" psychologists seem to do, that the psychology of religion can ever so develop as to be in any sense a substitute for philosophy or theology. In the opinion of this school, ethics, aesthetics, logic, epistemology, and metaphysics are ultimately nothing but functional psychology. As a result, the psychology of religion "becomes," in Professor Ames' words, "the conditioning science for the various branches of theology, or rather, it is the science which in its developed forms becomes theology or the philosophy of religion. If reality is given in experience (and where else could it be given?), then the science of that experience furnishes the reasonable and fruitful method of dealing with reality, including the reality of religion. The psychology of religion possesses, therefore, the greatest possible significance. It does not merely prepare the way for theology, but in its most elementary inquiries it is already dealing with essentials of theology and philosophy of religion. On the other hand, the philosophy of religion in its most ultimate problems and refined developments does not transcend the principles of psychology. The idea of God, for example, which is the central conception of theology, is subject to the same laws of the mental life as are all other ideas, and there is but one science of psychology applicable to it."²⁹

* *The Psychology of Religious Experience*, pp. 26-27.

On reading passages like this from enthusiastic representatives of the new Functional Psychology, one comes away wondering not that they have included so much, but that they have included so little within their capacious science. Why stop with the various branches of philosophy? Why not also reduce physics, chemistry, astronomy to functional psychology? What, indeed, are the physical sciences but formulations of experience—and is not psychology the science of experience? The same arguments hold in the case of physics that held for metaphysics. Surely if “the idea of God is subject to the same laws of the mental life as are all other ideas,” the same may be said with equal truth of the idea of the solar system. And this, I think, makes clear both the fallacy and the danger of this “pragmatic” view. Psychology studies the *idea* of God and the *idea* of the solar system and stops there. But neither astronomy nor theology means to limit its study to our ideas. They both mean to be objective—and it is hard to see why one should be denied this privilege if it be granted to the other. And if objectivity be thus denied to theology, the dangers that inevitably result are evident. Theology becomes purely subjective, religion becomes merely the way we feel, the idea of God is substituted for God and hence becomes the idea of an idea, or a confessed illusion, and the psychology of religion, having absorbed all that was objective in religion, finds it has nothing left to study, or at best becomes a branch of abnormal psychology. “This method,” writes Boutroux, “if it succeed, will lead sooner or later, to the abolition of the fact itself, while the dogmatic criticism has striven in vain for centuries to obtain this result. . . . It is in so far as they ignore or reject the scientific explicability of the elements of religion that men are religious; and religion has been able to exist only because of the non-existence of a science of religion. Contrary, then, to the other sciences which leave standing the things that they explain, the one just mentioned has this remarkable property of destroying its object in the act of describing it, and of substituting itself for the facts in proportion as it analyses them.”¹⁰

The psychology of religion must, then, in my opinion, take a much humbler position than that which some of its devotees

¹⁰ *Science and Religion* (English translation, New York, 1911), pp. 196-197, slightly condensed.

desire for it. It must content itself with a description of human experience, while recognizing that there may well be spheres of reality to which these experiences refer and with which they are possibly connected, which yet cannot be investigated by science. From this less ambitious view of its task, however, one must not conclude that the psychology of religion is either valueless as an end or useless as a means. Sharing in the limitations of science, it shares also its values. If religion is worth a tenth part of what its believers claim for it, it is worth cultivating as a human possession; and if it is to be wisely and fruitfully cultivated, it should be carefully and scientifically studied. If the religious values are to any extent bound up with each other and with the rest of life by laws of relationship, it is of great importance for us to know what those laws are. The psychology of religion is still too young to have accomplished a great deal in this practical direction. The field has been surveyed only in its outlines, and only in a general way can the practical religious worker gain from psychology a knowledge of what to expect in any given case. Exact and perfectly certain prediction is, of course, out of the question. But it is not too much to say that he who would systematically cultivate the religious life can already find a good deal of practical help from the psychology of religion; and as our knowledge of it increases we may confidently look to it for more and more assistance.

But even aside from its practical application, the psychology of religion has a value as an end in itself for all those who, in Aristotle's phrase, "desire knowledge." To know the truth is worth while for its own sake,—Francis Bacon, in fact, went so far as to call it "the sovereign good of human nature." And surely few things are so worthy of man's study,—just because few things are so thoroughly and deeply human—as is religion. The scientific study of the religious consciousness, therefore, needs no defense or justification from its devotees. Its value will shine by its own light for all those who love the truth and who love their kind.

OUTLINE FOR A STUDY OF THE EROTOGENESIS OF RELIGION.

By THEODORE SCHROEDER,
New York City.

Years ago I intended writing a book about Mormonism. While thus studying the literature of the Mormons, I saw that all the peculiarities of their theology had a sexual reason for existence.¹ This led to the investigation of other religious enthusiams, first, to satisfy a vagrant curiosity, then, consciously, for the discovery of the *how* and *why* of the phenomena which had interested me. This soon induced the conviction of a causal relation between lust and religion. Frequent synchrones, together with some rather obvious inductions, produced a working hypothesis, which in turn imposed the necessity of systematizing and methodizing the future inquiry. Hence this essay.

INDUCTIONS TO A WORKING HYPOTHESIS.

It would be a waste of time to take the reader over all the unconscious, half-conscious and unmethodical meanderings by which I arrived at my working hypothesis. Furthermore, it is unnecessary, because a better method is at hand, through what is substantially a condensed recapitulation of my labor. Before going far in the consciously planned part of my investigation, I learned that, in so far as my hypothesis involved only the assertion of *some* co-relation between *some* religion and lust, it was very far from being original.² The aggregate of the materials considered by all those others, whose opinions upon this subject can be quoted, will far exceed the materials available to me, because many of them had exceptional opportunity for first hand observation, but left little detailed description of that which justified the opinions which they expressed. Many others had before them materials which, for other reasons, are

¹"Sex-determinant in Mormon Theology," *Alienist and Neurologist*, May, 1908.

²"Religion and Sensualism as connected by Clergymen," *American Journal of Religious Psychology*, May, 1908. Other opinions were also found.

inaccessible to me. Often these opinions are justly entitled to greater weight than my own inductions, or interpretations, because they come from persons who were friendly partisans of the religions of which they wrote in spontaneous expression of what they found. Furthermore, in most of these persons, their conclusions were reached without any design or thought of questioning the objective verity of religious beliefs, nor the value of subjective evidences for the truth of its dogmas; and in many cases such persons were free from suspecting the psychologic import of what they said, or the support which the uttered opinion might give to such a theory as is soon to be made the subject of investigation. These opinions are entitled to great weight also for the added reason that they come from many intelligent observers, acting in isolation from one another, inspired by a great variety of motives, and yet reaching very similar conclusions. Their empirical inductions should be analyzed for the purpose of discovering the psychic essence, all of their necessary implications and the elements of their unification. Thus we may arrive at a more inclusive generalization, and, by successive inductions, we shall acquire a well supported working hypothesis. This then will furnish a condensed recapitulation of all of my investigation and of more besides, and will furnish a working hypothesis better supported than was mine when originally framed.

Among those having observed a connection between religion and sex, one may quote quite a few clergymen, who yet saw in this nothing to make them doubt the inerrancy of the "inner testimony" for religion, precisely because they had no deliberate scientific purpose in their interpretation of the observed facts, but often unconsciously sought to distort them into a harmony with, or even a justification of, their preconceptions. Many alienists can be quoted, and these frequently fall short of the whole truth, because too often they viewed the facts under their observations as belonging exclusively to the domain of pathology, and erringly thinking the pathology of religion to be always a thing apart and clearly separable from the religion of the normal man, they failed to relate it to the more normal functioning as a means for better understanding the latter. I believe a study of facts thus related, and the explanations offered for them, will show that most of these

authors also have fallen short of the scientific method, because they feared the impairment of this or that dogma and so avoided the same sceptical attitude toward religion that would accompany the study of our more exact sciences. It is in this spirit, as near as can be, that we must undertake to interpret the observations of others and our own studies, and thus, I believe, we can derive from the recorded observation of others a strong support for that working hypothesis which asserts the erotic origin of all religion, whether phylogenetically or ontogenetically considered.

WHAT IS RELIGION.

Naturally, we must begin the investigation of our hypothesis by an accurate determination of the essence of that to which the problem relates: that is, we must begin by determining what are the criteria of religion? There have been made hundreds of alleged definitions of religion which do not define. Most of these have been framed from an apparent desire to declare preeminence for the religion or ideals of the definor. Frequently, especially among orthodox Christian theologians, these definitions will exclude from the category of religion all religions not endorsing the "essentials" of their own. Through narrowness of vision such persons think they are defining all religion, because they unthinkingly generalize their own personal and particular creed. In other words, such persons fail to see that religion as such, must include even "false" religion. The more liberal religionists necessarily broaden their definition, at least, sufficiently to insure respectability for themselves by inclusion with their more orthodox friends. It seems to me that the common fault of practically all definitions of religion which have come under my observation, is that the definor depended wholly upon introspection; or failed to take into account more than one sect; or, in the broadest view, no more than one conception of religion; or they are determined by a psychologic imperative to vindicate some particular non-reasoned pre-conception of religion, and quite forgot that what was required was the discovery of a line of demarcation between the religious and the non-religious, objectively considered.

In contrast with all this, we must endeavor to formulate a definition of religion *as such*, which must generalize the elements of unification in all religions, whether true or false,

good or bad, and exclude all that, and only that, which by contrast is scientific or secular, and perhaps some cases of pathologic manifestations of religion. Our method must be to study religion objectively; to discover and to state with a maximum of precision, all those elements of unification without which even some professions of a "true religion" are not religious and which will enable us to determine when adherence to a "false religion" is truly religious in its essence.³

It can seldom occur that we will have full opportunity for a neurological examination of those victims of religious enthusiasm who will furnish the materials for a study of the erotogenesis of religion. Neither would a searching verbal examination avail much, even if it were practicable, because usually the subject would be most interested to conceal those very factors of sex which we should be most concerned to inquire about. Psycho-analysis according to the Freudian method would be helpful, if practicable. Proceeding, then, by the process of elimination, we pass most of the persons who are in the borderland of the non-religious. The differential essence of religion will be laid most bare and submit to the easiest discovery where it is most conspicuous through greatest spontaneity, namely: in those whose religious experiences are most intense, most exaggerated, and least restrained in expression. This means, in the greatest religious enthusiasts and their devotional successors, the religiously insane. As in the first, we must not be misled by pretenders and hypocrites, so, in the latter, we must be sure that the affliction is one whose very essence is abnormality of religion, with the essentials of religion all present, and that it is not a case where even obsessing pious verbalisms or ceremonials, by mere suggestion or sympathetic imitation, have been imposed upon a mentality originally otherwise defective. While the line may be difficult to define, I take it to be theoretically possible that, as one may pretend to be religious without being so in fact, another may have obsessions or hallucinations seemingly of a religious nature, without having any of the essence of religion in his insanity. So far as I am

³"The Religious and Secular Distinguished," *The Arena*, Jan., 1908. This is a crude effort in the right direction. Somewhat along the same line, and better, see: *Contemporary Review*, Sept., 1905, p. 389. See also, for conflict of Religious Morals and Ethical Science, chapter 25 of "*Obscene*" *Literature and Constitutional Law*.

informed, this is a distinction thus far wholly overlooked by persons in writing upon this subject.

Those affected by religion, whether normal or abnormal, are perhaps seldom experts in psychology, or, if they are, they will have the mystical and not the scientific attitude of mind toward the phenomena in question.⁴ For these reasons, we shall probably find it necessary to reject the authority of all introspective analysis made by religious persons. However, this must not preclude us from giving his self-analysis such weight or significance as it may compel after study and co-relation with our stock of knowledge upon psychology in general and sexual psychology in particular. Thus, we may get useful help even from the study of the subject's explanation of himself, which however, we reject as in itself non-authoritative, and accept for study as a symptom.

THE DEDUCTIVE METHOD.

Perhaps it will be well, if, near the beginning of our investigation, we check up our working hypothesis with the achievement of scientists in other fields of endeavor. If both are correct, our hypothesis must, at least, be consistent with these other accepted conclusions of the best scientific and philosophic thinkers and the effort to co-ordinate that knowledge with our present hypothesis, if it does not destroy the latter, will probably furnish convincing confirmation of it. But, in this connection, we must remember "that the certainty of any conclusion is great in proportion as the assumptions of the universal postulate made in reaching it are few."

For the purpose of this part of the discussion, I shall assume that certain viewpoints have sufficient approval from scientists to preclude the necessity for present further justification. Among these I include the attitude of mind which considers psychology to be only a branch of physiology. I also assume that the laws of organic evolution are applicable and for the purpose of this investigation, I shall assume the correctness of Spencer's formula that evolution is marked by a transition "from an indefinite incoherent homogeneity to a definite

⁴ Here I have in mind the distinction as pointed out in Jastrow's *Fact and Fable in Psychology*.

coherent heterogeneity."⁵ For the same reasons I shall assume the truth and applicability of the following from Prof. Haeckel: "The series of forms through which the individual organism passes during the progress from the egg cell to its fully developed state, is a brief reproduction of the long series of forms through which the animal ancestors of the organism (or the ancestral forms of its species) have passed, from the earliest period of organic creation down to the present time."⁶ Assuming these laws to be true, we can apply them to the known facts of religious worship, and thus we may retrace religious evolution to its beginning.⁷ The resultant deductions must, at least, be in harmony with our hypothesis, if that be true, and in harmony with all the known facts of religious history. This co-relation of history and the doctrine of evolution *may* produce sufficiently striking co-incidents to afford quite irresistible confirmation of our hypothesis.

CRITICS CRITICIZED.

If our working hypothesis has thus far withstood the test of scientific achievement, we may proceed to a study of existing criticisms of it. Practically speaking, as yet there are no critics of the working hypothesis as I have developed and stated it. However, as many have asserted that there exists some causal relation between lust and some manifestations of religion, these narrower claims have been criticised, and some of these criticisms are perhaps equally applicable to my hypothesis, or to the arguments made in its support, and therefore, it is desirable to make a careful study of those criticisms. This should enable us to disclose how far, if at all, an emotional or mystical predisposition has seduced these critics into the abandonment of the scientific method; into forgetting the rules of logic; into mistaking a figure of speech for an analogy; into an incapacity for refined discriminating between a true and a false analogy, etc., etc. This study of the critics should possess a two fold usefulness. First: It should serve as a warning to us, and lead us to avoid the pitfalls of others in so far as the critics

⁵ Spencer, *First Principles* (Appleton's Edition), p. 407.

⁶ Haeckel, *The Evolution of Man*, pp. 6, 7. See also, Fite, *Individualism*, p. 137.

⁷ "Erotogenesis of Religion," *Alienist and Neurologist*, August, 1907; same, *Zeitschrift für Religionspsychologie*, Band 1, S. 445.

have spoken wisely. Second: Where the critics have erred, by pointing out their errors, future critics of our hypothesis, will avoid at least the more common faults and so make their criticism a more valuable aid toward the further revision and correction of our hypothesis, or toward its destruction and so approach a nearer approximation to the truth.

CHECKS AND CONFIRMATIONS.

Next we come to a detailed study especially of conspicuous, distinctive, religious phenomena, thus to check up our theory in every conceivable manner. Here we must study the sexual manifestations of revivals, of monastic institutions, and the religious theories of sex-morals. Perhaps the most useful, because often times the most detailed, will be the study of the intellectual output of religious enthusiasts, and especially of the founders of freak religions, and the religiously insane. Co-ordinating the information thus obtained with our knowledge of psychology and especially of sexual psychology, normal and abnormal, should produce helpful results. Of course, here, if possible, we must look beneath what was done and said, to find, if there exists, a physiological cause for its being what it is. If our hypothesis is correct, then—all essentially religious manifestations in their final essence, must be explainable by the motivation which our hypothesis suggests, and this always without violating any of the canons of our present scientific knowledge. Furthermore, if our theory be true, each case of religion examined, wherein the data are approximately complete, besides being consistent with our hypothesis, should furnish some materials for its verification by the inductive methods, each supplementing the other. Just as our research shall be broad in the number of religions analyzed and religious enthusiasts subjected to psycho-analysis, and the thoroughness with which the analyses are made and the relative number of cases in which our hypothesis furnishes a possible explanation, or the only adequate explanation of the phenomena studied, will determine the probative force of its inductive confirmation of our hypothesis. The materials for this part of the work is inexhaustible, and may well consume several lifetimes before our hypothesis will have its final revision and the final approval or disapproval of the world's best thinkers.

THE GENEALOGICAL TREE OF RELIGION.

If our working hypothesis has successfully withstood all of the tests thus far proposed, another and greater labor yet confronts the scientific student of religion. Having now found the original source of religion, upon this basis it remains to trace the psychic processes which will explain the *how* and the *why* of the historic changes wrought through religious evolution, by tracing minutely the transition from one form of religion to another: the substitution of this object of worship for that; the growth and absorption of one fable after another; the development and sloughing off of successive myths and traditions; the appearance, deification, and rejection of numerous saviors; the enshrinement of this symbol and that, to its worship and destruction as an idol. In short, with the greatest detail available and with keen and trained psychologic insight, to point out the *how* and the *why* of religious changes and thus to build a genealogical tree of religions, from its roots in the prehistoric misinterpretation of sex, through a body of historic fact and religious sap potentially containing all religions, to its finest blossom in modern theism, all the while showing how the original essence is ever present and is the final determinant in the very existence of all religious predispositions. Here is another task upon which the highest intelligence and the greatest patience of many superior humans can well be exhausted. Then another million of years may elapse during which the backward races by accelerated evolution will prepare themselves for the final extinction of religion, its saviors and its gods, by the fruition of religions and the re-absorption of their seed into the materialistic, whence it came through our own ignorance of nature, its laws and manifestations.

SOME FUNDAMENTAL JEWISH RELIGIOUS PROBLEMS
AND THEIR RELATION TO LIBERAL CHRISTIAN
SECTS: SABBATH-SUNDAY; REFORM JUDAISM
AND UNITARIANISM; PULPIT AND STAGE;
RACE-RELIGION.

BY JACOB H. KAPLAN, Ph. D.,
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The following short study is based on beliefs held among the laity in Reform Judaism. One has but to glance at the questions I have sent to a number of well-selected laymen to see that one had rather not answer them at all than say definitely such and such is the solution to the problem. Simple as the wording seems to be, and harmless as the questions may seem, they are yet, as I believe, the very fundamental problems of modern Jewish and Christian life in their relation to each other.

In the first place, I have most carefully selected the names of Jews all over the country, names of men who I know are interested in Reform Judaism, and who, if they answered at all, would answer from deep feeling and conviction. The total number of men selected to whom I sent the *questionnaire* was only one hundred and fifty, and though I have received but twenty-three answers, it is a much larger number than I really expected, considering that, however one answers, there might be the feeling that, after all, there is something to be said on the other side. Some of the men who have answered easily stand highest in the country in their profession or business, and would be entitled to an opinion on any subject that they would undertake to handle; others are business men, whom I know personally, and know to be interested in Jews and Judaism. The answers, therefore, represent the real feeling of Reform Jews, and Jews interested in Judaism, and though only a dozen had answered, the real average of opinion and feeling among Reform Jews could accurately be gathered from the dozen papers.

The difficulty of settling any of the questions may be well inferred from the fact that the Sabbath question, for example,

has been discussed for several years in the Central Conference of American Rabbis, a number of papers written, investigations and reports made by prominent rabbis, and yet the question was left as unsolved as it was at the beginning. Personally, I have two solutions of the Sabbath problem, which I shall give at the end of the present paper, but which, I do not hesitate to say, are as opposite as the poles, one of which I *fear* is going to be the solution of all Sabbaths, Christian and Jewish, the other I *hope* might be the solution, and could be, if spiritual currents were as potent to-day as material considerations. Jewish problems and Christian Problems are very closely allied in countries where both live peaceably together, for, as Emerson has pointed out,

“Nor knowest thou what argument
Thy life to thy neighbor’s creed has lent.”

The men who have answered are physicians, lawyers, and (the greater number) business men. Their ages, those that have given their age, are one 28 (this is the youngest but a profound student of Hebrew Literature both ancient and modern); one 37; two 40; one 42; one 43; one 47; one 57; one 58; one 62; one 65; one 70; one 78; the rest have not given their ages.

The following is a copy of the *questionnaire*:

1. Do you believe a day of rest, that is a Sabbath, is essential to a religious life?
2. Do you believe Judaism can live without a Sabbath?
3. Do you think one can be a good Jew without keeping the Sabbath?
4. Do you believe that by any effort, however great, the Jews could and would observe the Sabbath?
5. Do you believe that Reform Judaism means a higher appreciation of Judaism, or a gradual loss of all things Jewish?
6. Do you believe Judaism would gain or lose by a Sunday-Sabbath?
7. Do you think that Reform Judaism leads to an ultimate assimilation of Jew with non-Jew?
8. Do you believe that Unitarianism and Reform Judaism could permanently unite in one congregation?
9. Do you believe a complete assimilation of Jew with non-Jew would be a loss or a gain to the spiritual forces of civilization?
10. Do you believe the stage, purified and reorganized, can take the place of the pulpit, and if so, would you consider that a gain or loss to religion in general?

11. Supposing the Jew has no distinct religious message for the world any more than Germany or Russia has a distinct political message for the world, do you believe the Jew's privilege, right, or duty would still be to preserve his individuality and separate religious existence? Please sign your name, age, if you do not object, and return to:

Dr. J. H. KAPLAN,
Selma, Alabama.

1. In the first place, knowing that many people work every day in the week, that many think one day is as holy or as unholy as another, while others, again, who advocate a forced observance of Sunday laws, think, or say they think, only of the body-life of physical man when they advocate a day of rest, I ask plainly, from a religious point of view, without mentioning any particular religion: (1) "Do you believe a day of rest, that is a Sabbath, is necessary for a religious life?"

To the above question 72%¹ answer in the affirmative, that a day of rest is necessary for a religious life, while 9% answer in the negative. Besides these, a few qualify the answers thus: "A Sabbath is not necessary for adults, but for the religious training of the young." Another one says: "A Sabbath is not necessary for a religious life, but for a healthy and useful life." Still another says that a Sabbath is desirable, but not essential. While still another does not understand the question, but he evidently means to answer in the affirmative, for he says, "No, one day is as good as another."

From the above answers, we conclude that by far the greater part of Reform Jews think a Sabbath is essential to a *religious* life. One cannot conclude from an answer like the one above, that a Sabbath is not necessary for the adult but is necessary for religious training of the young, that such a mind is hypocritical or feels itself above religion, or that it thinks religion an affair for children; rather, as it seems to me, is the opposite true, namely, that, if the religious *feeling* is stimulated in the young, the adult will have the feeling, though he do not often stimulate it by the means at first employed. The memory of the feeling of sacredness is there though he exercise not again the feeling itself.

2. Knowing that the Sabbath has always been the most important institution in Judaism, and that the observance of it

¹ Fractions of percentages are omitted.

was a joyful duty, and a breach of it almost unheard of in all the camps of scattered Israel, and knowing that the fewest in modern life of any professing the various shades of Judaism observe the Sabbath in the strict way in which it was observed, and yet Jewish thought and feeling and consciousness have deepened and widened in many various ways as it seems, I ask the second question: (2) "Do you believe Judaism can live without a Sabbath?"

The answers to this question are very nearly equally divided in opinion on both sides. For 56% believe that Judaism cannot live without a Sabbath, and 8% of these emphasize the thought by adding that no religion can live without a Sabbath. While 44% believe that Judaism can live without a Sabbath, still 16% of this number modify their opinion thus: "Yes, but not well;" "yes, but precariously;" "yes, but should have one for spiritual, mental and physical good;" while one says unreservedly, "A real, genuine and honest Judaism can live without a strictly religious observance of the Sabbath."

It appears, therefore, from the above that the majority of Jews believe Judaism cannot live without a Sabbath, and would no doubt say that no religion can live without Sabbath, while a large minority do believe that the Sabbath is not essential to religion.

3. As already stated, knowing that not many Jews under modern economic pressure observe the Jewish Sabbath, the next question is aimed at finding out whether the lack of observance is looked upon by the layman as an irreparable breach in the body of Judaism which may lead to dissolution, or whether there be enough vitality and thought to reconstruct inner consciousness and feeling and religious life processes to outer circumstances in spite of the chafing sores from impingement with economic problems. The answers received to question (3), "Do you think one can be a good Jew without keeping the Sabbath?" show that the modern Jew has not lost his interest in the pride of the Jew nor in the ever-expanding meaning of the term religion, or Jewish religion. It may be, of course, from a psychological point of view, that they also have first endured, and then embraced, laxity of religious observance, and now justify their own conduct, but while this is a possibility it is not a probability, for these men whose answers are here

recorded do not have to justify themselves to me or to any one else, they have answered, I believe, as they feel, for they did not have to answer at all. Here, 69% of the answers declare that one can be a good Jew without observing the Sabbath, although 6 of these, or 26% answer only conditionally by modifying, thus: "Not necessarily the seventh day;" "under forced conditions;" "not necessarily strict observance;" "yes, most emphatically;" very clever, and at the same time quite true is the following answer: "Yes, if you accept Hillel's interpretation of what constitutes Judaism." It must be explained here that Hillel, who was a doctor of the Law in the time of King Herod, said that the fundamental principle of Judaism is: "What is hateful to thee, do it not unto thy neighbor; this is the whole Law; the rest is but commentary." Certainly, from that point of view, or from a similar point of view that considers religion not a system of beliefs and custom but a well ordered life, according to any of the standards of righteousness, one can be a good Jew without keeping the Sabbath.

On the opposite side, believing that one cannot be a good Jew without observing the Sabbath, are 31%, but of this number only 9% are unconditionally so, while one says: "Yes, and No;" another says: "One cannot be a good Jew unless he makes some effort to keep the Sabbath or a part of it;" still another thinks that not in the "full sense of the word" can one be a good Jew without the observance of the Sabbath, while yet another says: "Not necessarily the seventh day."

It is evident from the above answers that the majority of Reform Jews do not observe the Sabbath, and do consider themselves good Jews. Here lies one of the fundamental distinctions in Jewish *consciousness* between the Reform Jew and the Orthodox Jew. Neither of them observes the Jewish Sabbath to any marked degree, but the Orthodox is conscious of sin, grave sin, for neglect of one of the chief duties of the Jew, and penitently approaches his Maker with the humble excuse that he could not otherwise provide for his family, while the Reform Jews, or the majority of them, as the above result shows, have lost all consciousness of sin in the non-observance of the Sabbath.

I am not now going to draw any conclusions from the above facts, as these too would be colored by one's own viewpoint as to

what constitutes Judaism, and also it would have to be colored by one's ideas as to whether the Jew must hold fast to the past, or readjust himself to what he calls modern economic conditions. Some of my own views on both sides will be given at the conclusion of this paper.

4. Mentally ranging myself with those who think that a Sabbath observance is necessary to a Jewish Life, and sympathetically entering into the economic struggles of the modern Jew, I ask the question (4): "Do you believe that by any effort, however great, the Jew could and would observe the Sabbath?" The "could" and "would" aim at the basal distinction as to whether the non-observance is due to *necessity* or *laxity*. The answers to this question show that about half consider the non-observance due to necessity, the other half consider it due to laxity. The result is as follows: 48% believe that the Sabbath cannot be observed "in this age and country," that is, as I take it, that the Jews could not observe it if they would on account of economic conditions confronting them in this modern life. In addition, 9% believe that the Jews neither could nor would observe the Sabbath, "unless they were persecuted again." This might be interpreted to mean that this small per cent believe that the non-observance is due more to laxity than absolute necessity. 43% believe, as I interpret it, that the Jews could and would observe the day, if the proper spiritual forces were applied, the conscience aroused, or perhaps the example set by men in thorough earnest about the matter. These are the modifying phrases used: "Probably a part of the day;" "As near as possible;" "Possibly;" "Yes, by great effort and feeling;" "Some Jews, not all;" "Yes, but only the day kept in the country in which they live;" "Yes, and the time is not far distant, if the holidays are an indication." It must be said, in explanation of the last modifying phrase, that the two Holy days of the Jews, New Year and Day of Atonement, are observed by Jews throughout the world perhaps more conscientiously and generally than any institution of any religious organization ancient and modern, and this can be said without fear of contradiction or exception. The other holidays, such as Passover, Feast of Tabernacles, and Feast of Weeks, are observed not to the extent of the two above mentioned, but to an extent far beyond the reasonable expectations of any one,

judging from the general neglect of the Sabbath observance, especially since, in the Jewish Religious Calendar, none of these is more important than the Sabbath. Hence, the above remark, "If the holidays are an indication" is quite logical but not psychological, I fear.

5. Question (5): "Do you believe that Reform Judaism means a higher appreciation of Judaism, or a gradual loss of all things Jewish?" Reformers, of course, always intend, nay more than intend, labor sincerely to improve, to raise to higher levels, but the questions are always pertinent: Have they succeeded? Have they wisely reformed? Have they not sinned by sweeping away the good as well as the evil? I shall not enter here into Reform Judaism. It is presented with clearness and scholarly force by David Philipson, D.D., in his *The Reform Movement in Judaism* (The Macmillan Co.: N. Y., 1907). It is necessary to state that there is serious question in the mind of rabbis and laymen as to whether Reform Judaism has built up or torn down. Or perhaps, it might be more truly analyzed thus: Reform always implies two processes, tearing down and building up. In Judaism it was felt, in the adjustment of inner conditions to outer conditions, that much of the ceremonial and liturgical accumulations of centuries was obstructing the view of the essence of Judaism; the inner courts could not be seen because of the walls without, and so the tearing-down process began, and the masses heartily joined in this, but as it seems to many, waited not for the appearance of the "inner courts," nor for the erection of the new buildings on the old site. To the student and to the onlooker all who have entered into the breaking-down process belong to the Reform Camp, but this is the fundamental distinction that some have also built up, while others have merely torn down. The real fact is that it requires no skill to tear down, hence all joined in that, while to build up requires much skill and labor, hence few have joined in that. It is seen, therefore, that many who are called Reform Jews are merely such as have lost all that *was* Jewish, "that and nothing more." In addition, it cannot be denied that many Jews think that even the breaking-down process has gone too far, that there is nothing left at all of the old courts, and that the new buildings are all strange and unrecognizable as Jewish. All these feelings question 5 is trying to fathom, and the answers are as follows:

69% think that Reform Judaism is a higher appreciation of Judaism, and some are quite emphatic in their belief. One says, that, in the course of evolution, it is the fittest for its environment. Another says, "Insistence on Orthodoxy in this age and country would make Judaism an impossible religion." A third says that Reform Judaism is the savior of our faith. A fourth remarks that Reform Judaism will preserve Judaism for the future. One says that Reform Judaism means a higher appreciation but that Reform Judaism of today is not reform at all. 13% think that Reform Judaism is neither the one nor the other. Yet another 13% think that Reform Judaism is a gradual loss of all things Jewish. One answers "No," and I cannot decide to which part of the question it refers.

The conclusion is forced upon us that a large majority of the laity thinks Reform Judaism has quickened Jewish consciousness and leads to a higher appreciation of things Jewish. A respectable minority, however, thinks that too much has been taken away to allow what is left to be recognized as Jewish.

6. Returning once more to the Sabbath question, keeping in mind all the various difficulties confronting this problem, such as the actual neglect of the Saturday-Sabbath no matter what the feeling may be about it, and knowing that many can observe a day of rest on Sunday, and leaving out from the discussion everything pertaining to the authority to make a change in the "day" observed, I ask (6), "Do you believe Judaism would gain or lose by a Sunday-Sabbath?" I mean, of course, whether Judaism would gain in Jewishness by transferring the "Day of Rest" from the unobserved Saturday to the may-be-observed Sunday, and whether such a transfer would carry any sanctity with it, especially, since even the Christians themselves are conscious that they are not observing the Sabbath but the "Lord's Day." Whether the answers have taken this into account I do not know, but the answers are clear-cut and stand thus: 61% answer that such a transfer would be a gain to Judaism. 26% think that it would be a loss while 13% answer "No" without indicating to what part of the question the "no" refers.

There is a great deal more involved in this question than any of those who have answered probably take into consider-

ation; their answers merely indicate the practical sense of the laity.

7. It is a well known secret that intermarriage between Jews and Christians has been rapidly increasing, especially in European lands. It is also a well known secret that religion has very little, perhaps nothing, to do with such intermarriages. It is a matter of politics pure and simple. In Russia it is privation of any decent means of livelihood, in Germany it is privation of every honor Christian decency permits to withhold from the Jew, that is the cause, not of conversion, necessarily, but of leaving the ranks of Judaism, and intermarriage is one of the outcomes of this baiting-process. It is also an open secret that the Jew considers it not conversion but perversion to turn from Monotheism to Trinitarianism, and, personally, I do not believe that 1-10 of 1% of those who, for marriage, or other reasons, are converted, make any pretence of being sincere, but this is also true, and worthy of note, that both Christian and Jew are losing long-cherished prejudices, losing also theological littleness, and therefore, coming closer together in aim, and purpose and belief, or, it may be, in their non-belief, from the ancient point of view. Considering now that there are real and honest differences both in belief, feeling and training, between Jews and Christians, intermarriage is certainly not conducive to conjugal happiness. Furthermore, assimilation may mean loss of Judaism on the part of the Jew and loss of Christianity on the part of the Christian, and it is this idea that I had in mind when I addressed the following question, (7) "Do you think that Reform Judaism leads to an ultimate assimilation of Jew with non-Jew?"

However the question was understood, the answers show that the majority do not believe Reform Judaism leads to assimilation. The result is this:

65% say that Reform Judaism does not lead to assimilation. Some modify thus: Not under proper guidance of rabbis; socially, somewhat, religiously, not.

35% think that Reform Judaism does lead to ultimate assimilation, and modify with these phrases: in some cases; yes, if Christians would believe in the Unity of God; perhaps in centuries to come; between the Reform Jew and those of

other sects who come closely to the essential doctrines of Reform Judaism, but surely not those widely apart.

8. It has been pointed out often, and, I believe, with much truth, that Reform Judaism and Unitarianism are astonishingly similar in their beliefs, though very dissimilar, a fact which my question does not hint at, in the psychological makeup, due to historic differences: the one has a Jewish history behind, the other a Christian history, though similar they are in that both are monotheistic in theology as well as in practice. True it is that Judaism has been far more "practice," "observance of Law," than theological belief, but this, in modern Judaism, has been lost sight of by the general laity, hence one might well ask, (8) "Do you believe that Reform Judaism and Unitarianism can permanently unite in one congregation?"

Remarkable indeed, are the answers to this question, showing that, no matter what is said about Reform Judaism being a religion of belief, the consciousness is deep rooted that Judaism is "practice" and "Laws" different from other religions. 82% say that it is impossible for Unitarianism and Reform Judaism to unite permanently in one congregation. Some modify thus: Not yet; not unite, but good if pulpits were exchanged; unless the latter embrace Judaism; Unitarianism has no history. Religion must have its roots in history, emotion and devotion.

18% think that it is possible to unite in one congregation, but modify thus: If they do away with Christ; ultimately yes; if both could forget traditions. It will be seen that, even of this 18%, only one person really believes that the thing can ultimately be done.

This is, perhaps, one of the finest examples of the difference of logical and psychological reasons. It seems to me that, logically, there are no valid reasons why two liberal branches of religion like Unitarianism and Reform Judaism should not be able to unite permanently in one congregation, but, psychologically, there are many reasons why the thing cannot be done.

9. I doubt whether the same scenes appeared to the minds of those who answered question (9) as appeared to my mind when asking the question. I was thinking of the fascination of a European trip, where one meets every few miles another nationality, other customs, other languages, other physiognomies, and other scenes, and then I thought of the popular

words, "Assimilation," "Conformity," "One Church," etc., etc., and, without hinting at the tyrannies of monopolies of means and thought, without stating the psychological impossibility of one pattern for all minds and hearts, I ask: (9) "Do you believe a complete assimilation of Jew with non-Jew would be a loss or gain to the spiritual forces of civilization?"

48% say it would be a serious loss. One says in explanation, "At this time, and for many generations;" another says: "Believing Judaism to be one of the great civilizing forces, I would consider its destruction (synonym of assimilation) deplorable."

9% think it impossible until ideas and sentiments draw more closely together; but, says one, "this should not prevent closer feeling as of two political parties." 9% say they are unable to answer. 21% say it would be a gain. Among the reasons for this opinion of gain are the following: "It would kill prejudice;" "No loss, as long as Monotheism is maintained;" "Probably no spiritual loss."

One thinks it would be a gain socially, but religiously a loss. Another thinks it depends on the manner of assimilation as to whether it would be a loss or gain.

10. Question (10) is one of universal interest to religions. It applies to Judaism as well as to Christianity, and often has it been said that the stage is a more powerful moral force than the pulpit. People often say "that play was a more powerful sermon than anyone preached in the pulpit." The stage is the child of religion, has been, and can be made a moral force; it is more liberally patronized than the churches, more gladly attended, more liberally paid for; many who have no time to attend church services, have the time and the money to attend the theater; problem plays, moral plays, etc., etc., have all great influence on the people, why not therefore, convert the stage into an uplifting power, has been asked, and I ask it in the following question: (10) "Do you believe the stage, purified and reorganized, can take the place of the pulpit, and if so, would you consider that a gain or loss to religion in general?"

Most astonishing, indeed, to me were the answers to this question in their unanimous denial that the stage could ever take the place of the pulpit. I had thought, from the fact that everyone finds time to attend the theater, while not quite so

many find time to attend services or lectures at church or temple, that quite a number might be willing to convert the pulpit into the stage, but somehow thoughtful men are opposed to thoughtless practice, and say, "not so," "it cannot be done," and "it would be a serious loss, if done." One very cleverly, and, perhaps, with much truth, sad to say, answers: "If the stage were purified, the masses would not be attracted." One answer is not legible; one says it is impossible at present, and all the others say it is impossible. Such modifying phrases have been used: "It is unthinkable;" "the two cannot merge,—a loss if they did;" "nothing can take the place of the pulpit;" "the stage will always be a place of amusement, while the pulpit a place of instruction."

11. The eleventh and last question is one that many did not quite understand, and, in fact, it is one that was suggested to me by one of my Orthodox Jewish friends, one whose views on Jewish life are based on deep learning and feeling for Judaism, and yet this suggestion quite surprised me as it did many of those who answered it. In explanation of the question let me state that my friend said in substance: "You are always speaking of a mission of Judaism, and therefore you think that the Jew must keep his individuality because of his mission, but I don't comprehend your mission. I am an Orthodox Jew," he emphasized, "and yet I say I don't understand your mission. When the world was steeped in ignorance and superstition, and idolatry, then we had a mission, but the Christian of to-day is morally, ethically, intellectually, the equal of any Jew. Suppose he does believe in Jesus, and has his Trinity, he is morally and intellectually the equal of any of us. What is our mission? We teach righteousness and morality. If he has these saving graces, he is saved. But I claim," he continued, "that I have nothing more to teach the Christian, yet I love my Judaism, my own mother, I have a right to my individuality and to my time-honored customs, and therefore I want to be a Jew, I want to remain a Jew, and have a right to myself even if I have nothing more to teach." From this conversation, which, I know, differs in viewpoint from what I had thought and from what many Reform Jews think, I formulated the following question: (11) "Supposing the Jew has no distinct religious message for the world, any more than Germany or Russia has a distinct political

message for the world, do you believe the Jew's privilege, right, or duty would still be to preserve his individuality and separate individual existence?"

43% take the whole question and answer distinctly "Yes," the Jew has a right to a distinct religious life, and separate existence.

26% answer as unreservedly, "No," he has no right to separate existence, if he has no message. "There is no room for the race—Jew," says one of this number, "The sooner he disappears, the better." Another one answers thus: "The Jew should not maintain a separate existence, and distinct religious ideals should not have such effect." One says my question is too vague for a concise answer. In addition to the 43% who answer affirmatively, there are 9% who answer more than affirmatively, they say that they cannot conceive Judaism without a message. Parenthetically, I wish to add that one of those whose answer is as last stated is, to my mind, one of the greatest legal authorities in the United States. Another 4% would probably have to be added to the other side, denying the right of separate existence, for the answer reads thus: "The mission of the Jew is to monotheize, this done, his work is finished." The rest of the answers I cannot read. The result is here difficult to fathom. Some, evidently, do not understand the real meaning of the question; others cannot conceive Judaism without a message, and others deny the right of separate existence to Jews who have no message. The fewest understand that the question issued forth from profound feeling, that sentiment claims its rights as well as reason and message and religious instruction. Yet the result indicates that a small majority hold that the Jew, message or no message, has a right to his individuality, while a large minority hold that the message is the important part of the Jew, and without it, if indeed he can ever be without it, he should be absorbed into unrecognition.

These various opinions and deductions may prove nothing, after all, but the student does not have to be reminded that doubt and suspense are as great factors in human education as definite and final knowledge, and to know the state of doubt and the percentage of difference of opinion is as interesting and as important to the student as to know the finality of things, if there is such a concept in human knowing. And so my task

might end here, but it does not. I have something else to add to the state of doubt.

Those who have followed the paper thus far might be interested to know what the rabbi thinks of these various questions, and so I have asked the opinion of one single rabbi, whose opinions on Jewish questions I value above all others in the camp of Reform Judaism. Without stating his name, I append here his opinions on these same questions, in the same order as above given. And at the end of this, I cannot refrain from stating what I personally think of one of the questions, namely Sabbath Observance. I give not even here any excuses for holding two opposite views on the Sabbath questions, irreconcileable in every way, one of which as already stated, I fear, will be the solution of all Sabbaths, Christian and Jewish, the other, I hope, might be the solution, and could be, I am convinced, if a number of Christian and Jewish scholars were to emphasize the fact from their Sinaic heights that religious sanctity or saintliness is as truly a human possession of transcendent value as are any of the shares of countless stock-companies for the worthless possession of which our whole education has been training us.

The following answers are those of the rabbi mentioned whose opinions, as stated, I value above all others in the Reform rabbinate (See the questions above)

- (1) I do, especially under modern conditions of competitive livelihood and materialistic temptations.
- (2) Not in any sense of real spiritual vitality.
- (3) For a generation or two, as one is near enough to the feeding-roots of Ghetto-tradition.
- (4) Not in the diaspora, not even with the full inspiration from a great Palestinian center.
- (5) Reform Judaism is based upon a sincere desire for emancipating Judaism from its medieval shackles; it has, however, been misled into anunjewish emphasis upon the need of assimilation which, chiming in with the materialism of the atmosphere, has worked for a false attitude towards Jewish and even religious values.
- (6) The latter, because the Sunday-Sabbath induces flirtation with Christian applause, and tends to secularize religion and to cosmopolitanize Judaism and the Jew prematurely.
- (7) It is involuntarily one of many influences in that direction, though, with the Russian Jew, it may rather tend, in many instances, to delay the process of complete submergence.
- (8) The Unitarian would not desire it, nor would the Jew be satisfied with it.

- (9) A considerable loss, according to every law of natural evolution.
- (10) Stage and pulpit have altogether different though, sometimes overlapping spheres. The thought of D. F. Strauss (*Der alte und der neue Glaube*), according to which art will become the final humanity-faith, is now quite thoroughly exploded.
- (11) There are religious messages, not of thought or word, but of deed and life; our separate religious and national existence is needed to form, for the world's instruction, a priest-people. This is to be accomplished by the inclusiveness of statehood, by forming a society upon principles of justice and equality.

And now let me state what I believe are the two possibilities of the Sabbath. I fear that the Jewish Sabbath, as well as the Christian Sunday-Sabbath, is passing away. Neither of them can be observed, as they ought. Enforeing laws is no remedy, it is reprehensible from every point of view. An enforced Sabbath is not a spiritual Sabbath. The Sunday, I believe, is as little observed by the non-Jew, as is the Saturday by the Jew, not because the Christian is irreverent but because of the impossibility of setting aside one day for absolute rest and spiritual uplift. The trains must continue to carry their human freight, the hotels must continue to serve their guests, the telegraph must continue to send the messages of vital importance, the meals in the home must continue to be served by someone, and a thousand industries must continue to put forth in order to supply the demands of our modern life. In this there is no accusation, no shutting of eyes, no reproach, it is analysis pure and simple. The only solution for all this is to save the spiritual force of the oncee kept Sabbath by sanctifying a *one-seventh-day-Sabbath*. That is, we must consecrate each day a part for rest and spiritual uplift, a one-seventh-day-Sabbath. In fine, this is what is happening, namely an impossible Sabbath, an unobserved Sabbath and a loss of all feelings that come from a truly observed day of rest and spiritual uplift, and all this can be saved by converting the actuality into a *sanctioned-observance-of-a-part-of-each-day*. Thus we convert Sabbath-Breakers into Sabbath-Observers which is a mental-spiritual gain of tremendous value. Every one can then observe the sanctioned Sabbath and feel the result in soul-life.

This is an outline of what I have worked out in detail in a lecture on "The Sabbath of the Future."

There is, however, another possibility of remedying the laxity

of Sabbath observance, and, in my own mind, contrary to all other opinion, I am convinced it can be done.

I am unalterably convinced that the Saturday *can* be observed by Jews, and the Sunday *can* be observed by Christians, if they want to observe them. That such observance would interfere with business is no doubt, but that is the very purpose of observance. I am not living outside of modern life, and am not a dreamer of dreams, and I believe I have a high conception of the dignity of labor and industry, and yet I know that these are not the only things of value in human life. The proper dignity of life is attained only by him who has time to contemplate the beautiful and the sublime, and reverence the good and the pure. Most people are carried away by unenviable envy of those who have made what is called a phenomenal success in the commercial world. If intellectual, moral and spiritual attainments were occasionally held up for emulation, a finer appreciation of the dignity of man might gradually creep over the nation. If, therefore, men of highest intellectual and moral attainments would emphasize the spiritual attainments as of some value in the assets of man, and set the example of importing into our civilization some of the religious fervor which is the distinguishing mark of oriental civilizations, while the lack of all conception of it is the distinguishing characteristic of Occidental civilization, then the Jews, who have made greater sacrifices than this, would very likely see things in a different light, for their respect for the opinion of the learned is not gone, and the Christians too would no doubt follow the lead of real sincerity of those who are not by profession in the business of religion, as it is often expressed.

These are my own two opposite views of the Sabbath problem. It may be, of course, that, as some say, the Sabbath is not such an important matter after all, and that work and industry are the only saving graces of mankind, if so I have no quarrel with those who honestly hold such and similar views, only I do not believe it, and so record my dissent.

THE PSYCHOLOGY AND PEDAGOGY OF DOUBT.

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Students of laboratory psychology are thoroughly familiar with the phenomenon of contrast. Distilled water, for example, tastes sweet after a dose of bitters; the hand kept in hot water and then plunged in lukewarm water feels cool; a green spot is seen, if the eyes, after gazing intently at a red disc, shift their gaze to a white background; and so on with the other sense organs. The explanation is that the neural substance becomes exhausted or fatigued, and reverses itself, so to speak, for the purpose of recuperation or restoration to normal condition.

Less commonplace is the fact that similar contrast-phenomena obtain in the purely mental realm. Sadness follows upon prolonged or excessive happiness; and, on the other hand, the wretchedness of lovers who have quarreled passes quickly into a joy that is ineffable, when the barriers are removed, or the obstinacy overcome, and they become reconciled. In morbid conditions, we have mania passing into melancholia and back again to mania, and, so on, around the vicious circle.

The thesis of this paper is that doubt and belief are contrary psychical states, that the law of contrast holds between them, and that belief is the inducing or positive state, and doubt the induced or negative state. To take up the last point first: phylogenetically and ontogenetically, belief precedes doubt. Belief grows out of the elementary process of perception; it is the instinctive and naive acceptance of perceptions as true. To be, is to be true. And this acceptance continues until there has been a sufficient accumulation of experience to bring the accuracy or reliability of the earlier perceptions into question. Professor Earl Barnes' studies show that the critical spirit does not begin to manifest itself before ten or eleven. The children then begin to employ such phrases as, "I think," "I've been told," "My idea was," "The Bible says," "They say," "I was taught in the Sunday school," etc., instead of the dogmatic

statements they had been in the habit of using. About three years later, these mildly uncertain expressions have become developed into the more positive assertions,—“We imagine;” “I used to believe;” “I do not exactly know;” “I doubt.”

A more searching study would undoubtedly have revealed the fact that this steady growth in scepticism was due to the beliefs that were instilled,—beliefs which the growing experiences of the young would be sure to prove absurd or untenable. It is, of course, impossible to lay down a mathematically accurate law, but it is safe to say that the more common, everyday experiences a belief comes in conflict with, the more rapidly will it arouse doubt in its possessor's mind. Thus, a little lad of three, who had been taught to believe that God is omnipotent asked his father, “If I had gone upstairs, papa, could God make it that I hadn't?” Another infant philosopher wanted to know why “if Christ died all up and then got up again, why can't grandpa get up?” “Talk about God's being good!” bitterly protested a five-year-old to his mother, “I should think he was good! Make all this ice and make Tommy fall down and most kill himself. I should think he was good!” Very many begin to doubt the goodness or justice of God, when they learn that He not only knew Adam and Eve would eat the apple, but had even planned that they should do so. Why, then, did He blame them? “God won't take care of you, if you don't say your prayers,” said a grandmother to her not over-pious descendant. To which the little fellow, drawing upon his past experience, very acutely replied, “Well, He did.” “My idea of heaven has changed,” said an older boy, “and now I think that heaven is space, but if that is so, how could the heavens open, as it says they did in the Bible?” Another could not understand how those in heaven can be happy or blest, knowing that some of their relatives and friends are suffering torments in hell.

It is the instilling of these and many similar beliefs, which must necessarily be contradicted by reason and experience, that has proved to be the most prolific breeder of adolescent doubt. Nor is God benefited or complimented by the unwise and often-times contradictory statements that parents and religious teachers make concerning Him. Replying to *questionnaires* sent out by Professors Burnham, Starbuck, Leuba, Hall, and others, thousands of adolescents have declared that, as they

advanced in years and experience and study, they gave up their faith point by point; which led Professor Starbuck to conclude that "doubt seems to belong to youth as its natural heritage." But, if this be so, the question immediately arises, Why do not the children of enlightened parents, of agnostics and the so-called non-religious share in this unhappy heritage? It is as if on discovering numerous cases of dyspepsia among young people (due in reality to unwise dieting), one should conclude that dyspepsia is a natural heritage of youth. Why speak of doubt as a "heritage," when its psychology and etiology are so simple? The minds in which false and irrational ideational complexes and systems were not formed and built up, and on the other hand, those in which these, having been built up, proceeded to crystallize because of subjective conditions or absence of objective incentives to change and growth, will both be found to be devoid of distressing doubts. But those that continue to grow, notwithstanding the crystallizing dogmas with which they are burdened,—in such minds doubts abound, and, as will be shown later, perform a very valuable function. Scores of young men, reared in orthodox homes, and taught to accept the Bible as the alpha and omega of science and history, sociology, ethics, and all other branches of knowledge, have declared that their religious structures, so carefully built up for them by their parents and teachers, fell with a crash as soon as they were introduced to the biological and physical sciences. Thus, one respondent writes: "When sixteen I read the doctrine of evolution and 'The Idea of God.' Everything seemed different; I felt as if I had been living all my life on a little island and now was pushed off into a great ocean. I have been splashing around, and hardly know my bearings yet. I don't see any need for a belief in the resurrection." Another writes, "At fifteen I began to give up the faith of my childhood point by point, as it would not stand the test of reason. First the belief in miracles went, then the divinity of Christ; then at eighteen metaphysical studies showed me that I could not prove the existence of a personal God, and left me without a religion." (Starbuck, *The Psychology of Religion*, pages 233 and 237). Not a few become embittered when they realize that their childish credulity has been imposed upon (whether innocently or otherwise is immaterial to them), and react with great

violence against everything pertaining to religion. One of Leuba's respondents wrote:

"I do not perform religious exercises, public or private. To me such practices are incomprehensible, childish, and absurd. I have no religious needs. I am devoid of religious feelings. I never had any religious experience. I am very seldom in church. When in one I wonder at the phenomenon of otherwise intelligent persons acting like a lot of heathens. My principal feeling is one of contempt; I also feel ashamed for them for being such monkeys. My physical state at such times is great uneasiness, a feeling of restraint, and an intense desire to get in the open air. Religion, to my conception, is another name for superstition; it is one kind of superstition. I consider it to be utterly useless and superfluous, if not positively harmful. My grandfather was a Presbyterian minister. My mother was a strong Presbyterian. She believed literally. She taught me her faith diligently from my earliest childhood. She was never severe or strict, but taught in a loving and charming way. I attended Church and Sunday School until fourteen. All my early associations tended to make me an orthodox Christian. I have never met a more conscientious person than my mother was. I suppose I accepted her teachings as a matter of course, without reflection when very young. When old enough to study physical geography, I learned that some things she believed were not true. Later, in biology, that many more things she believed were not true, and I have been learning ever since what an immense mass of superstition her belief was." ("Contents of Religious Consciousness," *Monist*, July, 1901.)

This case is typical of thousands, and deserves closer study. It discloses the prevalent conception of religion as a mass of beliefs, dogmas,—a creed of some sort; in other words, something almost exclusively intellectual. If, therefore, the dogmas are outgrown, and the beliefs become doubts or denials, the conclusion begins to dawn that religion is but "another name for superstition;" that its practices are "incomprehensible, childish, and absurd." Much worse is the further conclusion that the subject has "no religious needs" and is "devoid of religious feelings." Now it needs no trained psycho-analyst to point out that such phrases as these frequently indicate a keen sense of loss and a desperate attempt to compensate for it by generating an air of bravado and toughness in matters theological. There is certainly wanting in these respondents the spirit of peace and contentment which characterizes those who have suffered no serious spiritual loss. From less pugnacious individuals there issues a wail instead of a sneer; a prayer instead of a reproach. "We have no chapel where we can kneel down," cried such an

one, "no more faith to sustain us, no more God to whom we can address our prayer. Our hearts are empty, our souls without an ideal, and without hope. . . . You who have the good fortune of believing in a Sovereign Ruler, entreat him to reveal himself to us, for we long to suffer and die for a faith." (Leuba, "Neo-Christian Movement," *Amer. Journ. Psychol.*, vol. 5, p. 479). And the hero in Huysman's *A Rebours* wails, "Alas! Courage fails me and my heart is heavy. Oh, Saviour, have pity on the Christian who doubts, on the unbeliever who desires to believe, on life's victim who must embark alone in the night and under a starless sky!"

Likewise, Oscar Wilde:

"When I think of religion at all, I feel as if I would like to found an order for those who cannot believe; the Confraternity of the Faithless, one might call it, where, on an altar on which no taper burned, a priest in whose heart peace had no dwelling might celebrate with unblessed bread and a chalice empty of wine."

The pathos of it is that all this suffering is entirely unnecessary; and we cannot help believing that this source of mental unhappiness, leading at times to insanity, will be eliminated when the above conception of religion, inherited from the disputatious theologians of the Middle Ages, will be supplanted by the present-day conception which is laying increased emphasis upon feeling and doing, and insists that the best test of a creed are its fruits in the way of social service. The question whether God creates drunkards, thieves, murderers, the diseased, and insane is less interesting to this age than the problems concerned with the reformation and cure of these unfortunates. A single scientific monograph on eugenics is worth more than all the volumes that have been written upon predestination; and of still greater value are the laws and the measures that have been taken to prevent the multiplication of deficient and degenerates. Likewise, the question whether God can make $2 + 2 = 5$ is less vital and absorbing than the problem how to make two bushels of corn grow where only one grew before. The past wrangles fiercely over the question whether Balaam's ass spoke Hebrew, or not; the present spends its energies in preventing cruelty to animals; and so the illustrations of this fundamental difference in viewpoint might be multiplied almost indefinitely. When it is realized that religion

is not a theological platform, and that eternal salvation, or damnation does not depend upon the acceptance or rejection of it, but rather that religion is a state of soul,—profound, involving and affecting the entire ego, expanding and ennobling it,—that every normal human being is capable of experiencing this state on appropriate occasions, *e. g.*, during some crisis, or turning point in one's life, some important or epoch-making event, some soul-stirring scene, etc.; that it is never a constant condition in any but the abnormal, though the influence of a few such experiences may extend over the whole span of life; that it can be induced by high thinking, by striving to get into sympathetic *rapport* with one's fellows in order to serve them, by efforts towards self-culture and expansion, by joyous labor and self-imposed sacrifice, by contemplating the beauty, grandeur, and mystery of Nature, and other such ways;—when these things are realized, it will no longer be possible for a normal human being to declare and believe that he is “devoid of religious feelings, or never had any religious experience.” Nor will it be necessary to yearn vainly “to suffer and die for a faith” that has been outgrown.

It is curious to observe that the remedy that was offered these unfortunates suffering from decaying and festering faith was more faith of the same sort, on the principle, evidently, of *similia similibus curantur*. *Credo quia absurdum est*, cried the medieval religious, when his reason challenged his faith, and immediately drowned his reason and his doubt in a fresh torrent of faith. Even as late as the last century, the prudent Renan concluded resignedly:

“The most logical attitude of the thinker toward religion is: to behave as though religion were true. We must act as though God and the Soul were proven. Religion is one of the numerous hypotheses, such as the waves of ether, or the electric, luminous, calorie, and nervous fluids, nay, the atom itself, which we know to be mere symbols and manners of speech, convenient for the explaining of certain phenomena, but which none the less we maintain. The more we reflect, the more we see the impossibility of proving; but also the *moral necessity* of believing in these great premises: God and the Soul. Let us keep the category of the unknowable. Parallels meet at the Infinite: Science and Religion doubtless meet there. And if not, we can say with Goethe: ‘*Wenn Got betrügt, ist wohl betrogen.*’”

In his *Will to Believe*, Professor James comes out more positively and advises that, when in doubt, choose the view or

hypothesis that harmonizes best with your thought system, and believe that. It is closely akin to Tennyson's advice:

"For nothing worth proving can be proven,
Nor yet disproven; wherefore, thou be wise,
Cleave ever to the sunnier side of doubt,
And cling to Faith beyond the forms of Faith!"

It is apparent that these writers thought of religion exclusively in terms of belief; its essence is an ancient Hebrew solution of cosmological and theological problems which the modern age finds it difficult to accept. Hence their words of advice and essays upon "the will to believe;"—the remedy as desperate as the ailment.

The present generation, owing to the numerous changes and readjustments necessitated by the rapid advances in every field of human interest and activity, has found it necessary to shift the theological centre of gravity, and as a consequence religion is being interpreted anew, or rather there is a return to the conception of it so clearly and masterfully taught by the lowly Nazarene. The conviction is growing that religion is primarily for man, not for God; and that therefore a good deed is worth a thousand *Pater Nosters*. The fruits of the medieval theology were a rich variety of creeds, and wars and inquisitions and persecutions designed to convince the sceptics of their truth and strength. The fruits of the modern theology are a new sense of brotherhood, an awakened civic consciousness and conscience, a new patriotism, more genuine democracy, treaties of peace among the nations, and ideals of equal opportunity, fair play and social service as expressed in the numberless new social and philanthropic institutions, organizations and movements all over the civilized world. Less theology is being preached, and more genuine religion experienced and practised than ever before in the history of man. The world is so busy learning its new lessons in co-operation and practical religion that it has no time for idle disputations and barren beliefs. The test of every religious belief is its efficiency for social service, which means that unless it can coin itself into useful deeds, it has no religious value.

One important consequence of this shifting of emphasis from theory to practice, from beliefs to deeds, will be the disappearance of religious doubt just as in earlier centuries a similar

shifting of emphasis put an end to religious wars. It is here that religious pedagogy should take her cue, and remembering that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure, should shape a Sunday-school curriculum which will not only keep the young from morbid doubt, but will lead them deeper and deeper into the true religious life, first through nature-study, perhaps, including astronomy, geology and kindred sciences, then boy scouts, and city beautiful clubs, and later civic and philanthropic associations, or other agencies that will make for efficient and altruistic citizenship. Such subjects, though not orthodox, will surely prove as interesting and as rich in religious content as the old-time catechism, learned by rote and as devoid of meaning to the majority of children as nonsense syllables.

The pedagogy here advocated is the prevention of doubt by modern scientific and liberal training, which utilizes the results of research in the various fields of human knowledge and represents the modern viewpoint; by abandoning antiquated methods and obsolete subjects; by ceasing to force interest and stimulate unnatural piety; and by preventing the sicklied-o'er-with-the-pale-east-of-thought condition by diverting the energies and directing the interests into more objective and useful channels. We disagree with Professor Starbuck. Doubt is not necessary; it is not a natural heritage of youth;—it is an unhappy state induced by dogmatism and unwise pedagogy.

This much, however, should be said in doubt's defence: there is always a sufficient psychological reason for its existence, and when it does exist, it performs a very valuable function. It is Nature's agent for remedying an intellectual evil. Most men are lazy-minded, and in their thinking follow lines of least resistance. As a consequence, they hold many beliefs which they have accepted on insufficient evidence. But if their minds are not yet dormant or crystallized, doubts will spring up and wage a sort of phagocytic war against these untried beliefs, the issue being determined according to the law of the survival of the fittest. Of this much we may be sure,—the good and beautiful and true in men's beliefs have withstood the onslaught of doubt, and only the false and unworthy have perished. But the fight has frequently been a fierce one, causing untold suffering. Wherefore the Hebrew Rabbis and Christian Fathers urged their pupils and charges to flee from doubt as from the

Evil One himself, which for the weak and timid was doubtless sound advicee. But a more manly attitude would have been to face the doubts squarely and honestly, and so far as possible utilize them, make allies of them. *Dubito ut intelligam*, said Desearthes; and Tennyson, speaking from expert knowledge, declared:

“Who never doubted never half believed;
Where doubt there truth is—’tis her shadow.”

Which is true enough for those in whose minds were planted ideas and beliefs which have been definitely discarded by science and modern thought. For such, doubt proves a valuable gardener, uprooting the weeds and pruning the decayed branches. Or, in psychologieal terms, it separates and eliminates those elements from thought complexes and those complexes from the larger thought system which would prevent further growth and cause arrest of development. A elergyman, for example, writing to Professor Starbuck, remarks: “I always hail doubt as sure to reveal some unexpected truth. As often as I have tried to dodge doubts I have suffered. My real doubts have always come upon me suddenly and unaccountably, and have been the precursors of fresh discovery.” Carlyle’s Teufelsdröckh was another who passed through the “Baphometic Fire-baptism of doubt” and emerged a new man, regenerated and viewing the world through clearer and more experienced eyes. There are thousands such, who are made better and stronger men by their doubts; who acquire broader sympathies and wider viewpoints. Anatole France has these in mind when he writes:

“Happy those who know but one truth, and who stieck to it with indestructible confidence! Happier—or at least better and greater—are those who have surveyed things from every side, who have seen them under multiple aspects and full of contrasts. They have come close enough to the truth to realize that they shall never reach it. They doubt—and become benevolent and gracious; they doubt—and they have strength with sweetness, liberty and independence; they doubt—and they become the moderators and the good counsellors of this poor humanity which is so insanely enslaved to certainty, and which does not know how to doubt. This is because doubting is by no means a popular art. To practise it skilfully, we must have a Montaigne. Let us learn from him the technique of true doubting, indulgent doubting, the doubting that teaches us how to understand all beliefs without being misled by any; that teaches us not to look down on men because they make mistakes, even to share their

errors when they are consoling to ignorance (of which we ourselves possess so generous a share)—or even their lies because of the poetry they contain; to sympathize with them when they are unfortunate or wretched; to love them and to serve them not according to fixed rules, but as we ourselves would be loved and served."

Evidently, doubting is an art so fine, and so dangerous to those unskilled in its use that it would be unwise to recommend its practise indiscriminately. And this brings us to say a few words concerning philosophic doubt, which is of less importance than religious doubt. For philosophy, "a preliminary doubt is the fundamental condition," said Sir William Hamilton, following Descartes. And before them both Aristotle had declared that "philosophy is the art of doubting well." Professor Royee has brought out very clearly the distinction between the two types of doubters in the following passage:

"Any man may by chance, in his mind, come momentarily to question anything. That is so far a matter of passing association, and involves nothing suspicious. A modern, or, for that matter, an ancient thinker may moreover persistently question God's existence. If the thinker is a philosopher, or other theoretical inquirer, such doubts may form part of his general plans, and may so be as healthy in character as any other forms of intellectual considerateness. But if a man's whole inner life, in so far as it is coherent, is built upon a system of plans and of faiths which involve, as part of themselves, the steadfast principle that to doubt God's existence is horrible blasphemy, and if, nevertheless, after a fearful fit of darkness, such a man finds, amidst 'whole floods' of other 'blasphemies,' doubts about God not only suddenly forced upon him, but persistent despite his horror and his struggles, then it is vain for a trained sceptic of another age to pretend an enlightened sympathy, and to say to this agonized, nervous patient: 'Doubt? Why I have doubted God's existence too.' The ducklings can safely swim, but that does not make their conduct more congruous with the plans and feelings of the hen. The professional doubters may normally doubt. But that does not make doubt less a malady in those who suffer from it, and strive, and cry out, but cannot get free."
(Psychological Review, vol. 1, p. 150.)

Philosophic doubt is a mental exercise, yielding strength and pleasure to those who indulge in it. Indeed, some professors of philosophy put their pupils through a course of doubting, as a preliminary to a more profound study of its problems. But in religious doubt there is an element of fear and reluctance which makes it a disturbance instead of an exercise, a pain instead of a pleasure. And because it is entirely unnecessary,—existing, as has been shown, because the beliefs instilled in childhood and

youth are such that they carry the germs of doubt within them—do we advocate its elimination by the adoption of subjects and methods in religious pedagogy more in keeping with the spirit and results of present-day civilization. Both psychology and pedagogy have here an excellent opportunity to render high service to future generations by making practical application of their knowledge to realm that has been much neglected and abused. Happily there are numerous signs that this need is already attracting attention, and will undoubtedly be fully met in the not distant future.

PRAGMATISM AND RELIGION: A NOTE.

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A philosophical tendency so far reaching as Pragmatism would naturally have something to say about religion. Is then the pragmatist also a religionist, and, if so, of what type?

The pragmatist has several inveterate habits, which must be known, if we are to understand his deliverances. He has, for example, a mania for the concrete and experienced, and a phobia for all that is abstract and "thought out." He has his face set firmly toward the future, toward results and consequences, and refuses to stop and discourse concerning first principles, the Absolute, or even past facts, unless they be relevant enough to his present situation to affect his future condition.

The pragmatist subscribes to the Roman adage: *Humani nihil a me alienum puto*. If any hypothesis or belief is brought to his notice, it is duly weighed and measured, with an eye to its working power, and its future possibilities. "On pragmatic principles," says James, "we cannot reject any hypothesis, if consequences useful to life flow from it" (5:273).

Consequently, religious and even theological ideas are neither accepted nor rejected without a hearing. "What are they worth for active, every-day life?" (5:73), and "How well do they fit in with our other acknowledged truths?" are the questions that are put to them; and if they can make satisfactory answer, if they can prove that they can work well, they are admitted into the individual's religious "union," so to speak (4:xii).

But what does the pragmatist mean by the term "working well," as applied to religious ideas? He means that they must make for soul-expansion, for growth and development of the individual and social life. They must make for better character and greater efficiency.

The pragmatist, if he does not openly champion, at least has a good word for any belief that works to good advantage. There can be no absolute certainty, no absolute proof. We must take *something* for granted before we can begin even our

scientific or philosophic investigations, if it is nothing more than the Cartesian *Cogito, ergo sum*. Science begins with axioms and postulates, and tacitly assumes that they will hold good. The evidence which confirms them is *made*, as Professor Schiller has said (9: see. 4). Likewise, says the pragmatist, religion must begin with a belief, with a fundamental assumption, which cannot be proved, but which leads on and yields spiritual satisfaction. This is the burden of Professor James' *Will to Believe*, and *Varieties of Religious Experience*.

The pragmatist also has his views concerning *authority*. For him authority cannot be fixed and final (4). There is no absolute determination in the course of events, else thought were futile and choice impossible(9). Teleology has not the characteristics of universality, eternity and objectivity; it is individual and variable. There is purpose in all things. Professor James says, "The only *real* reason I can think of why anything should ever come is that some one wishes it to be here" (5: 289). But the purpose is not the kind meant in the teleological argument for the existence of God. It is subjective and individual, and spends itself in and for the concrete situation. There are purposes rather than a Purpose.

It follows from this that pragmatist ethics is evolutionary. The earlier stages of social life dominated by custom, tradition and authority can hardly be called moral. Only when the self, or conscience, becomes sole authority is the stage of true subjective morality reached (3: 286-7). Consequently, the standard of ethical conduct of any given time is merely an experimental one and is normative for that time only. Being an adjustment to a concrete situation, it cannot claim permanent validity, but only for so long as it may continue to fit (3: 298, 300). This adjustment, moreover, is dependent upon prevailing social conditions. As these change, the adjustment is disturbed, and a new one must be made (3: 327). This is why a cannibal's code of morals differs from a Christian's, and why my standard of conduct may differ from that of my Revolutionary ancestor. A pragmatist has little sympathy with the old-time song,

"It was good for our fathers,
And it's good enough for me."

The pragmatist is interested in *salvation* also; in salvation of self and the world,—conceiving salvation in almost any com-

hensive sense (5:284-299). He recognizes this as a fundamental problem of religion. His attitude towards it is neither that of a shallow optimist, nor that of a morbid pessimist. He does not go to extremes,—believing neither that all will be saved, nor that none will be saved. He likes to draw particular conclusions, and eschews the universal. He believes that “some of the conditions of the world’s deliverance do actually exist.” There are certain things which work in these conditions that insure salvation, namely, *our acts*. These furnish the primary saving force, but co-operating with them are our fellow men, and also the superhuman forces,—including God himself. Everything in the universe is not finished and sure, but there is danger and uncertainty, calling for individual action and seriousness of thought.

PRAGMATIC PLURALISM AND THE ABSOLUTE.

As already indicated, the pragmatist thinks in relative terms, and avoids anything that savors of the absolute. Consequently the idea of an Absolute Being, over and above all things, or the sum-total and perfect fulfilment of all things, does not suit him at all.

Royce has given a good description of the Absolute. “The Eternal is not merely that which lasts all the time. That alone is eternal which includes all the varying points of view in the unity of a single insight, and which knows that it includes them, because every possible additional point of view would necessarily leave this insight variant” (8:140). The Absolute is the great All-Knower, who unifies all things.

Over against this James says: “The Absolute, taken seriously, introduces all those tremendous irrationalities into the universe which a frankly pluralistic theism escapes” (6:116). One of these irrationalities is the problem of evil. How can this all-embracing Absolute reconcile both good and evil to its unity? It is clear that for the pluralist this problem does not exist. He is not troubled with the origin of evil, but only with the problem of how to lessen its amount (6:124).

Pragmatism frankly makes no attempt to get back to the absolute origin of things. There are only beginnings toward certain ends, with certain purposes in view, not absolute beginnings. “The thing is what it does” (1:293).

In reaction to such absolutist notions as those of Royce and Bradley, pragmatism runs to the opposite extreme of pluralism, but not to a universe wholly disconnected. It admits that there is much unification; nor does it stand for any particular amount of union or disjunction in things, but it simply thinks the evidence is not sufficient to justify the notion of all things being pieces of the Absolute mosaic (5: 161).

There is one point on which pragmatism and absolutism seemingly agree—that the human and the divine substances are identical. Yet, there is this difference; the latter makes for pantheism—all things are parts of the totality of the divine substance;—whereas the former has its divine only in the many *eaches* of the human (6:34, 37).

THE RELIGION OF WILLIAM JAMES.

Perhaps the relationship between pragmatism and religion is best exemplified in the religion of William James, as described by his pupil, Professor Pratt (7).

Professor James, he tells us, was a believer in some kind of a God, and some kind of immortality. Yet he was so antagonistic to dogmatism and creeds that he would never state his faith in God so that it could be easily examined. The Absolute, which philosophy offered him as God, was so distasteful to him, that he was driven from it into pluralism, and this colored all his philosophy.

His hope of immortality was pragmatic. He thought the hypothesis was one full of hope and promise, and therefore worthy of holding. As to further grounds, they were not sufficient for him.

He thoroughly sympathized with mysticism. He believed the "ultimate significance of the mystic tradition of the nature of the universe is itself one of the profoundest problems of philosophy" (7: 231).

Still, he himself was no mystic. He had what he called the "mystic germ," which answered the call of mysticism, but could not fully make one of him. In one of his last letters, written to Prof. Leuba, he fully explained his position. After all his philosophizing and striving after God, which, as he says, had led him away from Christianity and his infant theistic prejudices, he felt that he was outside the mystic circle. "I

have no sense of communion with a God. I envy those who have, for I know that the addition of such a sense would help me greatly. The Divine, for my active life, is limited to impersonal and abstract concepts, which, as ideals, interest and determine me, but do so but faintly in comparison with what a feeling of God might effect if we had one."

If the value of a theory is to be measured by its results in practice, then pragmatism's practical value is very small indeed. It could not yield even to its chief exponent and protagonist that mental peace and comfort and feeling of security which absolutism gives its humblest votary. In the one signal case in which it was put to test, it failed to "work well," and therefore stands condemned out of its own mouth and by its own standard. A treatise on swimming may describe with admirable accuracy all the movements which the swimmer unconsciously performs, but it can never become a substitute for the water and the splashing and spluttering which the beginner must go through, if he is to become proficient in the art. Likewise, pragmatism may be an excellent psychological description of what unconsciously takes place in the minds of religious, but as a preparatory course or discipline, carefully thought out and intended to lead up to the religious state, it is as futile as the treatise on swimming. For religion,—the kind that James yearned for—a goodly amount of bathing in the warm waters of absolutism is necessary. Strangely enough, absolutism owes its greatest pragmatic value to those very traits which are so obnoxious to the pragmatist,—to narrowness, cocksureness, loyalty, enthusiasm, etc. After all, is not religion at heart a loyalty and enthusiasm?

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THE CHINESE GOD OF THE HEARTH.

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The god of the hearth is worshipped throughout the Chinese Empire. Doolittle, in his *Social Life of the Chinese*, says: "There are two objects of worship, as the Chinese aver, to be found in every family, viz., the ancestral tablet and the kitchen god." From very ancient times the Chinese have worshipped the god of fire as the provider of proper nourishment to men and the bearer of the offerings to the gods in heaven. But his office as a tutelary god of the household and his duties of recording the deeds of the family and reporting them to Heaven are a much later development.

In ancient times, the Chinese lived in eaves and in conical sod-huts which had a small opening in the roof to admit light. The piece of ground below this opening called "the place where the rain comes in," or "the center of the house," was sacred to the tutelary god of the ground on which the house was located. Sacrifices were made to this god. Just as each feudal lord had an altar to the god of the ground and the god of the grain, so each householder had an altar in the center of the house open to the sky and sacred to the guardian deity of the place. This god is worshipped to this day by officials in Pekin among the five sacrifices. Among the people, we still have the goddess of the caves, for whom two large globular lanterns are hung before the main reception room of the house.

As civilization progressed among the Chinese, the god of the center of the house gradually gave way to the god of the hearth. The god of the hearth gradually was allotted the functions which he has to-day.

We find the offering to the god of the hearth mentioned in the *Li Ki*, in the chapter entitled "*Li K'i*," and attributed to Tsze Iou, a pupil of Confucius. "Confucius said, 'How can it be that Cong Ung Deung knew the rules of propriety? He piled up wood and burned it to the god of the hearth. But the sacrifice to the god of the hearth is a sacrifice to an old woman. They use a common pot to place the food into, and they use a

pitcher in place of the sacrificial goblet.''" Hwai Nan Tsze, who died 122 B. C., speaking of the days of Yao and Shun and Wu and Wen Wang, says that, after each meal, these old worthies made a small offering of food to the god of the hearth.

In the *Li Ki* we find the offering to the god of the hearth among the seven and the five official sacrifices performed by the emperor and his officials:

"The emperor establishes in behalf of all the people seven sacrifices, namely, those to the tutelary god of life (controlling the length of life, misfortune, reward, and punishment), the center of the house, the gates of the capital, the streets of the capital, the abandoned spirits of his predecessors, the door of the house, the hearth. The emperor establishes on his own behalf these seven sacrifices. The feudal lord establishes in behalf of his subjects five sacrifices, namely, those to the tutelary god of life, the center of the house, the gates of the capital, the streets of the capital, the abandoned spirits of his predecessors—A simple officer, or the common people establish one sacrifice, namely, either that to the door of the house, or that to the hearth."

In the "Yueh Ling" of the *Li Ki* we note further several facts about the god of the hearth. "The tutelary spirit (of the three months of summer) is Chuh Yung—The sacrifice is to the hearth. The lungs are offered first." This part of the *Li Ki* was written by Lu Pu Wei, the teacher of She Hwang Ti, who died 237 B. C. At this time the sacrifice to the hearth was performed in the summer. The guardian god was Chuh Yung. He is said to have been one of the six ministers of Hwang Ti, B. C. 2697. He ruled the South and finally became one of the controlling spirits of the universe. Another version has it that he was the son of the emperor Chwan Hu. He is the god of fire and is represented with a human face and the body of an animal. Ga Gi who lived in the first century A. D. says regarding the explanation of Chuh Yung, "In the summer the Yang or male vapors are very bright. On bright days Chuh Yung resembles that form. Again it is as though the name were taken from a man who controlled the summer regulations." The words Chuh Yung may be interpreted "saluting the vapor." Hence Ga Gi's conclusion is probably not far from the correct one. *

We have noted that, in early times, some looked upon the worship of the god of the hearth as given to an old woman who

Note.—See also A. Nagel's article, "Der chinesische Küchengott," in the *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft*, 1907, XI, 23-43. (Editor.)

first cooked food. This is probably a very old tradition. That making Chuh Yung the tutelary god is probably a later one. In the course of time, a large number of names were associated with the god of the hearth. By the time of the Northern Wei dynasty, 386-532 A. D., they were so numerous as to be troublesome. Accordingly, in the year 493 A. D., in the reign of Tai Ho, an imperial edict was issued as follows:

"Formerly there were over forty gods of water and fire. In the audience hall of the emperor they sacrifice to the tutelary gods of the gates of the capital, the door, the well, the hearth, the center of the house. Each one of these objects has about forty tutelary gods. These need not be established. All may be done away with."

By the end of the eighth century A. D., we find that the surname which is now given, namely, Diong, to the god of the hearth was current. From the Yew Yang Tsa Tsoo we learn: "The name of the god of the hearth is Gui. His form is like that of a beautiful woman. Also his surname is Diong, his name Dang. His personal name is Cu Guoh. His wife's name is King Ge. She has six grown-up daughters. All are named Chak Hak (general investigators)." At present the god of the hearth is represented as an old man with a long beard. He wears a cap dating from the Ming dynasty. In his left hand he holds the felicitous gem. His wife is on his right. Around about him are pasted pictures of two cocks, two birds, and other animals. He is called "the god of the hearth the ruler of destiny."

According to the *Li Ki*, the sacrifice to the god of the hearth took place in the summer. This custom has been observed by the emperors and officials from early times. We read in the books of the Later Han, 25-220 A. D.:

"At the beginning of summer five quarters before daylight all the officials of the capital dressed in red, in the last month of summer they dressed in yellow, and made an offering to the god of the hearth." The Pih Hoo T'ung explains the reason why the sacrifice was made at this time. It says: "The summer belongs to fire, which controls the nourishing and growing of all beings and so they worship the god of the hearth. The god of the hearth is the lord of fire. It is that which men employ to nourish themselves."

At the present time, among the people, the sacrifice to the god of the hearth takes place on the twenty-third, or the twenty-fourth of the twelfth month. The official sacrifice takes place

in the summer. In order to understand why the sacrifice takes place on this day, and also, in order to appreciate the functions of the god of the hearth, we shall have to know the history of the god of destiny or life. Among the five sacrifices already referred to, we find that to the tutelary god of life. This god was identified with the upper two stars of the foot of Ursa Major and had jurisdiction over the length of man's life, misfortune, rewards, and punishments. According to the *Li Ki* this god was worshipped in the winter. According to the *Chow Li*, the worship consisted in burning a pile of wood. The god belonged to the sky, and so was worshipped by a pyre burned in the open air. The fire was no doubt looked upon as a messenger conveying men's gifts to the gods whose habitation was in the sky. Very early this tutelary god of human life became amalgamated with the god of the hearth. In the popular religion these two gods have coalesced to such a degree that the ordinary man thinks of the god of the hearth as the ruler of human life. The ruling of human life became a function of the god of the hearth, and, naturally, his going up to heaven and reporting was placed toward the end of the year. His birthday is celebrated in the eighth month, the third day.

At first the god of the hearth was worshipped as the god of fire. The fire has always been looked upon as a beneficent agent. It enabled men to prepare their food, and very early was regarded as the agency by which the sacrifices were sent up to the gods. As civilization progressed, the family life centered about the hearth, and the god of the hearth became the guardian god of the family and its interests. The god of the center of the house, who belonged to feudalism, was gradually displaced by the god of the hearth. The organization of the empire by She Hwang Ti brought in another factor. The god of Heaven, Shangti, was recognized as ruling over the affairs of men, just as the earthly emperor ruled over them. As men became more conscious of Heaven and its ruler, there grew up the new conception of the god of the hearth and his functions of observing the conduct of men and reporting the same to Heaven. We see in this new conception of the god of the hearth the influence of the emperor in the lives of his subjects, and a new sense of national unity.

It is difficult to say how early this amalgamation between the

tutelary god of human life and the god of the hearth took place. Later writers put the blame for this development on the emperor Wu Ti of the Han dynasty (140-86 B. C.). A writer of the T'ang dynasty, Luk Gui Mung (eir. 713-756 A. D.), says:

"The commentators say that the god of hearth lives among men and spies upon them and investigates small sins. He discovers the sin and announces the same to Heaven. Again it is said, the god of the hearth, as opportunity offers, writes down men's merits and sins and ascends and announces the same to Heaven. Sacrifices should be made to him and he should be prayed thereby for blessing and good fortune. This originated in the time of Wu Ti of the Han dynasty from the words of his necromancers."

In the *She Ke* we read regarding Wu Ti:

"A man of Ca (Shantung) named Sieu Ung, came to see the emperor to display his methods of controlling the spirits. The emperor had a wife whom he loved. The wife died. Sieu Ung with his necromancer's methods compelled the wife of the emperor to come in the form of the god of the hearth."

In another passage of this historical work we read regarding the worship of the god of the hearth by this emperor. A necromancer said to him:

"If you sacrifice to the god of the hearth you will be able to control things. If you are able to control things, then you can make cinnabar ore change into gold. When you make gold, then you can make vessels for food and drink, and that way prolong life. If you prolong life, then you may visit the immortals in the Pung Lai Islands in the sea. If you visit them, then you will be given a title and sacrifice will be made to you and you will never die."

By the time of the T'ang dynasty the conception of the god of the hearth as the deputy of Heaven, investigating and reporting men's conduct to Heaven, was well established. But, as we shall see from the quotation from Luk Gui Mung, 713-756, it was not acknowledged by all. This writer has a high conception of God. He says:

"If a man practises the doctrine of the superior man and carefully nourishes the old and with love rears the young, suffering cold with them, and satisfying them with food in the same way as he does himself; if he mourns at the time of burial, is respectful at the sacrifices, does not disregard ceremony, restrains himself, does not neglect the power of music to harmonize his heart; does not deceive behind shut doors, nor has anything to be ashamed of in the darkest corner of the house, will the god of the hearth accuse such a man, even though he does not offer one sacrifice?"

If I practice the mean man's doctrine, and act contrary the conduct of the superior man; if father, son, elder brother, younger brother, husband and wife each cooks his food and eats by himself; if my heart is fixed on gain, if I conceal my deceit, exalt wickedness and establish sin; if during the year I offer a hundred sacrifices, will the god of the hearth treat me as a special case? Heaven is very high, the god of the hearth is very low. The God of heaven is very honorable and severe. The spirits are obscure and oblique. If the god of the hearth is able to deceive the God of heaven, then the god of the hearth is not sincere. If Heaven hears and believes his words, then Heaven is not wise. If the lower is not sincere, and the higher is not wise, how then can he be the ruler of heaven?"

By the time of the Sung dynasty, 960-1278 A. D., the practice of sending off the god of the hearth at the end of the year was well established. Huang Sing Dai (*ca.* 1127-1163 A. D.) says:

"The ancient traditions say that in the twelfth month, the twenty-fourth day, the god of the hearth has an audience with Heaven for the purpose of speaking about the affairs of the household. On a chariot of clouds and horses of wind he rides. He tarries a little while. The family has cups and plates. They prepare abundant sacrifices. A pig's head cooked thoroughly, two fish, sugared beans sweet and sticky, flour dumplings. The boys offer wine, the girls stand in the rear. They pour a libation on the floor, they burn idol paper money. The god of the hearth is happy. He does not listen when the slave girls quarrel. He does not become angry when the cat and dog run about the house and dirty it. The family see the god of the hearth off to ascend to heaven's gate after he has eaten and drunk his fill. Pray do not speak about our shortcomings, take the blessing, return and divide it among us."

The sacrifice to the god of the hearth, preceding his departure to report to heaven, takes place on the twenty-third, or on the twenty-fourth day of the twelfth month. The sacrifice on the twenty-third day is the meat sacrifice and that on the next day is the vegetable sacrifice. The families who offer the one do not offer the other. As the day closes and the twilight comes on, a table is spread in the kitchen before the stove above which is pasted the picture of the god of the hearth and his spouse. In the center of the table is an incense burner, and on each side of it a candle and a vase with flowers. Then, spread in a row are ten, or eight, or five bowls of food according to the means of the family. There are duck, chicken, pork, fish, dishes of candy of various colors and cakes. Just before, the food are ten small cups of wine. On the floor, at the foot of the table,

is an urn for the purpose of burning idol paper money and sending the god off to heaven.

The head man of the house comes, lights the candles and the incense. He takes the incense into both hands, raises it to his forehead, and places it in the incense burner. Then he kneels, and while kneeling, bows three times.—The other male members likewise kneel and bow. The women and girls of the household stand behind. When they have finished, the head of the house burns idol paper money and then takes the old god of the hearth and burns him. As the flames ascend the family repeat the words:

“Hearth god and hearth mother
Ascend to heaven and speak good words.”

Then fire-crackers are let off.

The vegetable sacrifice is very similar to the meat sacrifice, except that all the dishes are vegetable. The new god of the hearth is pasted on the morning of the twenty-third day in some places and in some places on the fourth day of the New Year. After the sacrifice, some families throw beans over the roof. This is done by people who have come from Kiangsi, where these objects are meant for the steeds of the god of the hearth.

In some parts of China, the place above the door of the stove is smeared with dregs of wine, or sugared dumplings are stuck about it. These and many other interesting customs are intended to influence the god of the hearth to speak well of the family before heaven.

The god of the hearth occupies a very important position in the social and religious life of the Chinese. Ko Hung, in the early part of the fourth century, said:

“The spirit of high heaven presiding over life investigates the evil and sin of men. From those who commit great sins the tutelary spirit of life takes away one year. From those who commit small sins he takes away one hundred days. According to the lightness or seriousness of the sins, he takes away little or much.”

This was probably early applied to the god of the hearth.

What are the sins which the god of the hearth investigates? The best authority is the sutra of the god of the hearth which bears no date, but which is very popular in Foochow. It is repeated by a Buddhist monk, or some one in the family who is able to read when any one is sick in the family. Sometimes

it is repeated a hundred times. This sutra has this to say about heaven:

"The method of the Tao is passive. The decrees of Heaven cannot be fathomed. No matter what you may do, you cannot escape the justice of Heaven. Not one jot or tittle of merit, or transgression can escape his searching eye. Reward follows good and punishment follows evil as doth the shadow the object. The great high one (Laoze) said: 'Calamity and blessing have no doors, to keep them in or out, but men themselves call them upon themselves.'"

Here is a list of the sins over which the god of the hearth has jurisdiction:

"To act without righteousness; to act contrary to the doctrine; to know one's transgression, but not repent; to know the good, but not do it; to make crooked of the straight, to mix bad with good; to change things which should be hated for things which should be loved; to do away with public weal by replacing it with selfish interest; to squander other people's goods and wealth; to separate people's relatives; to injure people's grain; to destroy the marriage relation; if rich, to be proud; if you do wrong and escape punishment, to have no shame for the wrong deed; to take by violent methods, to ask by forcible means; to desire to plunder and rob; to murmur against heaven and cherish resentment against man; to blame the wind and scold the rain; to listen to the words of wife and concubine and disobey the teaching of father and mother; to put away what is reasonable and follow that which is against reason; to go back on relatives and turn toward strangers; to give unbounded rein to lusts and passions; to have a poisoned heart and a compassionate exterior; males who are not sincere and kind and women who are not gentle and compliant; the man who does not keep his household in peace; the woman who does not respect her husband; to give way to envy frequently; not to treat with proper ceremony the husband's father and mother; to treat the ancestors disrespectfully and be remiss toward them; to disobey the commands of superiors; to step across the well, or across the stove; to step upon or abuse, or treat food improperly; to step or jump over men; to light incense with fire from the stove; to cook food with dirty wood. Over such sins the god of the hearth has jurisdiction. According to their lightness or seriousness he takes away from the allotted number of years. When the allotted member of years is ended, then death will follow. After death there will be further retribution."

Here is a further elucidation which throws light upon the social life of the Chinese. It speaks regarding the god of the hearth: "At the time that he received jurisdiction in the household, he assisted and spread abroad the great reformation." Again he informed the people as follows:

"The world is growing weak, and the Tao is diminishing, men have no virtue. They are not loyal to their ruler and prince, not filial to father

and mother, not respectful to teachers and elders, not true friends, elder brothers do not treat younger brothers as they should. Husband and wife are not true to each other. Friends do not treat friends righteously. Men do not fear Heaven and Earth, do not fear the spirits and ancestors, do not respect the three lights (sun, moon, and stars). They despise the five grains. They throw away paper with written characters. They buy with big measure and sell with short weight. They kill life and injure the living. They covet possessions for their own private profit. They are heterodox, licentious, rebellious. All sorts of sins when committed, the recorder puts down with his pen, the messenger transmits the document to those who judge in the lower regions. They confuse man's body and spirit causing him to topple over and fall. Other men will despise and hate him. Whatever he plans will not be agreeable. Every movement and action will come to nought. Daily the facts will be ascertained. Every ten days they will be collated. They will accumulate till the end of the month. Together they will be reported to Heaven. There will be no delay. I, at the proper time, will go above to the court of Heaven. There I will present the statement on the sin register. The order is received to execute the judgment. The three boards divide the duties. The ten thousand Shen obey their commands causing bad diseases to spring forth. It is difficult to escape the light or heavy punishments. Heaven's law is majestic and stern. Greatly should it be feared."

More might be quoted from the same source, but we have enough to know what sins are noted and punished and also how they are punished. We must not think that his work is merely noting sins. He has a much more positive influence. This part of the sutra repeated three times kneeling:

"The supervisor of the kitchen. He notes among men merits and transgressions. At the proper time he ascends and memorializes Heaven. He embodies high Heaven's natural creation. He assists and protects the people below. He drives away the evil spectres and spirits. He sweeps away from the house disease and pestilence. The whole family is joyful and blessed. The whole household becomes famous and numerous. Morning and evening we receive his protecting and sheltering love. On the gengsing day we should put away various sins. Thou most compassionate and happy countenance; most glorious and powerful spirit; the master of the hearth, the ruler of life; nine ages, highly exalted hearth department ruler."

This little sutra or classic of the god of the hearth is recited before the god of the hearth when one of the parents, or some member of the household is sick. A table is spread before the stove with an incense burner and candles and food. The classic is repeated by some one in the house who knows how to read. It may be repeated a hundred times.

When a member of the household is about to start on a journey he burns incense before the god of the hearth.

The young bride worships the kitchen god. She comes to the house of her husband in the morning. In the morning she worships Heaven and Earth. In the afternoon she first worships the ancestors and then the kitchen god. A table with an incense burner and candles is before the god of the hearth. The furnace for burning idol paper is at the foot of the table. The husband takes one large stick of incense or three small ones and lights them and places them into the burner. Then they kneel and bow before the god of the hearth. While worshipping heaven and earth she has her head covered, while worshipping the god of the kitchen, her head is uncovered.

The women never scold inside the kitchen, because they fear the kitchen god. Not even the children are scolded in the kitchen.

When the family moves in Foochow suburbs, after all the household goods have been moved away, the kitchen god is moved to the new abode. A relative lights a bamboo torch and precedes or follows the moving family. Usually the torch is kindled halfway from the new house. Firecrackers are let off five or ten houses before the new abode. The torch is placed in the new hearth.

The birthday of the god of the hearth is on the third day of the eighth moon. At this time a sacrifice resembling somewhat that already described takes place.

We have followed the development of the god of the hearth and noted that he was worshipped as a god of fire and how, later, with the growth of the empire and the growing consciousness of Heaven's interest in men, he became the recorder of the deeds of the family and the reporter to Heaven. Upon his report depends the length of life and punishment and reward. To-day this god occupies a position of influence inferior to no other god. The ages have rolled by, dynasties have arisen and flourished and decayed, but he has remained unchallenged in his realm.

LITERATURE: BOOKS, ETC.

Die Kultur der Kulturlosen. Ein Blick in die Anfänge menschlicher Geistesbetätigung. Von DR. KARL WEULE. Mit 3 Tafeln und zahlreichen Abbildungen nach Originalaufnahmen und Originalzeichnungen von K. Reinke. Stuttgart: Kosmos (Franckh'sche Verlags-handlung), 1910. 100 p.

The author of this admirable little book is Director of the Ethnological Museum in Leipzig and Professor of Ethnology in the University. It covers ground not so simply and adequately treated in English since Professor F. Starr's *Some First Steps in Human Progress* (N. Y., 1895). Stock is taken, so to speak, of the "culture-equipment" of the "culture-less," i. e., of the lowest races of man and their ancestors. The common possessions of all mankind are enumerated and briefly discussed. The eight short sections deal with the following topics: People and ethnology, ethnographic parallels, new teachings of anthropology, the culture-elements of mankind, inventory of all-human possessions, the first acquisitions of man, fire, conclusions. The upright position and a "human hand" are primitive birthrights of the race, without which one cannot conceive man as such to exist. The use of articulate language is the first great human character reaching out far beyond the merely physical. Another primal acquisition of man is the use of weapons and tools (really one, and born of the same primitive technique). At the beginning lies, too, the use of fire, if not, indeed, its production, which may, after all, be a common human art. Some of the processes of manufacture of various objects of a more or less ingenious nature, such, e. g., as the boomerang of the Australian blacks, go very far back into "prehistoric times." The use of ornament, the employment of shelter (temporary, at least), working in wood and stone, the use of skins, certain modes of preparing food, etc., are very old in all parts of the globe. On this point one might also consult the interesting article of Eduard Hahn, "Wirtschaftliches zur Prähistorie," in the *Zeitschrift für Ethnologie* (vol. 43, 1911, pp. 821-840), where abundant evidence is produced to counteract the opinion rather prevalent in some quarters as to "the meager endowment" of primitive man and the emergence, within a period of some 7,000 to 10,000 years, of civilized man from a very marked rudeness or crudeness involving, for his early ancestors, a most insignificant culture-equipment. To the culture-elements of primitive humanity, the present reviewer thinks, should be added also the beginnings of religion. Altogether, man, when he became man, was more human than many anthropologists and ethnologists, not to say biologists, are yet quite willing to concede.

A. F. C.

V. GIUFFRIDA-RUGGERI. L'Uomo come specie collettiva. Discorso pronunciato nella Solenne inaugurazione dell' Anno Accademico nella R. Università di Napoli, il 4 Novembre 1911. Napoli: Tipografia della R. Università, 1912. 44 p.

In this Inaugural Address, résuméing a forthcoming book, Professor Giuffrida-Ruggeri, an able and prolific member of the younger school of

Italian anthropologists, and now Professor of Anthropology in the University of Naples, discusses the character of the human race and its varieties, according to the "neomonogenetic" theory, of which he is the foremost protagonist. For him, there is but one "collective" or "systematic" species of man, *Homo sapiens*, the varieties of which are all eugenetic among themselves. *Homo sapiens* he divides into some eight "elementary species," and these, again, into "varieties" and "subvarieties." The eight "elementary species" of the "collective species," *Homo sapiens*, recognized are: *Homo australis*, *Homo pygmaeus*, *Homo indo-africanus*, *Homo niger*, *Homo americanus*, *Homo oceanicus*, *Homo asiaticus*, *Homo indo-europaeus*. Under such a classification, the Andaman Islanders appear as *Homo species pygmaeus asiaticus var., andamanicus subv.*; and the Neandertal man as *Homo species australis australianus var., neanderthalicus subv.* All, or almost all of these "elementary species" have a "double direction," both as to physiognomy and as to head-form. Thus, the *Homo australis* presents in the Veddas a Caucasoid direction, and in the Melanesians and Tasmanians a Negroid direction; *Homo pygmaeus* presents a double cranial direction, brachy and dolicho; *Homo americanus* presents a double direction, Caucasoid and Mongoloid, and also double cranial directions, etc. All these "double directions" (on them depends the absence of homogeneity), according to the author (p. 28): "Serve to indicate that we have to deal here with characters, which, in the larger subdivisions of the elementary species themselves, must be given great weight, while for the largest groupings (elementary species or subspecies), it is rather an *ensemble* of tegumentary-skeletal characters and also considerations of spacial distribution that are to be regarded." Professor Giuffrida-Ruggeri rejects as "paradoxical and absurd" the polygenetic views of Klaatsch, who maintains that the differences between the various human races are "anterior to the *Homination* (humanization) of man," holding that "since these differences all lie within the orbit of what is human, they cannot be anterior to the races themselves" (p. 36). Important for the explanation of certain problems is the "geographic variation, which tends toward fragmentation of the species,"—man's early spread over the globe was favored greatly by his prolificness (he is a creature fertile all the year round) and by his omnivorousness. Geographic *isolation*, however, has often led to the formation of local varieties, which, again, have later obtained a somewhat larger extension. As a disturber of "geographic variation," the author emphasizes the "violent elimination" of his fellows,—something notably characteristic of man alone. This has buried from observation, doubtless, many lacunae and "missing links" in the way of human variations. It explains also the aspect of "ethnic stratification" revealed by investigations, e. g., in France,—on the other hand, in certain regions, where the first occupants have been able to maintain themselves, this stratification is absent. The "man of Neandertal," able to survive against nature's adverse phenomena, fell before another variety of the human species (something repeated throughout the long course of man's existence), and was probably "exterminated" by "the cannibals of Krapina." It is rather unlikely that among the varieties now existing we should find the exact representative of primordial man,—

this argument applies to those theories, also, which see in the Pigmies such a survival (it is worth noting here that "the Asiatic Pigmies 'mongolize,' just as the African Pigmies ('negritize'')). On this head the author remarks (p. 20):

"What there is in the Pigmies of the unknown primordial man cannot, therefore, be greater than what there is of him in the Australians. Both as a whole are far removed from the Urtypus and belong in the collective species of the present *Homo sapiens*, like other elementary species, and by the same right as the White, the Black, the Yellow, the American, the Oceanic. In such an estimate all the anatomical, physiological and systematical ideas are in agreement." The great continental formations of man (white, black, yellow, etc.) had once a much more restricted extension, and were not always in reciprocal contact. Indeed, as Biasutti, in his valuable memoir on *Situazione e spazio delle provincie antropologiche nel mondo antico* (Firenze, 1906) has pointed out, "the great racial nuclei of to-day are the increase *in situ* of originally small groups." The reviewer is particularly interested in Professor Giuffrida-Ruggeri's promised book, since some of the doctrines therein set are very closely akin to those which he has for a number of years past expounded in the course in Anthropology at Clark University.

A. F. C.

Library of Philosophy. Edited by J. H. Muirhead, LL.D. *Psychology of the Religious Life.* By GEORGE MALCOLM STRATTON. London: George Allen and Co., Ltd., 1911. Pp. xii, 376. Price \$2.75 net (The Macmillan Co., N. Y.).

The author, who is Professor of Psychology in the University of California, and published in 1903 a volume on *Experimental Psychology and its Bearing upon Culture*, makes in the work now under review "an attempt to describe some of the more significant features of religion and to discover the causes that give them their peculiar character." In search of material, he has "gone first to a number of the great canonical collections, to the epic and to reliable accounts of custom and observance, and only in the second place to the introspective reports of individuals,"—this is done so that "one attains his scientific view of religion mainly from its manner of expression in some vital society, and there is far less danger of laying undue stress on what is exceptional and even morbid." For "the less civilized peoples" the most important guide has been "the well-known works of Tylor and of Frazer,"—and the author adds, "wherever it has been possible to consult the sources they note, I have usually cited only the earlier authority." In the Index appear just 20 items under the heading, "Indians, American, religions of," and the American anthropologists and other authorities cited include the following: Bancroft, Boas, Catlin, Fletcher, Leland, Matthews, McGee, Morgan, Schoolcraft, Smith, Stevenson, Turner, Wilson,—not an exhaustive list to be sure, nor one, which, with the exception of the names of Boas and Fletcher draws much upon the more recent scientific studies of the religions of the American aborigines conducted by the younger school of American anthropologists. Reference is, however, occasionally made to the *Handbook of American Indians North of Mexico*, recently published

by the Bureau of American Ethnology at Washington. Use should have been made of the excellent tribal monographs published by the American Museum of Natural History, New York, the Field Museum, Chicago, the University of California, the University of Pennsylvania, etc.

After an Introduction (pp. 1-19) on "Expressions of the Sense of Conflict," comes Part I, treating of "Conflicts in Regard to Feeling and Emotion" (appreciation and contempt of self, breadth and narrowness of sympathy, the world accepted or renounced, the incentives to renunciation, the opposition of gloom and cheer, the suppression and intensifying of emotion, the wider connections of feeling); Part II, "Conflicts in Regard to Action" (ceremonial and its inner supports, coolness toward rites, some rival influences upon action, activity and reverent inaction, the inner sources of passivity); Part III, "Conflicts in Regard to Religious Thought" (some stages of religious thought, causes of the trust and jealousy of intellect, the place of belief, images of the divine, the opposition of picture and thought, the escape from imagery, many gods and One God: the motives for increase, the motives for decrease and unity, the known and the unknown God, divinity at hand and afar-off). Part IV (pp. 325-367) is devoted to the consideration of the "Central Forces of Religion" (the idealizing act, change and permanence in the ideal, standards of religion).

Professor Stratton, in an attempt to define religion, says (p. 343): "If, in the face of facts so obdurate, an attempt should still be made, one might say that religion as the appreciation of an unseen world, usually an unseen company and religion is also whatever seems clearly to be moving toward such an appreciation, or to be returning from it. Or, perhaps, it might better be described as man's whole bearing toward what seems to him the Best, or Greatest,—where best is used in a sense neither in nor out of morality, and greatest is confined to no particular region."

And, again (p. 352): "Accordingly, it would, perhaps, be truer to say that religion is the effort to maintain communion, not with the infinite, but with that which possesses supreme worth,—which is, perhaps, but a deeper kind of infinitude. Through uncertain ways man stumbles forward to meet supremacy, misled often, and blind to the true nature of its credentials. Yet, in all his wanderings, he renders homage to some portion or distant representative of what is eminent, since that uncommon and profound Perfection, which alone is greatest and best, can without deceit and without shadow of turning appear to men in various forms."

A marked feature of religion, the feeling of opposition, conflict, discord, contrast, jarring factors, incongruity of things, double tendencies, hostilities, fluctuations, variations,—with a curious feeling or half-recognition of the affinity of opposites, the closeness of evil to the good, the *laus et damnatio temporis acti*, etc.,—is what the author treats of in detail in this book, considering such characteristics to be present at some time or other in all known religions, primitive and civilized, ancient and modern, heathen and Christian. To quote his own words (p. 3): "In the religious life there is an inherent struggle. The presence of the Supremely impressive makes the self and other men and all the common goods of life objects at

once of value and contempt. Reverence calls forth both hope and fear, both rejoicing and dejection.

"And yet men naturally see this conflict, not as wholly in themselves, but at least in part as without: the parts and powers of the world appear to be in mutual strife. There is, however, in peoples and religions a differing sense of this discord. The Greek pictured the world, somewhat as he built his temple, with a certain simple grace; while the Germanic mind, like the Gothic vault with its impenetrable shadows, saw the gloom and evil close to what is fair. Every people and every person in varying degrees reveals a peculiar feeling of the tension of the world."

Religion, however, has no monopoly of this "feeling of the tenseness of the world." As we read (p. 15): "But the sense that life and the world is tense with opposition is not confined to religion. And so we must look to the appearance of such feelings elsewhere. The religious imagination that hides evil within the good, or links beauty close with ugliness, or, in contrary manner, puts them far apart, expresses in its own way the very thoughts which artists and philosophers have often presented as truths of their own perceiving." In religion men are prone to inconsistencies, just as in polities or art, "but there is this difference that the religious seem at times less anxious to avoid such inconsistencies, and appear even to take some joy in the puzzle and paradox of contradiction" (p. 16).

Again (p. 19): "There is here a grave love of paradox, a sublime spiritual humor, as if religion by its very might could set at nought all common laws. The religionist of this type,—and all religion as it develops seems to show the character,—thus sees the action of the universe as a divine comedy. The confidence which high religions usually have that the righteous order is, or is to be, triumphant is among the impressive things of human nature and of history."

Professor Stratton takes an evolutional view of the development of religion in general, as appears from his statement on page 338: "The priest, once close in office to the sorcerer and magician, ceases in time to be a mere performer of occult rites and becomes a prophet and representative of divine nobility, giving by his own character and perception and intercourse with the best from past and future a fresh impression of the nature and purpose of Godhood. Impossible as it seems, the mumbling medicine-man is the far-off precursor of St. Francis and Savonarola, of Wesley and Luther."

And likewise from another statement on page 327: "The mature and civilized man, the savage, the child, even the higher of the beasts,—all these are attentive to upheaval or devastation; but more than this, they are possessed of curiosity, since, even in minor changes, they discern with satisfaction the operating cause. This curiosity, schooled and made methodical, works not only in science, but in religion; and that the Unseen, the Ideal, should be conceived as Creator, springs largely from this passion to explain."

As to the general character of the religions of "savages (see especially pp. 96-101) the author takes a more reasonable view than some other psychologists of the day, in sounding a rather minor key for fear as the

creator of religion. As he rightly observes (p. 97): "It would not be at all surprising to find that the savage often has the resilience of the child, and even in religion is only exceptionally a prey to dread. His fears are real and compulsive while they last, but before long give way to impassivity or action."

Professor Stratton has written an interesting and a serviceable book, but on the whole it makes the impression of an exposition rather than an explanation of religion and of the religious life.

A. F. C.

Early American Philosophers. *Lectures on Moral Philosophy*. By JOHN WITHERSPOON, D.D., LL.D., President of the College of New Jersey. Edited under the Auspices of the American Philosophical Association by Varnum Lanning Collins. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1912. Pp. xxix, 144. With Portrait.

The author of these *Lectures on Moral Philosophy* was a noted example of Scottish influence upon early American religious, social, educational and political life. Precociously educated (he began to read the Bible at 4 and matriculated at Edinburgh when 13), he became President of Princeton in 1768, after declining once, associated himself with American patriotic movements, was a member of the Continental Congress and a signer of the Declaration of Independence. Besides all this he was an active churchman and played a prominent part in the organization of the Presbyterian Church. At the College of New Jersey, now Princeton University, he lectured on Moral Philosophy, which included Ethics and Politics (also Jurisprudence as a part of this); he likewise taught French and Hebrew, heard classes in Greek and Latin, Divinity, History, and Eloquence (i. e. Oratory and Criticism). His hobbies were "horticulture, the purification of the English language as spoken in America, and the encouragement of Scottish immigration." His *Lectures on Moral Philosophy* were never intended, apparently, for publication, and the text is based, therefore, upon the syllabus furnished for student use, of which several MSS., copies made by the attendants upon his courses, exist. Of special interest, considering the period in which they were composed, are the sections of these *Lectures* on civil society, polities, etc. He recognizes the advantages enjoyed by monarchy in "unity, secrecy and expedition," and those of aristocracy in "wisdom in deliberations." Of democracy he observes (p. 92): "Democracy has advantage of both others for fidelity: the multitude collectively always are true in intention to the interest of the public because it is their own. They are the public. But at the same time it has very little advantage for wisdom, or union, and none at all for secrecy and expedition. Besides the multitude are exceedingly apt to be deceived by demagogues and ambitious persons. They are very apt to trust a man who serves them well, with such power as that he is able to make them serve him."

The last sentence has its application in American politics at the present moment. Dr. Witherspoon's general conclusion is that "every good form of government must be complex." Another remark concerning democracy is this (p. 98): "Democracy tends to plainness and freedom of speech, and sometimes to a savage and indecent ferocity. Democracy is the nurse

of eloquence, because, when the multitude have the power, eloquence is the only way to govern them." On pages xxv-xxix is given a list (41 titles) of President Witherspoon's publications. It was "through his teaching Princeton became the home and fountain-head of Scottish realistic philosophy in America."

A. F. C.

Massachusetts Historical Society Collections. Seventh Series. Vol. VII. *Diary of Cotton Mather. Part I, 1681-1708.* Published at the Charge of the Peabody Fund. Boston: Published for the Society, MDCCCCXI. Pp. xxvii, 604.

Ibid. Vol. VIII. *Diary of Cotton Mather. Part II, 1709-1724.* Boston, MDCCCCXII. Pp. xiii, 360.

The Massachusetts Historical Society has done well to publish these interesting volumes. As Dr. Worthington C. Ford says, in his brief Preface, "the *Diary of Cotton Mather* is of value as the record of a man of peculiar attainments, as a bibliography of a very prolific compiler and publisher, and, most of all, as an important contribution to the history of the Congregational Church in Massachusetts." A diary is always more or less "the more intimate and immediate record of the writer's thoughts," and Cotton Mather began the process very early, having inherited the habit from his father, Increase Mather. We have here, indeed, a most curious human psychological document. Ancestral characters and tendencies and the theological training of his day combined to exaggerate in Cotton Mather the morbid introspection already marked in his father, and, "physically not strong, and with oversensitized intuitions, he became an ecstatic, dangerously near to one possessed." As the editor remarks (p. xix), "in course of time his earnestness becomes painful, his resignation and self-abasement ring false," etc. He was also a man of overweening vanity, with a perfect mania for publishing his own works. His activities were by no means confined to New or Old England, but he busied himself with the polities, religion, etc., of the West Indies, France, Spain, etc. Of his *Magnalia*, Mr. Ford says that it is "the one contribution from New England of value to history in the period from 1650-1780," and of his more extensive compilation, the *Biblia Americana*, that it "perhaps fortunately never saw publication." Moreover, "as an ardent proselytizer he sought the reformation of the world, and the instruments were to be prayers and printed books." The record of the vie intime of one of the most remarkable of all Americans is contained in these two volumes.

A. F. C.

Questions Théologiques. Ascétique et Mystique. Par l'Abbé JEAN DELA-CROIX. Paris: Librairie Bloud & Cie., 1912. 63 p.

The Abbé Delaeroix discusses briefly in this pamphlet asceticism and mysticism and their differences, resemblances, etc. He detects in the intellectual world of to-day a renewal of interest in the study of mystic phenomena, which is a matter for rejoicing, although he is careful not to advocate the indiscriminate teaching of mystical doctrines to everybody. Nor does he go so far as to maintain the presence of God in every mystic state. The mystic state "is the consequence and the perfection of the

ascetic state." Between the ascetic and the mystical states there is thus a difference in intensity; but the fundamental distinction is of another sort, viz., in the mystic state we have "the substitution of divine action for human initiative,—the operation of the Holy Ghost."

A. F. C.*

The Religious Possibilities of the Motion Picture. By HERBERT A. JUMP, Minister of the South Congregational Church, New Britain, Connecticut. Printed for Private Distribution. 32 p.

This pamphlet owes its existence to a proposed equipment of a New Britain church with a moving-picture adjunct as an aid to religious education, which met with some opposition, being regarded as a decided innovation in church methods. The Rev. Mr. Jump summarizes here what he was able to find out concerning the vogue of the motion picture and the prejudice against it, its good and bad side, the invention-aspect of the motion picture, censorship of films, cost, etc. Taking the parable of the Good Samaritan as a text he justifies the sermon-story of the motion picture of to-day.

A. F. C.

Smithsonian Institution. Bureau of American Ethnology. Bulletin 47. *A Dictionary of the Biloxi and Ofo Languages, accompanied with thirty-one Biloxi Texts and Numerous Biloxi Phrases.* By JAMES OWEN DORSEY and JOHN R. SWANTON. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1912. 340 p.

The mythological texts in this volume interest us here. The thirty-one items are concerned with the rabbit, bear, brant, otter, opossum, raccoon, wild-eat, turkey, buzzard, dog, ant, katydid, locust, crow, hawk, woodrat, frog, buffalo, duck, wolf, red-winged blackbird, fox, humming-bird, deer, goldfinch, redbird, ghosts, water-people, thunder-beings, moon, sun, etc., and their doings in and out of the world.

The tale of "The Rabbit and the Frenchman" (pp. 13-15) is a "Tar-Baby" story, which, the authors say, "is evidently of modern origin," but, one may add, not necessarily non-Indian. Another tale, "The Brant and the Otter" (pp. 23-26), although it was obtained directly from the Biloxi, "will be recognized as an Indian version of Aesop's fable of the Fox and the Crane." In their animal-tales these Indians distinguish "the Ancient of Brants" from "a brant of the present day,"—the latter is *pûdeda*, the former, *pûdédna*. And so with the other creatures, "the ancient of Opossums," "the ancient of Tiny Frogs," etc. The story of "the Ant, the Katydid, and the Locust" (p. 38) reminds one of Aesop's fable of "The Ant and the Grasshopper." The longest myth (pp. 85-107) is about Tuhe, the Thunder-Being. In Biloxi mythology the Sun is a woman and the Moon a man. The creator, in Biloxi belief is Kuti mañdkeě, i. e., "The One Above." The tale of "How Kuti mañdkeě made People" deserves reproduction here:

"Kuti mañdkeě, The One Above, made people: He made one person an Indian, while the Indian was sleeping Kuti mañdkeě made a woman, whom he placed with the Indian, and the latter slept till day. Kuti mañdkeě departed for the purpose of making food for the Indian and the woman. After his departure, something was standing erect [it was a

tree], and there was another person, who said to the Indian and the woman, 'Why have you not eaten the fruit of this tree? I think that he has made it for you two to eat.' And then the woman stewed the fruit of the tree, and she and the Indian ate it. As they were sitting down, after eating the fruit, Kuti mañlkeē returned. He had departed for the purpose of obtaining food for the Indian and the woman, and he returned after they had eaten the fruit of the tree and had seated themselves. 'Work for yourself, and find food, because you shall be hungry,' said Kuti mañlkeē, in anger, as he was about to depart. When he had gone a long time he sent back a letter to them; but the Indian did not receive it,—the American took it, and, because he took it, Americans know very well how to read and write. And then [after the receipt of the letter] the people found a very clear stream of water. The American was the first one to lie in it; next came the Frenchman. They were followed by the Indian. Therefore Indians are not usually of light complexion. The Spaniard was the next to lie in the water, and he was not white because the water had by this time become very muddy. Subsequently the Negro was made, and, as Kuti mañlkeē thought that he should continue to attend to work alone, he made the Negro's nose flat, and, as the water had become very muddy, the Negro washed only the palms of his hands, therefore Negroes are very black, with the exception of the palms of their hands."

This "Biloxi story of the Garden of Eden" neither makes the woman altogether responsible for the "Fall," as happens in Semitic legend, nor report the deed done, as happens in a story obtained from the Canadian Mohawks by the present reviewer in 1888 (see *J. Amer. Folk-Lore*, 1889, vol. II, p. 288), where the disobedience is attributed to the man as a matter of valor or bravery. The Biloxi story is more generically human than the account given in our Bible, for both man and woman were spoken to by the "other person," and seem equally to blame. The cooking of the fruit by the woman is another touch that adds to the humanity of the occasion as seen by the Biloxi. The latter part of the story, explaining the origin of the various races, appears as a much longer myth among other peoples of the Southeastern region, e. g., the Seminoles, one version of it being incorporated in the speech of a chief as given in McKenney and Hall.

The Dictionary (pp. 169-340) contained many etymologies of psychological interest.

A. F. C.

Songs of Jamaica. By CLAUDE MCKAY, with an Introduction by WALTER JEKYLL, author of "Jamaican Song and Story." Kingston, Jamaica: A. W. Gardner & Co., 1912. 140 p.

The author of this little book, now a member of the Constabulary is "a young Jamaican peasant of pure black blood," who began serious life as a wheelwright, and it is, naturally enough, dedicated to Governor Olivier, "who by his sympathy with the black race has won the love and admiration of all Jamaicans." The brief preface by Mr. Jekyll treats of the peculiarities of Negro English as spoken in the island. The fifty songs treat of a rather wide range of subjects, such as "Quashie to Bucera," "King Banana," "School-teacher Nell's Lub-Letter," "Cudjoe Fresh

from de Lecture," "Old England," "Dat Dirty Rum," "De Dog Rose," "Beneath the Yampy Shade," "Mother Dear," "Strokes of the Tamarind Switch," "My Mountain-Home," "Jubba," "Fetchin' Water," "De Days Dat are Gone," "Lub o' Mine," etc. An appendix (pp. 135-140) gives five tunes to which certain of these songs are sung. Footnotes explain difficult words and expressions. In these songs God appears also as "Lard," and "Massa,"—likewise "Gahd" (p. 53). To the Jamaican Negroes Queen Victoria was "our Missis Queen." Some of the exaggerations of the Negro singer are very interesting:

"An' ratta now deh train himse'f
Upon de cornstalk dem a' night
Fe when it fit to get him bite" (p. 36).

[And (every) rat now practices climbing the cornstalks at night, so that he may get his bite when the corn is ripe.]

"You see petater tear up groun', you run" (p. 14).

[When you see the potatoes tearing up the ground in their rapid growth, you will run to save yourself from being caught and entangled in the vines.]

This last reminds one of the humorous exaggeration of the growth of squash vines in Kansas.

On page 42 the Jamaican proverb, "Rock-'tone (stone) a river bottom no feel sun hot," appears in the following form:

"Nuff rock'tone in de sea, yet none
But those 'pon lan' know 'bouten sun."

This stanza (p. 52) is of psychological interest:

"Why do I sleep? My eyes know why,
Same how a life knows why it die:
Dey sleep on in distress,
Knowin' not why dey res',
But feelin' why dey ery."

In connection with the poem, "Jubba," we are told (p. 130) that "an auction of loaves of fine bread, profusely decorated by the baker's art, is a feature of rustic dances."

Words of African origin are very rare in these songs and in kindred literature of the Jamaican Negroes. One such appears to be *unno* or *onnoo*, defined (p. 76) as "an African word, meaning 'you' collectively." It is used as follows:

"You t'ink Judge don't know unno well?" This book should find a place in all collections of Negro literature and folk-lore.

A. F. C.

Drachen und Drachenkämpfer. Von GEZA ROHEIM. Erweiterter Separat-Abdruck aus "Jung-Ungarn," Jahrgang 1911. Berlin, 1912. 56 p.

This monograph on *Dragons and Dragon-fighters* is provided with bibliographical references in the form of foot-notes, and the discussion carries one all over the globe. By "dragon," the author means "not merely the mythical creature known to Europe and Eastern Asia as

'dragon,' but all those mythic figures which appear in all parts of the earth as enemies of the hero; figures, which, in the main, are to be referred to three varieties of animals (or combinations of these) viz., large species of fish, reptiles like the crocodile and the alligator, and, especially, serpents." All these creatures (the serpents in part) live in the water, and are therefore "water-demons." Their victims are the drowned and it is their anger that bring on the deluge, etc.—these ideas are widespread and quite in consonance with the cosmogonic philosophy of primitive man.

After briefly discussing various theories of interpretation of the dragon-myth: Winisch's season-struggle (the dragon is the winter-demon, the hero the god of spring), Krause's Aryan theory (the killing of the dragon is a remembrance of the victory of the Aryans over the aborigines, with which was associated the triumph of the cult of light and the patriarchal social system), Hartland's view of "survival" of a cult connected with human sacrifice (the more merciful and newer god, conquers the old deity, appearing now in the form of a monster), the Tylor-Frobenius nature-phenomena theory (the dragon-conquering hero is the sun), Siecke's lunar-solar explanation (four principal types of dragon-myths: 1) the hero is the light, the dragon the dark, part of the moon,—this is the oldest type; 2) the hero is the sun, the dragon the moon; 3) the hero is the sun, the exposed maiden the light moon, the dragon the demon who devours the moon; 4) the hero is the sun, the dragon the demon causing eclipses of the sun)—the author states that his extensive examination of mythological material (primitive peoples and European folk) has led him to recognize different types of dragon-myths, animalistic, atmospherical, astral, etc.

Besides river-dragons (the river itself is often conceived of as serpent, etc., as river names show), there are mountain-dragons (the monster of the mountain spring or stream sometimes becomes a mountain-demon, the personified mountain itself; and in the serpent as demon of the volcano we get light on the fire-breathing dragon), forest and tree-living dragons, etc. One fertile source of dragon-myths in primitive times is "the contest between bird and snake," the *motif* of so many tales and legends. First we have the myth in the form of the story of the snake-killing bird (a number of birds of prey are enemies of the serpent). Then, aided, perhaps by totemism, etc., out of the figure of the dragon-killing bird arises that of the human hero who conquers the dragon. The treasure-protecting dragon may, as Lippert has suggested, be due to belief that the dead himself, in dragon-form, guarded what was put into the grave with him; similarly might be explained the dragon-warders of the other world, etc.,—with this dragon the soul of the dead or his guiding divinity must battle, before entrance can be had.

Dragon-myths may also have arisen from the competitive contests of shamans. Myths of the winged dragon arose when the ideas of the soul-serpent and the soul-bird came together. The presence in the myth of the

sacrificial often shows that dragon-tales are "survivals" from earlier times when human sacrifice was in vogue, as Hartland has shown. The existence of dragons as water-monsters on earth makes easy their existence in the celestial waters, in rain, clouds, rainbow, etc. The natural enemy of the dragon (as the demon that keeps back the rain) is the storm-god, whose voice is the thunder and whose weapon is the lightning. When the dragon, as sometimes happens, is the storm itself, the conquering hero is the deno invictus sol. When the dragon-fight takes place in the sky human beings are not always merely passive spectators, but often shoot arrows into the air, perform "magical" rites, etc., to aid the victory of the sun, or other hero contesting with the dragon, etc.

Some dragon-myths are to be explained in relation to the changing aspects or phases of the moon. From full moon to new moon the dark part devours the light; from new to full moon it is the other way. The various things seen in the dark part of the moon and also in the light have their place here also. The multi-phased moon is also responsible sometimes for the idea of the many-headed dragon. The repute of the moon as water-bringer stands in relation with the attribution to the dragon of guardianship of the water of life, etc.

The sun, when regarded as the swallower-up of the stars every morning comes to be looked upon as a dragon, and in such case, we sometimes find the dragon-killer to be the new moon rising close to the setting sun. Certain astral myths can be explained simply as tranferences to the stars of lunar motifs, etc. The morning-star appears sometimes as dragon-killing hero. In the myths of the dragon and the dragon-killing hero the original types occur mostly in combination. No matter whether it be in Hellas or on the Congo, in Japan or among the Algonkian Indians, "heterogeneous elements mingle in a homogeneous whole." We have thus the phenomenon of "mythic convergence," e. g., between the Papuas of New Guinea and the Brazilian Indians. In the author's own words (p. 56):

"In the field of mythology, folk-lore and comparative religion we shall rarely find such phenomena as can be completely explained from a single point of view, but all the more frequently such myths as have arisen as the description of diverse (chiefly nature-) phenomena, but which under the co-operation of social and cultural environment, have partly fused, but also partly adapted themselves to one another, i. e., have become convergent." On "convergence," besides the section in Gräbner's *Methode der Ethnologie* (Heidelberg, 1911), one should read Dr. R. H. Lowie's brief article on "Convergent Evolution in Ethnology" in *The American Museum Journal*, 1912, XII, 139-140. *Dragons and Dragon-fighters*, even though one cannot approve all of its theses, is a very interesting and suggestive monograph.

A. F. C.

Les reliques et les images légendaires. Par P. SAINTYVES. *Le miracle de Saint Janvier et son explication scientifique. Les reliques du Buddha. Les images qui ouvrent et ferment les yeux. Les reliques corporelles du Christ. Talismans et reliques tombés du ciel.* Paris: Mercure de France, 1912. Pp. 334.

La Simulation du Merveilleux. Par P. SAINTYVES avec une Préface du Dr. PIERRE JANET, Professeur au Collège de France. I. *Les Maladies Simulées: Les Sujets de la Cour des Miracles, Mendians et Mythomanes.* II. *La Simulation du Surnaturel chez les Spirites, les Possédés, les Extatiques.* III. *La Simulation des Guérisons Miraculeuses: Le cas de Pierre de Rudder.* Paris: E. Flammarion, 1912. Pp. xiii, 387.

The author of these two volumes is already well-known for his writings on topics coming within the anthropological field, such as *Les Vierges mères et les Naissances miraculeuses (Essais de Mythologie comparée)*, and *Les Saints successeurs de Dieux (Essais de Mythologie chrétienne)*, and as the translator of Baldwin's *Mental Development in the Child and the Race*. Both books are supplied with abundant bibliographical references, in foot-notes, and cover a wide range of learning.

Of *Legendary Relics and Images* pages 5-55 are occupied by a discussion of the miracle of St. Januarius at Naples and its scientific explanation, which begins with the observation: "The ancients did not know the miracle of the liquefaction of the blood; it is a prodigy particularly Catholic." Naples had no monopoly of the liquefaction of sacred blood, for, in various parts of Europe, at various times, similar wonders have been reported of the blood of Christ, St. Patrick, St. Wit, the martyred (9th cent.) monks of Saint-Amand in Flanders, St. James of Compostella, St. Lawrence, St. Pantaleon, St. Philomena, St. Thomas Aquinas, St. Alfonso of Liguori, St. John the Baptist, St. Stephen, etc. On the basis of experimental reproduction of the "miracle," analysis of the "manna of St. Nicholas," etc., the author concludes (p. 35) that "the miraculous mixture of Naples is very likely a composition of manna and balsam colored with blood," and that the process is the same as that used by the priests of Egnatia, near Bari, of whom Horace, in one of his satires states, that they tried to make him believe the incense of the temple liquefied without the aid of fire. The phenomenon of the liquefaction itself seems explicable by reference to the temperature of the season of its production and to mechanical actions affecting the composition of the "blood," which find their explanation in the laws of physics. But an actual scientific examination of the reliquary and its contents would be needed to settle the matter for good and all. Some of the other "liquefactions," like many reliques of a different sort, have been such palpable frauds as to be of interest only to the historian of human deception.

The sacred reliques of Buddha include articles of clothing, his plate and water-pot, his broom, etc., scattered in various places from Kandahar to Konghanapura; the impressions of his feet in Ceylon, Burma and Siam, the most famous being on Adam's Peak (Ceylon); the urn with his ashes at Nyagrodha; his eye-teeth, the one venerated at the temple in Kandy, Ceylon, is most celebrated; the Bodhi, or tree (*Ficus religiosa*), under which he attained supreme knowledge,—the original tree, destroyed in the 18th century, has been "renewed" several times since. M. Saintyves is of opinion that the Buddhistic practices in question are "only Vishnuite survivals, and the reliques of Buddha the reliques of a more remote past."

We see here "the deep ties that unite the living religions with the dead ones."

Among the miracles which, doubtless, contributed to prepare a favorable atmosphere for the proclamation of the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception by Pius IX, in 1854, M. Saintyves cites the "epidemic" of miraculous Madonnas (who moved their eyes, changed countenance, etc.), which took place in many Italian cities in 1850, beginning at the church of Santa Clara at Rimini. Of these prodigies, the author thinks that they were in general, not frauds, but examples of "collective suggestion," etc. The corporeal reliques of Christ, discussed on pages 107-184, consist of a tooth (lost at the age of 9), which the monks of Saint-Médard de Soissons (so denounced by the Abbé Guibert) once claimed to be in possession of; tears (the famous *Sainte Larme* of Vendôme, subject of a dissertation by the curé of Vibraie in 1699; the tear of Vendôme and some others were reputed to be tears shed by Christ over Lazarus; others were tears shed while washing the feet of his disciples, and on other occasions); umbilicus (revered at Clermont in the beginning of the 13th century; another was preserved at Rome, and a third at Châlons-sur-Marne, given to Charlemagne by an angel, and presented by him to Pope Leo III.); blood (the reliques at Mantua, Rome and Weingarten, brought by St. Longinus from the Holy Land; those of La Rochelle, Bec-Helluin, Fécamp, Sarzanne, and Halle, due to Nicodemus; those in England attributed to Joseph of Arimathea; those of Saint-Maximin and Neufvy-Saint-Sépulchre, attributed to Mary Magdalene; those of Reichenau, Billom and Bruges, of which one at least was attributed to the Virgin Mary as preserver; those of various churches in Constantinople); beard, hair, nails (part of the beard at the church of St. Cecilia at Rome, also at the Escorial and the Abbey of Notre-Dame d'Argensole, in Champagne,—the famous crucifix of Lueques, the church at Chartres, that of Saint-Alban de Namur, etc., claimed to possess some of the hair; so also the Cathedral of Clermont, which had likewise part of his beard, and several finger-nails, besides many other reliques; foreskin (possession of the foreskin of Christ, removed at his circumcision, was claimed by a number of churches and shrines, the most celebrated being the Abbey of Coulombs, near Nogent-le-Roi, St. John Lateran at Rome, the Abbey of Charroux, the last said to have been given by the Empress Irene to Charlemagne as a betrothal-present). The public cult of the foreskin, which obtained in certain places, is a curious evidence of the strange mentality of part of the Middle Ages, at least.

The longest section (pp. 185-332) of the book is devoted to a consideration of "talismans and reliques fallen from the skies,"—thunder-bolts, aeroliths, *gemmae cerauniae*, fossils, "jeux de la nature," prehistoric stone implements, etc., idols fallen from the sky, liturgical reliques, and those of "apologetic" origin, imitations, forgeries, etc. The literature of "thunder-stones," in their mythological and folk-religious aspect, has now attained considerable dimensions, even in English (cf. Ch. Blinkenberg's *The Thunderweapon in Religion and Folklore*, Cambridge, 1911,—a work too late to be referred to by M. Saintyves). The belief that prehistoric axes, knives, arrow-heads, etc., are "thunder-stones" is widespread as such names for them are reported, not only from all parts of

civilized Europe, but also from China, Japan, Farther India, Java, Celebes, Malacea, Assam, Madagascar, the Congo, West Africa, etc., and there are many legends (the Maori, e. g., is cited on pages 225-228), telling of their celestial origin. Of idols fallen from the sky may be mentioned the *palladia* of Troy and Athens; and during the early Middle Ages many churches and shrines boasted images of the Virgin, etc., which had either fallen from heaven, or been brought down thence, by angels, or in some other wonderful way. According to M. Saintyves both the ancient *palladia* and the Christian "Our-Ladies," of the so-called *acheirotype* sort, go back for the legends of their celestial origins to the older folk-lore of "thunder-stones." Among liturgical reliques, to which celestial provenance has been attributed are magic weapons (staffs, swords and spears, ceremonial and votive shields, etc.) ritual objects used in public worship (crosses and oriflammes, processional palms, magic girdles and ligatures of various kinds, bells, sacred vessels, altars, tapers, reliques of Christ and of the saints, etc., monastic and liturgic clothing, ornaments, etc., rings, *palliums* and miters, stoles and chasubles, rosaries, crosses and medals, etc.). The list of objects in the class of "apologetic" reliques is quite long and includes letters from Jesus and from the Virgin (the first ones sent forth have had many imitators since the 6th century), etc., besides the flowers and other things the sudden appearance of which in mid-air proved the sanctity of holy men and women when it was doubted by their fellows or by the heathen. Where belief ended and satire began in some of the accounts on record is hard to tell. The author, citing H. Estienne, a great recorder of these burlesque reliques, says (p. 307):

"Brother Oignon, returned from the Holy Land, exhibited a feather of the wing of the Angel Gabriel. . . . Besides this, he pretended that the Patriarch of Jerusalem had shown him 'a piece of the finger of the Holy Spirit as well and as whole as it had ever been, and the nose of the seraph that appeared to St. Francis, and one of the nails of the cherub, and some rays of the star that appeared to the three Kings of the East, and a phial of the sweat of St. Michael when he fought with the Devil.'"

A perusal of this study of reliques should surely make one feel sympathetic with what may be the saner related practices and ideas of uncontaminated primitive peoples.

As motto for the first part of his *Feigning of the Marvellous*, M. Saintyves consistently takes the hasty words of David, "All men are liars," for had the great Hebrew King had at his disposal half the evidence here displayed he would have felt abundantly justified in his general aspersion of mankind. Large chapters in the feigning of disease, etc., are concerned with the deeds of beggars and the exploitation of pity and charity by the poor, etc.; other equally curious chapters with the history of what the author calls *mythomania* (here the simulation does not include serious lesions,—"they lie and invent, as a fish swims") and *pathomimia* (here the mythopathic simulations of diseases, etc., amount sometimes to a veritable "folie opératoire"). The second section (pp. 91-252) treats of the simulation of diseases, etc., reputed to be supernatural, and under this head the author includes the tricks of mediums and spiritists, the *mythomania* of occultism, "electric girls" (pp. 118-131), haunted houses, false

demoniacs and diabolical mythomania, "‘entraineurs,’" false extatics, false fasters, false prophets, "‘things brought from heaven’" (pp. 210-221), false stigmata, false pregnancies, subconscious frauds in diseases of personality. Part III (pp. 253-369) is devoted to the consideration of the feigning of miraculous cures, with special reference to the miracles at Lourdes and the particular case of P. de Rudder, of Jabbeke, the subject of an alleged cure of "‘a complete and complicated fracture of the left leg,’" said to have taken place in 1875, as the result of a pilgrimage to the sanctuary of Notre-Dame de Lourdes, at Oostzacker-lez-Gand. The volume closes with a brief discussion (pp. 371-382) of the rôle of fraud and deceit in the formation of beliefs, and a bibliography (pp. 383-384) of 17 titles relating to the cures at Lourdes. A large part of the alleged cures of diseases, etc., can be set down at once as merely "‘cures’" of feigned ailments or pretended "‘cures’" of troubles already cured before the appeal to Lourdes, etc. The "‘cure’" of P. de Rudder, e. g., the author considers "‘an incomparable case of feigned cure in a patient already cured.’"

According to M. Saintyves, miraculous cures, like miraculous states, possessions and extasies, "‘are universal phenomena, found with ‘speaking with tongues,’ at the origins of almost all religions;’" and "‘in all religious movements which admit of epidemic spiritual maladies, there is always a prodigious development of morbid impulsivity, and, consequently, of fraud and deceit.’" Moreover (p. 382):

"The rôle of insincerity in the evolution of beliefs is not a negligible one. The psychologists who think to the contrary do not seem to have given attention to the share of the supernatural and the marvellous in the genesis, the growth and the triumph of religions. For, whoever says supernatural and marvellous says therewith a large percentage of fraud and trickery. In many cases, we must give up explaining miracles by unknown forces and declare them overlooked deceits."

A. F. C.

PERIODICAL LITERATURE.

BY ALEXANDER F. CHAMBERLAIN.

71. *Babylon and Greek Astronomy.* In an article on "Babylon und die griechische Astronomie," published in the *Neue Jahrbücher für das Klassische Altertum* (vol. 27-28, 1911, pp. 1-10), F. Cumont discusses the probable borrowings of the Greeks from the Babylonians in this field. The author thinks that, at first, the tendency was to exaggerate this debt on the part of Hellenic culture. Among the things thought to have been actually borrowed are: Duodecimal and sexagesimal systems of measurement, the *gnomon*, the knowledge of the most important facts of uranography, the ecliptic, the signs of the zodiac and the planetary series. Calendaric and lunar ideas seem even to have been borrowed after the Persian wars.
72. *Catholic survivals among Protestants.* The article of R. Andree on "Katholische Ueberlebsel beim evangelischen Volke," in the *Zeitschrift d. Vereins f. Volkskunde* (vol. 21, 1911, pp. 113-123) contains some interesting information concerning the remains of Catholic beliefs, ideas, customs, etc., among the Protestant people of Germany. Of the worship of relics feeble traces only are found, but even in children's games and songs suggestions of the adoration of the saints occur. Other items are retention of fasts and of Catholic holy and feast days; the use of the sign of the cross among the Masures; thank-offerings of sailors on the Schleswig Halligs; votive offerings of various kinds (sometimes, as among the Masures, for the release of "the poor souls"); belief in the efficacy of water from holy wells; pilgrimages to holy wells, shrines, and other holy places, ruined chapels, etc.; use of "holy water," as, e. g., in Oldenburg. Interesting also are the attribution of secret powers to Catholic priests and the application to them by Protestants in times of distress and dire need. This whole subject of the relations of the two religions among the German folk is of great psychological significance.
73. *Children's prayers.* The article of O. Schulte, "Das Kindergebet im Grossherzogtum Hessen," in the *Hessische Blätter für Volkskunde* (vol. 10, 1911, pp. 1-16), gives the results of a questionnaire on children's prayers issued by the Hessian Folk-Lore Society in 1907, for both Catholics and Protestants. The author gives numerous examples,—form, rhymes, figures, etc., testify abundantly to the adult origin of children's prayers (the chief types are the "thou" prayer, and the recitation formula; belief in angels is prominent; jest has even crept into some children's prayers). Catholics and Protestants have their own peculiar children's prayers, although many prayers are common to both faiths. The author notes that Luise Hensel's

hymn, "Müde bin ich, geh' zur Ruh'" has become a Catholic prayer, and is even sung now by Jews,—in fact this Protestant poem has conquered all Hesse. Children's prayers, like folk-songs, show tendencies to disappear in many parts of the Grand Duchy.

74. *Comet folk-lore.* In a brief article in the *Zeitschrift d. Vereins f. Volkskunde* (vol. 21, 1911, pp. 292-293), A. v. Löwis v. Menar describes "Ein russischer Schutzbefehl der wider Kometen Halley." The German text is given of a Russian "protective letter" against the Halley comet,—letters of this sort (the one in question was originally published in the *Golos Samary*) were sold in the Samara region, just before the appearance of the Halley comet, by a man in monkish garb.
- 75-76. "*Couvade.*" In his monograph, "Das sogenannte 'Männerkinderbett,'" in the *Zeitschrift für Ethnologie* (vol. 43, 1911, pp. 346-563), H. Kunike discusses the literature (Bibliography pp. 560-563) of the *couvade* in Europe, Asia, Indonesia and Polynesia, Africa and America. Besides what may be termed "the classic land of the *couvade*" (in northern South America), there exist two other important *couvade-areas*, viz., in southeastern Asia, and southwestern Europe (the Basques). The author rightly warns against unjustifiable generalization regarding this curious custom. He distinguishes two types of the *couvade*. One of these may be an *imitatio naturae*, a *couvade* proper; while the other, found in South America, may sometimes be explained as "a temporary union with the father" for the child, or something of the sort. This, the author thinks may have been connected with the transition from matriarchy to patriarchy. The first type may have grown up out of the other. In a brief article, "La *couvade* en Espagne," in *L'Anthropologie* (vol. 22, 1911, pp. 246-247), Professor R. Verneau discusses the paper on the *couvade* in Spain, published in *Anthropos* for 1910 by Dr. Aranzadi. Professor Verneau is of opinion that an investigation is necessary to determine where the idea of the *couvade* is not altogether a myth,—Dr. Fuset claims this for Ibiza, one of the Balearic Is.
77. *Cult of the "Thracian Horsemen."* In the *Zeitschrift f. Religionswissenschaft* (vol. 15, 1912, pp. 153-161, 8 fgs.), G. Kazarow, of Sofia, has an article on "Die Kultdenkmäler der sog. thrakischen Reiter in Bulgarien," based chiefly upon Dobrusky's account (in Bulgarian) in the archeological publications of the National Museum in Sofia. To the 6 hitherto known monuments of this cult reported from Bulgaria (lead tablet from Steklen, Clay plate from Belcin, imperfect marble group from Ahar-Keui, marble plates from Arear and Bela-Cerkova), the author adds two others (a marble relief plate from somewhere in the region of Dupnitza, and a marble plate found in 1910 in the ruins of the Roman *castellum* at Lom (Almus) on the Danube. About the cult of the Thracian horsemen and the sculptures (such as those considered here) which it inspired, little is known with certainty. F. Cumont is of opinion that these sculptures "relate to

the Thracian cults spread in the Roman Empire by troops coming from that region." The cult of the horsemen seems to have been very popular in Thracee, but while there have been found there hundreds of reliefs representing the Thracian horsemen, up to the present only some 8 or 9 monuments have been discovered which relate to the "mysteries" involved. These sculptures have long been recognized as of great importance for the history of religion in southern Europe. The last plate described contains the following: In the center of the upper field, between the two horses, a female figure, with long garment, hair parted and hanging down low; on the horses two knights with short chiton and chlamys, Phrygian cap, etc.; under the hoofs of the first knight's horse is a male and under these of the second knight's horse a female figure, and behind these horses, respectively stand a male and a female figure; about the horses' body wind symmetrically two snakes,—in the space enclosed by them are incised two; in the upper right corner a bust of Sol with rayed crown, etc.; in the left corner a clothed bust of Luna with two crescents. In the lower field, from left to right; an object like a tripod, a running ram (with wool indicated), a vase, and, above the ram 6 loaves of bread; in the center a table, whose three conventionalized animal-legs are united by a ring, and on the table to the right a dish in which is a fish; near the table on the right a cock and above it what appear to be an amphora and a bow; in the right corner, in front of the cock, the figure of a lion resting on his hind-legs with forefeet in walking attitude. That these sculptures represent some "cult" is evident, but so far it has not been made out.

78. *Egyptian Pantheon.* In the *Zeitschrift f. Religionswissenschaft* (vol. 15, 1912, pp. 59-98), Günther Roeder, of Breslau, treats of "Das Ägyptische Pantheon," discussing first the history of the idea of the pantheon (Humanistic and Reformation writers; comparative school of the 18th century,—de Brosses, Meiner, Tychsen, Vogel, Pritchard, Schlegel, etc.; the Egyptology of the 19th century in France, England, Germany,—the philosophic, historical comparative and universal-history schools), and then (pp. 70-98) the division of the pantheon,—primitive deities (animals, trees and stones, fetishes and amulets), cosmic deities (the world and the heavenly bodies; origin and conservation of the world), social deities (local gods and goddesses, the mythic state, families), death-deities, etc. The primitive Egyptian pantheon contained a large number of deities, whose characters and effects were considerably limited, some belonging to the people as a whole, others being often quite local. A sort of "selection" followed, the minor and merely local one being absorbed or taken over by those whose adherents happened to achieve political power and so propagated their religion. These greater and more important deities received many names and had many qualities attributed to them, "so that their worshipers came to the belief that their god was the only and almighty one." In this way, "by means of secondary identifications, a monotheistic trait first appears in Egyptian theology, but it

was never able to overthrow the polytheistic structure." Even the oldest known forms of the Egyptian deities belong already to different places; the old core has had attached to it so many traits and myths that it is hardly possible to recognize this through the mass of strange and manifold ideas now surrounding it. Osiris, e. g., is the local divinity of Busiris; a cosmic vegetation deity; a mythic, beneficent king and ruler of the dead; the sun-god settled in Heliopolis; creator; divine king and world-ruler, etc., all at once.

It is customary to regard the Egyptian religion as born of the Nile valley and native to the soil. While it is true that certain of its traits (e. g., the rising of the sun out of the eastern desert and its setting to the land of the dead in the west; the life of the gods in boats, the veneration of the desert animals, etc.) may really have had such an origin, the essential elements of Egyptian religion seem to have had two larger connections. To the other African peoples, neighboring Egypt, on the south particularly, point the ruder and cruder concepts of the cosmos and the rule of nature, the use of fetishes and amulets, the presence of deities in animal form, primitive ideas of death and of spirits, etc. To the north points another group of ideas of a higher intellectual order,—the intellectual interpretation of the rude primitive concepts of the cosmos and the powers of nature, the idealizing content of myths, the individual formation of the divine personalities with a tendency toward monotheism, the ethical application of belief in a resurrection and life beyond the grave. The remarkable position of Egypt midway between Africa and the neighbors on the north is reflected elsewhere,—in language, art, culture, race. The Egyptians were in many ways a mixed people. Libyans from the northwest, Semites from the northeast, Negroes and negroids from the south, all had their share in the making.

79. *Feelings and laws in Judaism.* In the *Zeitschrift f. Religionswissenschaft* (vol. 15, 1912, pp. 99-136), S. A. Horodezky, of Bern, discusses "Zwei Richtungen im Judentum," religious laws and religious feelings,—the second of these is free and unlimited, the other burdensome and often suffers from pedantry; the one gives life, the other deadens and fossilizes. These two directions are clearly perceptible in the religious history of the people of Israel. The one appears as the declaration of the majority of the people, who took no share in the constitution of the religious codex, and to whom even the many laws were only a burden, since they sought free worship of God, yearning belief of heart and feeling; the other was the work of official and bureaucrats, of matter-of-fact men and learned men, such as law-givers, priests and rabbis. At the head of the majority stood the prophets, the Agadists, Messianism, the Cabballists, and the creators of Chassidism. Taken altogether Israel thus appears to be rather "a people of feelings" than "a people of the Book," as is so often maintained. The prophets were the first to base Judaism upon feeling and upon belief of the heart, and they were also the first to give it an ethical and a moral foundation,—in the prophetic books of the

Old Testament appears the real religion of Israel, with its yearning for the generically human and concepts that applied not merely to the Jews alone. Then came a reaction and the God of the people and of the prophets gave way to the God of the learned men, a God of laws and prescriptions,—this was the condition a few centuries before the rise of Christianity in Judaism. But there arose occasionally great men who protested against this pedantic religious legalism, such, e. g., as Elisha b. Abuah (135 A. D.) and the famous Hillel (140 B. C.), the latter a true heir of the old prophets, who had many eager disciples. In the conflict between Elisha b. Abuah and the Talmudic synod appeared the "Agadists," whose saying ran "God wishes the heart," as opposed to the "Halachists," who "shut themselves in the 'upper-chamber' to make laws for the people." These "Agadists" were the spiritual heirs of the prophets. After the fixation of the Talmud (ca. 300 A. D.), "Halachism" was imposed upon the people to a large extent, but later on sharp protests were made. One of the sharpest of these protests against Halachistic doctrines, etc., was the movement of the Karaites in 761. Of tremendous effect was the work of Maimonides (1135 A. D.), who, in his *Mishneh Thora* collected "all the laws, commands and customs that had been added by tradition since the time of Moses." A later collection, the *Turim* of Rabbi Jacob Ben Asher (1280 A. D.) exceeded that of Maimonides in including "many laws based merely on numbers, on cabbala, and on mysticism." Other collections, too, appeared later still, down to the *Schulchan Aruch* of Rabbi Moses Isserles.

The real folk-movements originating in Judaism during the Exile, after the Agada, are the Messianic idea, the Cabballa and Chassidism, of the pseudo-Messiahs the most important and influential were Serenum (720 A. D.) and Sabbatai Zewi (1626-1676 A. D.). The latter affected almost the whole Jewish world (Palestine, Arabia, Poland, Western Europe). The first Cabballist to enter into conflict with Halachism was Rabbi Abraham Abulaffa (1240 A. D.), and he was both Cabballist and pseudo-Messiah. Other noted Cabballists were Isaae Luria (1522-1570 A. D.), Moses Corduero, Chari Wital, Salome Alkabz, Elisa Galieo, Israel Sarok, etc. Attempts to harmonize Cabballists and Halachists were made, but the appearance of Chassidism und Bescht (1698-1760) made that impossible. Chassidism sought to base Judaism on the feelings, the belief of the heart, love, etc. It gave religion a breath of new life. The "father of Chassidism," Rabbi Israel Baal Shem Tob (Bescht) was neither "Gaon," nor acute-minded, neither a Rabbinist, nor head of a community—simply an average Talmudist, but possessed of a great soul and a feeling heart, instead of the brain-racking reason of the Rabbinists. All the movements here considered, Prophetdom, Agadism, Messianism, Cabballa and Chassidism, had one and the same foundation, were inspired by one and the same spirit (the mental and moral as well as the material and political salvation of Israel). Their one aim was to place the duty of the heart above the laws, and to emphasize the rights of the feelings over those of reason.

80. *Folk-Lore of "Eden."* In his article, "Une légende anthropologique," in the *Revue Anthropologique* (vol. 21, 1911, pp. 191-193) Dr. P. G. Mahoudeau reports a curious "anthropological myth." It appears that, on the basis of the discoveries of the Abbé Bourgeois at Thenay (Loire-et-Cher), so important in the history of European archeology, has grown up a local legend or myth to the effect that at Point-Levoy was the site of the Garden of Eden, and that there had been found the bones of the animals of Paradise, and likewise those of Adam.
81. *Homeric similes, etc.* In the *Zeitschrift f. Aesthetik u. allgem. Kunsthissenschaft* (vol. 7, 1912, pp. 104-127, 266-301) Willy Moog publishes two sections of a somewhat detailed discussion of "Die Homerischen Gleichnisse." Among the oldest portions of the *Iliad* is the Eleventh Book, which is particularly rich in similes and comparisons, relating particularly and chiefly to actions in battle, the advance and retreat of heroes, etc.,—also to physical processes and the emphasizing of physical strength. The following table of the occurrence of these figures of speech in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* is of interest:

	Sphere of divine and mythic		Human life		Animal life		Plant world		Inanimate nature		Total
	Sim.	Comp.	Sim.	Comp.	Sim.	Comp.	Sim.	Comp.	Sim.	Comp.	
Iliad	3	40	31	56	91	39	12	10	58	46	386
Odyssey	4	20	18	36	21	24	3	6	2	16	150
Total	7	60	49	92	112	63	15	16	60	62	536

In the *Iliad*, the figures from animal life and from inanimate nature (elemental nature-phenomena) largely predominate, while in the *Odyssey* these take a much less important place. Judged by its similes, etc., the *Iliad* appears to be the older work, while the *Odyssey* represents a later period and the product of another individual.

82. *Interpenetration of the three Chinese Religions.* In his article, "Einige Beispiele für die gegenseitige Durchdringung der drei chinesischen Religionen," in the *Zeitschrift für Ethnologie* (vol. 43, 1911, pp. 429-435, 7 fgs.), E. Boerschmann gives some interesting examples of the mutual inter-influence of Taoism, Confucianism and Buddhism. The stone temple of Lo-kiang-hien, discovered by the author in the northern part of the province of Szechuan, in its ground-plan, altars, figures of deities, etc., shows a remarkable commingling of the ideas of these three religions. The sanctuary on Heng-shan,

one of the five holy mountains of ancient China, shows Buddhistic influences; and in the temple of the iron Buddha on this same mountain are to be found Taoistic figures, etc.

83. *Islam's rôle in culture-evolution.* In an article in *Scientia* (1912, vol. II, N. 23-3, pp. 397-426) Leone Caetani, a member of the Italian Parliament, discusses "La funzione dell' Islam nell' evoluzione della civiltà." According to the author, the Orient found salvation in Islam from Occidental destruction: "Islam, not, by will of its prophet, and against the wish and the interests of his first adherents, by ways and for reasons quite unforeseen and unknown to all, became the tangible expression, the most powerful instrument of the great anti-European revolt or reaction in the Asiatic conscience" (p. 416). By gradual evolution Islam came to be what it has been and must ever remain "the inevitable adversary of western civilization." Such will it be as long as it has life, the Orient's shield of defense, the barrier of opposition to our culture. It is not a matter of race or country (these concepts seem foreign to the Oriental mind), but of the "religious sense." Islam is "the necessary instrument of differentiation, of conservation, of defense of the Orient against the Occident." Mere Europeanization of the Orientals, even if possible, would be evil. As Signor Caetani says, "A religionless Orient would be like a lawless Occident,—would be dead." Conquest by force of arms is a vain illusion. Not the destruction of the Orient is to be desired, but a moral resurrection of its own, favoring and strengthening its internal development and giving free play to the many evolutionary currents concealed within it which can make for the real interests of the true Islam, that, with its millions of believers, must find for ages to come a historical and a social function in the world of mankind. To preserve the religious sense of Islam in the conflict with the Occident is the great problem here. What will be the ultimate effect of Italy's action in Tripoli remains to be seen,—if it is merely a victory of imperialism and militarism, the end will be really calamitous.
84. *Japanese children's festivals.* One evidence of a reaction of the Japanese against over-Occidentalization is to be seen in the increasing attention being now given to "the five festivals" as they are termed. Two of these are "the girls' festival," celebrated on the third day of the third month, and "the boys' festival," celebrated on the fifth day of the fifth month. An interesting account of these two festivals will be found in W. Müller's article, "Japanesisches Mädchen-und Knabenfest," published in the *Zeitschrift für Ethnologie* (vol. 43, 1911, pp. 568-580, 6 fgs.).
85. *Joan of Arc.* G. Brandes' article on "Jeanne d' Arc in Dichtung und Geschichte," in the *Neue Jahrbücher für das Klassische Altertum* (vol. 27-28, 1911, pp. 186-207), treats of Joan of Arc in literature from Varanne's *De gestis Joanne virginis* in 1516 down to Andrew

Lang. Among those who have treated more or less of "La Pucelle" are Shakespeare, Chapelain, Voltaire, Schiller, Anatole France, Michelet, etc.

86. *Lupercalia.* A detailed discussion of this important ancient Roman festival will be found in L. Deubner's article, "Lupercalia" in the *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft* (vol. 13, 1910, pp. 481-508). The author accepts the etymology of the name *Lupercalia* (from *lupus* and *arceo*) as "wolf-warder," "protector against wolves," a term quite natural in a community of shepherds. In the *Lupercalia* we have a change from a pastoral festival to a penitential ceremony, the bloody ritual (cf. Greek *katharsis*) being of later origin, added at a comparatively recent period to the ancient Roman ceremony.
87. *Magic and Music.* In a letter from Kouroussa, French Guinea, on "La magie musicale chez les peuplades africaines," published in the *Revue Musicale* (vol. II, 1911, pp. 103-104), M. Joyeux calls attention to music and magic in the native ceremonies performed on the death of a hunter. Here a song is sung to counteract the effect of the souls of the animals slain upon the dead hunter. This suggests corresponding practices among certain American Indian peoples, etc. On the question involved one should consult M. J. Combarieu's *La musique et la magie* (Paris, 1909).
88. *Miracle of the broken and restored vessel.* The wonder-tale of the broken and mended vessel is studied, with abundant references to the literature of the subject, by O. Weinreich in his article, "Das Mirakel vom zerbrochenen und wieder geheilten Gefäß," in the *Hessische Blätter für Volkskunde* (vol. 10, 1911, pp. 65-87). This motif appears in a Greek legend of the fourth century, B. C., and the story occurs in many legends of Christian saints, from Gregory of Tours down; also in the stories of the childhood of Jesus. A cognate tale is told of Dasuki, a companion of Mohammed, and there is a Persian proverb relating to a broken glass put together again. In the same cycle may be placed, perhaps, Goethe's little poem *Wunderglaube*. In some of the saint-legends the Devil is the breaker of the vessel.
89. *Missionized Indians.* In his brief article on "Missions in the Creek Nation," published in *The Southern Workman* (vol. 40, 1911, pp. 206-208), Dr. F. G. Speck describes the condition of the Indian and Negro population of the northwestern part of the "Creek nation," in Oklahoma, where there are, to-day, "thousands of mixed-blood Negroes and Creeks, who pass either as the one or the other." Some fifty years ago the Creeks were largely Christianized, but the proportion of Christians among them at present seems to be small, and a few only of the old congregations (Baptist and Methodist chiefly) are still left. The members of one little church, the author notes, include

Negroes, Yuchi Indians, half-blood Greeks, etc. According to Dr. Speck many are neither pagan nor Christian; many are Christian in their ethics, but in all else pagan.

90. *Modern witchcraft-proceedings.* In his article, "Ein moderner Hexenprozess in Posen," in the *Mitteilungen der schlesischen Gesellschaft für Volkskunde* (vol. 12, 1910, pp. 191-215), Dr. A. Hellwig gives the texts of legal proceedings, etc., in a charge of witchcraft made against a woman of Schöndorf (Posen) in 1907.

- 91-93. *Pagan survivals in Christian churches*, etc. In the course of his article, "Apuntes etnográficos sobre los otomíes del Distrito de Lerma," in the *Analcs del Musco Nacional de Arqueología* (vol. 3, 1911, pp. 57-85), P. Henning notes the survival of ancient heathen customs among the "Christian" Otomis of the District of Lerma, State of Mexico, in connection with the veneration of crosses at San Nicolas Peralta, Aeazuleo, etc. In some chapels images of the Virgin and of Jesus have Indian features, etc. The great majority of these Indians still make almost exclusive use of their mother-tongue. Admixtures of heathenism also occur in the Catholicism of the Tuxpaneca Indians of Jalisco, according to C. Macias and A. Rodriguez Gil, whose article, "Los actuales indios tuxpaneca del Estado de Jalisco," appears in the same publication (vol. 2, 1910-1911, pp. 195-220). Some more interesting evidence of a similar kind is furnished by E. Adan, whose article on "Las danzas de Coateteleo," likewise appears in the same publication (vol. 2, 1910-1911, pp. 133-194, 7 pls.). It treats of the dances held at Coateteleo (Morelos) in connection with the festival of the Virgin of Candelaria, the last Sunday in January, on the shores of the lake of Coateteleo. Their ceremonies include the recitation of several dramatic pieces. The Indians in question, now very mixed, are descended from the Aztecan tribe of the Tlahuicas. It seems that the Virgin of Candelaria is looked upon as the titular divinity of the lake, festivals being held to prevent it drying up. Lumholtz, in his *Unknown Mexico* (Lond., 1903, vol. 2, pp. 375-383), described the mixture of heathen and Christian rites at the church of the little town of Parangaricuturo, among the Tarascan Indians, and other instances have been published by Professor Frederic Starr. Of the more recent books treating of the phenomena of the contact of paganism and Christianity, may be mentioned: G. Mondain, *Des idées religieuses des Hovas [de Madagascar] avant l'introduction du Christianisme* (Cahors, 1904); C. Renel, *Les religions de la Gaule avant le Christianisme* (Paris, 1906); P. Sébillot, *Le paganisme contemporain chez les peuples celto-latins* (Paris, 1908). Of interest also is the section on "Survivance et invention dans le christianisme populaire," in A. van Gennep's *Religions, moeurs et légendes* (Paris, 1908) pp. 86-98. In van Gennep's opinion the situation, e. g., in Mexico is not merely one of "survival." Here in the compromise now existing there has been "invention" also; the variations noted

"have not necessarily consisted of simple incorporations of pre-existing pagan elements." The Christian priest of aboriginal origin has perforce "invented" something, as well as merely carried things over.

94. *Palestinian folk-lore, etc.* In the *Archiv f. Religionswissenschaft* (vol. 15, 1912, pp. 137-152) Richard Hartmann treats of "Volks-glaube und Volksbrauch in Palästina nach den abendländischen Pilgerschriften des ersten Jahrtausends," giving an account of the Palestinian beliefs and customs recorded and referred to in the writings of the European pilgrims of the first millennium A. D., particularly the *Itinera Hierosolymitana* edited by Tobler and Molinier and by Geyer, and the account of the pilgrim Silvia (better Etheria) of Gallia Narbonensis, edited by Heraeus (1908),—there is also Meister's Leipzig dissertation, *De itinerario Aetheriae abbatissae* (1909). Among the things noted are the attribution of superhuman, demonie or divine powers to living water; sacred enclosures, trees, etc.; sacred stones, stone-heaps, elevations, casting stones, etc.; sacrifices, relique-cult, etc. These are remains of primitive beliefs and customs preceding the Israelitish religion proper and surviving in the folk-lore and folk-action of the Orient. From the pilgrim records it appears that from time to time Christians accepted some of these beliefs, practiced some of these rites, or at least had no objection to them,—e. g., the bringing of barren women to the place in the Jordan where Jesus was baptized by John. The water of the Jordan is to-day highly esteemed by Christians all over the world for various purposes. The height-cult lingered in Christian garb, e. g., when on the site of Moses' grave on Mt. Nebo a church was built.
95. "*Possession.*" In his article, "Deux cas de possession chez les Ba-Ronga," published in the *Bulletin de la Société Neuchâteloise de Géographie* (vol. 20, 1911, pp. 387-402), H. A. Junod, describes with some detail, two cases (one provoked, the other spontaneous) of *psikouembo*, "folie des dieux," "possession,"—both women of the Baronga of Lourenço Marques in Portuguese South-East Africa. Both subjects, after recovery from the attacks, became "good Christians." These "possessions" occur more frequently among women than among men.
96. *Prayer among the ancient Romans.* In *Classical Philology* (vol. 6, 1911, pp. 180-196) Professor P. J. Laing discusses "Roman Prayer and its Relation to Ethics." The rather "primitive form," retained so largely throughout its history by the Roman prayer is noted. The author also observes that "it did at an early date in certain cults involve moral ideas,—not moral merely in the sense in which Jevons uses the term, but moral in the ordinary acceptation of the word."
97. *Slavery in ancient Greece.* Dr. S. Zaborowski's article, "La Grèce antique et sa population esclave," in the *Revue Anthropologique* (vol.

21, 1911, pp. 245-258) contains some interesting data and statistics concerning the slave-population of ancient Greece,—in the fifth century two-fifths of the inhabitants of Greece were slaves. The number of female slaves manumitted exceeded the males, and the price of freedom usually ran much above the original purchase-cost. Some of the slaves who were state-prostitutes had great influence in social and political affairs. The incomes of citizens were often derived from the labor of slave artizans, etc. Among the sources of slavery were stealing, abandonment and sale of children. The nationalities contributing to the Greek slaves were numerous,—in a list of 124 manumissions the following appear: Arab, Armenian, Bastarnian, Bithynian, Cappadocian, Cypriot, Egyptian, Galatian, Illyrian, Italian, Jew, Lydian, Mysian, Paphlagonian, Phenician, Phrygian, Pontian, Sarmatian, Syrian, Thracian, etc. The great growth of slavery, according to Dr. Zaborowski, was coincident with contempt for manual labor especially and the development of oratory,—it went with a certain softening or deterioration of the Greek mind.

98. *Solomon's Ophir, etc.* To the literature of the famous voyage of the sailors of King Solomon, J. Dahse adds something in his monograph on "Ein Zweites Goldland Salomos," in the *Zeitschrift f. Ethnologie* (vol. 43, 1911, pp. 1-79, 7 fgs.). After discussing the knowledge of the ancients concerning West Africa, the traces of intercourse by sea, etc. (revealed by the presence of aggry-beads, *swastika* on gold-weights, astronomical ideas, figures on calabashes, etc.), with Phenicia, etc., the author concludes that *Ophir* was located in South Africa (Zimbabwe) but *Uphas* (see Jer. x. 9) was Guinea (West Africa) even now termed "the Gold Coast." Proofs that Guinea was "a land of gold" are adduced. The views here set forth are to the effect that the voyagers of King Solomon visited two "lands of gold," not merely *Ophir*, as commonly thought.
99. *Survival-use of instruments in ritual, etc.* In his detailed monograph "Das Messer," published in the *Archiv für Anthropologie* (vol. 10, n. s., 1911, pp. 91-150, 9 pls., 7 fgs.), C. A. Seyffert treats, among other things, of the knife and tool and implement in cult and ceremony, e. g. circumcision, and other rites of mutilation, marking, scarifying, etc. Stone knives survive in ritual and cult use, long after the advent of the age of metal. And knives of various sorts survive for similar uses when they have quite disappeared from ordinary employment.
100. *Taoist pantheon.* In his article, "Ueber das taoistische Pantheon der Chinesen, seine Grundlagen und seine historische Entwicklung," in the *Zeitschrift für Ethnologie* (vol. 43, 1911, pp. 393-428, 18 fgs.), H. Mueller discusses with some detail the origin and development of The Taoist pantheon as distinct from the family-pantheon and the Buddhist and Lamaist pantheons.

101-103. *Totemism, etc.* In his article, "Der Totemismus," in the *Zeitschrift f. Religionswissenschaft* (vol. 15, 1912, pp. 1-23), E. Reuterskiöld, of Upsala, after discussing briefly the origin of the word *totem*, treats of the writings of McLennan (in *The Fortnightly Review* for 1869), who saw in "totemism" the foundation of the mythology of the ancients, and made it a stage through which all peoples had to pass on their way to civilization; Robertson Smith (in his *The Religion of the Semites*, 1889), who found so much "totemism" in the religion of ancient Israel, and whose followers and imitators founded what might be termed a "school," in accordance with whose doctrines "totemism" was discovered to be back of agriculture, the domestication of animals, the religious factor of humanity, the development of family, state, church, etc.,—in fact, *totemism* was "the prime motor of all material progress," and the root of all things notably human; Frazer (in his *Totemism and Exogamy*, 1910), whose four volumes are a great storehouse of material from all quarters of the globe,—he would look for the origin of "totemism" in the fact that primitive peoples exist, who are ignorant of the very physical rôle of the father in the production of the child; Spencer and Andrew Lang, with their "nick-name" theories, or theories of mystic union between name and name-bearer (cf. also Pikler and Somlo), etc. R., himself, seeks for the origin of totemism in the very early human period when the individual played no rôle, and when primitive thought did not distinguish between man and animal. Man's association of himself with one animal species or another was not an accident. Many other things contributed the evolution of totemism in various parts of the earth. Whether totemism is a religious, a magical or a social phenomenon, is a question with different answers in different places. Among the Indians of the North Pacific coast it is social; among certain Australian tribes, magical,—and, R. thinks, not demonstrably religious with any modern people. On this point the author remarks (p. 21): "But what direction the development of the religious rites have taken we can discover from the totemic dances, the initiation-rites, and the *Intichiuma*-ceremonies. They have all aimed at representing the members of the tribes in totem-form, or, in other words, to attain a close bond with these animals."

There is, however, in these ceremonies an individualizing element. The more the interest centers about what happens with the individual, the more the clan takes to the background.

In connection with this article should be read the informing monograph on *Totemism*, published by Dr. A. A. Goldenweiser in the *Journal of American Folk-Lore* for 1910.

Following Reuterskiöld's article in the *Zeitschrift f. Religionswissenschaft* is a "Sketch of the Totemism and Religion of the People of the Islands in the Bongainville Straits, Western Solomon Islands" (pp. 24-58), by G. C. Wheeler, of London University. The topics discussed are: Totemism, kinship (totem-kinship, kinship through marriage, blood-kinship, adoption and re-marriage), religion (worship of dead-kinsfolk and identified dead, communication between the dead

and the living, the *sape*-shrine, the *tiong dondoro* or communicators with the world of the dead, infant ghosts, sickness demons, etc.). A valuable part of this article (to be continued) is the numerous native texts containing statements of facts, customs, beliefs, etc., for which parallel English translations are given. The Mono people who are here conceived, are divided into exogamous clans (the names of 13 were obtained); and each clan or *latu* is associated with two totems, the *tua* and the *tete*, the latter being of secondary importance. The child always belongs to the *latu* of its mother; "marriage within a person's own *latu* is forbidden and seldom occurs,"—but "being laughed at" seems the only penalty for such transgression, although the belief exists that such a marriage, known as *uloulo* "resulted in death (supernatural)." There is "no universal rule as to the eating or not eating of the *tua* and *tete* by the folk of the *latu*. With these people blood-kinship is "only a special case of *latu* kinship." The generic name for "Supernatural Being" is *Nitu*, a term which includes everything from *ghost* to "any fantastic or legendary creature." The author thinks that this word is "probably identical with *nitu*=the heart" (cf. *nituna*, seed of a fruit). There formerly existed a class of men, known as *tiong dondoro* (i. e. "seers;" *tiong*, "man," *roro*, "to see"), who had special powers of communication with the world of the dead. A man became such a "seer" by being attacked by a ghost of his own totem-clan,—going mad and then recovering. There are a number of ghosts of children who are worshiped by the Mono, the most important being "*Tiong Tanutanu* [the man who makes things], the eldest child of the celebrated chief, 'Big' Gorai." Certain *nitu* are believed to cause sickness among the living,—these sickness-*nitu*, however, are mainly of non-human origin, differing in this respect from the *nitu* who are the ghosts of identified human beings. Certain *nitu*, such as those known by the names of *Dudueri*, *Soi* and *Bego Tanutanu*, have had their human identity so far obscured that to them "the term 'god' is almost applicable." There are also some less important *nitu* of non-human origin.

Another interesting contribution to the literature of totemism is Prof. Hutton Webster's article on "Totem-clans and Secret Associations in Australia and Melanesia," in the *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* (vol. 41, 1911, pp. 482-508). In secret societies like the Melanesian *duk-duk*, etc., "so widespread throughout the aboriginal world," Professor Webster sees "one of the most remarkable efforts early man has made to establish, under conditions otherwise anarchical, some semblance of settled government," but thinks also that "it would be a vital error to infer that the great secret societies of Melanesia and West Africa were consciously devised to preserve law and order in a savage community," since "there can be little doubt that this legal function is or has been incidental to their main business of initiating young men into manhood." But not all this legal function need be of the origin indicated by Professor Webster. Another aspect of primitive secret societies (very prominent in aboriginal America) which investigators in other parts of the globe

have not sufficiently emphasized, is their "dramatic and magico-religious ceremonies,"—these he considers "closely connected with the structure and functions of totem-clans," and is "tempted to see not simply a psychological affinity between clans and secret societies, but their truly genetic relationship." According to the author: "The evidence from Australia and Melanesia would thus seem to indicate that what were once clan rituals confined to totem groups, with advancing culture have often been diffused among other clans than those which originally enjoyed exclusive control over them. The amalgamation of clans within this area has given rise to fraternities whose performances appear to be essentially the rituals of the commingled totem groups. Behind the structure and functions of the secret societies we can sometimes detect the structure and functions of totemic clans. It does not necessarily follow that the formation of secret associations in every case breaks up the earlier totemic grouping. The clans may still survive as social divisions, though no longer in possession of distinctively clan rites and ceremonies." Moreover, "the secret society and the totemic organization may coexist in a primitive community," but it does appear, however, that "the extreme development of secret societies, as in the southern islands of the Melanesian Archipelago, is to be connected with the decline of totemism as a social institution." But the secret society has not been the only factor in this situation.

104. *Urban civilization.* A welcome item in the midst of so much denunciation of the modern city as the evil of all evils is H. Fehlinger's article, "De l'influence biologique de la civilisation urbaine." in *Scientia* (vol. X, 1911, No. 4, pp. 421-434), treating of some of the recent literature concerning alleged "physical degeneration" in urban communities. In the opinion of the author, "it is a mistake to see in the city, the goal of modern migrations, and the center of mixture of types of different races, a danger to the progress of the development of humanity and civilization." He also believes that the power of resistance of uncivilized people has been greatly exaggerated in the past.

105. *Vaccination in China, Japan, etc.* In an article on "The Introduction of Vaccination into the Far East," published in the *Open Court* (vol. 25, 1911, pp. 525-531, 1 pl.), Dr. Berthold Laufer, anthropologist and Orientalist, treats particularly of a color-print (probably posthumous) by Katsugawa Shuntei (fl. 1800-1820), a pupil of Saunyei, with a long inscription by Sōsai Setto. The print is concerned with the introduction of vaccination into Japan,—the small-pox devil is the typical Japanese *oni* or Chinese *kuli*. It is interesting to learn that, sometime before 1850, "a new deity sprang up,"—in the print in question is "the conception of a powerful lucky genius, riding on a cow, and driving out, with the force of his spear, the disease of small-pox."

106. *Ventriloquism-myths.* In his brief article on "Engastirmythen," in the *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft* (vol. 13, 1910, pp. 621-623), O. Weinreich publishes some notes on ventriloquism-myths, with special reference to Rabelais and his authority for various statements, viz., C. Rhodiginus' *Lect. Antiq.* (1517).
107. *Veronica legend.* In an article on "A Buddhist Veronica," in the *Open Court* (vol. 25, 1911, pp. 650-666, 1 pl. 15 fgs.), Dr. Paul Carus discusses the Christian legends of King Abgars and Veronica, comparing them with the Buddhist story of King Ajatasatru. The frescoes of the eaves of Qyzyl near Kutch, which were discovered by Grünwedel antedate the corresponding idea in Christian art and Dr. Carus is of opinion that the Veronica legend may possibly have been derived from the Orient.
108. *Witch-dolls.* In his article on "Rachenpuppen aus Mexiko und Verwandtes," in the *Zeitschrift f. Religionswissenschaft* (vol. 15, 1912, pp. 313-318, 2 fgs.), Rudolf Pagenstecher discusses the question of "witch-dolls" and related objects in connection with the description of two small wax dolls (from Zacualeo in western Mexico) forming part of the Starr collection in the Museum of Ethnology, Cambridge (England). These "dolls," pierced with thorns or needles, are used to work injury through witchcraft. On account of the perishability of wax no corresponding objects from classical antiquity have survived, although often employed; lead figures, for like purposes, are well known. As in the case of the Mexican "doll," winding about with string, as well as piercing with thorns or needles, is in vogue elsewhere. Parallel customs are cited.
109. *Yezidis.* In connection with the articles already noticed in this Journal (vol. 5, 1912, pp. 254-255) should be read W. B. Heard's "Notes on the Yezidis," published in the *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* (vol. 41, 1911, pp. 200-219). History and origin, religious beliefs and ceremonies, social rites, customs, etc., superstitions, etc., are considered, and on pages 215-219 are given several chapters of the *Jelwet*, one of the sacred books of the Yezidis, adapted from a translation by a Chaldean ecclesiastic of Mosul, made in 1901.
110. *Zimbabwe-ruins in Rhodesia.* About these famous ruins many articles and several books have been written, and not a few "wild" theories of origin set going. In his paper, "Zur Simbäye-Frage," in the *Mitteilungen d. k.-k. Geogr. Gesellschaft in Wien* (vol. 54, 1911, pp. 437-452, 4 pls., 1 fg.), R. Pöch résume's the literature of the subject—his Bibliography has 46 titles. In his opinion there is no evidence that these ruins are older than the period of the Middle Ages in Europe. Nor has any convincing evidence appeared of the presence in this place of Egyptians, Phenicians, Sabeans, etc. The ruins themselves have not been shown to be beyond the capacity of the African aborigines, and the same may be said of the gold-mining carried on in this region.

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